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ABSTRACT 
The release of the Commonwealth's Australia's Oceans Policy (AOP) in 1998, introduced 
the concept of integrated ecosystem-based oceans management to be implemented through 
Regional Marine Plans. The South-east Regional Marine Plan (SERMP) was the first plan 
developed under AOP. Fisheries, being the third largest industry in the south-east region, 
play a significant role in the implementation of the SERMP. This thesis identifies 
implementation issues for Australian fisheries in the broader context of regional marine 
planning. Specifically, fisheries and oceans management arrangements are analysed for their 
capacities to meet the objectives of AOP, in terms of integration and conflict management 
that crosses jurisdictions and sectors, and also within the fisheries sector. 
This thesis argues that effective implementation of the SERMP will require an advanced 
capacity for integration between sectors and jurisdictions. It also argues that the 
implementation of the SERMP will require more innovative and focused approaches to 
conflict management, so that traditionally opposing interest groups can work towards 
cohesive integrated oceans management. This thesis examines the development and 
implementation of the SERMP, supported by comparative analysis of international initiatives 
and other approaches to natural resource management. This analysis demonstrates that 
fisheries require a carefully planned combination of instrumental and institutional 
arrangements to address issues raised in the SERMP. Likewise, oceans management 
currently addresses integration issues at the higher echelons of government but lacks the 
operational support to effectively implement the SERMP. This thesis proposes the use of 
key tools that incorporate instrumental and institutional bases for integrated management that 
embody ecosystem-based management principles and effective conflict management 
techniques. 
Australia has traditionally adopted a "negative" integration approach to natural resource 
management, whereby activities should not be inconsistent with overall objectives for 
management. This thesis concludes that Australia needs to progress towards a more 
"positive" approach to integration in oceans management by breaking through traditional 
sectoral and jurisdictional mindsets in order to practically meet ecosystem-based objectives. 
This requires a more concentrated effort to build the integrative capacity from within sectors, 
such as fisheries, to meet the overall objectives of AOP. 
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RSMWG Resource Sharing and Management Working Group 
SAFAC Southern Aquaculture Fisheries Advisory Committee 
SBT. Southern Bluefm Tuna 
SCUBA Self Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus 
SD Sustainable Development 
SDS Sustainable Development Strategies (Canada) 
SEC Sustainable Environment Committee 
SENTF South East Non-Trawl Fishery 
SERMP South-East Regional Marine Plan 
SESSF Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery 
SESSFAG Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fisheries Assessment Group 
SETF South-east Trawl Fishery 
SFA Sustainable Fisheries Act (USA) 
SFMF Southern Fisheries Management Forum 
SFR Statutory Fishing Right 
SIFAC Southern Indigenous Fisheries Advisory Committee 
SoCFAC Southern Commercial Fisheries Advisory Committee 
SPP State Planning Policy (Queensland IPA) 
SRFAC Southern Regional Fisheries Advisory Council 
SReFAC Southern Recreational Fisheries Advisory Committee 
SSF Southern Shark Fishery 
TAC Total Allowable Catch 
TACC Commercial Total Allowable Catch (NZ) 
TACN Non-Commercial Total Allowable Catch (NZ) 
TAFE Total Allowable Fishing Effort 
ToR Terms of Reference 
TRFA Tasmanian Regional Forest Agreement 
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
VMS Vessel Monitoring System 
WATNA Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement 
WCED World Commission on Environment and Development 
WCVI West Coast of Vancouver Island (Canada) 
WCVIAM West Coast of Vancouver Island Aquatic Management (Canada) 
WCVIAMB West Coast of Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board (Canada) 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
YOTO Year of the Oceans (USA) 
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PART!: 
INTRODUCTION 
The Commonwealth Government released Australia's Oceans Policy in December 1998.1 
This document introduced the concept of integrated ecosystem-based management of 
Australia's vast ocean domain. The Oceans Policy is an ambitious and challenging approach 
to oceans management, which confronts long-standing resource use conflicts through a focus 
on integration across sectors and jurisdictions. Regional Marine Plans are designed to 
implement the integrated policy framework of Australia's Oceans Policy. The South-east 
Regional Marine Plan (SERMP) was the first plan to be developed under this framework and 
was released in May 2004.2  The South-east marine region comprises offshore waters (3nm 
to 200nm) from just South of Bermagui in New South Wales to Cape Jervis in South 
Australia, taking in the waters of Victoria and Tasmania, including Macquarie Island. 3 
The implementation of the SERIVIP will impact on the fishing industry in the South-east 
Region, through a focused approach to integrating uses and cumulative impact management. 
Australia has responsibility for the fourth largest fishing zone in the world. The Australian 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is some 16 million square kilometres, an area twice the size 
of the continental landmass, extending from tropical to Antarctic waters.4 Australian 
fisheries have experienced a period of impressive growth over the recent past. Seafood 
exports have doubled in the past five years, while aquaculture has grown in value from $237 
million in 1990 to $743 million in 2002-03 ($135 million in the South-east Region' ).6  The 
gross value of seafood production in 2002-03 reached $2.2 billion ($396 million in the 
South-east Region) and is expected to reach $5 billion by 2020. Moreover, fishing, 
aquaculture and associated processing are vital rural industries, sustaining regional 
communities around the coastline. 
Commonwealth of Australia. (1998). "Australia's Oceans Policy." Canberra: Environment Australia. 
2 National Oceans Office. (2004). "South-east Regional Marine Plan— Implementing Australia's 
Oceans Policy in the South-east Marine Region." Hobart: National Oceans Office. 
Ibid. 
Commonwealth of Australia (1998). 
National Oceans Office (2004): 8. 
6 ABARE. (2004). "Aquaculture." 
http://www.abare.gov.aulresearch/fisheries/aquaculture/aquaculture.html [Access date: 25 June 
2004]. 
AMISC (Australian Marine Industries and Science Council). (1997). "Marine Industry Development 
Strategy." Canberra: DIST; 
Commonwealth of Australia. (2003). "Australian Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry at a Glance 
2003." Canberra: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry; and 
National Oceans Office (2004): 6. 
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Fisheries and other marine industries are managed under sophisticated arrangements that 
deal with jurisdictional issues between governments, but little attention has been given to 
emergent imperatives, such as decision-making across sectors including fisheries, petroleum 
and conservation. Existing sectoral regimes for managing ocean resources are retained under 
Australia's Oceans Policy, but the basis of management must now shift to large marine 
ecosystems. Once implemented, Regional Marine Plans should ensure the continued 
sustainability of fishing and the ecosystems on which this, and other important activities, 
depend. 
Aims, objectives and significance 
The SERMP introduces a shift in decision-making to an ecosystem-based approach, whereby 
decisions must be integrated across sectors (such as fisheries, petroleum, conservation and 
tourism) and jurisdictions (including the Commonwealth, states and territories). 
Implementation of this plan is therefore likely to have a major influence on the management 
of marine resources, such as fisheries. The primary research question is: Does Australian 
fisheries management have the capacity for integration to efficiently meet the objectives of 
the SERMP? This thesis aims to examine both theoretical and practical issues arising from 
the development of the Oceans Policy, in particular by identifying critical issues in the 
implementation of fisheries management within Regional Marine Plans under Australia's 
Oceans Policy and by identifying tools and approaches for conflict management in the 
implementation process. 
These aims are addressed through the development of a set of key objectives, which are: to 
evaluate alternative policy instruments and develop an implementation strategy for fisheries 
management within Regional Marine Plans; and to produce a framework (tools and 
approaches) for resolving, or at least managing, conflicts between fisheries management and 
other sectoral uses. 
This thesis argues that effective implementation of integrated oceans management in general, 
and fisheries in particular, will require an enhanced capacity for integration between sectors 
and jurisdictions. It also argues that effective integrated management is predicated upon the 
development and implementation of innovative and focused approaches to conflict 
management. 
This research is significant for several reasons. Firstly, the development of Regional Marine 
Plans is a world first approach to integrate sectoral and jurisdictional interests in oceans 
management at such a large scale and little research into this topic has been carried out from 
a public policy perspective. In addition, marine industries such as fisheries have not yet 
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faced the challenge of meeting integrated management objectives under the regional marine 
planning process, which includes previously unfamiliar social and economic values. This 
thesis is the first study that examines the integration challenges faced by fisheries in 
Australia in the regional marine planning process. Secondly, although conflict management 
has been studied in fisheries and other sectoral arrangements, few studies have focused on 
conflict management techniques for integrating sectoral and jurisdictional interests in 
integrated oceans management regimes. This thesis identifies the primary conflicts that are 
impeding effective integration processes in the context of integrated oceans management and 
fisheries management in Australia. 
Research design and method 
The research undertaken included an extensive review of the literature, such as academic 
reviews and journal articles, government reports, non-government analyses and several 
unpublished reports. Literature was sought in relation to fisheries implementation issues in 
integrated oceans management regimes and analysed to determine the framework of analysis 
(the Framework) for the thesis (see Chapter One). The Framework provides the focus of 
analysis and has been used to test for and assess the capacity for integration, through 
application of the Policy Integration Scale (see Section 1.2.1: Table 1), and conflict 
management within the given case studies. The Framework was refined in subsequent 
phases of the project with the collection of insights from other research resources and 
experiences, which brought about enhanced understanding of the pertinent issues. 
Participation in the 2003 International Student Symposium on Negotiation and Conflict 
Resolution in the Hague, the Netherlands, provided extensive information on different 
conflict management techniques at both the international and national scales and an 
opportunity to develop some practical alternative dispute resolution skills that would benefit 
this project's development. The month-long Symposium, hosted by the Institute for 
International Mediation and Conflict Resolution (IIMCR), offered insights into the 
motivations and triggers of conflicts as they relate to resource management and some 
practical alternatives to traditional arbitration for the management of these conflicts. This 
was particularly appropriate for this research, which looked at the inter-relations between 
parties involved in resource sharing arrangements within fisheries and between resource 
sectors in regional marine planning. 
To assess the implementation issues identified in Chapter One, a scanning exercise was 
conducted of literature and government reports on fisheries management, within the context 
of oceans management developments, in Australia, Canada, the USA, New Zealand, the 
European Union and Iceland. International examples are used as counterfactuals, or 
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hypotheses for what could have been done, for Australian development throughout the 
project. Although the inherent differences in politics, governance and contextual 
circumstances are noted as impediments to direct comparative analyses, it is recognised that 
certain specific aspects of these examples and some of the implementation issues they have 
overcome will lead to valuable and practical insights into the improvement of integration in 
Australia's fisheries and oceans processes. 
The second phase of the research program involved specific evaluation of various 
approaches to integrated natural resource management. This analysis draws on experiences 
of overseas natural resource management sectors and other natural resource sectors within 
Australia. The research in this phase was based upon document analyses, literature reviews, 
and semi-structured interviews, focused specifically on identifying and evaluating 
mechanisms designed to incorporate integrative processes and to resolve or manage conflicts 
between contending uses in accordance with the framework of analysis described in Chapter 
One. This phase focused on building informal networks with pertinent stakeholders and 
information obtained from them was cross-referenced back to the literature where possible, 
to ensure information was informed and accurate. Many insights obtained from the informal 
networks in this phase were used to further develop the framework of analysis for how 
integration and conflict management can influence the implementation of policies and 
strategies. 
The research involved in this phase was also conducted as a project for the National Oceans 
Office (NOO), examining implementation strategies to enhance integration and adaptive and 
outcomes-based management capacity. The content and analysis of the NOO report were 
subject to peer review by practitioners and experts in the appropriate fields. The data and 
their analysis have been presented in the thesis with the permission of the National Oceans 
Office. 8 
The third phase of the research program focused on Australia's national approach to the 
implementation of fisheries management in the Oceans Policy context. An assessment of the 
scope and limitations of current fisheries and oceans management arrangements, related to 
the goals and objectives of the regional marine planning process, was carried out. Interviews 
with key informants provided a range of primary data and elaborated the 'desktop studies' 
conducted in the previous phases. The interview schedule comprised a significant part of the 
research design. The face-to-face formal interviews involved a 'semi-structured open-ended 
questionnaire' format with 15 subjects selected on the basis of their experience and expertise 
with respect to their direct involvement in decision-making processes affecting the 
See permission statement in Appendix One. 
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implementation of fisheries management in the South-east regional marine planning process. 
The interviews were conducted under the guidelines for research involving human subjects 
and following approval from the Southern Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethics 
Commit tee. Letters of introduction and an accompanying information sheet were sent to 
subjects (via email) to request his/her participation in the investigation. Questions asked 
related to current fisheries and oceans management arrangements, successes and failures 
with respect to conflict management within these arrangements, and ways to strengthen these 
arrangements. A transcript was taken of the interview and was forwarded to the subject to 
ensure accuracy before being anonymously included in the body of the research, coded using 
random alphanumeric numbering (for example, "From interview with subject FR53"). 
The fourth phase of the research built on the preceding phases and involved the development 
of an inventory of policy instruments and institutional arrangements to facilitate the 
integration of fisheries management into regional marine planning models and outcomes and 
to enhance the conflict management capacity of the processes, to pre-empt any significant 
conflicts from arising. This 'toolbox' of policy instruments and institutional arrangements 
addresses the implementation of fisheries into integrated oceans management in a piecemeal 
approach, whereby tools can be adopted independently or in combination, but they are not 
necessarily presented as an all-inclusive approach to integrated management. 
Scope and limitations 
This research aimed to examine the implementation of fisheries management within a broad 
policy commitment to integrated, ecosystem-based oceans management. The focus of this 
research was on the development of Regional Marine Plans under Australia's Oceans Policy. 
While integrated oceans management has been promoted and supported in the international 
arena for a number of years, Australia is an international leader in the development of 
proposals for such management. This research moves beyond Australia to examine 
experience in other countries and to explore insights from their natural resource 
management. There is considerable validity in exploring international and other resource 
management experience to provide a basis for 'counterfactual analysis' of what could have 
been done under different circumstances or if different decisions were made. 
The use of international comparisons provides a key limitation. Direct comparison is limited 
by the differences in approach between countries. It must also be emphasised that this 
research is limited to a 'snapshot in time', at the very early stages of the SERMP 
development and preceding implementation. Another limitation, which is addressed in 
following chapters, includes a lack of agreement over key terms or concepts. 
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Given the aims of the research, a toolbox of assorted instrumental and institutional 
arrangements to meet integration objectives while minimising conflict, is presented. 
Limitations of the piecemeal approach to management are recognised and are at the very 
essence of integrated management. It is not, however, the objective of this research to 
provide an overall 'fix' to the implementation issues raised in the regional marine planning 
process. Rather, this project draws on a range of research to offer alternative options to 
address issues raised by the integration of fisheries management into regional marine 
planning. It is recognised, however, that ad hoc implementation, or the inappropriate choice 
of tools, will not produce effective results. To meet the objectives of integrated 
management, the whole system needs to be taken into account. 
The final limitations refer to aspects of the project design that have been incorporated, as 
much as possible, in the interpretation of results. The opportunities for close involvement in 
aspects of policy development during the course of researching and writing this thesis 
provided a number of benefits. At the same time it also meant that I was, at times, privy to 
in-house government information that was not in the 'public domain'. This information was 
not used until it was released publicly. 
Although the research benefited greatly from the data gained in the interviews with key 
informants, it is recognised that there are some limitations in the use, or interpretation of this 
data. Care must be taken in the use of qualitative data so as not to infer perceptions of the 
rest of the organisation based on selective interviews. This limitation culminates from the 
time constraints of the project, which meant that the number of interviews was limited and 
therefore not all participants in the decision-making processes were included. Instead, a 
selected sample of the main stakeholder interests were interviewed. 
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Thesis structure 
This thesis is divided into four major parts. Part I constitutes the Introduction, outlining the 
research aims and rationale of the project, the methods used to address the aims and the 
framework of analysis (Chapter One) on which this research is based. 
Part II of the thesis provides the context of this research as it relates to Australia's current 
oceans management arrangements (Chapter Two) and fisheries management arrangements 
(Chapter Three) and addresses how these arrangements currently meet the criteria in the 
framework of analysis set out in Chapter One. 
Part Ill comprises an evaluation of international fisheries and oceans policy developments 
(Chapter Three), and both national (Chapter Four) and international (Chapter Five) natural 
resource management models, in terms of the criteria in the framework of analysis set out in 
Chapter One. 
Part IV draws on the information collected throughout the study and proposes a number of 
instrumental and institutional policy and management tools and approaches (Chapter Seven - 
The Toolbox) that could be used in Australian fisheries and oceans management to address 
the more specific aspects of integration and conflict management that are currently lacking. 
Chapter Eight presents the final conclusions and recommendations of this thesis with respect 
to integrated management as it stands and the future prospects for fully integrated oceans 
management that incorporates preventative conflict management mechanisms are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1: FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
The Introduction to the thesis presented the aims and scope of this study. This chapter 
establishes the framework of analysis on which the study is based. The distinguishing 
characteristics and points of analysis - forming key criteria - are extracted from the 
extensive literature and international experience in the field of fisheries and oceans 
management, as pertinent triggers for successful and efficient implementation of integrated 
approaches. This framework comprises the core of the study and provides the basis for 
comparative evaluation of international and national models addressing these criteria. 
Information from the analysis is used to draw conclusions and determine best practice for the 
implementation of Australian fisheries in the regional marine planning process. 
1.1 Integrated management in the international arena 
The United Nations Stockholm Declaration of 1972 called for a more integrated and 
coordinated approach to planning so that development would be compatible with the need to 
protect and improve the human environment. 9 Years of protracted debate followed, from 
which the concept of integrated management arose. This concept was further refined in the 
prominent report by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 
1987, entitled Our Common Future, more commonly referred to as the Brundtland Report. 1° 
In 1983 the United Nations appointed the WCED to propose strategies for sustainable 
development, suggesting ways to improve human well-being through development 
opportunities in the short-term, without threatening the local and global environment in the 
long-term, thus expanding on the protection of the "human environment", as raised in the 
UN Stockholm Declaration. 11 Some of the strategies proposed in the Brundtland Report 
called for a more holistic approach to environmental management, for environment 
protection and sustainable development to be mandated by all, and for integration through 
regional and interregional action. 12 
The Brundtland Report triggered several international and national developments towards 
sustainable development. The most well known being the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The UNCED attracted 
Kenchington, R. and Crawford, D. (1993). "On the Meaning of Integration in Coastal Zone 
Management." Ocean & Coastal Management, 21: 109-127. 
10 United Nations Division for Sustainable Development. (2004). "Documents: Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Report, 1987)." 
http://www.un.org/esalsustdev/documents/docs.htm  [Access date: 20 June 2004]. 
11 The Brundtland City Energy Network. (2004). "Background: The Brundtland Report." 
http://www.brundtlandnet.com/brundtlandreport.htm  [Access date: 20 June 20041. 
12 	Nations Division for Sustainable Development (2004). 
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policy makers, diplomats, scientists, media personnel and non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) representatives from 179 countries in a massive effort to reconcile the impacts from 
human socio-economic activities on the environment and the impact of environmental 
degradation on human socio-economic activities. 13  The UNCED aimed for international 
agreements that respect the interests of all parties and protect the integrity of the global 
environment and development management systems, whilst recognising the integral and 
interdependent nature of the Earth. 14 The UNCED recognised the need to balance social, 
economic and environmental needs for the future of human kind and the necessity to adopt 
new approaches towards this form of integrated management. 
Arguably, the most significant outcome of the UNCED was the non-binding, but 
revolutionary Agenda 21. Agenda 21 was expected to address the pressing problems faced 
in light of the increasing pressure on today's society through the development of a broad 
programme of actions, incorporating the integration of environment and development needs. 
It reflects the global consensus and political commitment required for effective sustainable 
development 15 , which is the primary responsibility of national governments. Chapter 17 of 
Agenda 21 refers to the interconnectedness of our oceans and the need for reform in the way 
we manage developments in these environments, given that the oceans are an integrated 
whole in which resources know no boundaries. Seven key program areas are highlighted in 
Chapter 17, including: 
integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas; including 
exclusive economic zones; 
• marine environmental protection; 
• sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources of the high seas; 
• sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources under national 
jurisdiction; 
addressing critical uncertainties for the management of the marine environment and 
climate change; 
strengthening international, including regional 16, cooperation and coordination; and 
• sustainable development of small islands. 
13  United Nations. (2002). "Johannesburg Summit 2002 - United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development." http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/htmllbasic_info/unced.html  [Access date: 
3 February 20041. 
14 UNEP. (1992). "Rio Declaration on Environment and Development." 
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentlD=78&ArticlelD=  1163 [Access date: 3 
February 2004]. 
15 The term 'sustainable development' being coined by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED), or the Brundtland Commission, in 1987 as meaning the "development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs". 
16  "Regional" in this instance means regional on a global scale. 
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Program area one introduces the concept of integrated management of Coastal States' oceans 
in order to achieve sustainable development. However, the objectives do not specify what 
'integration' actually means beyond implementing integrated policy and decision-making 
processes that incorporate all sectoral interest groups in a precautionary approach towards 
sustainable development and environmental reporting. 17  To this end, the concept of 
'integration' remains ambiguous in meaning and open to interpretation by the implementing 
State. Agenda 21, in general, is an aspirational instrument that aims to develop a fair and 
safe worldin which all life is celebrated and as such, appeals to "enthusiasts and idealists to 
the extent that captures the ethos of contemporary environmentalism." 8 Despite this, the 
enormity of the Conference and the high degree of international political will shown towards 
meeting the objectives of this document was revolutionary in illustrating the international 
shift in thinking towards 'integration', whatever its interpreted meaning. 
The early 1990s also saw an increasingly alarming impact on fish stocks and ecosystem 
health, which resulted in increased efforts by the FAO to promote integrated management. 
In March 1991, at the Nineteenth Session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries, it was 
recommended that a new approach to fisheries management, which embraced environmental 
conservation and social and economic considerations, be considered as a matter of urgency. 19 
As a result, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (the Code of Conduct) was 
developed and adopted on 31 October 1995. The Code of Conduct covers six major themes, 
including the integration of fisheries into coastal area management . 20 In 1996, the FAO 
produced technical guidelines to assist in achieving the rational use of scarce coastal 
resources through integrated coastal management. These guidelines focus on the 
interconnectivity of fishing activities with coastal environmental health and highlight the 
need to integrate the protection of coastal resources with the sustainable management of their 
uses to achieve ecologically sustainable development. 2 ' 
In light of common concerns relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine and 
coastal biodiversity, Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) agreed to a 
work program to implement the Convention. This work program, adopted in 1995, is 
commonly referred to as the "Jakarta Mandate". One of the focal areas of the Jakarta 
Mandate is the development of implementation approaches for the integration of marine and 
' UNCED. (1992). "Earth Summit: Agenda 21." Chapter 17, s.17.5. 
18  Johnston, D.M. (1996). "UNCLOS III and UNCED: A collision of mind-sets?" In: Kriwoken, L.K., 
Haward, M., VanderZwaag, D. and Davis, B. (eds). Oceans Law and Policy in the Post- UNCED 
Era: Australian and Canadian Perspectives. Great Britain: Kluwer Law International: 11-24. 
19 Food and Agriculture Organisation. (1996). "Integration of Fisheries into Coastal Area 
Management." FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries 3. 
20 	and Agriculture Organisation. (1995). "Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries."  Food 
http://www.fao.orglfilagreem/codecond/ficonde.asp#BAC [Access date: 29 April 2003] 
21  Food and Agriculture Organisation. (1996). 
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coastal area management. Most recently, the Secretariat of the CBD released technical 
guidelines outlining some of the approaches for integration, including: the need to take an 
ecosystem approach to management; the importance of setting clear and measurable 
indicators for effective monitoring and adaptive management; the need to restore or 
rehabilitate key habitats to support ecosystem function and sustainable use; and the need to 
provide economic and social incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity. 22 
L2 Integrated management of Australia's oceans 
Integrated oceans management in Australia was seeded by international developments in the 
late 1980s to 1990s. Sustainable development was applied internationally to oceans and 
coastal areas through Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, which introduced the need for new 
approaches to the protection of our oceans, managing seas, and oceans as an integrated 
whole, requiring States to develop domestic policy initiatives and to cooperate 
internationally and regionally for the purposes of sustainable use and environmental 
protection. 23 In response to these international developments, Australia developed and 
implemented a National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) in 
December of 1992.24  The National Strategy for ESD provides the ecological template for 
cooperative decision-making and agenda setting by governments in the pursuit of ESD in 
Australia, based on ecosystem health and intergenerational equity. 
In addition to the paradigm shift towards ESD, Australia, under the auspices of the 1994 
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), was able to officially lay claim to its 
vast marine territories. Given these sovereign rights over living and non-living resources 
within its maritime boundaries, Australia was required to demonstrate to the international 
community that it could effectively manage those resources; hence the added impetus for an 
integrated oceans management system.25 
22 AiDEnvironment, National Institute for Coastal and Marine ManagementlRJKZ, and the Coastal 
Zone Management Centre/the Netherlands. (2004). "Integrated Marine and Coastal Area 
Management (IMCAM) Approaches for Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity." 
Canada: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. CBD Technical Series No. 14. 
23 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). (1992). "Report of the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development." Environment Council website: 
Earth Summit Documents. http://www.ecduncil.ac.cr/about'flp/riodoc.htm  [Access date: 28 January 
2004]. 
24 Department of the Environment and Heritage. (1992). "National Strategy for Ecologically 
Sustainable Development." http://www.deh.gov.au/esdlnationallnsesd/strategy/  [Access date: 5 
February 20041; and 
Kenchington and Crawford (1993). 
25 Vince, J. (2003). "The Development of Australia's Oceans Policy: Institutions and the 'Oceans 
Policy Community'." Paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, 
Hobart, Australia. 29 September - 1 October 2003. 
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1.2.1 The meaning of integration and the Policy Integration Scale 
to combine two or more things in order to become more effective 26 
combination into an integral whole; behaviour, as of the individual, in harmony with the 
environment27 
Integration has introduced a new dimension into natural resource management whereby the 
system, being the ecosystems on which life depends, is interconnected and it is recognised 
that activities that superficially appear unrelated, can actually have a significant impact on 
the functioning of the system as a whole. It has therefore been imperative for a change in 
attitudes and approaches to traditional sectoral-based management. This new approach 
involves management of 'the whole 28  and has been coined 'integrated management'. 
Integrated management attempts to overcome the deficiencies of redundancies involving 
multiple organisations performing the same task, policy lacunae where no organisation 
appears to be performing a seemingly necessary task, and the relative incoherence of 
contradictory goals and objectives between organisations .29 Depending on the context in 
which it is applied, integration can involve anything from simple informative action between 
sectors and/or jurisdictions, to the integrated management of resources such that sectoral and 
jurisdictional boundaries are broken down and resources are managed on an ecosystem basis, 
perhaps even by integrated governance mechanisms. In between these extremes lies various 
options such as the simple harmonisation of sectoral-based objectives and the renegotiation 
of management arrangements such that they take into account and can react to sectors on 
which they may make an impact or are impacted by. 
Thus, it can be said that integration is a continuum, ranging from simple coordination of 
autonomous organisations to the integrated management of different organisations under one 
overall strategy or policy. The sequencing of the qualitative components of integration 30, as 
they relate to government, have been developed into a Policy Integration Scale (see Table 
26  	Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary. 
http://dictionary.cambridge.orglresults.asp?dictB&searchword=integration [Access date: 2 April 
2003]. 
27  The Macquarie Dictionary. http://www.macquariedictionary.com.au/ [Access date: 2 April 2003]. 
28  In this sense, 'the whole' may'refer to the entire ecosystem, the sectors/jurisdictions on which 
management decisions may impact, the various layers of government, or any other predefined 
parameter. 
29  Peters, B.G. (1998). "Managing Horizontal Government: The Politics of Co-ordination." Public 
Administration, 76 (Summer): 295-311. 
30  'Integration' and 'coordination' are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
31  Considine, M. (1992). "Alternatives to hierarchy: The role and performance of lateral structures 
inside bureaucracy." Australian Journal of Public Administration. 51: 309-320; and 
Metcalfe, L. (1994). "International Policy Co-ordination and Public Management Reform." 
International Review ofAdministrative Sciences, 60: 271-290. 
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Table 1 	Policy Integration Scale (PIS) 
Scale Description 
Maximum 	9 	Overall government strategy/policy, that is full matrix structure - this 
integration 	 assumes a uniform national government with only technically convenient 
(or 	 instruments to elaborate at the implementation level - this is practically 
coordination) 
	unattainable due to the inherent conflicting interests between ministries 
but is included for completeness of the Policy Integration Scale. 
8 	Central government establishing government priorities/main lines of policy 
for all ministries/departments - this is high level preventative conflict 
management. 
7 	Centrally controlled parameter-setting with respect to what different 
ministries/departments should not do as such this is another "negative" 
integration process, which includes controls such as budget constraints or 
setting limits on the policy discretion of ministries. 
6 	Third-party arbitration of integrative differences - another example of 
"negative" and reactive integration in response to parties being unable to 
resolve issues themselves - this is a formal conflict management response. 
5 	Seeking consensus between ministries/departments i.e. use of project 
teams/joint committees/taskforces - this is an example of "positive" 
integration and is usually an informal voluntary process in recognition of 
the benefits of integration. 
4 	Ensuring that government has one voice and different 
ministries/departments do not take divergent negotiating positions by 
clearing work through the chains of command - this is coined "negative" 
integration as it works on the principle of not being inconsistent rather than 
being proactively cohesive - this is .a conflict avoidance response. 
3 	Two-way consultation between ministries/departments to inform on and 
respond to policy formation - depending on the effectiveness of 
consultation in incorporating other interests, this is a lower level 
preventative conflict management response. 
2 	One-way information exchange between ministries/departments through 
both formal and informal information systems and networks. 
Minimal 	1 	Independent decision-making by autonomous ministries/departments - 
integration: 	 managerial contact only. 
Adapted from: Considine (1992); Metcalfe (1994); and 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, PUMA Group. (1996). 
"Globalisation: What Challenges and What Opportunities for Government?" Paris: 
OECD. Paper OCDE/GD(96)64. 
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The Policy Integration Scale (the PIS) defines the capacities for integration rather than 
focusing on the structures that embody them. 32  The PIS is interpreted such that higher levels 
of policy integration depend on the strength and cohesiveness of policy integration at the 
lower levels. 33  Without this sound structural base of lower level policy integration, any 
attempts towards policy integration at the higher levels will most likely fail. The most 
common types of integrative bodies are the informal working groups, taskforces and project 
teams, otherwise referred to as lateral structures, which most frequently concern themselves 
with both problem-solving and operational issues. 34  These bodies require a generalisation 
that can also provide worthy insights into specific issues, hence are situated around the 
middle of the PIS. The success of lateral structures in achieving successful integration is 
highly dependent on the group leader's skills, mandate and commitment -to the process and 
its integrated outcomes. 35  A leader cannot enter into negotiations with a pre-determined 
outcome in mind, but a pre-determined approach can aid timely resolutions. 
Coordination is the basis for any integrated system and mainly refers to the more minimalist 
levels of the PIS. Coordination generally involves independent, equitable components 
working towards a common goal or vision. 36  In a broad sense, coordination means that the 
parts of a system work together more effectively and efficiently than if no coordination took 
place.37 Integration, in its full capacity, describes more of a cooperative exchange and 
unified process that insinuates an all-inclusive approach to management, although often with 
subordinate components.38 In terms of integrated oceans management, this means that all 
sectoral and jurisdictional factors are at least considered for their impact on the environment 
and how the environment will be impacted by the cumulative activities. These terms are 
used interchangeably throughout this thesis, but at a minimum, coordination or integration 
indicates some type of harmonisation of policies and practices across jurisdictional and 
sectoral boundaries, thus enabling the whole to work better than the sum of the parts. 39 
32  Metcalfe (1994). 
33  Ibid. 
34  Considine (1992). 
Ibid. 
36 KenCngtOn and Crawford (1993). 
37  Metcalfe (1994). 
38  Kenchington and Crawford (1993). 
39  Metcalfe (1994). 
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1.22 Hierarchies, markets and networks for integration 
Integration can be achieved through: hierarchical dominance, which represents a top-down 
approach to management; market forces, which assumes there is advantage in bargaining and 
exchange; networks of organisations or individuals; or a combination of these alternatives. 40 
The hierarchical approach is the traditional approach to management of the public sector as 
the high volume of work and speed required for decision-making means that the constant 
long-term attention of a managerial team is required .41  It is based on the principle of 
subsidiarity or 'nested' strategies, whereby the impetus for change or integration ideally 
stems from a central body or organisation at the top of the hierarchical chain and is 
implemented down the chain through management actions and policy programs.42 The 
success of hierarchies in incorporating a capacity for integration is highly dependent on 
effective communication between levels in the hierarchical chain, which is in itself often 
shaped by selfish concerns about career mobility.43 However, hierarchies have the potential 
to lower transaction costs by utilising authority and command within the organisation and 
minimising conflicts and competition between sectors. 44 The more nested the hierarchical 
structure and the more integration that occurs between implementation 4evels of government, 
the lower the transaction costs and the more efficient the institution in their management 
role.45 
To achieve efficiencies in integrated management it is assumed that the central decision-
making body has sufficient information to make effective decisions that cut across sectors, 
regions and interest groups. In reality, this is often an unrealistic assumption that makes this 
hierarchical system difficult to implement. Other common problems with hierarchies have 
developed from the misuse of the approach. Problems include; excessive layering, which 
can undermine the authority between immediate levels; a lack of value-adding by managers 
to the work of their subordinates; and the dissociation of group decision-making processes 
from accountability processes, which can result in somewhat meaningless decisions when 
40  Peters (1998). "Managing Horizontal Government: The Politics of Coordination." Canada: 
Canadian Center for Management Development. Research Paper No. 21. 
41  Powell, W.W. (1991). "Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization." Thompson, 
G., Frances, J., Levacic, R. and Mitchell, J. (eds) Markets, Hierarchies and Networks. London: 
SAGE Publications: 265-276. 
42 Kenchington and Crawford (1993). 
" Mitchell, J. (1991). "Hierarchies: Introduction." In: Thompson, G., Frances, J., Levacic, R. and 
Mitchell, J. (eds) Markets, Hierarchies and Networks. London: SAGE Publications: 105-107; and 
Powell (1991): 265-276. 
44 Peters (1998): Research Paper No. 21. 
45  Bennett, E., Neiland, A., Anang, E., Bannerman, P., Atiq Rahman, A., Huq, S., Bhuiya, S., Day, M., 
Fulford-Gardiner, M. and Clerveaux, W. (2001). "Towards a better understanding of conflict 
management in tropical fisheries: evidence from Ghana, Bangladesh and the Caribbean." Marine 
Policy, 25 (5): 365-376; 
Metcalfe (1994); and 
Peters (1998): Public Administration, 76 (Summer): 295-3 11. 
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assessed against implementation objectives. 46 Australia has adopted a version of the 
hierarchy approach whereby the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), as the central 
body, establishes the guidelines for national policy, and the Commonwealth, states and 
territories retain autonomous control over most policies and programs within their 
jurisdiction, which should be consistent with the national policy. However, Australian states 
have the legal authority, subject to the constitution, to make decisions not in line with the 
COAG national policy guidelines. 
Despite many overlaps, markets are the most commonly used alternative to hierarchical 
integration and are applicable in circumstances where participating parties may have 
contradictory interests, yet have something to gain by engaging in an exchange or bargaining 
process.47 Relative to hierarchies, markets provide for decentralised coordination through a 
high degree of flexibility in the coordination of separate activities, whereby individual 
parties pursue their own interests and the interaction between parties inadvertently produces 
a collective outcome. 48 Markets require minimal trust or ongoing relations between parties, 
yet are relatively dependent on other integration modes, such as networks, and agreements 
are generally supported by the power of legal sanction .49 The success of markets for 
integration depends ofi the willingness of participants to exchange independent resources to 
attain higher levels of collective welfare . 50 These exchanges do not necessarily involve 
money as the primary commodity - this is especially true for the public sector, which more 
commonly uses information exchanges - hence are often referred to as 'quasi-markets' 
instead of markets in the conventional sense of the word. 5 ' Market failure occurs when the 
exchange commodity fails to bring about the social optimum. That is, when perfect 
competition is broken and private interest succeeds over public interest .52  Policy formation 
based on a strong legislative or entitlements basis for citizens might also be damaged by 
market exchanges if the goals achieved through mutual adjustment by the participating 
parties are different from those intended by the legislators or implementers. 
46  Jaques, E. (1991). "In praise of hierarchy." In: Thompson, G., Frances, J., Levacic, R. and Mitchell, 
J. (eds) Markets, Hierarchies and Networks. London: SAGE Publications: 108-118. 
47 Peters (1998): Research Paper No. 21. 
48  Mitchell (1991): 105-107; and 
Powell (1991): 265-276. 
49 Levacic, R. (1991). "Markets: Introduction." In: Thompson, G., Frances, J., Levacic, R. and 
Mitchell, J. (eds) Markets, Hierarchies and Networks. London: SAGE Publications: 21-23; and 
Powell (1991): 265-276. 
° Peters (1998): Public Administration, 76 (Summer): 295-311. 
51 Peters (1998): Research Paper No. 21. 
52  Dubbink, W. and van Vliet, M. (1996). "Market regulation versus co-management." Marine Policy, 
20(6): 499-5 16; and 
Levacic (1991): 21-23. 
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Networks are defined as specific types of ongoing relations linking a defined set of persons, 
objects, or events. 53 Networks are characterised by: the social behaviour, or intrinsic 
characteristics of the components; the level of integration between the components; the 
interdependence of network components; the formality of network structures and 
relationships; and the instruments used to achieve integration within the network . 54 
Professionalism implies that there is an interest and commitment by individuals to do their 
jobs well by networking with other professionals and anyone required to fill in the gaps of 
the networks formed inside the organisation or public sector itself. 55 This is advantageous to 
integration on the one hand, through the ready-made networks upon which the public sector 
may draw information. However, if networks are too tightly integrated internally they can 
become too insular, proving difficult for external management of the players in the network, 
thereby leaving little capacity for integration across networks, or for external scrutiny of 
policy formation. 56 
1.2.3 Structures to achieve integration 
The structures available to help achieve integration vary widely and are not necessarily 
independent of each other. Each uses a combination of hierarchies, markets and networks in 
an effort to achieve a level of integration that suits the purpose of the issue at hand, whether 
this be minimalist cross-referencing or striving for the maximalist view of all-encompassing 
integration.57 Structural changes alone, however, cannot produce the changes in behaviour 
required for integration. There must be a clear will to change and coordinate activities for 
any integration initiative to be successful. 58 This extends to the political will of Ministers, 
without which any structural change to aid integration would be futile. 
Several other aspects of planning and administration can also significantly contribute to 
effective integration. The timing of integrative initiatives is very important as is the level at 
which it is pitched. The lower echelons of governments and other organisations are 
generally more concerned with the provision of public service and are therefore better 
positioned to negotiate ideas to coordinate or integrate with 'competitors' than at the top, 
where budgetary issues and political concerns generally dominate deliberations. 59 
Integration is often more readily accepted if governments and organisations use more 
53  Knoke, D. and Kuklinski, J.H. (1991). "Network analysis: basic concepts." In: Thompson, G., 
Frances, J., Levacic, R. and Mitchell, J. (eds) Markets, Hierarchies and Networks. London: SAGE 
Publications: 175. 
' Knoke and Kuklinski (1991): 173-182; and 
Peters (1998): Public Administration, 76 (Summer): 295-311. 
55  Peters (1998): Research Paper No. 21. 
56  Peters( 1998): Public Administration, 76 (Summer): 295-311. 
57  Powell (1991): 265-276. 
58  Peters (1998): Research Paper No. 21. 
59 
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informal bargaining techniques for negotiating terms and conditions, rather than the 
prescriptive hierarchical top-down approach. However, due care must be taken by 
governments in handing over this negotiating power so that all parties understand the value 
of integration and the intent of government policies and practices. Any negotiated outcome, 
therefore should be in line with government policies and approaches. 
In schematic terms, integration can be conceptualised on several different planes. Vertical 
integration occurs between the different levels in a hierarchical system. This can either be 
between management levels within the one organisation, department or government, or 
between governments and organisations that operate in a form of nested governance. A 
consensual approach to management is important in integrating, or coordinating, 
jurisdictional management. However, central governing bodies will rarely cede complete 
decision-making authority to an independent or disassociated body. 60 
Horizontal integration can occur between departments, sectoral organisations, or interest 
groups that are charged with the management of different aspects of the same sector or 
program. Horizontal integration, however, can also occur in a positive feedback loop, 
whereby these departments, sectoral organisations or interest groups manage different 
sectors or programs that have the potential to impact other sectors or programs. This type of 
horizontal integration usually involves working towards a common objective for all the 
sectors. 
In Australia, the potential for vertical integration occurs between the Commonwealth, 
states/territories and local government, but also within each tier of government such that 
integration may occur at the high-level policy formation stage or further down the echelons 
at the implementation stage. In fisheries, for example, vertical integration occurs through the 
Australian Fisheries Management Forum, which is charged with developing and reconciling 
national approaches to fisheries management that cross jurisdictional boundaries. Vertical 
integration occurs also within the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, charged with 
the day-to-day management of Commonwealth fisheries, such that individual fisheries 
managers must comply with overarching agency policies and arrangements. Horizontal 
integration occurs in Australian fisheries for example, through resource sharing initiatives to 
determine allocation and management arrangements between different users of the resource. 
There is also potential for horizontal integration between sectors involved in the 
management of Australia's oceans and its resources. 
60 KenCgton and Crawford (1993). 
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A discussion follows on existing structures currently available to achieve integration in 
Australia. These structures are presented to help define the concepts through examples and 
to highlight the substantial use of these structures in current management practices. 
1.2.3.1 	Cross-jurisdictional integration 
Cross-jurisdictional integration means that the system works towards consistency across-
jurisdictional boundaries where it impacts on the same resource, activity or ecosystem. 61  It 
provides for coordination between jurisdictions such as local government, 
states/territories/provinces, Commonwealth/Federal, and nation states. Some examples of 
cross-jurisdictional structures used in Australia include: 
• The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) - which meets annually and is the 
peak non-financial inter-governmental forum in Australia, comprising the Prime 
Minister, Premiers, Chief Ministers and the President of the Australian Local 
Government Association (ALGA). 62 The role of the COAG is to initiate, develop 
and monitor the implementation of policy reforms that are of national significance 
and require cooperative action by Australian governments .63  Issues are raised for 
consideration by the COAG from Ministerial Council deliberations, international 
treaties that may affect the states and territories or when the major initiatives of one 
government, particularly the Commonwealth, are likely to impact on other 
governments. 64  
• Commonwealth-State Ministerial Councils - which are designed to facilitate 
consultation and cooperation between governments with respect to specific policy 
areas. 65  Ministerial Councils usually refer to annual or biannual formal meetings of 
Ministers of the Crown from several jurisdictions, usually including the 
Commonwealth and the states and territories, but may extend to New Zealand, in the 
case of trans-Tasman issues, and to Papua New Guinea. 66  Although meetings only 
occur once or twice a year, issues are regularly settled outside this formal forum via 
correspondence. Guidelines for the establishment of new Ministerial Councils and 
the broad protocols and general principles for their operation have been developed 
61  Foster, E. (unpublished). "Evaluation of Alternative Models." Consultancy report for the National 
Oceans Office, 2003. (see Appendix One for signed permission forms). 
62 Commonwealth of Australia. (2002). "Commonwealth-State Ministerial Councils - A 
Compendium." Canberra: The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. June 2002. 
63 Australian Government. (2003). "The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Framework." 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet website. http://www.pmc.gov.au  
64 Commonwealth of Australia (2002). 
65  Moore-Wilton, M. (1999). "The State of Inter-Governmental Relations." Speech delivered to the 
National Policy Forum. 26 November 1999. 
66 Commonwealth of Australia (2002). 
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by the COAG. Ministerial Councils are free to determine their own rules and 
procedures so long as they are consistent with these documents. Ministerial 
Councils are established to initiate, develop and monitor joint policy reform, reform 
for consideration by the COAG or to oversee implementation of policy reform as 
instructed by the COAG. 67 
• A standing committee of officials - which consists of the relevant sectoral Heads of 
the Commonwealth, state and/or territory agencies to support each Ministerial 
Council and the COAG. Standing Committees generally meet more regularly than 
Ministerial Councils to developissues for consideration by the Ministers and also for 
the opportunity to work through and settle issues of less significance. Standing 
Committees may establish sub-committees, working groups and task forces to help 
the Standing Committee address particular policy issues, highlighting the vast 
amount of activity towards cross-jurisdictional integration that happens underneath 
the formal COAG framework. 
1.2.3.2 	Cross-sectoral integration 
Cross-sectoral integration assists multiple-users to reach an acceptable balance of outcomes 
across the full range of uses. 68  A corollary of cross-sectoral integration is attempting to 
understand the cumulative impacts of the relevant sectors. Cross-sectoral integration can be 
evidenced by the involvement, or consideration of various government departments or 
sectors in decision-making, through the development of inclusive lateral structures that take 
precedence over traditional departmental boundaries. 69 Furthermore, the application of 
cross-sectoral integration should ideally be coordinated and strategic between departments. 
Some examples of cross-sectoral integration structures used in Australia include: 
• Increasing demands for environmental monitoring and ecosystem-based 
management, which have emphasised the need to integrate government policies and 
programs across sectors and departments. Interdepartmental Committees (IDCs) are 
one approach used by the Australian Government to meet these rising challenges. 
IDCs comprise departmental representatives, with the authority to act on behalf of 
the department that they represent. They come together to discuss and advance 
issues that deviate from traditional sectoral management and require cross-sectoral 
consideration. 
67  Australian Government (2003). 
68  Foster (unpublished). 
' 9 Considine (1992). 
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•. Cross-sectoral integration at an officer level between departmental and agency 
employees. Since this level of integration is usually informal, however, its success 
in achieving cross-sec toral integration is dependent on the networks that the 
negotiating officer has to ensure all relevant parties are consulted. The structure of 
the public service also contributes towards the coordination of government policies 
and programs. The public service system in Australia is based on the Westminster 
system of governance and as such there is relatively frequent movement of public 
servants among departments as they work their way up the hierarchies .70 This 
frequent movement between and within departments and policy areas contributes to 
the possibility of generating integration or policy coordination through the 
knowledge of a variety of programs and policies. 
1.2.3.3 	Intra-sectoral integration 
Intra-sectoral integration refers to the integration of multiple-uses within a sector to reach an 
acceptable balance of outcomes across the full range of uses, users and values within that 
sector .71  It provides for the coordination of policies and programs of different departments 
and agencies managing the same resource or sectoral interest in a balanced and equitable 
manner, such that the outcome will benefit all user groups, but not to the detriment of the 
resource. Some examples of intra-sectoral integration structures used in Australia include: 
. Horizontal integration between departments and agencies responsible for 
management and policy within the same sectors (for example, the Australian 
Fisheries Management Authority and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry with respect to fisheries management and policy development), which can 
be compromised by an overlap in work agendas. Vertical integration within 
departments and agencies, that is between the policy or management officer at the 
bottom and the executive level staff and Ministers at the top of the hierarchy, is 
dependent on the communications strategies of departments and often comes down 
to personal interests and agendas. There is sometimes conflict caused by the 
conventional view that Ministers and executive staff exercise power and control over 
programs they know little about with respect to serving the public good, and that 
departments and agencies have very narrow views on policy, failing to see the need 
to impose overall priorities for government. 72 
70  Peters (1998): Research Paper No. 21. 
71 Foster (unpublished). 
72  Peters (1998): Research Paper No. 21. 
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Departments and agencies, which in carrying out their duties, may establish various 
structures to aid integration, both within and between departments and agencies with 
respect to coordinating management and policy agendas. Some of the structures 
available for use include working groups, 'advisory committees and taskforces. 
Generally speaking, any decision-making structure will comprise government 
representatives from the appropriate departments or agencies to adequately deal with 
the issue at hand. hi some cases, non-government representatives will be involved in 
discussions, but these discussions are generally geared towards advising decision-
making rather than settling issues, due to fact that decisions affecting Government 
policy need to be made by the elected representatives whom have been entrusted 
with the power to act on behalf of the Australian public. Non-government 
representatives do not have the power to make these decisions, but they may have 
the power to advise on behalf of their constituents. 
1.2.4 Processes to achieve integration 
In addition to structures and a general and political willingness to achieve integration, there 
are a number of processes that can also contribute to its effectiveness. Budgets reflect the 
priorities of the government in monetary terms and as such, can be the most effective 
impetus to policy change, including that for integration.73 The problem with a budgetary 
focus, however, is that individual departments and agencies are effectively competing for the 
same pool of money and this works in direct contrast to the concept of integration. So while 
a budget may establish a fund for integration, there are still going to be allocations within 
this that cause departments in the current sectoral climate to compete, rather than coordinate. 
This 'turf fighting' is not a new concept and, coupled with the risk of budget reductions 
across the board for integration, can entrench positions and work against integration. 
Regulatory review is another process that can achieve integration without the need for the 
direct coordination of departments and agencies. Having an independent regulatory body to 
assess legislation and policy for duplication or counter-productiveness in meeting the overall 
priorities and goals of government, can act as a coordinating process towards a quasi-
integrated system. 
Another process currently used in some specific programs, is the evaluation of legislation 
and policies with respect to meeting their objectives and that of the government in that 
specific area. 74 This process could be extended to encompass the priorities and objectives 
for a region or target population, such as the oceans, and hence could potentially work 
73  Peters (1998): Research Paper No. 21. 
'14 Ibid. 
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towards integration in this capacity. Limitations to this crosscutting evaluation, however, 
include the difficulties to establish and assess cumulative objectives and whether a specific 
program is meeting these objectives, given the variance in sectoral objectives that would be 
encompassed by such integration. 
Recognition of the balance of values, usually inherent in any area of natural resource 
management, is imperative for the development, of successful integrated management, plans 
or processes. 75 This type of management has been coined "triple bottom line" management 
and includes objective setting for a balance of environmental, economic and social values. 76 
Other processes noteworthy for successful integrated management include: ecosystem-based 
management measures to ensure management is applied across a whole system, rather than 
confined by traditional jurisdictional boundaries; an inclusive partnership approach to 
decision-making and management; and adaptive management principles to ensure the system 
is responsive to the changing needs of the environment, economy or society. 17 
In establishing appropriate integrated management practices, the costs and benefits of 
comprehensive integrated planning must be weighed against those of incremental change. 78 
In terms of Australia's oceans, this means weighing the development of Regional Marine 
Plans against traditional sectoral-based approaches towards ESD: The advantage of 
developing overarching integrated management plans is the capacity to address the broad 
needs of the whole region, the long-term aspirations for the region and the cumulative effects 
of many activities or uses . 79 However, incremental change allows for greater flexibility to 
react to changes in situations, new information, new understanding and new opportunities. 80 
Regional marine planning has arguably changed focus from planning for the whole large 
marine ecosystem to planning through incremental change, in response to the enormous 
complexities of comprehensive planning and in recognition of cost-efficiencies. The focus is 
now on coordinating independent sectoral activities, with each sector planning for the 
ecosystem-based requirements of the region. 
One potential disadvantage to integration in government is that accountability may be lost 
due to the difficulties in determining, if things go wrong, where in fact the break down 
occurred. This relates directly to the financial accountability of all government departments 
that spend money on behalf of the Australian public. Financial accountability becomes 
75 Kenchington and Crawford (1993). 
76 Potts, T. (2004). "Triple Bottom Line Reporting - A Tool for Measuring, Communicating, and 
Facilitating Change in Local Governments." A Paper for the Effective Sustainability Education 
Conference. NSW: Sydney. 
77 Kenchington and Crawford (1993). 
78  Ibid. 
79 Thid. 
80 thjd 
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somewhat difficult to enforce if several departments contribute to a combined fund or merge 
to combat difficult policy issues. Likewise, individual departments support the credibility of 
cooperative action when integration produces a positive outcome. 81 It is therefore important 
that departments or organisations are brought together on equal terms and that the lead 
agency does not hold all the power. 
1.25 Integration in the context ofAustralia's fisheries and oceans 
In the context of Australia's oceans, integration aims to achieve a cohesion of ocean-related 
activities by changing the past habits of sectoral management, while combining the 
knowledge of the oceans from all users in order to manage our activities more effectively 
and in harmony with the environment. A number of coastal and marine initiatives have been 
developed in Australia in the past decade. These have cuimmated in recent developments, 
such as regional marine planning to implement Australia's Oceans Policy and the proposed 
National Coastal Policy, which have highlighted the need for oceans management reform, 
recognising cross-jurisdictional and cross-sectoral interests in the marine environment. 
There are many faces to integration, including: environment-economy integration; integrated 
culturing; science-management integration; sectoral integration; and jurisdictional 
integration. Due to the complexity of Australia's constitutional division of powers and the 
traditional sectoral nature of resource management, the sectoral and jurisdictional aspects of 
integration are most appropriate for analysis in this thesis. Application of these concepts to 
oceans and fisheries management is described below, but it is recognised that there are many 
other faces of integration that will comprise effective fisheries and oceans management 
reform in Australia. 
1.2.5.1 	Cross-jurisdictional integration ofAustralia 's oceans management 
In Australia, cross-jurisdictional integration with respect to oceans management refers to the 
cooperation of governments and the potential cohesion of Commonwealth and state/territory 
regimes in recognition of the land-coast-sea continuum. Drawing on counterfactual analysis 
of other countries and natural management regimes, this thesis examines some of the cross-
jurisdictional structures and processes used in Australia and proposed under the new 
integrated oceans management regime to determine the level of integration that is 
achievable. It proposes a number of further developments that will enhance Australia's 
capabilities to integrate oceans management across jurisdictional boundaries. 
81  Considine (1992). 
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1.2.5.2 	Cross-sectoral integration ofAustralia oceans management 
The Australian system of governance is based on sectoral management. Over the last few 
decades there has been increasing international recognition of the need to manage our oceans 
holistically, taking into account the cumulative impacts of oceans activities and resource use. 
As an international leader, Australia has taken on this challenge and recognised the need to 
manage its oceans across all sectors. Drawing on counterfactual analysis of other countries 
and natural management regimes, this thesis highlights some of the significant advances 
Australia has made towards cross-sectoral integration of its oceans uses and proposes other 
avenues to enhance its capabilities towards this end. 
1.2.5.3 	Cross-jurisdictional integration ofA ustralia'sfisheries management 
It is well recognised that fish know no jurisdictional or administrative boundaries. 
Therefore, to manage our fisheries resources according to jurisdictional boundaries is 
illogical and would be to the detriment of the stock and the fishing industry, which depends 
on these stocks. Australia has devised several approaches to deal with the inherent problems 
of managing species across jurisdictional lines. Drawing from international experience, this 
thesis examines these processes and approaches for their adequacy in achieving cross-
jurisdictional integration of fisheries with respect to the sustainable use of the stock and 
suggests changes to enhance coordination. 
1.2.5.4 	Cross-sectoral integration ofAustralia 's fisheries management 
Fisheries are well established for integration into regional marine planning. However, with 
increasing demands on fisheries to prove their ecological sustainability against ecosystem-
based criteria, fisheries have to take on a more cross-sectoral approach to management, 
considering the needs of other user groups and non-consumptive users of the resource. This 
thesis examines the increasing pressures on fisheries and determines the adequacy of current 
management arrangements in meeting these increasing demands. 
1.2.5.5 	Intra-sectoral integration ofAustralia 'sfisheries management 
Australian fisheries are increasingly being assessed against ESD principles and as such, the 
Australian Government has recognised the need for the various fishing sectors, such as 
recreational, indigenous and commercial, to integrate their allocation and management 
processes. This thesis examines these ongoing processes and the complications inherent in 
multi-party management of the resource. 
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1.3 Conifict management 
Integrated oceans management has implicitly focused on the use of conflict management 
processes and has highlighted the need for more sophisticated conflict management 
techniques to be adopted .82  The establishment of cross-jurisdictional, intra-sectoral and 
cross-sectoral decision-making bodies has brought, often opposing, parties together to 
discuss issues of common interest in an attempt to find agreeable solutions. This process is 
at the very essence of conflict management and has been practiced in government for 
decades, but without any conflict management training or due recognition. Advanced 
training and information sharing, with respect to conflict management techniques and 
practices, can potentially save government both time and money. It is important that the 
paradigm shift from sectoral-based management towards integration is accompanied by 
sound conflict management arrangements to ensure a smooth transition. There are well 
developed reactive processes in place and precedents from which lessons can be learned. It 
is now time, however, to concentrate on the development of more proactive management 
tools to combat conflicts, through integrated management, before they arise. 
1.3.1 What is conflict? 
Conflict is a situation of non-cooperation between parties with conflicting objectives. 83 
Conflict has traditionally been associated with negative connotations, but is now recognised 
for its positive potential with respect to social change. 84  Conflict poses the risk of driving 
conflicting parties apart, yet on the other hand, offers opportunity to develop new and more 
creative solutions that better satisfy the needs and concerns of all parties involved. 
The source or 'root' cause of conflicts varies according to the circumstances from which 
they arise. The usual sources are from areas with fragmented management, where values of 
different parties differ; conflicts that arise as a by-product of an activity; the competition for 
resources; and spatial or temporal competition. 8' The hardest conflicts to resolve or manage 
are the philosophical conflicts, those conflicts that arise from actors with different values and 
objectives wanting to use or protect the same resource. This is for example, the case of the 
conservationist fishers that want to sustainably use marine resources for industry 
development and intergenerational equity versus the protectionist environmentalists that 
want to protect the marine resources for their intrinsic value and 'right' for life. Neither 
82  Considine (1992). 
83  CEMARE. (2000). "The Management of Conflict in Tropical Fisheries." United Kingdom: 
University of Portsmouth. Research Project R7334. 
84  Hinkley, L. and Reckseik, H. (2003). "MPA Perspective: Managing conflict with and among user 
groups: winning strategies for MPA managers." MPA News, 4 (10): 6. 
85  Johnson, J.C. (1989). "Introduction to managing marine conflicts." Ocean & Shoreline 
Management, 12 (3): 191-198. 
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view is wrong, nor is either view necessarily right. This is where appropriate management of 
the resource, but more importantly, of the actors involved will reduce the conflict. 
The appropriate analysis of a conflict will identify the information required for effective 
management of the conflict. Conflict analysis includes the identification of the source or 
'root' cause of the conflict. Often this step is washed over in the quest for quick fixes to hide 
or avoid dealing with the true source of the conflict, which may require large amounts of 
resources or time, or be beyond the scope of the government of the day. Conflict analysis 
also involves the identification of the actors involved in and affected by the conflict. These 
actors are often not prominent, and can be inadvertently left out of the negotiation process, 
which can lead to increases in conflict down the track when they finally join the process. 
The sensitivity of the conflict to various solutions can be determined, bearing in mind that 
most solutions are meaningless without the funds or means to implement them. The 
tractability of the problem must also be determined, as it is unproductive to try to resolve a 
conflict that cannot be resolved. 86 In this situation, it may be better to invest more resources 
into appropriately managing the conflict. Once the actors, conflict and tractability of the 
problem have been defined, it is important that actors develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the problem together and generate a list of all the possible solutions to the 
problem for consideration by the other relevant actors. 87  With this information, decision-
makers can make management decisions that will contain the conflict, sometimes resolve it 
and perhaps even turn an inherently negative conflict into a positive driving force for 
management and compliance. 
Environmental conflict can be a result of many compounding issues. For example, 
environmental conflict can be a result of: conflicting objectives, for instance through the 
conservationists desire to protect ecosystem health as opposed to the fishers' desire to make 
a living; a lack of knowledge or research; or of resource scarcity due to degradation, 
population growth, supply and demand, or unequal social distribution of resources.. 88  The 
exact cause of many environmental conflicts is largely unknown. This is due to the scarcity 
of baseline information about many resources and the fact that impacts may not be felt for 
generations, thus causing the potential for conflict down the track when it is too late. As 
with many other conflicts, environmental conflicts can involve: large numbers of 
participants; a lot of emotion; being highly politicised; very drawn out negotiations; and 
power imbalances.89 Environmental conflict is generally characterised by being somewhat 
more complex that humanitarian conflict as it does not just involve lives, but rather the 
86  Johnson (1989). 
87  Hinkley and Reckseik (2003). 
88  Langholz, J.A. (2003). Speaker: The 2003 International Student Symposium on Negotiation and 
Conflict Resolution. The Hague, The Netherlands: August 8, 2003. 
89  Ibid. 
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general health of the environment and function of the ecosystem as well.90 Many 
environmental conflicts are based on sketchy scientific information at best, with best 
available information and counter-research continually feeding into the information base. 91 
1.3.2 What is conflict management? 
Conflict management is the constructive way of dealing with opposing objectives. This can 
include preventive techniques, alternative dispute resolution methods or traditional 
adjudication.92 Conflict management within itself is a contentious issue, with some believing 
that disputes are non-productive, costly and damaging. 93  An alternative view of conflict is 
that, when managed effectively and when political and economic 'elites' show support, 
conflict can be very productive and cost efficient, incorporating conflicting opinions and 
views in a management regime agreeable to all interested parties. 94 It effectively can 
eliminate the tyranny of many decision-making processes. Conflict is the possible outcome 
of social diversity and this can indicate a healthy society, in which it is reasonable to expect 
some conflict .95  The most difficult issue to overcome with conflict management is that 
personalities often overshadow negotiations, which often come down to political pressure 
and/or personal agendas. 96 
Conflict management recognises that planning is an open, ongoing and adaptive activity. 97 It 
involves the process of demand assessment and scenario setting, whereby all participants 
leave negotiations feeling that their interests have been fairly considered. Conflict 
management also recognises that the perceptions held by stakeholders are the true drivers of 
agency decisions.98 Conflict management, rather than conflict resolution, is used in this 
study to indicate the somewhat healthy nature of well managed conflict in management 
today. Not all conflicts need to be resolved and, in fact, not all conflicts can be resolved so it 
is non-productive, costly and damaging to try and resolve intractable conflicts. For example, 
in the broad context of fisheries, conservationists generally keep fishers honest and the 
fishers generally keep conservationists from over regulating day-to-day activities. This is an 
example of management rather than the resolution of conflict as the conflict is philosophical 
with no clear resolution. The parameters of the conflict and its management are continually 
90 Langholz (2003). 
91  Ibid. 
92 Fels, A. (1999). "The Growing Importance of Conflict Management." Canberra Bulletin ofPublic 
Administration, 92: 21-23. 
93 Ibid. 
94 - Bennett et al (2001). 
Weeks, D. (2003). Speaker: The 2003 International Student Symposium on Negotiation and 
Conflict Resolution. The Hague, The Netherlands: July 22, 2003. 
96  From interview with subject TC 16. 
97 Irland, L.C. (1975). "Citizen Participation - A tool for conflict management on the public lands." 
Public Administration Review, May/June 1975: 263-269. 
98  Ibid. 
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changing with increased knowledge of the resource and environment, but the parties' 
perception of the resource, thus their objectives with regard to its sustainable use, will not 
change. 
The aim of conflict management is to achieve productive harmony in a potentially volatile 
situation. In doing so it is important that the views or opinions of any disputing party are not 
compromised beyond that to which they agree, nor too should the lowest common 
denominator be enforced so as to deem any resultant management decision ineffectual. 
Conflict management should acknowledge the emotion involved in conflict and establish 
ground rules for engagement between parties. Conflict management should not focus on 
what divides the parties, but rather. should be based on commonalities, or a creative way of 
illustrating the benefits that differences may bring. 99 It is important that parties recognise 
and focus on the broader context in which their 'argument' lies. This will reduce the 
tendency for emotional nitpicking of details. One way to achieve this is to identify a 
common goal or objective for the parties concerned and to focus on reaching this common 
goal throughout the session. 
1.3.3 Conflict management tools 
Conflict management comes in many forms, including prevention, negotiation, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, litigation and enforcement. Each conflict scenario dictates the 
specific tools or culmination of tools required to address the dispute at hand. In determining 
which tools to use to address the conflict, certain factors should be considered such as: the 
cost of the process; the number of parties involved; the complexity of the dispute; if 
confidentiality is to be maintained; if the parties want direct negotiations and if they want a 
continuing relationship; whether there is a need for binding resolution; and whether the 
dispute involves expert or legal issues where a precedent is desirable.' °° 
Some basic strategies for conflict management or resolution are: 
to get parties to agree on something - anything - as a starting point for negotiation. 
Often they soon realise that they have the same ultimate objectives but are simply 
approaching it from different perspectives. By working together, they can make 
robust management plans that will ultimately meet all their objectives; 
. to dissociate the people from the problems and not turn the conflict into a personal 
attack on any individual or group involved in the conflict; 
99 Weeks (2003). 
'° Fels (1999). 
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• to admit to mistakes that have been made. This is especially important for 
government, where past policies and management plans have not worked as planned; 
and 
• once a solution is agreed upon, it is most important that effective implementation 
strategies are enforced and that parties can see the results through effective 
monitoring and adaptive management. 101 
In some instances, conflict management tools are used'inappropriately to mask the 
underlying source of the conflict. This situation may occur when conflict is so volatile that 
'quick fixes' are required to save lives or divert environmental disasters, when time or 
monetary constraints prevent in-depth research, or when governments want to make political 
statements. Whilst some 'quick fixes' can be counter productive, some can 'band-aid' the 
situation and alleviate any immediate pressures, hence leaving open the path to resolve the 
deep-seated conflict. 
As we move towards a more holistic approach to natural resource management, it is evident 
that a shift away from traditional reactionary conflict resolution to more proactive conflict 
management is required. The more creative Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) practices 
are increasingly replacing contemporary adversarial conflict management, with mediation of 
some commercial disputes costing as little as 5% of litigation or arbitration. 102 ADR 
practices generally involve processes that focus on building ongoing relationships and 
longer-tenn conflict management solutions. 103 ADR practices provide alternatives to lengthy 
and cumbersome litigation measures and rely on participants' willingness to negotiate an 
agreeable solution. Some believe that ADR practices have been used all along and the only 
difference now being that these practices have been given formal labels.' 04 
ADR practices can allow for a tailored solution encompassing all parties' interests. They can 
give the parties a greater sense of ownership of the outcome, hence a greater commitment to 
abiding by the solution. 105 The processes can be voluntary and if any party is not satisfied, 
they can easily withdraw. The processes are also usually faster and can lead to better future 
relations between parties than litigation measures. However, some ADR practices are not 
legally binding. For example, if a mediating party does not abide by the agreement reached 
'°' Hinkley and Reckseik (2003); 
"Insights into negotiation." Johns Hopkins University. Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
International Studies - Guidelines for Negotiations. Handout given at The 2003 International 
Student Symposium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution. The Hague, The Netherlands: July 21, 
2003 
102 Fels (1999). 
103 See Sections 1.3.3.1 to 1.3.3.4 for some examples of APR approaches. 
'°' From interview with subject GJ62. 
' 0' Fels (1999). 
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in mediation, there is no legal recourse to make them do so. It would undermine the trust 
and ongoing relationship between parties of the mediation, but there would not usually be 
any legal ramifications. 
1.3.3.1 	Preventative conflict management 
Government adopts preventative mechanisms through policy development, planning and 
coordination, networking, information systems and public consultation. 106  Policy 
development should involve public consultation throughout the process, however, the impact 
of consultation on the final policy product can be quite variable (see discussion on 
consultation in Section 1.3.3.8). Planning and coordination involves the assessment and 
inclusion of overall public interest in planning initiatives. Planning should be open and 
transparent, consider all competing demands, attain legitimacy through the inclusion of all 
interested parties, and have an accessible appeals process.' 07  Networking is essential for 
effective preventative conflict management. By informing all the relevant players, it 
effectively takes away the element of surprise that often instigates fiery responses and 
induces conflict. Developments in information and communication technology have meant 
that information is more readily available and processing and decision-making based on 
information dissemination is more timely. It is necessary for any governing body to provide 
open and transparent means of gaining access to information and to clearly illustrate the 
process of decision-making to attain the legitimacy necessary in a process to enhance 
compliance. These processes all link to the need for appropriate public consultation where 
the public.have an active role in decision-making, rather than the public rights of appeal on 
decisions that have already been made.' 08 
A recent example of preventative management is the work towards developing a 
Commonwealth recreational fishing policy through a mediated workshop. This process not 
only involved recreational fishers, including recreational anglers and game/sport fishers, but 
also indigenous fishers, commercial fishers, the aquaculture industry, tourism 
representatives, conservationists and Federal and state government representatives. As a 
public resource, it is also of great importance that the process is open and transparent to the 
general public, with opportunities for the public to actively participate in negotiations. 
However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that even this process is under political 
106 Commission of Inquiry into the Conservation, Management and Use of Fraser Island and the Great 
Sandy Region and The Cabinet Office of New South Wales. (1990). "Public Issue Dispute 
Resolution - A Joint Discussion Paper."; and 
From interview with subject XU1 1. 
107 Commission of Inquiry... (1990). 
108 Ibid. 
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influence, whereby it is being advanced rapidly to meet with political deadlines, a move 
some involved in the process see as a demise to the effectiveness of the process.' 09 
1.3.3.2 	Negotiation 
Negotiation is a voluntary bargaining process between parties designed for them to reach 
agreement.' ° Negotiation requires good communication and manipulation skills and a 
willingness to listen." A good example of a negotiation process is the 'Salamanca 
Agreement' process, an unassisted negotiation process designed to break the deadlock of 
agreement over forest management in Tasmania.' 2 The Salamanca Agreement was signed 
by representatives of: the Forest Industries Association of Tasmania (FIAT); the Wilderness 
Society and the Australian Conservation Foundation - later combined to form the Combined 
Environment Groups (CEG); the Tasmanian Trades & Labor Council (TTLC); the 
Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association (TFGA); the Tasmanian Forestry Commission 
(TFC) and the Tasmanian State Government. 113  The Salamanca Agreement committed all 
parties to work together over a 12-month period towards developing a long-term strategy for 
forest management in Tasmania that proved legitimate to all negotiating parties. This 
process *as institutionalised in 1990 with the establishment of a Ministerial Council, which 
was called the Forests and Forest Industry Council of Tasmania (FFIC)." 4 
There is a risk in negotiation of reaching an ineffectual lowest common denominator 
agreement. It is important to emphasise commonalities and work on these to reach 
agreement rather than going directly for the bottom line.' 5 All parties cannot be satisfied if 
relative gains are the measure of success. If there is an emphasis on achieving common 
goals with each party getting enough gains to keep an agreement, this will often result in 
rapid settlement of any dispute." 6 
109 From interview subject F033. 
ItO ADR Associates, L.L.C. (2003). "IIMCR Mediation Training - manual." Washington. 23-25 July 
2003: 2. 
" Zartman, W. (2003). Speaker: The 2003 International Student Symposium on Negotiation and 
Conflict Resolution. The Hague, The Netherlands: July 21, 2003. 
112 Sandford, R. (1991). "Conflict management, dispute resolution and ecologically sustainable 
development." ACT: Department of The Arts, Sport, The Environment, Tourism and Territories. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
Zartman (2003). 
116 "Insights into negotiation.": July 21, 2003. 
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1.3.3.3 	Mediation 
Mediation involves a neutral or impartial third party helping disputant parties to reach their 
own voluntary, negotiated resolution or amicable settlement to a dispute. 117  Mediation offers 
one means of turning acrimonious negotiations into constructive and productive sessions, by 
turning the negotiation into a win-win situation in the search for an 'integrative' solution ." 8 
Mediations are usually voluntary and not legally binding in themselves, but the outcomes of 
the mediation may later be grounded in legislation or policy. Mediation must be consensual, 
based on trust and confidentiality must be assured."' 
The role of a mediator is to facilitate discussion towards resolving conflict and to steer 
parties away from hardening their positions. A mediator, however, has no power to impose a 
solution on parties. 120  Mediation ranges from minimal active interference, such as simply 
physically bringing the parties together, to active participation whereby the mediator may 
convene workshops and provide summaries of discussions held, still all without imposing 
any decisions orjudgements.' 2 ' Mediators can also make use of separate meetings with 
parties, often referred to as caucuses, to allow parties to vent emotion or to ensure that 
parties are satisfied with the progress.' 22 
The purpose of a mediation session is not to assign blame or enter into a win-lose argument, 
but rather it aims to give parties the opportunity to: 
• vent and diffuse emotion; 
• clear up misunderstandings; 
• determine underlying interests or concerns; 
• separate needs and wants of parties; in order to 
• find areas of agreement; and 
• incorporate these areas of agreement into solutions that satisfy all parties' needs. 123 
The most demanding role of a mediator may be the out of session preparations required for a 
successful mediation. This can involve: the reading, preparation and dissemination of any 
pre-mediation papers, agreements and briefs; organising the mediation logistics -. including 
the room, refreshments and equipment; contact with all relevant parties; preparation of an 
117 ADR Associates (2003):1; and 
Noortman, M. (2003). Speaker: The 2003 International Student Symposium on Negotiation and 
Conflict Resolution. The Hague, The Netherlands: July 22, 2003. 
" ADR Associates (2003): 2. 
119 Noortman (2003). 
120 Fels (1999). 
121 Commission of Inquiry...(1990). 
122 Noortman (2003). 
123 ADR Associates (2003): 1. 
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opening statement; drafting of agreements; and any follow-up contact identified in the 
session to ensure the effective implementation of the agreement. 124  Often the mediator 
needs to identify and develop a 'power-with' approach, where it is identified exactly what 
the parties could achieve by working together, as opposed to what they could achieve by 
working against each other. 125  Sometimes the best way of doing this is by highlighting the 
best alternatives to a negotiated agreement and worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement 
(I3ATNA and WATNA). 126 
One of the most important roles of a mediator is to keep the parties focused on the big 
picture of what they need to achieve from a mediation session collectively, rather than 
getting immersed in the detail of what each party wants. It is important for a mediator to 
separate the interests, or needs, of the parties from their positions, or desires when entering 
the session. 127  In doing this, the mediator can identify the essential points necessary to reach 
agreement and steer away from the non-essential desires the parties may have. As Mick 
Jagger once sang: 
You can't always get what you want 
But if you try sometimes 
Well you might find 
You get what you need. 128 
Mediation begins with a welcome and, depending on the circumstances and the mediator's 
style, a reaffirmation of the positive first step parties have taken in choosing to enter into the 
mediation process. The mediator then should explain the mediator's role in the process and 
describe what the mediation process will entail, including appropriate mediation agreements 
and ground rules as the mediator sees fit. Parties,' starting with the party that instigated the 
mediation, should then be invited to explain what it is that brought them to the mediation 
process. 129  From here, the mediator can take control and caucus, or run a joint session, as 
they see fit until some agreement is reached. This implies that the mediator should be able to 
read the parties and the situation well enough to keep further conflicts under control. The 
mediator should also. duly acknowledge any common objectives as a significant step forward 
for the negotiating parties. 
124 Noortman (2003). 
125 Weeks, D. "The Eight Essential Steps to Conflict Resolution." Tarcher/Putam. 
126 ADR Associates (2003): 27-28. 
127 Jbid 2. 
128 Jagger, M. and Richards, K. (1968). "You can't always get what you want." 
http://www.keno.org!stones_lyrics/you_cant_alwaysget_whatyou_want.htm [Access date: 5 
January 2004]. 
129 ADR Associates (2003); and ADR Associates training session in the Hague (2003). 
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Like many procedures of negotiation, mediation is evident in many Australian policy 
processes. The Recreational Fisheries Allocations Workshop, held in Coolangatta in 
October 2002, is an example of a well-run mediation. 130  The workshop was chaired by an 
independent chair (from South Africa) who had a clear understanding of the topic and was 
able to offer some insightful experiences and to clarify the various points being made, 
without imposing his own views on the subject of Australian recreational fisheries allocation 
issues. This workshop was, however, only a small part of the negotiation process involved 
in the development of a Commonwealth policy on recreational fisheries management. 
	
1.3.3.4 	Conciliation 
Conciliation is an informal process whereby a neutral third party attempts to bring disputant 
parties to agreement by lowering tensions, improving communications, interpreting issues, 
providing technical assistance, exploring different solutions and bringing about a negotiated 
settlement.' 3 ' A conciliator will go further than a mediator by offering suggestions, opinions 
or expert advice, but will still not impose a solution on the parties involved.' 32 This form of 
negotiation is best used in situations where parties are unable or unwilling to directly 
negotiate. Although distinction is made between conciliation and mediation, it is very rare 
that a mediator will not try and impart suggestions or advice in order to move the situation 
along, hence the terms are often interchanged. For the purposes of this thesis both of these 
management tools are referred to as 'mediation'. 
1.3.3.5 	Arbitration 
Arbitration is a quasi-judicial process whereby a neutral third party makes a bindingdecision 
on behalf of the parties involved. This process may allow for court appeals, however, such 
appeals slow the process such that it can fall in line with the litigation process. 
1.3.3.6 	Litigation 
Litigation involves the resolution of disputes in court, generally with legal representation, in 
a win-lose situation. This traditional reactive form of conflict resolution is impersonal, 
relatively inflexible and provides little practical scope for dealing with natural resource 
management issues that often involve an element of value judgement and interpretive 
license. 
130 Personal observation. 
'' Commission of Inquiry.. .(1990). 
132 Fels (1999). 
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1.3.3.7 	Enforcement 
Enforcement is the detection of a breach of laws or by-laws by an authority and the 
proceedings that are consequently brought against the party at fault. This is generally 
associated with post-conflict management outcomes and is designed to ensure these 
outcomes are enforced. Enforcement is an essential support for any agreement made in 
negotiation or adjudication. If parties to an agreement feel that there is not adequate 
enforcement in place to maintain the terms of the agreement, then it renders it meaningless. 
Likewise, if laws and by-laws do not have sufficient enforcement, then they are more likely 
to be breached and become relatively ineffectual. 
1.3.3.8 	Public Consultation 
An increasingly important area of conflict management with respect to natural resource 
management is involved with public consultation. Coupled with the holistic management of 
natural resources is a move towards more inclusive and legitimate decision-making. As 
guardians of natural resources that belong to the general public, the government has a duty to 
inform and consult with the public on management and regulatory issues. The type of 
community consultation adopted in any decision-making process will depend on the 
information and level of legitimacy required by the community to ensure effective 
implementation. Community consultation ranges from government-dominated informative 
consultation to community-dominated decision-making and management. 133  Co- 
management occurs somewhere in the middle of the spectrum whereby community, industry 
and government officials work together somewhere in the spectrum of an advisory to 
partnership role, to attain agreement that satisfies all parties. 
Carson and Gelber (2001) identified the main principles of effective consultation required 
for successful management. 134  These are: appropriate timing in the development of the 
issue; to be all-inclusive of those impacted by decisions; parties should remain community-
focused rather than individually-focused; consultation should be interactive and dôliberative; 
consultation may only be effective if the process and the participants' roles are clearly 
explained; participants should have faith in the process that outcomes will be addressed 
adequately where appropriate; facilitators should be independent, skilled and flexible; the 
process should be open, fair and subject to evaluation; and it should be cost-effective and 
flexible to meet the circumstances. 135 
133 Pomeroy, R.S. and Berkes, F. (1997). "Two to tango: the role of government in fisheries co-
management." Marine Policy 21 (5): 465480. 
134 Carson, L. and Gelber, K. (2001). "Ideas for Community Consultation - A discussion on principles 
and procedures for makingconsultation work." NSW: NSW Department of Urban Affairs and 
Planning. 
135 Ibid. 
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Once these basic principles for effective consultation have been established, the next step in 
the consultation process is to decide on the method of selecting who to consult and how. 
Different circumstances and issues will require different consultation methods and the 
inclusion of different players. Random selection of participants, used in conjunction with an 
appropriate societal profile, offers opportunity for representative participation. 
Contemporary consultation methods have become dated, with participants in many cases 
feeling over-consulted and still unheard. It is therefore important for authority figures to 
develop innovative ways of consultation that include and utilise public perceptions. Some of 
these methods include the use of: search conferences, deliberative polls/televoting, citizen's 
juries, consensus conferences, focus groups, charrettes and resident feedback panels.' 36 
1.3.3.8.1 	Co-management 
Co-management can provide for the semi-private control of a public resource and as a 
strategy lends itself to the decentralisation of central government control. 137  Many forms of 
vertical decentralisation are evolving in the developed and developing world today. USA 
fisheries for instance exercise a form of deconcentration, or administrative decentralisation, 
whereby the national fisheries agency transfers authority and responsibility to eight regional 
fishery management councils established under the Magnuson Act 1977. Under the 
Resources Management Act 1991, New Zealand delegates some authority and decision-
making powers to district officials, but Central Government retains the ultimate right to 
overturn these decisions. In Australia, we have devolved certain powers with respect to 
recreational and commercial fisheries management over to the states without a direct 
reference back to the Commonwealth. In Norway the government has formally given fishers 
responsibility for the regulation of the cod fishery under the Lofoten Act of the 1890s, with 
elected fishers acting as inspectors and a public agency as the enforcer.' 18  In the 
Netherlands, the privatisation of fisheries is evident through the individual quota 
management system. In this system, the government sets a national quota and "management 
groups" of fishers then take on the management of these quota. 139 
Resources such as fisheries are common property, as they are non-exclusive. It is therefore 
difficult to control access to the resource and each user of the resource effectively subtracts 
from the welfare of other users. In the absence of some form of property right pertaining to 
fisheries resources, these characteristics can lead to the "tragedy of the commons". 140  Once 
136 Carson and Gelber (2001). 
137 Mikalsen, K.H. and Jentoft, S. (2001). "From user-groups to stakeholders? The public interest in 
fisheries management." Marine Policy, 25: 281-292. 
138 Pomeroy and Berkes (1997). 
131 Ibid. 
140 Hardin, G. (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science, 162: 1243-1248. 
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some form of right to the resource is recognised and assigned, an appropriate form of 
management should be implemented. In the case of a common property resource, it seems 
only fit that .a common property theory strategy such as co-management should be used. The 
co-management hierarchy in relation to fisheries management strategy ranges from 
government centralised rule, whereby fishers are informed of management decisions, to 
community self-governance and self-management, whereby fishers design, implement and 
enforce the rules and regulations upon advice from the government. 141 
Co-management has the potential to pre-empt conflict in natural resource management 
through participatory democracy, whereby the interested parties can take ownership of the 
management decisions made. By involving the resource users in management decisions, and 
in some cases devolving power to them, a greater sense of legitimacy, hence efficiency and 
compliance, can be achieved. However, co-management involves a high degree of trust 
between parties. Governments must trust that users can and will manage themselves well 
and in the interests of intergenerational equity if decision-making power is transferred to 
them. Users must also trust that governments will incorporate their concerns and ideas when 
consulted in the management process. There is a danger, however, in devolving too much 
power of a public resource over to a select few. The general public, conservationists and any 
other impacted parties inust be able to readily access and assess the regulatory regime 
governing the use of their collective resources. 
In Australian fisheries for example, Management Advisory Committees (MACs) embrace 
the concept of co-management in an advisory capacity to the AFMA Board. In theory, there 
is trust from the government that MAC members will disassociate themselves from their 
vested interests and make informed decisions that would be best for the fishery. Likewise, in 
theory there is trust from MAC members that the government will seriously consider their 
recommendations. The AFMA Board has recently come under review with respect to 
adequately addressing recommendations from the MACs and is now required to accompany 
any decision based on these recommendations with a reasoned response. Despite these 
theoretical relations, trust between MACs and the AFMA remains somewhat problematic. 
MACs are also coming under increasing scrutiny by non-members who are questioning 
members' impartiality and the representation of their interests, as non-members. 
In other circumstances, conflicts over resources can lead to co-management. In these 
situations, governments turn to co-management as a means of responding to a management 
crisis. This reactionary management process can occur with the deterioration of the 
resource, conflicts between stakeholders, conflicts between management agencies and 
'" Pomeroy and Berkes (1997). 
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resource users and general governance problems. 142  Whether reactionary or preventative, co-
management has the potential to save time and money through legitimising management 
processes and providing users with ownership of the management decision. 
1.3.3.8.2 	Stakeholder theory 
In any participative process, it is important to select the appropriate stakeholders to suit the 
objectives of the process. Mikalsen and Jentofi (2001) describe the attributes of stakeholder 
theory, adapted from business management literature, as applicable to fisheries 
management' 43 In most processes, participatory stakeholder numbers are limited due to the 
enormity of legitimate interests in most management areas, which if all included, would 
make timely decision-making impossible. It is imperative for stakeholder salience to include 
the most appropriate stakeholder representatives to ensure ownership and legitimacy of the 
process. The salience of stakeholders involves preliminary ranking according to three 
stakeholder at 	legitimacy (having legal, moral or presumed claims), power (being in 
a position to influence decision-making) and urgency (holding a position that demands 
immediate attention from managers).lW 
Once ranked, stakeholders can be categorised into stakeholder types, which decision-making 
authorities can then use to decide which stakeholders to include in participatory consultation 
processes. Stakeholders possessing all three stakeholder attributes are classified as 
Definitive Stakeholders and as such have an unequivocal claim for integration into the 
process. 145  According to this theoretical framework, environmental interests in Australian 
fisheries have become Definitive Stakeholders, a point reflected by the inclusion of 
permanent environmental observers in fisheries management processes. The consideration 
of environmental issues in fisheries management is granted power through the strategic 
assessments of fisheries under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999, legitimacy through the principles of sustainability and stewardship of a public 
resource and, arguably, urgericy through the increasing number of overfi shed stocks and 
overcapacity of the industry. It is perceived, however, that as assessments are completed and 
findings incorporated into fisheries management strategies and plans, the urgency should 
subside and environmental interests representing these issues will once again become 
Expectant Stakeholders. The limited observer status of environmental interests in the 
142 Ibid. 
"i Mikalsen and Jentoft. (2001). 
' Adapted from: Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001); and 
Mitchell, R.K., Agle, B.R. and Wood, D.J. (1997). "Toward a theory of stakeholder identification 
and salience: defining the principle of who and what really counts." Academy ofManagement 
Review, 22 (4): 853-886. 
"i Ibid. 
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management process was perhaps in recognition of this potential for a change in influence 
once the assessments had been carried out. 
Expectant Stakeholders possess two out of the three stakeholder attributes and are generally 
active in the management process. 146  Further categorisation within this tier of stakeholder 
type gives an indication for how stakeholders will behave. Those with power and legitimacy 
will be the Dominant Stakeholders as their influence is assured. Generally their attributes 
dictate that managers will pay them the most attention. 147 Those with urgent and legitimate 
interests are Dependent Stakeholders, because they depend on other stakeholders and/or 
managers for the power to give rise to their claims. 148 The most precarious stakeholders, 
however, are those with the power and the urgency but who lack the legitimacy. 149 
Dangerous Stakeholders are, for instance, extreme conservationists, whereby they have the 
power through the media to bring their urgent environmental concerns, which lay outside the 
objectives of current government policy or legislation, to the forefront of political decision-
making.. As such, this group needs to be identified by management to prevent the use of 
such dangerous power, but not so much that they are granted legitimacy through 
acknowledgement. 150 
The final type of stakeholder is the Latent Stakeholder, who possess only one of the 
stakeholder attributes, hence has low stakeholder salience, being generally included in the 
management process at the discretion of management .' 5 ' Further categorisation of Latent 
Stakeholders can offer insights into the potential for stakeholders to impact on the process or 
to gain Expectant Stakeholder status. Dormant Latent Stakeholders possess power, but lack 
the legitimacy and .urgency to use jt. 152  However, they do have potential power and as such 
should be monitored by managers for changes in the urgency or legitimacy of their claims. 
Discretionary Latent Stakeholders, possessing the attribute of legitimacy, and Demanding 
Latent Stakeholders, possessing the attribute of urgency, have negligible influence on the 
process and in the absence of any other attributes, pose no threat to managers if not 
151 3  
146 Mikalsen and Jentoft. (2001). 
147 Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997). 
'' Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 's° Ibid. 
'' Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997). 
152 Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997); and 
Mikalsen and Jentóft. (2001). 
151 Ibid. 
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1.4 Framework of analysis 
The information in this chapter forms the basis of analysis for the rest of the study. The first 
part of the analysis looks at the capacity for integration. That is, how the different States, 
models or processes address: 
cross-jurisdictional; 
• cross-sectoral; and 
• intra-sectoral integration. 
These are qualitatively addressed in terms of- 
 instrumental integration, such as through integrated policies and planning; and 
. institutional integration, such as inclusive decision-making bodies and co-
management structures. 
Where appropriate, models are also ranked (from level 1-9) for their integration capacity in 
accordance with the Policy Integration Scale set out in Section 1.2.1. This will standardise 
and strengthen integrative capacity comparisons between models, bearing in mind that 
comparison is of a qualitative nature only. 
The second part of the analysis looks at the capacity for conflict management. Firstly, the 
assessment draws on the tools proposed in Section 1.3.3, to identify those used by the nation, 
model or process to address conflict management. Conflicts are analysed in terms of the 
source of the conflict, the identification of relevant actors - drawing from the stakeholder 
theory analysis outlined in Section 1.3.3.8.2 - and the tractability of the conflict, all of which 
contribute to the possible solutions available to decision-makers to appropriately manage the 
conflict. In recommending appropriate conflict management tools the following issues are 
considered and the appropriate tool chosen according to the needsof the disputant parties 
and decision-makers: the cost of the process; the number of parties involved; which parties 
to involve - drawing from the stakeholder theory analysis outlined in Section 1.3.3.8.2; the 
complexity of the dispute; if confidentiality is to be maintained; if the parties want direct 
negotiations; if parties want a continuing relationship; whether there is need for a binding 
resolution; and whether the dispute involves expert or legal issues where a precedent is 
desirable.' 14 
The following chapter establishes the oceans management context for this study and assesses 
current arrangements in Australia for their capacity to incorporate integration and conflict 
management objectives in accordance with the framework of analysis set out in this chapter. 
'' Fels (1999). 
9 
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PART II: 
AUSTRALIA'S OCEANS & FISHERIES 
DEVELOPMENTS 
CHAPTER 2 	4USTRALIA 'S OCEANS POLICY ND 
REGIONAL MARINE PLANNING 
Australia has adopted the concept of integrated management, as raised in the international 
context, for the management of its oceans in line with ecosystem-based management 
principles. This chapter explores the introduction of integration into domestic oceans policy 
and highlights some of the issues related to integrated management, including the need for 
conflict management processes to overcome the obstacles of implementation. 
2.1 The introduction of integrated oceans management into 
Australia 
The Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) was opened for signature in December 1982. It 
provides a framework that inter alia addresses the protection of the global marine 
environment and national maritime rights and responsibilities. 115  The LOSC entered into 
force on 16 November 1994 and was the international driver for the development of 
Australia's Oceans Policy (AOP).' 56 Australia ratified the LOSC on 3 October 1994, thus 
providing a basis to formally claim its vast maritime territory. 157  The LOSC enabled nations 
to claim exclusive economic zones (EEZs) to enhance nations' economic growth through the 
sovereign rights to exploit the resources in their EEZs. 158 However, these sovereign rights 
come with an obligation to demonstrate the effective management of those resources. This 
155 VanderZwaag, D., Davis, B., Haward, M. and Kriowken, L.K. (1996). "The Evolving Oceans 
Agenda: From Maritime Rights to Ecosystem Responsibilities." Introduction. In: Kriwoken, L., 
Haward, M., VanderZwaag, D., Davis, B., Oceans Law and Policy in the post- UNCED era: 
'Australian and Canadian Perspectives. London: Kluwer Law International: 1-9. 
156 Rothwell, D.R., (1996). "Australia and the Law of the Sea: Recent Developments and Post-
UNCED Challenges." Chapter Four. In: Kriwoken, L., Haward, M., VanderZwaag, D., Davis, B., 
Oceans Law and Policy in the post-UNCED era: Australian and Canadian Perspectives. London: 
Kluwer Law International: 59-74. 
157 Eadie, E.N. (2001). "Evaluation of Australia's Oceans Policy as an example of public policy-
making in Australia." Maritime Studies, 120: 1-13; and 
Vince, J. (2003). "The Development of Australia's Oceans Policy: Institutions and the 'Oceans 
Policy Community". Paper presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, 
Hobart, Australia. 29 September - 1 October 2003. 
158 Alder, J. and Ward, T. (2001). "Australia's Oceans Policy: Sink or Swim?" Journal of 
Environment & Development, 10 (3): 266-289; and 
Lee, D. (2003). "Australia's Fishing Future - A non-government view." Maritime Studies, 130: 18-
22. 
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requirement is designed to discourage nations from declaring EEZs to stop other nations 
from utilising the resources in that area for economic benefit. When Australia formally 
declared its EEZ in 1994, a period of intense lobbying by Australian scientists and the 
maritime industry began. 159  This lobbying prompted the Commonwealth Government to 
consider an integrated and ecosystem-based policy for the planning and future management 
of Australia's maritime regions that would meet the requirements of the LOSC and also 
provide a framework for ecologically sustainable development (ESD) in Australia's EEZ. 160 
Ecologically sustainable development (ESD) underpins Australia's efforts towards achieving 
integrated management across the land and sea interface, thereby providing the basis for 
compromise between the conflicting interests of development and conservation. 161  The 
definition of ESD in Australia is encapsulated in Australia's National Strategy for 
Ecologically Sustainable Development (1992): 
using, conserving and enhancing the community's resources so that ecological 
processes, on which life depends, are maintained, and the total quality of life, now 
and in the future, can be increased. 162 
The Australian National Strategy for ESD (the Strategy) sets out the broad strategic and 
policy framework under which governments will cooperatively make decisions and take 
actions to pursue ESD in Australia, based on ecosystem health and intergenerational equity. 
The Strategy is unique in its identification of inter-sectoral issues that must be collectively 
addressed by governments to achieve ESD, as intended in the aims of the Strategy. As such, 
it provides the broad framework, or 'blueprint', for cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional 
integrated management as encapsulated byAOP. In addition, reflecting these international 
initiatives, Australian governments in general are progressing towards a triple bottom line of 
ecological, social and economic sustainability in natural resource management. 163 
159 Eadie (2001). 
160 Alder and Ward (2001). 
161 Eadie (2001). 
162 Department of Environment and Heritage. (1992). "National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable 
Development." http://www.deh.gov.au/esd/nationallnsesdlstrategy/  [Access date: 5 February 20041. 
163 Potts, T. (2004). "Triple Bottom Line Reporting - A tool for measuring, communicating, and 
facilitating change in local governments." A paper presented at the Effective Sustainability 
Education Conference. NSW: Sydney. 
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2.2 The development of Australia's Oceans Policy 
On 8 December 1995, the Australian Prime Minister, Paul Keating, announced plans to 
develop an "integrated oceans strategy" that would "assist in dealing with problems in the 
marine environment, taking the opportunities offered by our marine areas, and meeting our 
obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for our Exclusive 
Economic Zone!M  'Integrated' in this context refers to the active engagement of all three 
spheres of government and the full range of stakeholders! 65 This initiative for developing an 
integrated strategy to deal with problems or conflicts in the ocean environment was further 
accentuated in the 1996 elections, which highlighted bipartisan support for drafting a 
national oceans policy.' 66  The concept of integrated oceans management was, and still is,. 
innovative. Without set precedents, the Commonwealth decided to pursue the 'safer' option 
of a national policy, rather than legislation, to avoid having to deal with the issue of the OCS 
3nm limit and to provide some leverage for implementation methods.' 67 The conservation 
sector still argues that legislation is required to enforce the goals of AOP and the National 
Oceans Office (NOO) is currently reviewing this option. 168 
On 2 March 1996 the Liberal Government was elected and on 3 March 1997 the Prime 
Minister, John Howard, announced plans to develop Australia's Oceans Policy (AOP) 
designed to maintain Australia's sovereign rights and to ensure the ESD of the marine 
environment. 169  Problems encountered during the development of AOP reflected the 
sectoral-based management and bureaucratic control that had governed activities in the past. 
The historical friction between Commonwealth, state and local governments was also a 
major hurdle for AOP to overcome, a hurdle that is yet to be satisfactorily overcome. 
Public consultation featured highly in the development of the Oceans Policy, with a 
consultation paper on Australia's Oceans Policy released by the Prime Minister for public 
comment in April 1997.' °  Environment Australia (now the Department of the Environment 
and Heritage), having responsibility for the development of AOP, commissioned a series of 
' Bergin, A. and Haward, M. (1999) "Current Legal Developments: Australia." The International 
Journal ofMarine and Coastal Law, 14: 387-398. 
165 Alder and Ward (2001). 
166 Eadie (2001). 
167 Vince (2003). "The Development of Australia's Oceans Policy:..."; and 
Vince, J. (2003). "Australia's Oceans Policy: Five Years of Integration Across Sectors and 
Jurisdictions?" Maritime Studies, Nov-Dec 2003: 1-13. 
168 Ayre, M. (2004). NOO: Personal communication - 8 January 2004. 
169 Bergin and Haward (1999). 
Wescott, G. (2000). "The development and initial implementation of Australia's 'integrated and 
comprehensive' Oceans Policy." Ocean & Coastal Management, 43: 853-878. 
' 70 Ibid. 
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Issues and Background papers in 1997 to prompt discussions on oceans policy within the 
community and government agencies. 171  In December 1997, a two-day Ocean Forum 
sponsored by Government, was held to gain input from stakeholder groups, academia, the 
scientific community, as well as government on the development issues relating to AOP. 
Despite the best intentions to include wide group diversity in discussions, most of the 133 
delegates that attended the Ocean Forum were Commonwealth and state bureaucrats. 172 
During this period, the Marine and Coastal Community Network (MCCN) also became a 
significant player in the distribution and collection of information from the community 
regarding the Oceans Policy. It was an unusual step for Government to designate part of the 
consultation process to an NGO, which illustrated the Government's desire to move to a 
more 'bottom-up' approach to oceans management. 173 
The Ministerial Advisory Group on Oceans Policy (MAGOP) was established in September 
1997 and consisted of eighteen members representing various key interest groups, to advise 
the Minister for the Environment on issues relating to the development of AOP from a non-
government perspective. 174  The following year, the MAGOP released a comprehensive 
report of its recommendations, which were based on a regional ocean planning and 
management approach. 175  These recommendations laid the early foundations for the 
development of Regional Marine Plans (RMP) that were designed to apply the principles of 
oceans policy to practical management on a regional basis. The MAGOP report highlighted 
the importance of incorporating ESD principles in AOP, the application of multiple-use areas 
and recommended the use of ecosystem-based management techniques. 17' The MAGOP 
also identified the conflict over institutional arrangements between the industry 
representatives, who believed current arrangements were suitable, and the conservationists, 
who believed that the current arrangements were fragmented and required integration. As a 
result, the MAGOP suggested three management options, none of which were adopted: 
• a Commonwealth-State Ministerial Council advised by Working Groups and NGO 
Reference Groups; 
• a statutory National Oceans Commission reporting to a Ministerial Council; and 
• a Coordinating Council reporting to a Ministerial Cciuncil. 177 
171 Vince, J. (2003). "Australia's Oceans Policy..... 
172 Wescott (2000). 
171 Vince, J. (2003). "Australia's Oceans Policy:..." 
174 Bergin and Haward (1999); 
Vince (2003). "Australia's Oceans Policy:..."; and 
Wescott (2000). 
175 Bergin and Haward (1999). 
176 Wescott (2000). 
177 Ibid. 
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Up until early 1998, the Commonwealth had been working closely with the states and 
territories (herein referred to as 'the states') in the development of AOP. However, due to 
the excessively prolonged agreement period by the states as a result of the unwillingness of 
the Commonwealth Environment Minister to concede to the states' demands of inclusivity in 
the decision-making body and for financial assistance to implement the policy, the 
Commonwealth vetoed the possibility of a national oceans policy in favour of a 
Commonwealth oceans policy released in December 1998, the International Year of the 
Oceans. 178  This political move contributed greatly to the historical friction between 
Commonwealth and state governments and undermined several years of negotiations and 
confidence building. It is only now that the Commonwealth Government, through regional 
marine planning and the Integrated Oceans Management (IOM) Initiative, is beginning to 
rebuild the trust of the states. To this end, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has 
been signed by Queensland and the Northern Territory to collaborate in the scoping phase of 
the Northern Regional Marine Plan. 179 
Australia's Oceans Policy was released in two volumes on 23 December 1998, with a 
$A50m budget for implementation over three years. Volume One of AOP establishes the 
framework for integrated and ecosystem-based planning and management for all of 
Australia's marine jurisdictions. AOP's vision for Australia's oceans is for: 
Healthy oceans: cared for, understood and used wisely for the benefit of all, now and 
in the future. 180 
It also included a series of nine goals and principles, institutional arrangements and policy 
guidance towards a national oceans policy. Volume Two of AOP details the specific sectoral 
measures or challenges posed by integrated oceans planning and management in achieving 
ESD, and proposes over 400 responses to these challenges in some twenty areas of oceans 
management. 181 A test of the success of AOP will be if regional marine planning can 
achieve harmonious development between sectOrs and across jurisdictions, whilst avoiding 
any serious cumulative environmental impacts.' 82  In other words, a measure of AOP success 
will be if it can achieve ESD on a national level. 
178 Foster, E.G. and Haward, M. (2003). "Integrated Management Councils. A Conceptual Model for 
Ocean Policy Conflict Management in Australia." Ocean & Coastal Management, 46: 547-563. 
179 Gleeson, M. (2002). AFFA: Personal communication. February 2002. 
180 Commonwealth of Australia. (1998). "Australia's Oceans Policy." Canberra: Environment 
Australia. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Eadie (2001). 
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2.2.1 Australia's integrated oceans management institutional arrangements 
The success of AOP and integrated oceans management in general is largely dependent on 
the effectiveness of institutional arrangements established to achieve coordination and 
cooperation between governments and their respective departments. Overall government 
commitment to an integrated and comprehensive oceans policy, however, is unlikely to wane 
due to Australia's assertion of its sovereign rights and consequent obligations under the 
LOSC. 183 
The Commonwealth institutional arrangements for implementing integrated oceans 
management, including the implementation of AOP and regional marine planning, are (see 
Figure 1): 
. the Sustainable Environment Committee (SEC) of Cabinet - to provide a whole of 
government framework on issues of environmental sustainability; 
the Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council (NRMMC) 184, supported by 
the Natural Resource Management Standing Committee (NRMSC) - to coordinate 
cross-jurisdictional issues; 
• the Integrated Oceans Management Working Group (IOMWG) of the NRMMC's 
Marine and Coastal Committee (MACC) - for states and the Commonwealth to 
collaborate and develop a national approach to IOM; 
• a National Oceans Ministerial Board (NOMB or 'the Board') - designed to drive the 
cross-sectoral implementation issues of AOP and includes Commonwealth Ministers 
for Environment and Heritage (chair); Science; Industry, Tourism and Resources; 
Transport and Regional Services; and Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation' 85 
• an Oceans Board of Management (OBOM) - consisting of the Secretaries of the five 
Commonwealth Board agencies, established to ensure a whole-of-government 
approach to AOP and to oversee the development, managenent and implementation 
of the NOO 3-year work plan; 
the Board Agency of Senior Officials (BASO) - consisting of the senior officials 
from the five Board agencies, including the Department of Environment and 
Heritage (DEll), Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS), 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources (DITR) and Department of Education, Science and Training 
(DEST), designed to work with the NOO and the BAOO to give advice to the 
OBOM on the development of AOP; 
183 Eadie (2001). 
184 	NRMMC took over the Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council's 
(ANZECC's) role when it disbanded in 2002. 
185 Vince (2003). "Australia's Oceans Policy:..." 
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• the Board Agency of Operational Officials (BAOO) - consisting of operational 
officials of the five Board agencies, created to work with the NOO and the BASO to 
support the OBOM; 
• a National Oceans Advisory Group (NOAG) - replaced the MAGOP, comprising 
non-government representatives selected by the NOMB for their expertise in oceans 
issues relating to sectoral interests and formed as a consultative mechanism to aid 
the Board in implementation and development; 
• an Oceans Policy Science Advisory Group (OPSAG) - formed to give unfettered 
scientific advice to senior level science officials in the NOMB through the OBOM; 
• a National Oceans Office (NOO) - initially part of the Department of Environment, 
now an independent, prescribed executive agency formed under the Public Service 
Act 1999, designed to implement AOP and coordinate and develop RMP5; and 
• Expert Working Groups and Regional Stakeholder Groups - comprising key non-
government and government experts and stakeholders in each region to advise on the 
RMP process. 186 
Figure 1 	Commonwealth Integrated Oceans Management institutional arrangements 
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186 Bergin and Haward (1999); and 
Commonwealth of Australia. (2003). "Oceans Policy: Principles and Processes." Hobart: National 
Oceans Office: 9. 
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2.2.2 Australia's Oceans Policy commitment for fisheries 
Australia's Oceans Policy identifies a number of challenges faced by Government in the 
effective management of ecologically sustainable fisheries in Australia. These challenges 
have been identified in the AOP Specific Sectoral Measures document' 87, which also 
identifies the Commonwealth's response to these challenges that will be implemented 
through regional marine planning. The first challenge is "to ensure ecologically sustainable 
fisheries that contribute to the social, cultural, environmental and economic well-being of 
Australians". 188 
The Commonwealth (the Government) response to this challenge has been addressed in 
terms of its commitment under several different programs. In fisheries management, the 
Government committed to: 
• carry out a comprehensive review of fisheries laws and regulations in order to 
streamline processes and reduce compliance costs through the Competition Policy 
Review; 
• continue the existing cost recovery regime and not impose a resource rent on the 
industry; 
undertake strategic environmental impact assessments of all new Commonwealth 
fisheries management plans and for all those without management plans within five-
years, in line with the requirements of the EPBC Act; 
• improve stakeholder involvement in management arrangements; 
• review existing and finalise remaining OCS arrangements for offshore fisheries; 
• continue to seek greater consistency in fisheries management across jurisdictions; 
• use RMPs to resolve resource allocation issues between commercial, recreational 
and charter fisheries; and 
improve the science base for management and development of marine resources. 189 
In terms of meeting the challenge of ecologically sustainable fisheries practices, AOP 
commits the Government to: 
• finalise and implement the Commonwealth Fisheries Bycatch Policy and a National 
Fisheries Bycatch Policy; 
develop and implement fisheries-specific actions, including Bycatch Action Plans 
(BAPs), into fisheries management arrangements; 
187 Commonwealth of Australia (1998) "Australia's Oceans Policy." 
188 Ibid 9. 
Ibid: 10. 
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provide $700,000 to establish a network of fisheries extension officers, through 
SeaNet, to promote environmentally sound fishing practices; 
• continue to implement the Recovery and Threat Abatement Plans for endangered 
species; 
• continue to lead international efforts and cooperate with Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations (RFMO5) to reduce seabird bycatch in fishing 
operations; 
develop and implement policies for the ESD of new fisheries, including pre-
commercial and experimental fisheries; 
• continue to develop performance and operational sustainability indicators taking into 
account broad ESD objectives; 
• continue to implement monitoring programs to ensure fisheries achieve long-term 
sustainability; 
• ensure domestic management arrangements are in line with international obligations 
• to effectively manage marine living resources; and 
. minimise the translocation of harmful marine pests.' 90 
To promote stewardship of the oceans and its fisheries resources, the Government committed 
to continuing efforts to develop codes of responsible fishing behaviour and fostering 
community involvement in activities that promote stewardship. 191  With a view to improving 
the sustainability and efficiency of fisheries, the Government committed to continuing its 
review of existing and potential economic and regulatory instruments. 192 
It is recognised that in meeting some of the requirements of AOP, some fisheries will require 
a form of structural adjustment and to this end, the Government committed to: 
carry out an industry development program in the southern shark fishery to make the 
industry more viable, while protecting the environment; 
• remove excess capacity in fisheries; 
• continue to pursue self-funded adjustment strategies through economic incentives; 
develop an industry-government working group to discuss options for an industry 
development program for the southeast non-trawl fishery; and 
• continue to participate in international forums, such as FAO and APEC, in an effort 
to reduce excess global fishing capacity.' 93 
190 Commonwealth of Australia (1998) "Australia's Oceans Policy": 10. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
Ibid: 11. 
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The Government recognised that recreational, charter and commercial fisheries often 
compete for the same resources and that management should be integrated to reflect this 
fact. 114  Therefore, the specific sectoral measures the Government committed to included: 
contributing $1 .8million to a National Recreational Fishing Survey; 
appointing a game fishers' representative to the Eastern Tuna and Billfish MAC; 
the development and implementation of a nationally consistent approach to 
recreational and charter fishing; 
continuing to ensure recreational fishing is ecologically sustainable; and 
continuing to involve recreational fisheries in consultative committee processes 
where appropriate. 195 
The Government committed to industry action through an ongoing commitment to: 
identify and implement cost-cutting strategies for industry and to encourage 
innovation and environmental responsibility; 
• increase trade and investment opportunities for industry; 
• remove unnecessary regulatory burden and minimise transaction costs to resource 
users; and 
• encourage the adoption of quality assurance and value-adding strategies through the 
SeaQual program. 196 
The Oceaiis Policy recognised that effective fisheries and oceans management could not be 
implemented without improvements to the current scientific knowledge base. 197 The 
Government, in recognising the need for improved science, committed to: 
• enhancing the capacity to conduct stock assessments; 
• collaborate with industry to undertake research and development to support 
management of new, ecologically sustainable fisheries; and 
• support research into the impacts of fishing and methods to mitigate these impacts, 
the use of catch components that would otherwise remain unused and life cycle 
knowledge of economically important species.' 98 
The problem of illegal fishing in Australian waters is increasing as global demands on 
diminishing fish stocks increase. This is especially the case in Australia's sub-Antarctic 
'p" Commonwealth of Australia (1998) "Australia's Oceans Policy": 25. 
195 1bid: 11. 
' 96 Ibid: 11. 
19'lbid. 
198 Ibid. 
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waters where the valuable, yet diminishing Patagonian toothflsh is targeted and to the north, 
where Indonesian vessels regularly encroach our waters. Through AOP, the Government's 
response to the rise in illegal fishing is to: 
• increase the number of civil patrols in our sub-Antarctic waters; 
employ more fisheries officers to police our northern waters; 
• amend the fisheries legislation to make surveillance and enforcement of foreign 
fishing more effective; • 
• continue to support the protection of fish stocks from illegal fishing through 
international forums such as the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO); 
• continue to develop national and international strategies dealing with illegal fishing, 
non-compliance and enforcement issues; 
implement the United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (the Fish Stocks Agreement); and 
develop a cost-effective means of implementing Australia's responsibilities as a port 
and flag State.' 99 
Notwithstanding that the development of AOP was a major achievement, the extent to which 
the policy added value could be questioned given that the main initiatives addressed in 
Volume 2 of AOP, the Specific Sectoral Measures, were already being addressed and the 
principles encapsulated by the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development 
and integrated management were already core elements of government policies. The value 
of such a policy, however, is shown by the fact that the specific measures being, or to be 
pursued by the Commonwealth across ocean sectors are coordinated, or at least made 
explicit, in the one document highlighting how the Commonwealth is planning to 
operationalise the goals set out for AOP. 
2.3 Regional Marine Plans 
Regional marine planning is the primary mechanism for implementing the ecosystem-based 
principles of the Commonwealth's AOP.20° In May 1999 a two-day workshop was held in 
Canberra to determine the RMP framework . 201  The major topics discussed were the 
planning phases, public consultation procedures and the draft structure of the Preliminary 
Options Paper. 
199 Commonwealth of Australia (1998) "Australia's Oceans Policy": 11. 
200 National Oceans Office. (2003). "Regional Marine Planning." 
http://www.oceans.gov.au/regional—marine-plan-overview.jsp 
201 Wescott (2000). 
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The resulting RMP framework comprises four phases. These are: the scoping, or definition 
phase of the Plan; determining the economic, social, environmental and cultural 
characteristics of the region via assessments; developing potential options; and analysing 
those options in order to implement the Plan .202 The scoping phase involves the definition of 
the regional boundaries and an overview of the environmental, economic, social and cultural 
interests in the region. The assessment phase then further defines these interests to improve 
our understanding of the unique characteristics of the region that should be protected or 
safeguarded for the future. There are six areas investigated in the assessment phase, namely: 
the biological and physical characteristics important to the region; 
the human uses within the region; 
the impacts that can affect the natural system; 
the community and cultural values of the region; 
the indigenous uses and values; and 
the management and institutional arrangements. 203 
The next phase is to develop options for management. This includes defining a list of 
alternative institutional arrangements that could be effectively used to implement the RMP. 
Finally, the selected option must be carefully implemented to ensure the objectives are being 
adequately met and that these act in accordance with the principles of AOP. 
It was claimed that Regional Marine Plans would: 
"implement ecosystem-based management as the basis for decision-making and 
management and embed the principles of ecologically sustainable development, 
including precaution into all decision making processes; 
. promote ecologically sustainable marine based industries that contribute to regional 
development; 
develop integrated management of sectoral activities and achieve strong efficient 
cross-sector linkages; 
. work towards consistency in management across jurisdictional boundaries when 
impacting upon the same oceans resource or sector; 
. lead to clearly defined and agreed Regional Marine Plan outcomes that are integrated 
across all sectors; 
. lead to fair decision-making and conflict resolution regarding access to oceans 
resources within and between generations; 
202 National Oceans Office. (2001). "Regional assessments for the South-east Regional Marine Plan." 
http://www.oceans.gov.au/reg—ass—intro.htm 
201 Ibid. 
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• increase involvement of resource users and the community at large in planning and 
decision making; 
engender long term responsible use of oceans resources - stewardship; 
provide flexible management arrangements that focus on measurable outcomes 
coordinated across sectors; 
contribute to adaptive management based on monitoring and evaluation of outcomes 
of management against expected performance, including providing for auditing and 
review processes; and 
• establish clear and agreed definitions of issues and terminology. "20" 
2.3.1 The South-east Regional Marine Plan 
Internationally, the Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) concept focuses atteition away from 
sectoral or jurisdictional management towards management of the marine ecosystem as a 
whole. 205  LMEs as conceptualised by Hinds (1992), refer to ecosystems that are so large that 
they cross several jurisdictional boundaries, thus requiring international attention. 206 
Australia has adapted this concept to address its national obligations for the effective 
management of ecosystems within its EEZ (also termed LMEs, but on a national scale). The 
first region chosen for planning was the South-east Region (the Region), incorporating over 
two million square kilometres of Australia's ocean waters off Victoria, Tasmania (including 
Macquarie Island), southern New South Wales and eastern South Australia (see Figure 2).207 
204 Environment Australia / National Oceans Office. (2002). "Environment Australia/National Oceans 
Office briefing on Marine Protected Areas in the South East Regional Marine Plan for the 
Commonwealth Marine Protected Areas Stakeholder Reference Group, the South East Regional 
Marine Plan Working Group, and the South East Regional Marine Plan Steering Committee." 
Outcomes of meeting. Melbourne: 17 September 2002. 
205 Hinds, L. (1992). "World marine fisheries. Management and development problems." Marine 
Policy, 16 (5): 394-403. 
206 Hinds (1992). 
207 Eadie (2001); and 
National Oceans Office. (2004). "South-east Regional Marine Plan - Implementing Australia's 
Oceans Policy in the South-east Marine Region." Hobart: National Oceans Office: vii. 
47 
CHAPTER 2: AOP & REGIONAL MARINE PLANNING 
Figure 2 	Map of LMEs that will be the basis for regional marine planning in Australia - the 
light blue around South Australia, Victoria, Tasmania and NSW illustrates the 
SERMP area. 
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[Access date: 20 June 2004]. 
The process to develop the SERMP was launched at a two-day Oceans Forum in Hobart in 
April 2000. The SERMP, as the first RMP, is essentially the 'blueprint' for the regional 
marine planning process in Australia. The south-east is perceived to be one of the more 
complex maritime regions with the inclusion of four states and the Commonwealth in major 
sectors such as fisheries and oil and gas production. 208  The SERMP has evolved over time. 
Initially, it was expected to be primarily a 'plan' that would identify gaps and direct future 
oceans related policy and management within the region. As the SERMP has developed, a 
'08 Bergin and Haward (1999). 
48 
CHAPTER 2: AOP & REGIONAL MARINE PLANNING 
focus on 'process' has emerged. The objective of the SERMP has evolved into the 
development of a framework for making management and policy decisions at the regional 
level, while identifying specific issues that need to be addressed in meeting the objectives of 
the SERMP. This reorientation from 'plan' to 'process' was, in part, a response to concerns 
expressed by Commonwealth agencies over progress in developing the SERMP. 
In February 2003, the Minister for the Environment and Heritage, the Hon David Kemp 
noted that the Board agencies were not satisfied with the progress of the SERMP. Although 
agencies outside the National Oceans Office (NOO) were applying pressure to speed up the 
process, they were reluctant to engage in a process they felt isolated from. The process was 
therefore slowed down and a concentrated effort to effectively engage Commonwealth 
agencies was embarked upon. On 21 February 2003, a workshop was held by the NOO in 
Canberra with all Board agencies to discuss the way forward and to ensure agencies were 
satisfied with the SERMP agenda. The process was expected to produce thee products in 
June/July 2003 that would adequately cover the concerns and hesitations of the Board 
agencies. These products were: 
• a post budget assessment of the ongoing role of the NOO; 
• a governance framework document highlighting implementation strategies; and 
• an action plan, or strategy for the south-east, which was more program related .201 
The draft SERMP was released on 18 July 2003, by the Chair of the NOMB and Minister for 
the Environment and Heritage, the Hon Dr David Kemp, with an Oceans Policy: Principles 
and Processes companion document outlining the Integrated Oceans Process for improving 
the cross-sectoral integration of oceans management, effectively defining the governance 
framework and implementation strategies for regional marine planning. The Integrated 
Oceans Process proposes a whole-of-government approach for decision-making with respect 
to marine issues that impact on more than one agency's area of responsibility. 210 It 
comprises three steps for issues assessment and strategy formulation: 
1. Relevance Testing - scoping the issues to determine if there is a lack of clarity with 
respect to assigned agency responsibility, what management arrangements are 
required for a new use of the ocean, what new policies could impact the marine 
environment, the cross-jurisdictionallcross-sectoral implications of an issue, the 
potential interactions/conflicts associated with the issue and if there is a potential for 
high-risk impacts (that is, through cumulative impacts); 
209 National Oceans Office. (2003). Canberra: DEll. Workshop - 21 February 2003. 
210 Commonwealth of Australia. (2003) "Oceans Policy.....: 6-7. 
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Issue Scoping and Risk Analysis - identification of the lead agency and risk analysis 
of issues (to be guided by Oceans Guidelines - once developed); and 
Strategy Development - assigning management strategies to deal with the issues 
effectively, using measurable objectives and indicators as well as the establishment 
of future integrated institutional arrangements. 
While the NOO has worked hard at addressing the issues of concern raised by Board 
agencies in the February 2003 workshop, there remains a level of uncertainty about the 
NOO's long-term ongoing role, which continues to cause anxiety amongst those involved in 
the process. 
The final SERMP was officially released by the Chair of the NOMB and Minister for the 
Environment and Heritage, the Hon Dr David Kemp, on 21 May 2004.211  The SERMP is the 
'action plan' for implementing Australia Oceans Policy in the South-east Marine Region. 
The SERMP includes nine regional objectives, which guided the development of the Plan 
and its 93 associated actions .212  In recognition of the SERMP being as yet unable to deliver 
on certain issues, a supplement to the SERMP will be produced in 12 months time. The 
SERMP Supplement will include details on: 
a complete system of marine protected areas (MPAs) within the Region (that is, a 
full assessment and identification of candidate areas within all 11 Broad Areas Of 
Interest, building on the two included in the SERMP) 213 ; 
• progress on a performance assessment system to measure the progress of the actions 
outlined in the SERMP; 
• progress on the integration of MPAs and other spatial closures, such as fisheries 
closures; 
• tools and approaches for achieving multiple-use management (drawing from the 
Otways case-study) ; and 
• an initial review of the progress on actions outlined in the SERMP. 214 
The SERMP is broken down into sections that reflect AOP. Each section is then assigned 
corresponding regional objectives and sub-objectives that are to be addressed, with specific 
actions to address these objectives outlined in the action plan. 
211 National Oceans Office (2004). "South-cast Regional Marine Plan." 
http://www.oceans.gov.aulse_implementation_plan.jsp [Access date: 20 June 2004]. 
212 National Oceans Office (2004) "South-east Regional Marine Plan - Implementing.....: viii. 
213 See Section 2.5.2 below for explanation of the NRSMPAs. 
214 National Oceans Office (2004) "South-east Regional Marine Plan - Implementing.....: xii. 
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The Managing Uses section, for example, refers to the management of human needs and 
uses within the Region. The objectives encompassed by this section are to: 
• increase long-term security of access and certainty of process for existing and future 
marine-based industries; and 
. promote economic development and job creation in the Region consistent with 
ecologically sustainable development. 215 
The Ecosystems section reflects the interconnectivity of processes and functions of the 
marine environment. This section guides management towards ecosystem-based 
management through the establishment of a National Representative System of Marine 
Protected Areas (NRSMPAs) in the Region and the management of human impacts on the 
environment, consistent with the principles of ESD. The regional objectives associated with 
this section are to: 
• protect, conserve and restore the Region's marine biodiversity, ecological processes, 
natural and cultural marine heritage; 
• increase knowledge and understanding of the Region to improve our capacity to 
pursue ecologically sustainable development; and 
• ensure that all ocean uses are ecologically sustainable .216 
The Cooperative Management section refers to the partnerships between governments, 
industry, the indigenous and wider community necessary for effective assessment, planning 
and management of oceans resources. This section also refers to the need for effective 
marine education tools, compliance and enforcement efforts and more targeted and 
coordinated scientific research and data management in the Region. 
The objectives relating to the Cooperative Management section are to: 
enhance community and industry stewardship and understanding of the values and 
benefits of the Region and involve them in its management; 
• take into account in decision making the needs, values and contributions of the 
community, industry, the national interest and international obligations relevant to 
the Region; 
215 National Oceans Office (2004) "South-east Regional Marine Plan - Implementing...": 45. 
216 Ibid: 49-53. 
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integrate management of access, allocation, conservation and use of marine 
resources to ensure fairness and accountability to the community and all users; and 
• involve indigenous communities in management of the Region in a manner that 
recognises and respects their rights, custodial responsibilities, contributions and 
knowledge .217 
Finally, the issues relating to the Implementation and Review of the SERMP and process are 
identified. Actions relating to adaptive management processes, which are an important 
component of regional marine planning that recognise our limited knowledge base and that 
management progresses with improvements in our understanding of the marine ecosystems 
and environment, risk-assessment and performance assessment, are included. 218 
While the action plan219 in the SERMP provides comprehensive aims and objectives for the 
Region with respect to integrated management, there are few tangible 'actions' to illustrate 
to the reader exactly how these objectives will be applied in practice. The action plan 
focuses on high-level objectives that will be further refined into operational objectives as 
appropriate institutional arrangements are implemented to address issues of integration and 
cross-sectoral and/or cross-jurisdictional coordination. 
2.3.2 The SERMP commitment for fisheries 
The SERMP action plan is arguably more vague operationally than the sectoral measures 
proposed in the AOP document. There are only a small number of actions in the SERMP 
that apply specifically to fisheries in the South-east Region, with the remainder of actions 
describing processes being carried out under other initiatives or contributing to integrated 
oceans management in general, rather than the anticipated focus on the needs of the Region. 
The actions that apply generally, but may have some impact on fisheries management 
include, but are not limited to: 
. the establishment of a broad-scale resource sharing framework (Action 1.1.1); 
continuing to provide opportunities for industry innovation and to manage industry 
expansion, to achieve ecologically sustainable use of marine resources in the Region 
(Action 1.2.1); 
promoting and encouraging industry uptake of environment management systems in 
the Region (Action 1.4.1); 
217 National Oceans Office (2004) "South-east Regional Marine Plan - Implementing... " : 54-58. 
218 Ibid: 59. 
219 Thud: 45-59. 
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recognising and promoting existing best practice and innovation in marine-based 
industries through information sharing and communication tools (Action 1.4.2); 
developing tools and approaches for multiple-use management (initially through the 
Otways case-study) (Action 1.6.1); 
conducting a targeted regulatory efficiency review (Action 1.7.1); 
continuing to develop a representative system of MPAs in Commonwealth waters 
and enhancing coordination across jurisdictions (Actions 2.1-2.2); 
developing measures to assist industry meet conservation requirements across the 
Region (action 2.3.7); 
building links between management of offshore marine resources/ecosystems and 
estuaries in the Region by identifying ecosystem services provided by estuaries, 
including the economic value of estuarine habitats to key species (Action 2.8.1); 
developing and applying methods of multiple-use risk assessment for threats to the 
marine environment, industry and communities (Action 2.9.1); 
supporting mechanisms to minimise interactions between industry and protected 
species (Action 2.9.6); 
• supporting awareness raising and capacity building initiatives for industry and the 
community (Action 3.2.1); 
reviewing the efficiency and effectiveness of existing stakeholder consultation 
mechanisms (Action 3.2.2); 
supporting industry-led research, education and participation initiatives in the 
Region (Action 3.4.1); 
communicating marine industry and community contribution to marine research in 
the Region (Action 3.4.2); 
incorporating risk-based decision making and management strategy evaluation into 
decision making processes (Action 4.2.1); and 
assessing the cumulative, social, economic and ecological impacts of multiple uses 
to determine priority areas for research and management (Action 4.2.3).220 
Other actions described in the SERMP apply specifically to fisheries, but remain vague in 
detail. These actions are expected to be applied across all the regions, with responses 
differing according to the circumstances in which they are applied. These actions are: 
• the establishment of an agreed framework for fisheries resource sharing and 
management between sectors (commercial, recreational, indigenous and aquaculture) 
that use Commonwealth managed fisheries (Action 1.1.2); 
220 National Oceans Office (2004) "South-east Regional Marine Plan - Implementing...": 45-59. 
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• to encourage and promote value-adding in the fishing industry in the Region (Action 
1.2.2); 
• to support scoping studies of economic issues facing commercial fisheries in the 
Region (Action 1.3.1); 
• to continue to assess Commonwealth fisheries performance in the Region using 
ABARE industry surveys and FIRS Fishery Status Reports (Action 1.3.3); 
to implement the "Displaced Fishing and Marine Protected Areas" policy framework 
(Action 1.5.2); 
to continue to promote and support improved communications between the 
petroleum industry and the commercial fishing sector with regard to seismic surveys 
and with other sectors more broadly (Action 1.6.2); 
to investigate ways and efficiencies in integrating fisheries spatial management and 
MPAs or other spatial management in other sectors in the Region (Action 2.3.3-
2.3.4); 
• to continue to conduct sectorally focused risk assessments - that is, strategic 
assessments under the EPBC Act (Action 2.9.2); 
• to support further research and development for the design and use of mitigation 
methods to avoid seal interactions in the fishing industry (Action 2.9.5); and 
• to examine the means for establishing regional structures and promoting indigenous 
participation in commercial fisheries and aquaculture (Actions 3.11.1 and 3.11.3) .221 
There are, however, some specific actions directed at the Southern Region Fisheries. These 
actions are: 
• to pursue complementary ecosystem-based fisheries management arrangements for 
fisheries resources, extending across the South-east Region, including consideration 
of OCS arrangements (Action 1.8.1); 
• to use ecological risk assessment of Commonwealth fisheries in the Region to 
determine priority research and management areas (Action 2.9.3); and 
• to investigate the use of management strategy evaluation for all sectors - but in the 
first instance, in the Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark (SESS) Fishery 
(Action 4.2.2).222 
221 National Oceans Office (2004) "South-east Regional Marine Plan - Implementing...": 45-59. 
222 Ibid. 
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In light of the relatively non-specific nature of these 'actions', it would be arguably more 
accurate to refer to this action plan as an agenda setting exercise, to which specific action 
responses will be developed as it is applied in the Region. Some of the more refined action 
responses and assessment systems will be released in the SERMP Supplement, however, the 
action plan as it stands is non-committal and provides little guidance as to what regional 
marine planning will mean for industries and the environment. 
2.3.3 Marine Protected Areas 
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) can incorporate ecosystem-based management, the 
precautionary approach to planning and management, adaptive management and a 
framework for conflict management if appropriately implemented .223  Where specific 
emphasis is placed in any MPA depends on the circumstances for which they were created. 
The criteria under which MPAs are designated range from scientific or ecological criteria to 
pragmatic and qualitative criteria and more recently, for socioeconomic, and representative 
area criteria .224  MPAs can serve as insurance against fisheries management mistakes, to 
protect biodiversity and regions for non-consumptive uses, to protect vulnerable species and 
habitats or for the management of conflicting uses. 225  For example, the Cod Grounds Marine 
Reserve is being established off the coast of Laurieton, NSW, to protect the critically 
endangered grey nurse shark. 116  Whereas, the Murray and Zeehan MPAs, being developed 
as part of the SERMP, are for the protection of more general conservation values identified 
through the National Representative System of MPAs. 
MPAs can be used in the integrated oceans management framework for effective conflict 
management between resource users and in fisheries management to maintain fish stocks and 
their habitats .117  Whilst ecosystem-based fisheries management issues can be addressed 
through management plans, MPAs provide an efficient and effective way to simultaneously 
achieve both fisheries management objectives and the broader objectives of integrated 
oceans management. Quite often, in meeting the objectives of one purpose, MPAs have 
unintended consequences or impacts. For example, a MPA established for conservation 
purposes can have an unintentional impact on the profitability of a given fishery. 
223 Agardy, M.T. (1994). "Advances in marine conservation: the role of marine protected areas." 
Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 9(7): 267-270. 
224 McNeill, SE. (1994). "The selection and design of marine protected areas: Australia as a case 
study." Biodiversity and Conservation, 3: 586-605. 
225 Ward, T.J., Heinemann, D. and Evans, N. (2001). "The role of marine reserves as fisheries 
managements tools." Canberra: BRS (AFFA): 23, 26. 
226 Department of the Environment and Heritage. (2004). "Cod Grounds Marine Reserve proposal." 
http://www.deh.gov.au/coasts/mpa/cod-groundsf#proposal  [Access date: 24 January 2005]. 
227 Ward, T. and Hegerl, E. (2003). "Marine Protected Areas in Ecosystem-Based Management of 
Fisheries." A report prepared for the Department of the Environment and Heritage for discussion at 
the World Parks Congress, Durban, South Africa. September 2003. 
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For MPAs to be successful in achieving their objectives, they must be implemented with 
sufficient monitoring and enforcement budgets, strategies and personnel to ensure they are 
effective and do not simply remain 'paper parks' 228  Recent studies have also focused on the 
need for complementary management outside the MPAs to ensure the success of the MPA in 
meeting its ecosystem objectives. MPAs established in the context of RMPs, have the 
potential to achieve this complementarity. It is also important that stakeholders can see the 
positive effects of MPA implementation through ongoing monitoring and objectives-based 
assessment .229 
The IUCN General Assembly identifies the two separate, but inextricably linked, roles of 
MPAs as being for ecosystem-based management and for the provision of 'no-take' reserves, 
free from human impact .230  It Australia, much confusion as to the objectives and hence, the 
effects, of MPAs has stemmed from the variation in terminology used between states and 
between states and the Commonwealth . 23 ' A Marine Park in one state may indicate a 
complete no-take area designed to protect a specific species, while in another state it may 
represent an area managed for multiple uses to meet an overall ecological conservation 
objective. This confusion can lead to compliance issues through misinterpretation of 
terminology232 and a lack of trust in the process of designation if stakeholders have raised 
expectations of the level of protection that would be offered by a MPA. 
The concept of 'representative' MPAs were introduced in Australia in the early 1980s. The 
development of a 3-tiered habitat classification scheme was intended to take over the ad hoc 
method of MPA designation experienced in the past. 233  This approach identifies geographic, 
substratum and biotic characteristics and consequently creates a profile of areas appropriate 
for representative protection. The habitat classification scheme was, however, limited by the 
vastness of the oceanic environment, with a majority of funds going towards the protection 
of well-studied areas, vulnerable species and habitat protection. Political and competing 
economic interests also inhibited effective implementation of this scheme. In 1988, the 
World Conservation Union (IUCN) General Assembly called on nations to protect and 
228 Jameson, S.C., Tupper, M.H. and Ridley, J.M. (2002). "The three screen doors: can marine 
"protected" areas be effective?" Marine Pollution Bulletin, 44: 1177-1183; and 
Sanchirico, J.N. (2000). "Marine Protected Areas as Fishery Policy: A Discussion of the Potential 
Costs and Benefits." USA: Resources for the Future. Discussion Paper 00 23. 
229 Sumaila, U.R., Guenette, S., Alder, J. and Cheunpagadee, R. (2000). "Addressing ecosystem 
effects of fishing using marine protected areas." ICES Journal ofMarine Science, 57: 752-760. 
230 Kenchington R., Ward, T. and Hegerl, E. (2003). "The Benefits of Marine Protected Areas." 
Paper prepared for DEll. 28 July 2003: 3. 
231 McNeill (1994). 
232 That is, a Marine Reserve can be a no-take area in one jurisdiction and a multiple-use area in an 
adjacent jurisdiction that may allow for the sustainable use of resources. If there is no consistency, 
or if the user is unaware of the variance across boundaries, this can lead to compliance issues. 
233 McNeill (1994). 
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restore marine heritage through the creation of a global, representative system of MPAS and 
complementary management .234  In light of this international proposal, the National 
Representative System of Marine Protected Areas (NRSMPAs) was declared in Australia, 
bringing representative areas to the forefront of IVIIPA designation once again 
2.3.3.1 Commonwealth MPAs in the SERMP area 
Although legislatively under the auspices of the EPBC Act, the political commitment for 
furthering Commonwealth MPAS towards a National Representative System of Marine 
Protected Areas (NRSMPAs) lies with regional marine planning, led by the NOO and under 
the guidance of the NOMB, making it a whole-of-government commitment. Under the 
NRSMPA initiative, the Commonwealth Government is committed to develop a 
Comprehensive, Adequate and Representative (CAR) system of MPAs to primarily protect 
biodiversity and ensure the long-term viability of marine and estuarine systems. 
The Commonwealth MPA process has been affected by a number of uncertainties since its 
inception. Researchers identified the need for regionalisation early on in the regional marine 
planning process, but the Minister had other priorities for the NOO. 235 What researchers saw 
as a two-year project was rushed through in about six months .236  This 'quick fix' is, 
arguably, nothing more than a response to political pressure, as the only tangible outcome of 
the SERMP, leading up to an election. 
Step one in the development of a CAR system of MPAs in the south-east involved the 
selection of Broad Areas of Interest (BAOI) based on biological and other scientific 
information. Eleven BAOI were identified in the south-east, which included a sample of the 
full range of bioregions in the Region, large enough to adequately protect the whole 
biophysical feature or place that the area aimed to protect, including areas of important 
conservation value .237 
'BAOI' was a concept introduced by the NOO and agreed by the DEH to give stakeholders 
some certainty about where these MPAs would not be. Stakeholders, however, became more 
anxious, as some of the BAOI covered areas of economic interest to them and there was a 
great deal of uncertainty in the way the DEll was handling MPA discussions .238  Uncertainty 
stemmed from the initial determination that there would be 11 candidate areas identified in 
Commonwealth of Australia. (2003). "The Benefits of Marine Protected Areas." Canberra DEB: 4. 
From interview with subject 11454. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Environment Australia / National Oceans Office (2002). 
238 From interview with subject MD2I. 
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the South-east Region, one in each of the 11 BA0L 239 This created a lot of conflict over the 
timing of such designations, given that proper assessment of all 11 candidate sites within two 
years was unrealistic. With this type of commitment, it was also unlikely that states would 
continue any support for RMP, a loss that would be detrimental to the process at that 
stage . 240  The process has, however, evolved. This, together with pressure from industry and 
further research into candidate areas, has meant that it was not necessary to identify a 
candidate area in each of the BAOI in the original SERMP. Only two have been included in 
the SERIvIP. The further nine areas will be assessed for their representativeness, in 
accordance with the ten MPA specifications, and incorporated in the SERMP Supplement 
due for release in 2005. 
A review of the international literature indicates that the fishing industry in general holds 
deep-seated and negative views over MPAs. The industry feels that they often bear the cost 
of policy that will not necessarily provide any benefit to them. 241  In recent times, fishing 
interests have recognised potential benefits for the industry from MPAs. This support, 
however, has often waned when the declaration of MPA impacts on favourite fishing 
grounds .242  Some industry representatives argue that RMPs are being used as vehicles for 
MPAs and for the DEll to become active participants in fisheries management processes and 
as such, refuse to show support for RMPs. 243 There continues to be strong opposition by 
some within the fishing industry over MPAs, despite the effort and investment that has 
already gone into the consultation procesS. 244  This is primarily because these fishers feel 
they continually bear the cost of government decisions, in terms of access and financial 
burden on the industry. Fishers may also view MPAS as merely another way of managing 
already sustainable fisheries, rather than for the protection of ecosystem health .241 
As with many areas of public policy the problem faced by MPAs is that their benefits are 
slow to realise while the costs, or loss of income to key stakeholders are immediate, 
impacting on fishermen's livelihoods that may not be able to survive the short-term 
reductions in income. 246  Until scientists can be more confident in their predictions of the 
benefits of MPAs and managers more confident that adequate compliance and enforcement 
239 From interview with subject NT49. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Jusseit, H. and Robinson, E. (2003). "Eastern Tuna & Billfish Fishery Industry Code of Practice for 
Responsible Fishing." Queensland: East Coast Tuna Boat Owners Association Inc (ECTBOA); and 
Bohnsack, J.A. (1993). "Marine Reserves: they enhance fisheries, reduce conflicts, and protect 
resources." Oceanus, 36(3): 63-67. 
242 Environment Australia / National Oceans Office (2002). 
243 From interviews with subject EY7I and NT49. 
244 From interview with subject 1 ,M21. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Jusseit and Robinson (2003). 
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can be implemented to realise these benefits, there will remain much resistance as to the true 
value of MPAs, especially of 'representative' areas competing with commercial production 
areas. There is clearly still a need for rethinking or for more education into what the process 
is about - why it is necessary and how it will impact industry if it is to go ahead 
successfully? 	 - 
2.4 Integration in Commonwealth oceans management 
2.4.1 Cross-sectoral arrangements in oceans management 
Cross-sectoral integration has been achieved at the Cabinet level through the Sustainable 
Environment Committee (SEC). The SEC was established to fulfil an election promise to 
provide a whole-of-government framework on issues of environmental sustainability. The 
SEC comprises the Prime Minister (as Chair) and Ministers from the portfolios of Transport 
and Regional Services; Environment and Heritage; Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry; 
Education, Science and Training; Industry, Tourism and Resources; and Fisheries, Forestry 
and Conservation . 247  Mailers considered by the Committee include greenhouse policy, the 
National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, land clearing, bio-diversity and oceans 
policy. 248  This body, however, only deals with high-level policy decisions and the more 
operational aspects of integration fall on other designated bodies or departments down the 
hierarchical chain. 
Australia has no legislative basis for integrated cross-sectoral management of its marine 
industries. However, the Commonwealth of Australia has committed itself to cross-sectoral 
integrated oceans management through the establishment of the NOMB, which is 
responsible for decision-making and the implementation of AUP. The composition of the 
NOMB means that it is well placed to deal with cross-sectoral integration issues at the 
Ministerial level. Ministers outside the NOMB may be called on to participate in certain 
decision-making processes that are relevant to their portfolios, however, in practice this 
option has rarely been put into use. The limitation of the NUMB is that there are no state 
ministers involved. To adequately meet all aspects of integrated oceans management, which 
crosses administrative jurisdictional boundaries, it is imperative that state ministers are 
included in the decision-making processes. 
247 National Oceans Office. (2004). "Australia's Oceans Policy Institutional Structures." DRAFT 
paper in preparation. 
248 Commonwealth Government. (2003). "Sustainable Environment Committee." The Commonwealth 
Government On-line Directory. http://www.gold.gov.au . 
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The establishment of the OBOM was a positive outcome of the Norton Review of Oceans 
Policy implementation, contributing towards cross-sectoral integration. 149  The OBOM is a 
very useful body in terms of filtering out important information that is to go to the NOMB 
for decision-making. It allows the NOMB to focus on the task of reaching agreeable 
outcomes that are based on a whole-of-government approach. While the OBOM has been a 
successful body, it lacks any state representation and hence cannot adequately deal with any 
potential integration issues or conflicts that cross jurisdictions. Although, on advice from the 
BASO and the BAOO, the OBOM may be better positioned to predict these issues than the 
NOMB. The BASO and BAOO work to the OBOM, which in turn reports to the NOMB, in 
a hierarchical chain of command. This gives rise to the question of whether, by the time 
specific regional groups are also added, there are too many layers in the bureaucracy, which 
can lead to a break down in the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall system down the 
track. This is something the NOO, in coordinating the process, will need to be wary of. 
To ensure a Commonwealth approach to oceans planning and management, the Oceans 
Policy Inter-Departmental Committee (OPIDC) was initiated for input via the NOO. The 
OPIDC consists of operational level representatives from Commonwealth portfolios beyond 
and inclusive of the five Board agency portfolios. This body acts to inform other agencies 
on oceans planning and management issues, rather than to get 'sign-off' on specific issues, to 
ensure that a whole of Commonwealth Government approach is maintained. This body is  
limited in its cross-sectoral capacity by a lack of decision-making authority but can act as a 
strong advisory body for the NOO in relation to issues that may impact other agencies and 
sectors beyond the scope of the five Board agencies. 
Regional marine planning has certainly enhanced the cross-sectoral integration capacity of 
the Commonwealth Government. With respect to oceans management, through the 
structures and instruments described above, the Government has moved from a position of 
conflict avoidance through 'negative' integration, to a more positive approach to integration 
through consensus building between departments and ministers. On the Policy Integration 
Scale (see Section 1.2.1), before AOP and regional marine planning initiatives were 
introduced, the Commonwealth Government worked around a Level 4 with respect to cross-
sectoral integration, which ensured that the Government had one voice and that different 
departments did not take divergent negotiating positions from one another .25G  This concept 
of not being inconsistent, or 'negative' integration was achieved by clearing work through 
249 TFG International. (2002). "Review of the Implementation of Oceans Policy." Final Report. 25 
October 2002. 
250 Metcalfe, L. (1994). "International Policy Co-ordination and Public Management Reform." 
International Review ofAdininistrative Sciences, 60: 271-290. 
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the hierarchical chains of command within each department and being supported by Level 2 
type structures, like the OPIDC, involving one-way information exchanges. The 
introduction of integrated oceans management, as envisaged by AOP and regional marine 
planning introduced a more proactive approach to planning and management, whereby 
consensus was sought between ministers and departments on the future direction of oceans 
management such that sectoral activities and interests were coordinated with each other in 
the planning stage of development. This approach is consistent with Level 5 on the Policy 
Integration Scale and reflects Australia's commitment towards integrated ecosystem-based 
management. 
2.4.2 Cross-jurisdictional arrangements in oceans management 
The Integrated Oceans Management (TOM) Initiative stems from a request of the Natural 
Resource Management Ministerial Council (NRMMC) and is being carried out by the TOM 
Working Group (IOMWG) of the NRMMC's Marine and Coastal Committee (MACC), 
which was established in 2002.251  The IOMWG consists of Commonwealth and states 
working in collaboration to develop a national approach to IOM, with one of the main 
functions of the IOMWG being to report to the MACC on options for integrated approaches 
to sustainable oceans use across all jurisdictions. 252  The Director of the NOD chairs the 
IOMWG, with Secretariat support provided by the NOO. This IOMWG is the 
Commonwealth's method for bringing the states into the negotiation process without 
revisiting the arduous tensions associated with the Oceans Policy. Cooperation on IOM is 
not, however, intended to create another layer of bureaucracy or to override current OCS 
arrangements, which generally constitute reactive cross-jurisdictional agreements on specific 
sectoral issues, usually limited to bilateral negotiations. Rather, TOM is intended to 
streamline current arrangements through facilitation of cross-jurisdictional decision- 
making. 253 
The basic principles underpinning TOM stem from the common ground sought through the 
development of the Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE) in 1992, the 
National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) also in 1992 and the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 1997 .254  The National Strategy for ESD 
251 National Oceans Office. (2002). "Developing a national approach to integrated oceans 
management: principles and outcomes." DRAFT Paper for consideration by the IOM Working 
Group. 13 December 2002. 
252 National Oceans Office (2004) "Australia's Oceans Policy Institutional..." 
253 IOMWG (2003). "Joint Statement - Integrated Oceans Management: A collaboration approach to 
the ecologically sustainable development of Australia's marine resources." Endorsed by the 
Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council on 3 October 2003; and 
Vince (2003) "Australia's Oceans Policy..... 
254 IOMWG (2003) "Joint Statement—..." 
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committed all governments to managing resource uses in a way that ensures ecological 
sustainability and equity within and between generations, while the IGAE and COAG 
pushed for enhanced cooperation and integration. 255 
IOM is the coordination ofplanning and management activities and policy development 
within and between sectors of activity (industries, community) and governments to deliver 
ecologically sustainable development of the ocean and its resources, based upon and 
understanding of ecological, social, cultural and economic values. 216  IOM work to date has 
involved the IOMWG reaching agreement on national outcomes that TOM should achieve 
and the associated endorsement of these outcomes by the MACC. 257 In the December 2003 
meeting, the IOMWG worked on ways to deliver these desired outcomes and developed a 
work program towards this end for 2004.258  One decision resulting from the December 
meeting was to broaden the scope of the IOMWG to include other Ministerial Council 
representatives to encompass the full suite of sectoral interests impacted and involved in 
such decision-making. 259 Therefore, the IOMWG now also includes representatives from the 
Standing Committees for Transport, Tourism and Mineral and Petroleum Resources. 260  This 
extended IOMWG will be charged with the responsibility of working out how to get the 
national outcomes actioned through their individual chains of command. Some of these 
actions are already underway, for example the Oceans Guidelines, being developed by the 
NOO, will establish the guidelines for applying ecosystem-based management to the oceans. 
There is debate between the Commonwealth and states about where IOM sits with respect to 
other policies and plans. It is the states' view that IOM is overarching of both 
Commonwealth responses, such as AOP and RIvIP, and state responses, such as coastal 
planning and water quality initiatives. 26' Until recently it was the Commonwealth's view, 
however, that IOM sits under AOP, thus continuing the debate with the states over the 
endorsement of AOP. 262 This view has changed as the Commonwealth realises that they will 
not get as effective state cooperation if TOM sits under the Commonwealth AOP. 263 
255 National Oceans Office (2002) "Developing a national approach..." 
256 IOMWG (2003) "Joint Statement - ... 
257 Hutchison, E. (2004). NOO: Personal Communication- 8 January 2004; 
For detail on outcomes specifics, refer to: JOMWG (2003) "Joint Statement—.. 
258 IOMWG. (2003). "Working towards arrangements to support integrated oceans management - 
Proposed work program (2004)." Endorsed by the Natural Resource Management Ministerial 
Council on 3 October 2003. 
259 Hutchison (2004). 
260 National Oceans Office (2004) "Australia's Oceans Policy Institutional..." 
26! From interview with subject NT49. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Thud 
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The Otways Case Study in the South-east Region is a test of how the TOM framework will 
work in practice. If the Otways case does not work, it is questionable just how TOM will 
practically work as a concept .264  The states will watch the Commonwealth carefully in the 
Otways Case Study to determine how integration with the states, as part of the TOM 
initiative, will work in practice. It will be the first such study that will grapple with the 
concept of moving away from sectoral-based management, towards improving conflicting 
situations through this new integrated way of management. Much of it is political and will 
depend on the personal will of those involved .265 
The IOMWG is limited to deal with cross-jurisdictional issues as they apply to developing a 
national approach to TOM and not specifically to the development or implementation of 
AOP. AOP and regional marine planning are Commonwealth initiatives, therefore are not 
necessarily recognised as initiatives in need of integration in the IOMWG forum. Therefore, 
a separate negotiating forum was established under the auspices of AOP to incorporate state 
interests into regional marine planning. In the South-east Region, a South-east States 
Consultative Working Group was established to keep states informed on the RMP process. 
This forum is limited to advising on Commonwealth developments (Level 2 on the Policy 
Integration Scale) rather than integrating or harmonising management with the states, as is 
happening under the TOM framework. There is, however, suggestion that this forum may be 
utilised for the implementation of some actions in the SERMP, including the Otways case 
study.266 
Integrated oceans management has highlighted the inefficiencies of traditional jurisdictional 
management of the oceans. The TOM initiative is one approach to building the integration 
capacity in oceans management to cross-jurisdictional administrative boundaries. In terms 
of the Policy Integration Scale, cross-jurisdictional integration capacity in this process has 
been at around Level 3, where two-way information exchange between jurisdictions does 
occur. In the absence of national policies or guidelines, however, there has traditionally been 
no onus on states or the Commonwealth to incorporate other interests. Where national 
policies or guidelines do exist relating to oceans management, jurisdictions tend to manage 
their marine domains through the 'negative' integration principle of not being inconsistent 
with those national policies and guidelines. This approach is at a Level 4 on the Policy 
Integration Scale. The IOMWG is a proactive integration tool that brings jurisdictions 
together to reach consensus on a national approach to oceans management issues that cross 
jurisdictional boundaries. As such it is broaching a Level 5 on the Policy Integration Scale, 
264 From interview with subject NT49. 
265 From interview with subject TC 16. 
266 National Oceans Office (2004) "Australia's Oceans Policy Institutional..." 
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but reservations are held as to the ongoing cross-jurisdictional integration capacity of these 
arrangements once a set of national integrated oceans management guiding principles are 
agreed on and the need for such consensus building is reduced. Consensus building could be 
an interim arrangement in setting the national scope for integrated oceans management, after 
which time cross-jurisdictional integration capacity will fall back in line with the traditional 
'negative' integration approach to management. 
2.4.3 Intra-sectoral arrangements in oceans management with respect to 
fisheries 
While AOP and the SEMP do not comprehensively address internal fisheries issues, there 
are some significant commitments made towards enhanced intra-sectoral integration that 
deserve mention in this chapter. Historically, the Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority (AFMA) manages the commercial catch of the Commonwealth fisheries through 
the AFMA Board, on advice from fisheries specific Management Advisory Committees 
(MACs).267  In light of heightened international and national awareness regarding the 
interconnectivity and interdependence of marine resource uses, a commitment in the 
Commonwealth Fisheries Policy Review and in the SERMP means that resource allocation 
for the recreational and indigenous fishers will be addressed in management plans to 
encapsulate the full impact of fishery users on the resources and environment. 268 In October 
2003, the first of quarterly meetings was held between AFMA and RecFish Australia, the 
national recreational fishers representative body. These meetings are designed to allow 
discussion of matters such as allocation in shared fisheries, MAC memberships, spatial 
management and any other issues relating to the coordination of the recreational sector with 
Commonwealth managed fisheries .269  This is a significant step towards resolving some of 
the integration issues within fisheries management with respect to recreational and 
commercial fishing. In addition to these bilateral meetings, in June 2003, the Australian 
Government made a commitment to accelerate work towards the development of a resource-
sharing framework for Commonwealth-managed fisheries through the DAFF (see Section 
3.2.1.6.1 for further details on the resource sharing initiative) .210 
261 Fisheries Administration Act.1991 (Cth) (as amended), ss.56-67. 
268 From interview with subject HKO 1. 
269 From interview with subject F033. 
210 AFFA. (2003). "Looking to the Future: A Review of Commonwealth Fisheries Policy." Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service: Section 3.9; and 
National Oceans Office (2004) "South-east Regional Marine Plan - Implementing...": Action 
1.1.2. 
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2.5 Conflict management in the Commonwealth Oceans Policy 
process 
Conflict in oceans policy is multi-faceted, crossing vertical and horizontal planes both within 
and across government and sectoral interests. The ecosystem-based and integrated approach 
to planning and management underpinning AOP has the potential to engender new conflicts. 
Traditional sector-based management has meant that resource users have had to develop 
management plans and frameworks to manage their specific use and impact on resources in 
isolation. AOP has brought a change in focus to an ecosystem perspective whereby, through 
such processes as regional marine planning, cumulative sectoral impacts will be assessed 
against the objectives of AOP. The process has not, however, satisfactorily reached this 
stage .271  Primarily, this has caused tensions between consumptive.  and non-consumptive 
users as to the impact each is having on the marine environment and the compensation 
required for the imposition of further regulations and limitations to traditional practices. 
In some government departments there is a distinct lack of inter-agency communication and 
networking, which can contribute to conflicts between departments and a lack of trust in 
government .272  While some agencies are very focused and successful in consulting with the 
public, it is often the case that they neglect to consult internally with other agencies or 
sections so that a breakdown in communication occurs, which can lead to duplicated effort or 
misconceptions about what work is actually being carried out. 
Often the cause of conflict in natural resource management is that it is being managed on 
several different levels of government simultaneously and this causes frustration and anxiety 
as to what is being decided elsewhere 'on the food chain'. This has clearly been 
demonstrated in some stales where there was little knowledge and understanding about what 
each level of government and the other departments have decided and are currently working 
on with respect to the Commonwealth's oceans management arrangements. 273 
Resource users such as fisheries and the petroleum industries see the major conflict within 
AOP being with the conservationists. Apart from the philosophical conflict between 
resource users and preservationists, conflicts eventuate because industries believe 
conservationists come to the negotiating table not hilly understanding, nor focusing on the 
issues at hand and/or are simply pushing the "emotive conservationist line of attack".274 
Industries understand that conservationists have a very broad scope of issues from many 
27! From interview with subject GJ62. 
272 From interviews with subject XUI I and TCI6. 
273 Observation resulting from interview process. 
274 From interviews with subject EY71 and BS82. 
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sectors to address and only limited funding to adequately prepare themselves in some cases, 
but argue that this is no excuse for being under-prepared or narrow-minded with respect to 
understanding other interests in the area. 275  Likewise, in some governmental meetings, 
especially those involving agencies with a high turnover of staff or with those that regularly 
use proxies, there is a criticism that the lack of engagement reflects a lack of interest and 
effort in adequately preparing themselves to be effective in meetings that already have a 
work history.276  There is clearly a need for new procedures and expectations of those 
involved in these consultation processes. 
2.5.1 Commonwealth-state relations 
The most prominent conflict that underpins AOP and regional marine planning is the 
political distrust between the states and the Commonwealth. In focusing on integration 
between sectors and jurisdictions, the initial national oceans policy development confronted 
longstanding tensions between Commonwealth and state governments (and between and 
among resource users) over coastal and marine management. The easing of these tensions, 
however, abruptly ceased when the Commonwealth stopped consultation with the states and 
announced the release of the Commonwealth's Australia's Oceans Policy without the 
continuing partnership. This has meant that, despite current MoUs in the northern RMP 
process, no states have formally endorsed AOP or regional marine planning, thus limiting its 
formal reach to Commonwealth waters and agencies. 
The underlying source of this conflict has, however, little to do with the states' views on best 
practice for integrated oceans management, but rather it is a product of political mistrust and 
government concern. The lack of state endorsement has the potential to negatively impact 
on community's involvement in and support for the policy and planning initiatives under 
AOP, given that a fundamental distrust within the government itself is not likely to promote 
wider spread support from state-based stakeholders. 
When the NOO was established in 1999-2000 there was, however, agreement at the 
bureaucratic level that states would work with the NOO. 277 In the south-east, this 
involvement has taken place through the South-east States Consultative Working Group, 
which has met several times since its inception, highlighting the good relations between staff 
at the NOO and state representatives at the officer level .278  This Working Group is not 
advisory, nor decision-making, but rather it comprises representatives remotely involved in 
275 From interview with subject BS82. 
276 From interview with subject TC16. 
277 From interview with subject NT49. 
278 From interviews with subject NT49 and TCI 6. 
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the SERMP process and is the NOO's way of keeping states in the loop about the 
Commonwealth RMP process at the operational level. 279 
2.5.2 Conflict management in the Commonwealth Marine Protected Areas 
process 
The process of developing MPA specifications has been a great source of conflict in itself. 
A group of ecologists were invited to develop specifications for MPA designations based on 
their expertise in the area. They initially came up with around 20 specifications, which went 
to stakeholders for editing and approval and then were peer reviewed by a science and 
management team. The 'peer review' is a contentious point as it was supposedly the experts 
in the ecological field that devised the specifications, so the 'peers', or experts for review 
included the management staff. By the end of the process there were 10 specifications 
remaining. Controversy surrounds the effectiveness of these specifications in achieving 
ecosystem-based management. The specifications were altered from their original scientific 
basis by economic and management interests that centred on minimising conflicts between 
users and ensuring cost-effectiveness with respect to compliance and enforcement .280 Some 
researchers believe that the final specifications lack some of the detail, hence the ecosystem-
based value, of the original specifications. 8 ' Likewise, some stakeholders view the 
specifications as too broad and non-prescriptive, hence inherently creating the polarisation of 
stakeholders in the process and impeding consensus-based decision-making. 282 
The primary goal of the NRSMPA is to develop a system of MPAs that are 
comprehensive - that include MPAs that sample the full range of Australian 
ecosystems; 
adequate - that include a system of MPAs that are of appropriate size and 
configuration to ensure the conservation of marine biodiversity and integrity of 
ecological processes; and 
representative— that include MPAs that reflect the marine life and habitats they are 
chosen to represent. 283 
It appears that the selection of MPA specifications lost sight of this primary goal and made 
the process a political process of reaching agreement rather than meeting the true essence of 
279 From interview with subject TC16. 
280 Environment Australia / National Oceans Office (2002). 
28! From interview with subject 1N54. 
282 From interview with subject FM66. 
283 Commonwealth of Australia. (2003). "Australia's South-east Marine Region: A User's Guide to 
Identifying Candidate Areas for a Regional Representative System of Marine Protected Areas." 
Canberra: Environment Australia. 
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the NRSMPAs, which is for the conservation of a representative sample of marine 
ecosystems and processes. There is no mention of economic or political parameters in the 
CAR system and perhaps, these should therefore be included through a complementary set of 
socioeconomic specifications, in the determination of candidate areas rather than the 
development of ecological specifications in the first place, which are supposed to be based 
on ecosystems and biodiversity conservation. That is not to say that science alone can 
generate the most effective system of MPAs. Stakeholder and political support are essential 
and must be included in the process for effective implementation to occur. The difficulty 
lies in striking a balance between the weight and timing of science-driven and politically-
driven consideration so that ecological integrity is maintained and industry development is 
assured in the long-term. 284 
The MPA process involves several supporting structures tailored to the specific needs of the 
complex process. The Commonwealth MPA Committee (CoMPAC) comprises 
representatives from all Commonwealth agencies with an interest in the area. 285 This cross-
sectoral body is used to avoid surprise reactions in Government by the DEFI informing 
CoMPAC of what is happening in the process, prior to going to the stakeholders. It is the 
responsibility of the respective agency representative to regularly update their Minister on 
sensitive issues that may arise for their portfolios. CoMPAC also provides input into the 
Commonwealth MPA process by highlighting any complementary marine environment 
management objectives, such as spatial management for fisheries .286  It is noted, however, 
that despite processes covering more species-specific aspects of management, these often 
operate on or are implemented using different time scales. It is therefore difficult to predict 
the impact of different processes on each other or the way in which these complement or 
contradict each other, even though the integration of spatial management processes is a 
commitment of the SERMP. 287 The Focus Group was initially formed to discuss and refine 
the BAOI concept as drafted by scientists using reserve design software .288  This group is 
expertise-based and has since been formally.constituted to steer the DEH on the likely 
reactions of the Stakeholder Reference Group to certain proposals. 
Arguably the most important group that the DEH deals with in the process is the 
Commonwealth MPA Stakeholder Reference Group (SRG). The SRG was established as a 
284 Bergen, L.K. and Can, M.H. (2003). "Establishing Marine Reserves. How Can Science Best 
Inform Policy?" Environment, 45 (2): 8-19. 
285 From interview with subject 1N54. 
286 Commonwealth of Australia (2003) "Australia's South-east Marine Region...... 
287 From interview with subject FM66; and 
National Oceans Office (2004) "South-east Regional Marine Plan - Implementing...": Actions 
2.3.3 &2.3.4. 
288 From interview with subject 1N54. 
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result of a request from the Australian Seafood Industry Council (ASIC) and environmental 
NGOs for a better and more open process. 289  It comprises a large group of stakeholder 
representatives nominated by their peers. This group has a formal advisory role, but 
practically the DEH recognises that support from this group is essential for any official 
statement of intent to be passed .290 There was some concern, however, that a breakdown in 
the chain of communication between the ASIC and certain elements of the fishing industry 
meant that fisheries interests were not being adequately represented in the MPA process.29 ' 
This issue has since been addressed through a joint project whereby the DEH and NOO 
provided the ASIC with funding to commission a liaison officer to facilitate the industry's 
input into the MPA process in the SERMP. 292 
The MPAs Stakeholder Reference Group, established as a way to work around isolating 
interest groups in the decision-making process, was designed to bring sectoral stakeholders 
to the table and work together on MPA designation. This process, while laudable, fell apart 
in a September 2003 meeting when fisheries presented their option, oil and gas industry 
presented their position of no exclusions, and the environmental NGOs came to the meeting 
unprepared due to absences and funding delays from the DEH.293 The process then became 
embroiled in conflict with the DEH having to take on a mediation role and try to keep all the 
stakeholders at the table. This failed and the DEH agreed to meet with the stakeholders 
separately to facilitate the development of their individual proposals. The process of 
separate meetings was the exact opposite to the approach recommended to the DEn. With 
appropriate mediation training, however, the relevant personnel may have been able to keep 
control of the situation and continue to work towards an integrated solution.294 What has 
eventuated is that fishers have stuck to the letter of the specifications and proposed a 
minimalist option and the environmental NGOs have built on the specifications to propose a 
much larger MPA proposal .295 Each option is of course 'right', but by developing these 
options separately the DEli is putting itself in the position of choosing a single 'best' option, 
rather than working on a consensus-based solution, to the dissatisfaction of one or the other 
party, or in the worst case - to the dissatisfaction of all parties. This could potentially result 
in meaningless designations that would require high levels of compliance and enforcement 
resources resulting from a lack of ownership of the outcomes. 
289 From interview with subject GJ62. 
290 From interview with subject 1N54. 
291 From interview with subject EY7I. 
292 From interview with subject FM66. 
293 From interview with subject 1N54. 
294 Ibid. 
295 From interview with subject 1N54. 
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2.13 The National Oceans Office 
Much of the remaining conflict involves the NOO, the primary agency responsible for 
integrated and ecosystem-based planning and management of Australia's marine 
environment, including the development and implementation of RMPs. 296 The NOO is an 
Executive Agency located in Hobart, and its location has given rise to scepticism over its 
ability to work effectively with other Commonwealth officials based in Canberra. 29' The 
initial problems associated with setting up such a specialised office also constrained the 
capability of the NOO to immediately start on the development of the first RMP, therefore 
setting the process back at least 12 months .298  The constraints arising from setting up the 
Office and is processes from scratch also limited the NOO's role in implementing AOP 
beyond the scope of regional marine planning. This limitation, however, is now recognised 
and being addressed. 
The main conflict to date has been over the role of the NOO and the extent to which it adds 
value to management. 299 Departments based in Canberra have met regional marine planning 
work by the NOO with suspicion, in part due to the inexperience of the NOO in terms of 
integrated planning, while being concerned that the ongoing role of the NOO has not been 
clearly defined. This has led to concerns over the NOO having, or obtaining a 'power of 
veto' over management decisions. This has been especially evident in processes such as 
MPA designation whereby the NOO's concept of BAOI created much uncertainty. It is a 
moot point that had the DER, with more experience in the area, taken charge of the entire 
process with its own appropriate timeframe independent of the SERMP process, whether the 
resulting impasse and conflict not have occurred .300 
Potentially the NOO has a significant role in integrated management where individual 
sectors are unable to resolve issues and manage resources holistically by traditional means. 
The terms of this involvement remain, however, unclear and are the cause of much 
underlying anxiety. This issue is one being addressed through the progress of the Otwas 
case study and is one that Board agencies, as well as the states, will closely watch to 
determine the nature of the NOO's involvement and the potential for its future involvement 
In terms of value-adding, the NOO comes under close scrutiny. Much of the fishing industry 
sees that the money spent on the NOO would be better allocated to deal with pollution (land- 
296 TFG International (2002). 
297 Alder and Ward (2001). 
298 TFG International (2002). 
From interview with subject LX67. 
°° From interview with subject 1N54. 
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and sea-based) and catchment management issues, which would effectively deal with 
integration as it applies to ecosystem-based management . 301  To date, the NOO has been 
under budget302 , however, it has also been under-delivery in terms of desired outcomes. 303 
Around 28% of funds spent by the NOO over the first three years were related to 
establishment costs. This is not unreasonable given the specialised nature of the assigned 
tasked, yet this has proved costly in personnel time, and may explain the under-delivery in 
this period .304  It is also recognised that implementing RMPs will incur significant financial 
burden on the Commonwealth and states. Much of the financial support of AOP to date has 
come from the sale of a major share of Telstra.305 Alternatives to ongoing finding 
arrangements, once this source is exhausted have not been identified, causing much anxiety 
in governments with respect to the ongoing commitment that may be imposed, but unfunded. 
A major cause of conflict and arguably much of the reason for hesitant support of the 
SERMP by states and industry, is due to the fact that these costs have not been made explicit 
for those involved, nor has any ongoing funding assistance been offered to states and 
external agencies to implement any processes or arrangements in line with RMPs. 306 A 
major component of these implications will be felt through the need for planning, 
compliance and enforcement arrangements with new commitments under the AOP and 
regional marine planning. Despite these expected financial implications, it is estimated that 
if the SERMP improves the value of the overall marine industry output by a mere 0.3%, then 
it will break even .307  In actuality, the potential return on investment into the SERMP is hard 
to decipher, as it is generally understood that the large projects, which could pdtentially have 
improved the value of the marine industry, would have gone ahead with or without the 
SERMP. It may result that the states, and even some Commonwealth agencies and industry, 
will continue to carry the financial burden of implethenting the SERMP. 
2.5.4 Other oceans management bodies and the SERJIIP 
It is not just the NOO that has had an unsteady beginning. The lack of clarity with respect to 
the roles of the ministerial-selected NOAG and the SERMP Steering Committee308 has been 
problematic. After the release of AOP the Government's focus was primarily on 
establishing the appropriate institutional arrangements and finalising the location of the first 
301 From interviews with subject MD2 I and LX67. 
302 Expenditure amounting to 45.7% of planned expenditure over the first three years: TFG 
International. (2002). 
303 Only two out of five phases of the SERMP completed: TFG International (2002). 
304 TFG International (2002). 
Alder and Ward (2001). 
306 From interviews with subject EY71, NT49, ZA91 and LX67. 
307 TFG International (2002). 
308 The SERMP Steering Committee is no longer convened. 
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RMP. Despite early efforts to include sophisticated public consultation in the development 
of AOP, when it came to these decisions of national significance, the community was 
arguably limited in its capacity to input into the process, with the only external input really 
being provided by the ministerial-selected NOAG. 309 The role of the NOAG has teetered 
between being an advisory body to, and a representative sounding board for, the NOMB. 
This has caused some confusion as to its purpose and the best way to incorporate community 
interests through this body. 310 
The SERMP Steering Committee was assigned the following tasks in its Terms of 
Reference: 
contributing to and advising on, the planning process for the South-East Region, 
including key tasks and milestones as a means of facilitating clearly specified 
outcomes for inclusion in the SERMP; 
assisting with RMP assessments including the ecological, social, cultural and 
economic value of marine resources, opportunities for regional economic 
development, and the assessment of impacts of proposed outcomes; and 
providing for peer review throughout the RMP process .311 
The SERMP Steering Committee, acting as an expertise-based committee with a mixed role 
of facilitating transparency and input of stakeholders into the process and a technical role to 
provide input into management, science and planning issues, did not have a clear focal point 
from the beginning. 312  Future plans are expected to have independent bodies that deal 
separately with the issues of transparency and technical advice. Membership of this body 
was also questioned, as the process for selection was not open and transparent, offering no 
opportunity for the public to nominate members who could offer appropriate regional-based 
expertise and knowledge into the process .313 
Interdepartmental conflicts and conflicts with the NOO have also arisen over the uncertainty 
over the RMP prodess. Concerns have been raised over what the RMP process means for 
each department in terms of resources and structure; and/or why the NOO was effectively 
'auditing' each department in the scoping and assessment stages of plan development. The 
NOO was very unclear about the direction of the first Plan, the SERMP, itself evolving from 
being a 'plan' to a 'process'. The NOO took a bottom-up' approach of extensive 
309 Alder and Ward (2001). 
310 TFG International (2002). 
" National Oceans Office. (2003). "South-east Regional Marine Plan Steering Committee." 
http://www.oceans.gov.au/se_steeringcommitee.jsp [Access date: 9 January 20041. 
312 TFG International (2002). 
313 Alder and Ward (2001). 
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consultation on detail without having an overall context within which to place the 
information.3 " Without clear direction and a lack of effective communication, the NOO has 
met with a lot of resistance from Commonwealth departments. The NOO, in response to 
these criticisms, are now consulting with Canberra-based departments in a structured and 
focused way, with increasing numbers of staff members based in Canberra as liaison officers 
for government departments. It has been suggested, however, that if regional marine 
planning brings about nothing more than a shift in focus then it has still been a very 
significant and worthwhile process. 315 The SERMP has also been criticised for not 
introducing anything new. This criticism may, however, reflect the fact that the states and 
Commonwealth are moving forward towards meeting the objectives of AOP as a result of 
being involved in the RMP process. 
2.6 Summary 
Integrated management is a relatively long-lived concept that has yet to be practically 
implemented in the oceans jurisdiction. This chapter illustrates the developments towards 
integrated oceans management in Australia, in terms of AOP and regional marine planning 
commitments and the broader integrated oceans management initiative. These initiatives are 
designed to meet the increasing demands of ESD through the integratiOn of Australia's 
oceans resource management based on ecosystem management principles. Integration across 
ocean use sectors and jurisdictions does, however, give rise to further potential conflicts, as 
more stakeholders demand input into decision-making processes. This chapter identifies 
Australia's federal commitment to participative oceans management processes in an attempt 
to prevent conflict from occurring, primarily through the use of stakeholder driven processes. 
Despite these advancements, there is an increasing sense of over-consultation by 
stakeholders who see few tangible outcomes for their efforts. 
While integration is occurring in the Australian Commonwealth Government with respect to 
oceans management, it remains towards the lower echelons of the Policy Integration Scale, 
with no department or jurisdiction willing to cede too much power to ecosystem-based 
management in the overall governance framework. As such; it is likely that coordination 
will be enhanced in Australian oceans management, but integration in terms of ecosystem-
based management will be limited to sectoral applications. This concept is explored in the 
following chapter, which looks at the development of fisheries management in Australia and 
its capacity to incorporate integrated approaches through ecosystem-based management. 
314 TFG International (2002). 
315 From interview with subject NT49. 
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With the continual decline in fish stocks globally, fisheries management arrangements are 
under increasing scrutiny. Developments in resource management point towards managing 
natural resources on an ecosystem basis, taking into account the impact of extraction not 
only on the resource, but on the habitat and ecosystem within which it resides. As described 
in Chapter 2, Australia is addressing the challenge of moving from sectoral-based to 
ecosystem-based management of its oceanic resources. This chapter explores Australia's 
commitments, both nationally and internationally, to meet the objectives of ecosystem-based 
management for its fisheries, including those related to integration. Australia's fisheries 
management is assessed for its capacity to incorporate integration objectives through direct 
and indirect management arrangements and therefore its capacity to meet the broader 
objectives of AOP and the SERMP. 
3.1 Global fisheries management developments 
In 1609 Hugo Grotius introduced the mare liberum doctrine that the ocean and its resources 
were 'common' property and therefore were free for all to exploit. 316 The 'free and open' 
access paradigm dictated the pattern of fisheries exploitation globally until the late 1960s and 
resulted in the over-exploitation of marine resources, in what has been deemed the "tragedy 
of the commons". 317  This paradigm provided little incentive to promote conservation of 
fisheries resources or their environments. Many unmanaged fisheries were well established 
before the Second World War, with Japan having already established a fully industrialised 
fishery by this time .318  Since the Second World War, increases in technology and demand 
for food supply has led to the steady increase in world fisheries catch and has highlighted the 
increasing need for effective management of these catches to prevent global over-
exploitation. Stock depletions have attracted global attention and support for the LOSC, 
which validates national maritime jurisdictions and the responsibility to manage sustainable 
exploitation of resources within these jurisdictions. 319 
The 1980s and 1990s saw an era of heightened environmental awareness. This was reflected 
in Australia by the shift in focus by Commonwealth and state governments from a 
316 Russ, G.R. and Zeller, D.C. (2003). "From Mare Liberum to Mare Reserva rum." Marine Policy, 
27: 75-78. 
Hardin, G. (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science, 162:1243-1248. 
318 Hinds, L. (1992). "World marine fisheries. Management and development problems." Marine 
Policy, 16 (5): 394403. 
319 Alder, J. and Ward, T. (2001). "Australia's Oceans Policy: Sink or Swim?" Journal of 
Environment & Development, 10 (3): 266-289. 
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developmental to a sustainability perspective with regard to fisheries practices. 320  A number 
of international instruments were developed in this period to deal with the sustainable 
management of marine resources. These include: 
• the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the Compliance 
Agreement) - this Agreement is based on Article 91 of the LOSC, which obligates 
states to ascertain a genuine link between themselves and any vessel they register. 321 
This Agreement was introduced to strengthen the LOSC provisions, increase the 
effectiveness of multilateral fishing organisations and to introduce reporting 
requirements to FAO in an attempt to increase public knowledge of fishing activities 
in international waters; 
• the 1995 Rome Consensus on World Fisheries an agreement to reduce fishing 
• 	capacity, rebuild stocks, maintain sustainable fisheries and aquaculture ventures and 
to support and strengthen regional fisheries bodies and international fisheries 
developments 322 ; 
• the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the 
Fish Stocks Agreement) - the objective of which is to ensure the long-term 
conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks through effective implementation of the relevant provisions of the 
Convention 323 ; and 
• the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Code of Conduct) - this 
voluntary Code provides principles and standards applicable to the conservation, 
management and development of allfisheries. It also covers the capture, processing 
and trade offish and fishery products, fishing operations, aquaculture, fisheries 
research and the integration offisheries into coastal area management. 324 
320 Haward, M. (1995). "The Commonwealth in Australian Fisheries Management: 1955-1995." The 
Australian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy, 2 (2): 313-325. 
32!  Anon. "Agreements to Promote Fishery Conservation and Management in International Waters." 
http://www.netpets.com/fishllegarchives/mar-8.2.html [Access date: 29 April 20031. 
322 FAO Fisheries. (1995). "The Rome Consensus on World Fisheries." Adopted by the FAO 
Ministerial Conference on Fisheries, Rome, 14-15 March 1995. 
323 United Nations. (1995). "Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks." New York. UN 
Document: AJCONF. 164/37. 
324 Food and Agriculture Organisation. (1995). "Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries." 
http://www.fao.org/filagreem/codecond/ficonde.asp#BAC [Access date: 29 April 2003]; and 
Syndes, A.K. (2001). "Regional Fishery Organizations: How and Why Organizational Diversity 
Matters." Ocean Development & International Law, 32: 349-372. 	 - 
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In addition to these international instruments specific to enhancing the sustainable 
development of fisheries, meetings in 2000 and 2004 of the Conference of the Parties (COP) 
paved the way for the new and emerging concept of ecosystem-based management. The 
COP is the governing body of the Convention on Biological Diversity and progresses 
implementation through taking decisions at biennial meetings. Decisions V16 and Vllhl I of 
the COP relate to defining the ecosystem approach and its application for the integrated 
management of land, water and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable 
use in an equitable way. This approach has been recognised by the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development as an important tool for enhancing sustainable development. 
The FAO has also recognised the growing international pressure on fisheries thanagement to 
address integrated issues, through the consideration of ecosystem impacts of fishing. In 
2003, the FAO released a technical paper entitled The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries. 
Issues, terminology, principles, institutionalfoundations, implementation and outlook .325 
This document embodies the development of ecosystem-based terminology and the 
relevance to fisheries. It sets out to illustrate the relevance of the Code of Conduct towards 
implementing an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) and builds on this by establishing a 
clear set of EAF principles and operational implementation guidelines. 
The variation in terminology between this and the CBD application of the ecosystem 
approach, for instance, is illustrative of the growing interpretive literature in the field of 
ecosystem-based management. Interpretive license of this terminology stems from the fact 
that an ecosystem is itself difficult to define, hence we see an increasingly wide and varied 
application of its meaning in the management of natural resources for the integration of 
sustainable use and conservation. 
3.1.1 Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) are usually decision-making bodies 
established by three or more States or international organisations that see common gains in 
cooperating to manage regional fisheries. RFMOs traditionally collect and assess scientific 
data, set regulatory measures and establish enforcement measures to overcome collective-
action problems related to the use of regional fisheries. 326  There are, however, marked 
differences in capacity amongst and within RFMOs to carry out these functions. RFMOs 
325 Garcia, S.M., Zerbi, A., Aliaume, C., Do Chi, T. and Lasserre, G. (2003). "The ecosystem 
approach to fisheries. Issues, terminology, principles, institutional foundations, implementation 
and outlook." FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 443. Rome: FAO. 
326 FAO. (1999). "Report of the Meeting of FAO and Non-FAO Regional Fishery Bodies or 
Arrangements." Rome: 11-12 February 1999. FAO Fisheries Report No. 597: 53pp; 
Syndes (2001); and 
Syndes, A.K. (2002). "Regional fishery organisations in developing regions: adapting to changes in 
international fisheries law." Marine Policy, 26: 373-381. 
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tend to be consensus driven, providing institutional safeguards for Member States with the 
right to veto and also in order to enhance the probability of compliance and enforcement of 
decisions made. 32 ' The authority to enforce decisions is often limited by the States' 
reluctance to hand over sovereign rights, hence a reluctance to delegate adequate decision-
making authority to the RFMO, rendering it an ineffective enforcement body. This problem 
is exacerbated by the lack of adequate monitoring, compliance, surveillance and enforcement 
measures at the regional and national levels. This accentuates the fact that even though 
RFMOs may make strong recommendations and management decisions, they are ineffectual 
if not implemented with an adequate level of enforcement. 
There are other significant limitations in the ability of RFMOs to effectively manage 
regional fish stocks. Generally, RFMOs are slow in addressing the problem of regional 
overfishing and overcapacity. This failure has been assigned to a number of problems, the 
primary problem being the failure by some Member States to accept and implement the 
international instruments that effectively underpin the functioning of RFMOs and reflect the 
expectations of the international community. If some States adopt these instruments and 
others do not, then it emphasises the baseline differences of what States will and will not 
agree to, which in turn may influence cooperation in the RFMO. Likewise, Non-member 
States may undertake activities that contradict the mandate of the RFMO and, therefore, 
compromise the effectiveness of the RFMO in achieving its set objectives. 
In terms of data reporting, on which most management decisions are based, some States are 
reluctant to transparently divulge accurate and complete fishery statistics relating to discards 
and bycatch for example, for fear of the imposition of further restrictions on fishing 
practices. States are also reluctant to divulge this information when their nationals have been 
in breach of the relevant RFMO mandates. In the absence of a global format for the 
recording and presentation of fishery statistics, some RFMOs are presented with statistics 
that are in incomparable formats, rendering them collectively unusable. 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is recognised as the primary issue 
confronting the effectiveness of RFMOs. FAO has introduced an International Plan of 
Action (IPOA) to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) 
Fishing. 328  This is a voluntary instrument within the framework of the FAO Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and as such is limited by a States' willingness to adopt 
327 Hinds (1992); and 
Syndes (2001). 
328 FAO. "International Plans of Action." http://www.fao.org/fdipa/ipae.asp  [Access date: 30 April 
2003]. 
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the recommendations, whether they be an RFMO member or non-member. To date, there 
has been varied success in grappling with this complex issue, the primary problem being the 
lack of national and regional legislation for States to enforce IPOA provisions. In terms of 
RFMOs, this is in part due once again to the States' reluctance to hand over sovereignty to a 
central governing body, which may impinge upon their national jurisdiction. Political 
pressure and consensus or majority vote agreement, however, often addresses this issue 
adequately so that States will act on the recommendations of the RFMO. 329 The other major 
challenge is how to impose restrictions on non-RFMO Member States, especially in relation 
to voluntary instruments such as the IPOA FlU. 
The RFMOs that Australia is a party to, which may have relevance to regional marine 
planning in the south-east region, are the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Living Marine Resources (CCAMLR) and the Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT). CCAMLR came into force in 1982 as part of the Antarctic Treaty 
System. 330  It was formed in response to international concerns regarding the potential 
impact of increasing krill catches on the Southern Ocean ecosystem. CCAMLR's aim is to 
conserve the marine life of the Southern Ocean while supporting harvesting practices. The 
CCSBT came into force in May 1994, formalising the voluntary management arrangements 
between Australia, Japan and New Zealand for the sustainable management and conservation 
of Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) resources .331 
3.1.1.1 	Do RFMOs adequately address the issue of integration as raised in the 
RMP process? 
Regional marine planning commits Australia to support its international obligations - 
legislative and institutional. To this end, Australia has proven to be a world leader in the 
fight to protect the Patagonian Toothfish. Through CCAMLR Australia has fought for the 
CITES332 listing of the species, albeit unsuccessfully. Australia has taken a leadership role in 
addressing the problems of RJU fishing, reflected through national measures such as: the 
development of a National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing; 
undertaking proactive enforcement against IUU fishers, for instance, through novel changes 
to legislation allowing for "hot pursuit" provisions; and increased surveillance around Heard 
and McDonald Islands. 333 
329 Syndes (2001). 
330 CCAMLR. http://www.ccamlr.org [Access date: 18 March 2004]. 
' CCSBT. http://www.ccsbt.org/index.html  [Access date: 18 March 20041. 
332 CITES stands for the "Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora". 
AFFA. (2003). "Looking to the Future: A Review of Commonwealth Fisheries Policy." Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service. Outcomes 3942: 52. 
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Australia supports the CCSBT through a ban on international SBT fishing in the Australian 
EEZ, including Japanese fishing. During the SBT dispute (1998-2000), a ban was also 
placed on Japanese port access, which has since been lifted so that any international fishing 
vessel can use Australian ports on application to the Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority. 334  The port ban was prompted by Japanese breaches of the CCSBT quota 
restrictions and a dispute over 'experimental fishing', which occurred concurrently to Japan 
being taken to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). The 
implementation of the SERMP needs to take account of measures for the conservation of 
SBT in our national waters. 
3.2 Australian fisheries management 
3.2.1 Direct fisheries management arrangements 
The Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS) negotiations of the 1970s resulted from states 
challenging the Commonwealth's assertion of sovereignty over offshore regions under 
common law. 335  Although the Commonwealth retains sovereignty to the low water mark 
under common law, OCS arrangements, through mirror legislation, gave 3nm jurisdiction to 
the States .336  The OCS arrangements for the management of fisheries provided for fisheries 
to be managed by: the Commonwealth; a state, to the edge of the AFZ; a combination of 
state control to 3 rim, then Commonwealth control from 3-200 nm; or by a joint authority."' 
Most fisheries are managed by a combination of state and Commonwealth powers. 338  Under 
the OCS, the 'agreed arrangement' is specific to each fishery and determined independently 
according to the circumstances influencing management. As such, it addresses cross-
jurisdictional integration issues, but only on a specific sectoral scale. 
The 1980s saw rapid development of the commercial fishing industry in Australia. This was 
in part due to the development of the deepwater trawl fisheries in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (for example, orange roughy). 339 In 1982 Senator Archer (Tasmania) presented a 
report with future recommendations for the Australian fishing industry, which was followed 
3
'4 Header, J. (2004). DAFF: Personal communication - 2 July 2004. 
" Commonwealth of Australia. (1998). "Australia's Oceans Policy - Part 1." Canberra: Environment 
Australia. 
336 Examiner's clarification. 
137 Haward, M. (1995). "The Commonwealth in Australian Fisheries Management: 1955-1995." The 
Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy, 2: 313-325. 
338 McColl, J.C. and Stevens, R.A. (1997). "Australian Fisheries Management Authority: 
Organizational Structure and Management Philosophy." In: Hancock, D.A., Smith, D.C., Grant, A. 
and Beumer, J.P. (eds.). Developing and Sustaining World Fisheries Resources. The State of 
Science and Management. Melbourne: CSIRO Publishing: 655-660. 
Kearney, RE., Andrew, N.L. and West, R.J. (1996). "Some issues in the management of 
Australia's marine and coastal fisheries resources." Ocean & Coastal Management, 33 (1-3): 133-
146. 
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up by the Australian Fisheries Conference held in Canberra in 1985. ° Following these two 
key events, the Federal Government committed to a review of the Commonwealth Fisheries 
Act 1952 and in 1989 produced a White Paper document titled New Dire ctions for 
Commonwealth Fisheries Management in the 1990s, which led the way for ffiture fisheries 
reform .141 
Embedded in the New Directions report was the means for Commonwealth Government to 
pass seven new legislative bills regarding fisheries management in Australia. 141  The two 
primary legislative amendments were the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (FMA) and the 
Fisheries Administration Act 1991. Other legislation dealt with issues such as the cost-
recovery of management incursions and penalties. 
The FMA defmed five primary legislative objectives, replacing the outdated Commonwealth 
Fisheries Act 1952. 141  The objectives of this legislation included: 
implementing efficient and cost-effective fisheries management on behalf of the 
Australian Government; 
the implementation of ecologically sustainable development principles and the 
exercise of the precautionary principle, with particular focus on the effects of 
fisheries practices on non-target species and the long-term sustainability of the 
marine environment; 
maximising economic efficiency in the exploitation of fisheries resources; 
ensuring accountability to the fishing industry and to the community in AFMA's 
management of fisheries resources; and 
achieving government targets with respect to the recovery of the costs of AFMA.' 44  
More specifically, the FMA established the basis for the following: 
• specific management plans; 
• the AFMA to establish statutory fishing rights (quasi-property); 
• a joint authority; 
• initial allocation processes and allocation review; and 
• enforcement and monitoring. 	- 
340 Haward (1995); and 
Haward, M., Bache, S., Tsamenyi, M. and Rose, G. (2000). "Fisheries: Australia." Scoping Paper 
for ACORN I: Vancouver. 10- 11 December 2000. 
34' Haward (1995); and 
McColl and Stevens (1997). 
342 Haward (1995). 
141 Smith, A.D.M., Sainsbury, K.J. and Stevens, R.A. (1999). "Implementing effective fisheries-
management systems - management strategy evaluation and the Australian partnership approach." 
ICES Journal ofMarine Science, 56: 967-979. 
344 Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) (as amended), s.3. 
80 
CHAPTER 3: AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
Simultaneously, the Fisheries Administration Act 1991 was brought into force .345  The 
objectives of this Act were two-fold: 
• to establish an Australian Fisheries Management Authority to manage fisheries on 
behalf of the Commonwealth; and 
• to establish a Fishing Industry Policy Council to ensure participation by all 
interested parties in the decisions relating to the development of government policy 
with respect to fisheries management. 
In 1997, a change was made to the FMA objectives to include the precautionary principle. 346 
In 1999, a series of technical amendments were made to the FMA to improve its operation 
and effective management practices. The Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act 1999 was 
primarily written to incorporate the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, dealing with straddling and 
highly migratory fish stocks, and IUU fishing. 347 
Two other legislative amendments were passed in 2004. The first amendment addressed 
high seas fishing activities and other matters to give legal effect to Australia's domestic 
obligations under the FAO Compliance Agreement and to improve the AFMAs operating 
efficiency and effectiveness. 348  The second legislative amendment addressed compliance 
and deterrence measures. 349 
3.2.1.1 	The Australian Fisheries Management Authority 
Prior to 1992, the Australian Fisheries Service (AFS), located in the Department of Primary 
Industries and Energy, provided the services of the AFMA. 35° The AFS received much 
criticism for its management decisions. Fisheries were collapsing, fleets were expanding, 
there was a distinct lack of coordination between the fishing industry, management and 
science and the industry had no participatory role in management decision-making. 35 ' 
Combined with the pending challenges posed by the New Directions document, these 
criticisms indicated that a new body corporate was required to replace the AFS to meet the 
increasing demands on the fishing industry. 352 
Smith, Sainsbury and Stevens (1999). 
346 Gullet, W. (2004). Examiner's advice. 
Haward et al (2000). 
Fisheries Legislation Amendment (High Seas Fishing Activities and Other Matters) Act 2004 
349 Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Compliance and Deterrence Measures and Other Matters) Act 
2004. 
350 McColl and Stevens (1997). 
Ibid. 
352 Haward (1995). 
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The AFMA is a statutory body that replaced the AES on 3 February 1992 under the Fisheries 
Administration Act 1991•353  The AFMA consists of a Board of expertise-based members 
including a Chairperson, Governing Director, Managing Director and five selected 
directors.354 To ensure that the commercial fishing industry does not use this forum for 
personal gain for the industry, the number of members from the fishing industry is restricted 
to two.355 The Board has three committees (the Finance and Audit Committee, the Research 
Committee and the Environment Committee) to help the Board in the conduct of its 
business .356  The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) and 
the Bureau of Rural Sciences (BRS) regularly assess the performance of the AFMA to 
ensure its objectives and the objectives of the FMA are being met. 357  The AFMA's primary 
role is the day-to-day management of Commonwealth fisheries resources on the high seas, 
within the 200nm Australian Fishing Zone where this is possible and sometimes, upon 
negotiation under the OCS arrangements, to the low water mark, on behalf of the Australian 
public. In managing these resources, the AFMA provides "management, advisory, 
compliance and licensing services and implements appropriate fisheries management 
arrangements" stressing the necessary stakeholder involvement in all key areas of 
management decision-making. 358 Final decision-making with respect to the management of 
Commonwealth fisheries is, however, the responsibility of the AFMA Board. This ensures 
that the Minister responsible for the fisheries portfolio stays at arm's length from these 
decisions in an attempt to keep the influential, but often misguided, politics out of effective 
and sustainable fisheries management. The AFMA is responsible for setting the Total 
Allowable Catches (TACs), reference points and other management arrangements for each 
of its fisheries by means of individual management plans according to the needs of the 
fishery. As of 1994-95, management costs incurred by the AFMA have been recovered from 
industry via levies. 359 
Haward (1995). 
314 Smith, Sainsbury and Stevens (1999). 
" Ibid. 
356 AFMA. (2004). "About AFMA." http:f/www.afma.gov.aulaboutlboard/default.php  [Access date: 
16 March 2004]. 
311 Smith, Sainsbury and Stevens (1999). 
AFMA. (2003). "About AFMA." Fact Sheet No. 21. http:/Iwww.afma.gov.au [Access date: 16 
March 2004]. 
Haward (1995); and 
McColl and Stevens (1997). 
EN 
CHAPTER 3: AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
3.2.1.1.1 	Does the AFMA provide adequate capacity to address the issue 
of integration as raised in the RMP process? 
The AFMA governance structure operates at arm's length from the Government and as such, 
provides little opportunity for formal engagement or cross-sectoral integration with other 
Government departments or management agencies. However, the AFMA must operate 
within the bounds of current Government policy, including the Oceans Policy and the 
commitment towards ESD. This includes informal coordination and information exchange 
with relevant Government departments. On the Policy Integration Scale, as discussed in 
Section 1.2.1, the AFMA's statutory authority lends itself to a lower level (Level 1 or 2) of 
integration capacity with other sectors. The AFMA is, however, legislatively required to 
pursue the policy objectives of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 and the Fisheries 
Administration Act 1991, which include ESD and therefore necessitates 'a degree of 
integration across sectors 
In terms of cross-jurisdictional integration, the AFMA has a minimal integration capacity 
that is confined to informal information exchange. The capacity for formal cross-
jurisdictional integration comes under the OCS agreed arrangements. OCS arrangements are 
negotiated by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) on behalf of the 
Commonwealth, with advice from sought from the AFMA. The OCS agreements have their 
own limitations as they are reactive and usually species or fishery specific, offering little 
capacity for strategic cross-jurisdictional integration on any broader regional or intra-sectoral 
scale. 
The impetus for intra-sectoral integration also falls primarily on the DAFF charged with 
fisheries policy coordination, which includes resource sharing arrangements between 
fisheries sectors, such as recreational, indigenous and commercial (see Section 3.2.1.6.1). 
The AFMA has taken an informal proactive approach to intra-sectoral coordination by 
sponsoring quarterly meetings with the recreational sector to discuss intra-sectoral 
integration issues, hence enhancing the informal capacity for integration between fisheries 
sectors. Intra-sectoral integration has also been approached in an advisory capacity through 
the Management Advisory Committees (MACs: see Section 3.2.1.2.1 below for a more 
detailed discussion). 
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3.2.1.2 	Management Advisory Committees 
To assist in the establishment of legitimate management practices, the AFMA has the 
authority to establish MACs or Consultancy Committees (CCs) for each federal fishery. 360 
MACs are expertise-based advisory bodies, designed as 'co-management' tools to increase 
transparency and industry-government relations in what has been deemed the AFMA's 
"partnership approach to management" . 36 ' This partnership approach is important in 
engaging stakeholders to take ownership of decisions and also to have a greater 
responsibility for the well-being of individual fisheries. The primary objective of MACs is 
to advise on appropriate fisheries management plans, defining the objectives, concessions 
and allocation of these concessions and the rules that apply to participants in the specified 
fshery.362 MACs are apart of the AFMA and as such must adhere to the legislative and 
operational objectives of the agency. 363 Recommendations resulting from deliberations of 
the MACs are presented to the AFMA Board (see Figure 3), but the Board need not make an 
immediate decision on such recommendations if more information is required. The absence 
of the necessity of the Board to make immediate decisions regarding recommendations has 
been an issue in the past, as many such recommendations have been merely 'noted', 
effectively prolonging the lifetime of the issue in the absence of a decisive action. As a 
result, the AFMA's Communications Strategy is under review and future efforts will lie in 
the prompt dissemination of information between the Board and MACs. 364 
Figure 3 	Australian fisheries management institutional arrangements. 
AFMA Board 	Minister for 
Fisheries 
AFMA 
MACs 
TAC 	 Research 
Subcommittee 	 Subcommittee 
FAGs 
Adapted from: 	Smith, A.D.M., Sainsbury, K.J. and Stevens, R.A. (1999). "Implementing effective 
fisheries-management systems - management strategy evaluation and the Australian 
partnership approach." ICES Journal of Marine Science, 56: 967-979. 
° Smith, Sainsbury and Stevens (1999). 
361 Haward (1995). 
362 McColl and Stevens (1997). 
363 Collins, G. (2002). AFMA: Personal Communication - 16 December 2002; and 
See Figure 3 for fisheries management institutional arrangements. 
364 Ibid. 
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MACs comprise an independent AFMA selected chair, an AFMA officer (usually the officer 
responsible for the management of the fishery and who is the only member that is essentially 
representative of any particular interest) and up to seven other members as nominated by 
relevant stakeholder groups and determined by the AFMA Board for their expertise in 
commercial fisheries, science and, increasingly, recreational fisheries and environmental or 
conservation interests pertinent to effective management of the fishery. 365  As experts rather 
than representative members, it is important that industry members have the confidence of 
the industry, but can differentiate the potential for personal gains from the best interest of the 
fishery as a whole. MAC members in general must also demonstrate a commitment and 
preparedness to negotiate to achieve acceptable outcomes. 366  
In some instances, representatives of other areas of expertise may be selected by the AFMA 
Board as 'Permanent Observers' on the MACs. Permanent Observers are required to 
participate in MAC discussions in accordance with the requirements of other members, 
however, if deliberations eventuate in a voting situation, they would have to abstain from 
voting. The DEH has been granted Permanent Observer status for the term of the strategic 
assessments in accordance with the EPBC Act. Permanent Observers usually indicate a 
transitional time for policy or management of the fishery and allow for some flexibility in 
MAC numbers, whilst not granting the permanency of full membership. DEH Observers are 
required to make the appropriate commitment in attending meetings without substitution and 
to make a positive contribution to the MAC to which they are assigned .117  'Casual 
Observers' may also attend meetings at the Chair's discretion to provide additional advice or 
expertise for a particular agenda item or for the purposes of observing the operations of the 
MAC, although they may not participate in MAC decision-making processes .368 
Sub-committees may be convened to advise the MAC on particular issues. These sub-
committees may comprise outside expertise so long as there is at least one MAC member 
and numbers are kept to a minimum. 369  Fisheries Assessment Groups (FAGs) consisting of 
science, economic, industry and' management representatives are established to produce an 
annual assessment to the TAC and Research Subcommittees of the stock in question (see 
365 ACIL Consulting. (2001). "Management Advisory Committees: Concept and Conduct." A Report 
to the Australian Fisheries Management Authority: Canberra; and 
McColl and Stevens (1997). 
366 AFMA. (2002). "Management Advisory Committees." Fisheries Management Paper Series: IMP 
No. 1. 
367 AFMA (2002) "Management Advisory Committees." 
368 Ibid. 
369 Ibid. 
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Figure 3)•370  These subcommittees then assess the stock assessment and advise the 
appropriate MAC on the course of management action that they deem to be appropriate. 
3.2.12.1 	Do MACs provide adequate capacity to address the issue of 
integration as raised in the RMP process? 
MACs address conflict management objectives through participation and ownership of 
processes, yet also address the issue of integration through inclusive representation. MACs 
comprise definitive stakeholders, including commercial fishers with a legitimate claim to the 
use of the resource and whose claims demand the urgent attention of managers, due to the 
potential impact decisions will have on their livelihoods. The power to make decisions lies 
with the AFMA Board in accordance with the FMA. However, the inclusion of AFMA 
managers and key commercial fishers on MACs ensures that there is significant influential 
power to convince decision makers to take on advice from the MACs. Increasingly, 
conservation is gaining definitive status as the urgency of environmental protection is 
brought to the forefront of planning and management, power is achieved through 
environmental legislation such as the EPBC Act and legitimacy is channelled through ESD 
requirements of government policy, such as the National Strategy for ESD. Other expectant 
stakeholders, such as recreational fishers, who do not possess power to influence decisions, 
are increasingly being included in MACs, due to their legitimacy under the FMA and the 
urgency to address resource sharing arrangements to meet ESD and Oceans Policy 
objectives. 
MACs provide opportunity for integration through inclusion of the broader interests and 
stakeholders discussed above. The degree to which these interests are integrated is 
questionable. Most non-commercial interests are included as observers with no power to 
influence final recommendations from the MACs. Hence when relating such co-
management arrangements back to the Policy Integration Scale, the capacity for intra-
sectoral integration is around Level 2, comprising one-way information sharing. This type of 
integration, however, is in itself limited by the advisory nature of MACs and the fact that 
ultimate decision-making power lies with the AFMA Board. 
310 Smith, Sainsbury and Stevens (1999). 
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3.2.1.3 	The AFMA 'splans of management 
In developing a plan of management, the AFMA is required to set out: 
the objectives of the plan of management; and 
measures by which the objectives are to be attained; and 
performance criteria against which the measures taken may be assessed .371 
Plans of management for individual fisheries may include the following information: 
the fishing methods - based on area/time closures, species types, size/quantity of 
fishing gear and/or number of boats - and the type and quantity of fishing gear to be 
used in the fishery; 
the fishing capacity allowed for the fishery; 
• an indication whether management is to be by a system of registered statutory 
fishing rights (SFRs), or other fishing concessions; 
a description of the fishery - including the area, fish species, fishing method and any 
other relevant matter; 
• allocation procedures - including auction, tender or ballot; 
obligations and special circumstances applicable to the SFR/fishing concession 
holder; and 
the prohibition or regulation of recreational fishing and scientific research in the 
fishery.372 
In accordance with the FMA, the National Bycatch Policy and the EPBC Act, plans of 
management must also incorporate measures to reduce bycatch to a minimum. This means 
minimising the incidental capture of fish and other species not covered by the plan of 
management (see Section 3.2.1.5.2 on Bycatch Action Plans). 
3.2.1.3.1 	Do the AFMA's plans of management adequately address the 
issue of integration as raised in the RMP process? 
Many initiatives for further integration in fisheries have been raised in the RMP process. 
The most prominent initiative with respect to fisheries management is the integration of 
commercial, recreational, aquaculture and indigenous interests. Currently, the AFMA's 
plans of management do not allow for such integration, being limited to the management of 
commercial fishing operations. 
37' FM Act 1991. Division 2. Section 17. Sub-section 5 
372 FM Act 1991. Division 2. Section 17. Sub-section 6. 
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The plans of management do not adequately consider the impacts each fishery may have on 
other stakeholders, however, external influences on each fishery are assessed, for example 
though the EPBC Act export assessment process. While environmental impacts are 
receiving adequate attention, the social and economic impacts of the fishery on the 
communities and other industries have not yet been assessed. Integration in regional marine 
planning would suggest that it is important to assess and adequately address these developing 
issues through appropriate management responses. This is currently achieved through 
bilateral negotiations of issues as they arise (for example, fishing and seismic surveys). 
Regional marine planning, however, has introduced a concept of preventative management 
with respect to integration that should be embraced by the fishing industry through early 
identification of potential issues. 
3.2.1.4 	The Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery 
In September 2003, the Hon Dr David Kemp MP, Minister for the Environment and 
Heritage, wrote to the AFMA advising of the endorsement of the Southern and Eastern 
Scalefish and Shark Fishery (SESSF) Management Plan 2003. The SESSF incorporates 
the South-east Trawl Fishery (SETF), the Great Australian Bight Trawl Fishery (GABTF) 
and the Gillnet, Hook and Trap Fishery (GHATF; which is a amalgamation of the former 
Southern Shark and South-east Non-Trawl Fisheries) in a working model for a fisheries 
management framework that has a greater focus on ecosystem-based fisheries management 
objectives as committed to in Government policy, including the SERMP. Through this 
amalgamation, the AFMA hopes to be able to better manage intra-sectora1 374 issues through 
overarching goal and objective setting and to better facilitate and track the transfer of quota 
between fisheries .375  The SESSF Management Plan gives the AFMA a more effective 
framework to manage the impact of the Southern Region Fisheries on the environment 
through a variety of management mechanisms, one of which is the setting of global TACs 
for the SESSF.376 
Two new institutional arrangements have been introduced with the SESSF Management Plan 
to aid integration and implementation. The first is the SESS Fisheries Assessment Group 
(SESSFAG), which coordinates all the underlying FAGs associated with the amalgamated 
AFMA Management. (2004). "Agenda Item 8.1: Strategic Assessment." SETMAC85. February 
2004. http://www.afma.gôv.au [Access date: 6 June 20041. 
314 AFMA refers to these as 'cross-sectoral' issues, with each fishery operating as a 'sector'. In the 
oceans management context, these issues are referred to as 'intra-sectoral' as they are contained 
within the scope of the fishing sector. - 
" AFMA. (2002). "Strategic Assessment Report - Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark 
Fishery." Draft for public comment 31 July - 31 August 2002. 
376 AFMA. (2003). "A guide to the 2004 South East Trawl Fishery Management Arrangements." 
Canberra: AFMA. December 2003. 
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fisheries in the SESSF. These include the Shelf, Slope, Deepwater. and Shark FAGs. The 
SESSFAG provides collective advice to the AFMA Board, through the AFMA Board 
Research Sub-Committee, and to the MACs on biological, ecosystem and economic issues 
for the SESSF. 377 The otherjoint body is a joint MAC, taking over from the SESSF TAC 
Sub-Committee, which meets after attending the plenary session of the SESSFAG. The joint 
[Southern Region] MAC will include the SETMAC, the GABMAC and the GHATMAC and 
will be charged with advising the AFMA Board on issues relating to the global TAC process 
in the SESSF.378 
The SESSF Management Plan establishes Statutory Fishing Rights (SFRs) for fishers in the 
SESSF. Fishers previously fishing under the SETF, GABTF and the GHATF will be issued 
with a 'boat SFR' or 'fishing permit', which entitles the fisher to take non-quota species 
using specific input controls, such as particular fishing methods or areas, and/or 'quota SFR' 
that allows the holder of the boat SFR or fishing permit to fish for specific quota species. 
There are three steps in the granting of SFRs, each step having an associated appeals 
processes. 
These steps are: 
Registration fishers must register with the AFMA for eligibility to apply for the 
grant of SFRs (that is, eligibility depends on registration with the SFR option and 
quota unit registers on the 'snapshot' date —3 December 2003 379 - if there are any 
disputes over eligibility, applicants may seek an internal review by the AFMA 
within 21 days and if dissatisfied with this outcome, then the applicant may apply for 
a further review to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) within 14 days 38) 
Provisional Grants - the AFMA will issue a provisional grant to all fishers who 
were found eligible (if there are any errors or the applicant believes they are entitled 
to more SFRs than provisionally assigned, they may appeal to the Statutory Fishing 
Rights Allocation Review Panel); then 
" AFMA (2002) "Strategic Assessment Report—...": 23; and 
AFMA (2003) "A guide to the 2004 South East Trawl..." 
378 AFMA (2003) "A guide to the 2004 South East Trawl..." 
Ibid: 14. 
380 AFMA. (2003). "Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery Management Plan 2003. 
Frequently Asked Questions." Canberra: AFMA. 17 February 2003: 5. 
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3. Final Grants holders of provisional grants will be given the opportunity to apply 
for the final grant of SFRs within a given time period (any conditions imposed on 
SFRs are appealable to the AFMA within 21 days of being granted and if dissatisfied 
with this outcome, then the applicant may apply for a further review to the AAT 
within 14 days381 ) and the SFRs will then come into effect on 1 January 2005 382 
Statutory Fishing Rights are fully transferable within the Southern Region Fishery, with only 
a few exceptions. Leasing is allowed for quota SFRs unless the quota has already been 
fished against in that year. Quota SFRs are labelled either Type N (originally registered as 
quota units in the GHATF) or Type T (originally registered as quota SFRs or quota units in 
the SETF or (ABTF). 383  In practice there is no difference between the types, both being 
quota SFRs, but rather this labelling was introduced to meet industry concerns of monitoring 
transfers between fisheries to ensure correct levies are paid for each quota SFR.384 The SFR 
Register maintained by the AFMA will record information pursuant to any transfers that 
occur, leasing arrangements and the boats nominated against boat and quota SFRs. The 
AFMA may also impose certain management tools to complement the SESSF Plan. These 
include: 
. determinations - for example, for setting a TAC, overcatch and undercatch; 
• directions - for example, for area closures or gear restrictions; 
• conditions on the SFR orflshingperinit - for example, reporting using particular 
logbooks or VMS; or 
• regulations - for example, for species managed by the states. 85 
3.2.1.4.1 	Does the SESSF adequately address the issue of integration as 
raised in the SERMP? 
The SESSF is a significant advancement towards the intra-sectoral integration of fisheries in 
the south-east, as committed to in the SERMP. The cumulative ecosystem impacts of major 
commercial fisheries operations in the region can be accurately recorded, assessed and 
managed through registered boat-SFR5 with associated input controls and global TAC 
setting for the SESSF quota-based fisheries. The amalgamated fishery provides a working 
'blueprint' for global TAC setting, with the potential application to include other interests, 
including recreational and indigenous fisheries in the future. As a pilot amalgamation, the 
38! AFMA (2003) "...Frequently Asked Questions": 5; and 
Smith, K. (2004). AlMA: Personal communication - 5 March 2004. 
382 AFMA (2003) "A guide to the 2004 South East Trawl...": 15. 
383 AFMA (2003) "...Frequently Asked Questions": 3. 
384 AFMA (2003) "...Frequently Asked Questions." 
" AlMA (2003) "...Frequently Asked Questions": Attachment 1. 
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SESSF will be used to determine the 'actual' benefits of ecosystem-based management for 
the commercial sector and the potential benefits of application to the broader interests in the 
fishery. 
Despite this significant step towards intra-sectoral integration to meet the objectives of 
ecosystem-based management, the SESSF applies to only three major fisheries in the 
Region. There are still some 27 state and Commonwealth commercial fisheries that lie 
outside the jurisdiction of SESSF that operate in the area covered by the SERMP. Many of 
these excluded fisheries will not directly impact the SES SF, due to differences in targeted 
species, areas and fishing methods. They may, however, indirectly impact the SESSF 
through ecosystem linkages and should therefore, theoretically be managed inclusively. 
3.2.1.5 	Commonwealth Fisheries Bycatch Policy 
Bycatch comprises of three main components of fishing interaction. First is the portion of 
the catch that is incidentally caught, but not targeted, and kept or sold by the fishing 
operator. This is often referred to as 'by-product' and is generally incorporated into the 
AFMA's plans of management for commercial fishing operations. 'Discards' are the portion 
of the catch incidentally caught, but not targeted, which is returned to the sea due to the lack 
of commercial value or because regulations preclude the inadvertent catch being retained. 
Finally there is the portion of the 'catch' that is not landed, but is impacted by interaction 
with the fishing vessel, gear or operations. 
The Commonwealth Policy on Fisheries Bycatch (CPFB) refers primarily to discards and 
those species that are not landed but are impacted by the fishing operation. By-product 
species should be encompassed in existing management arrangements. The CPFB sets out 
the guiding principles, objectives and framework for implementing the policy through 
Bycatch Action Plans (BAPs). The CPFB builds on the National Policy on Fisheries 
Bycatch to meet the Federal Government's commitments to bycatch reduction under AOP, 
by ensuring that all direct and indirect impacts on the marine system are taken into account 
and managed accordingly. 386 
The guiding principles underpinning the policy include: fostering stewardship; promoting 
cooperation and transparency; ensuring complementary objectives for the short and long-
term, which cross jurisdictions and departments; using robust biological reference points and 
in the absence of such, to apply the precautionary principle to management; and finally, to 
386 Commonwealth of Australia. (2000). "Commonwealth Policy on Fisheries Bycatch." Canberra: 
June 2000. http://www.affa.gov.au  [Access date: 20 June 2002]. 
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develop BAPs, recognising the biological, ecological, economic and social nature of 
fisheries.387 	 - 
More specifically these goals have been refined in the CPFB to guide management towards 
ensuring that bycatch species and populations are maintained. The sub-objectives, nestled 
under this primary bycatch maintenance objective, are to: 
• reduce bycatch; 
improve protection for vulnerable species; and 
• - arrive at decisions on the acceptable extent of ecological impacts. 388 
There are a number of strategies suggested in the CPFB for implementing these objectives. 
These range from codes of conduct and management plans to the development, adoption, 
monitoring, reviewing and improvement of mitigation measures, incentive programs, 
education and awareness programs and the improvement and refinement of scientific data 
collection that underpins biological reference points used in BAPs. 
3.2.1.5.1 	Bycatch Action Plans 
The AFMA has the responsibility to manage the BAP process and for ensuring that resultant 
actions are implemented accordingly. BAPs identify bycatch issues, data requirements, 
options and possible solutions for issues raised in theft development. BAPs were required 
for all Commonwealth fisheries by end of March 2001 and must undergo biennial review in 
accordance with the Five Year Strategic Plan and Five Year Strategic Research Plan for each 
major fishery. The MACs responsible for these major fisheries formed special committees 
in order to prepare the BAPs. BAPs were submitted to the MACs and the AFMA's 
Environment Committee for endorsement and then submitted to the AFMA Board for final 
approval, before public dissemination and incorporation into statutory management plans or 
management policy. 
A number of issues are raised in the CPFB for consideration in the development of BAPs. 
These are: 
• defining the issues and prioritising them; 
• defining whether the issue is species/fishery/method/region specific or if it relates to 
the management status of the region; 
• defining whether the issue is a result of the nature of the fishery or of the 
management regime; 
Commonwealth of Australia (2000) "Commonwealth Policy on Fisheries Bycatch." 
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• determining what information and/or analysis is already available regarding: 
- the-status/vulnerability of the stocks/species concerned; 
- the economic benefits of reducing discards; 
- the impacts of the fishery on other species; 
- the mortality rate of discards; and 
- the conservation significance of the issue and its impact onbiodiversity, 
foodwebs, recreational/indigenous fisheries, trade/economy and the 
environment; 
• identifying strategies that address interactions with vulnerable species; 
• identifying the groups affected by the issue; 
• determining if there are any engineering solutions and their relative effectiveness; 
• identifying international obligations, trade issues, state/territory policies/initiatives, 
legislative obligations, codes of practice, management/industry practices or 
education programs; and 
• determining who should pay for any proposed actions or management measures. 389 
3.2.1.5.2 	Do BAPs adequately address the issue of integration as raised 
in the RMP process? 
BAPs explicitly address the integration objectives of the RMP process through the CPFB 
commitment to ensure that BAPs are developed in "harmony with related legislation, 
international obligations and national policy directions" . 390 There is also a commitment for 
the actions identified in the BAPs to be incorporated into fishing concession conditions, 
SFRs and into fisheries directions, regulations and/or management plans. BAPs could be 
strengthened as a tool for integrated management by ensuring that complementary 
requirements for inclusion in the AFMA' s plans of management are incorporated into the 
FMA and/or the EPBC Act. 
The Check List for Developing a Bycatch Action Plan 391  in the CPFB, clearly articulates that 
BAPs should address: intra-sectoral integration issues, such as recreational and indigenous 
catch; cross-jurisdictional integration issues, such as international obligations; and cross-
sectoralldepartmental issues, such as due consideration of arrangements already in place to 
mitigate bycatch. The Check List also clearly states that information and analysis already 
available should be used in the action plan, therefore avoiding duplicated effort. 
388 Commonwealth of Australia (2000) "Commonwealth Policy on Fisheries Bycatch." 
389 Ibid. 
° Ibid. 
' Ibid. 
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3.2.1.6 	Commonwealth Fisheries Policy Review 
The New Directions for Commonwealth Fisheries Management in the 19905392  underpinned 
the review of the Fisheries Act 1952, which resulted in the development of the FMA and 
related legislation applicable to Commonwealth fisheries today. The New Directions 
document established three over-arching objectives for management controls, which 
included: the conservation and sustainability of fisheries resources and their environment; 
the maximisation of economic efficiency; and cost-recovery. 
The document addressed features such as: 
• a preference for market forces (that is, ITQs) to govern management; 
• cost-recovery in line with the principle that those who benefit should pay the cost; 
• the need to precisely define access rights and develop a formal register of those 
rights; 
• the development of management plans for all commercially viable fisheries; 
• economic priority setting; 
• the establishment of an independent specialist review panel to address allocation 
issues; 
• structural adjustment packages to reduce fishing capacity; 
• research funding arrangements; 
• industry codes of practice (for example, for minimising bycatch); 
• introduced species and disease; 
• regulation and representation of recreational fishers; 
• the establishment of the AFMA, the AFMA Board and MACs; 
• the need for cross-jurisdictional fisheries coordination; 
• and the complete review of fisheries legislation. 393 
In June 2000, some ten years after the release of the New Directions policy document, the 
then Minister for Fisheries, the Hon Warren Truss, MP announced his intention to carry out a 
CFPR to evaluate the performance of the current fisheries policy in response to the new 
challenges arising in natural resource management. These challenges included: increases in 
technological sophistication; increases in recreational fishing activity; recognition of 
indigenous fishing activity; new environmental legislation; integrated oceans management. 
initiatives; high seas fishing; and aquaculture development. 
392 Commonwealth of Australia. (1989). "New Directions for Commonwealth Fisheries Management 
in the 1990s." Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. 
393Thid. 
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In November 2000, industry and stakeholders were brought together in a conference, 
Looking to the Future, designed to establish the parameters of the review. 394 The Review 
Steering Committee was then formed and an Issues Paper was released on 16 January 
200 	This Paper highlighted the need to move with the growing trend towards 
ecosystem-based management, to ensure Australia's involvement in prominent international 
agreements and to establish access security to the fisheries resources for all user groups. The 
primary focus of the Issues Paper, however, was on ESD. Being a whole-of-government 
review, the CFPR was intended to assess the functioning and management of all relevant 
government departments including Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry - Australia (now 
DAFF), the AFMA, the NOO and Environment Australia (now DEH). 
As part of the CFPR a series of 12 port visits were carried out in January 2001. This forum 
provided the general public and representatives from all user groups with a chance to input 
into the Policy Review Process. The Review Steering Committee met six times between 
December 2000 and June 2001 and in this period, 47 written submissions were received. In 
July 2001, a draft report was submitted to the new Minister, the Hon Wilson Tuckey, MP. 
Following this report, Minister Tuckey decided to conduct a further 11 stakeholder 
consultations. The information was then supposed to be collated in preparatiOn for the final 
document, which was due for release early 2003. However, another change in Minister to 
the present Minister, Senator Ian MacDonald, dictated that the process be postponed once 
again until such time a this Minister familiarised himself with the CFPR report and the 
issues pertaining to that report. Effectively, the CFPR was 'shelved' for some six months. 
In June 2003, Looking to the Future —A Review of Commonwealth Fisheries Policy was 
released. This document contained 52 outcomes, or directions for Commonwealth Fisheries 
Policy that were intended to guide the management of Commonwealth fisheries into the new 
millennium. 396 These directions were in the following areas: 
• integrating Commonwealth fisheries policy with other strategic initiatives; 
• ecologically sustainable development; 
• economic efficiency, cost-recovery and adjustment in fisheries; 
• improved management of Commonwealth fisheries; 
• education, compliance and enforcement; 	 - 	- 
• fisheries research; 
Review Steering Group. (2001). "Commonwealth Fisheries Policy Review." Canberra: 
Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry - Australia. 
395 Ibid. 
396 AFFA. (2003). "Looking to the Future: A Review of Commonwealth Fisheries Policy." Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service: 48. 
95 
CHAPTER 3: AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES MANA GEMENT 
• resource sharing and improved cross-jurisdictional arrangements; 
• security and cancellation of access rights and penalties; 
• preference for output controls in the form of ITQs; 
• international fisheries issues; 
• food safety and quality; 
• biosecurity, marine pests and fish health; 
• building partnerships for the future; and 
• realising aquaculture potential .397 
Whilst Looking to the Future addresses many pertinent and emerging issues in the AFMA 
efficiency, industry expansion and aquaculture development, it fails to incorporate initiatives 
that would fluidly move Commonwealth fisheries towards integrated management as 
committed through such initiatives as regional marine planning and the National Coastal 
Policy. Many issues, such as recreational fisheries, a preference for ITQs, cost-recovery and 
cross-jurisdictional coordination, are carry-over issues from the New Directions policy 
document and have been highlighted again in the CFPR, indicative of the complexities 
involved in adequately addressing these more difficult issues. 
3.2.1.6.1 	Does the CFPR adequately address the issue of integration as 
raised in the RMP process? 
Outcome 22 of the CFPR (and Action 1. 1.2 of the SERMP) commits the Government to 
develop a national resource sharing and management framework covering commercial, 
recreational, charter, aquaculturc and indigenous fishing. There is, however, no precedent 
for this type of integrated management and the outcome is highly dependent on how the 
resource is initially allocated. In light of the fact that recreational fisheries were addressed 
with respect to this issue in the New Directions document without avail, it would appear that 
a more defined allocation protocol or policy should be defined before shared management 
can be adequately addressed. In this regard, the DAFF has established a Resource Sharing 
and Management Working Group (RSMWG) comprising management and definitive and 
expectant stakeholders, including commercial and recreational and charter interests, to deal 
with the complex issue of multi-sectoral fishing allocations and to provide advice to the 
Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation (the Minister). This group first met on 24 
November 2003 and has since developed a Draft Framework for Resource Sharing and 
Management (the Framework). 
AFFA (2003) "Looking to the Future.....: 48-53. 
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The RSMWG has proposed a logical stepped approach to providing advice to the Minister 
on the allocation of fisheries resources between sectors. This sophisticated approach 
includes recognition of the potential need for conflict management techniques as described 
in this thesis. The first stage will be for facilitated negotiation between Working Group 
members to reach agreement on resource allocation between sectors. 398 if Working Group 
members are unable to negotiate an agreeable allocation between the sectors themselves, 
then the use of a mediator will be considered, either from within DAFF, or appointed by 
DAFF.399  Finally, if an agreeable outcome is still not reached, then an Independent 
Allocation Panel appointed by the Minister, should be considered. 400 
The Framework commenced pilot testing in the Eastern Tuna and Billfish Fishery and the 
Southern and Western Tuna and Billfish Fishery on 4 February 2004.401  Some participants 
in the RSMWG are concerned that the process is moving towards a political deadline, which 
is perhaps too fast to adequately address the complexities involved in such allocation 
procedures 402  Alternatively, focusing on process rather than the practical application of a 
'working' process, may compromise the principle objective of the Australian Government 
for ESD. There are also concerns that the lack of financial support provided to recreational 
fisheries participants will impact on the representativeness of the working group. 403 This is 
being partially overcome through the use of teleconferencing and electronic information 
dissemination. 
The Framework envisages that the Minister's final allocation decision, based on the advice 
of the RSMWG, will be applied to the Total Allowable Catch (commercial) managed by the 
AFMA.404 It is anticipated that once these allocations are determined, management 
arrangements between the Commonwealth and the states and Northern Territory will be 
developed through the Australian Fisheries Management Forum (AFMF), but states and the 
Northern Territory will retain access rights of non-commercial uses and will assign the 
appropriate management arrangements .405 In this regard, through the AFMF, fisheries are 
well established to deal with cross-jurisdictional fisheries issues at the national scale and at 
the regional scale through the Northern and Southern Fisheries Management Forums (which 
398 Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. (2004). "Draft Framework for Resource Sharing 
and Management." Revised draft Discussion Paper from 24 November 2003 meeting. Canberra. 
Ibid. 
400 Ibid. 
401 Hurry, G. (2004). Personal Communication - 5 January 2004. 
402 From interview with subject F033. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. (2004). "Explanation of Framework." Support 
documentation for 4 February 2004 meeting of RSMWG. 
405 Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (2004) "Draft Framework..." 
97 
CHAPTER 3: A USTRAL JAN FISHERIES M42V4GFMENT 
are sub-sets of the AFMF) .406 Integration within fisheries is currently minimal, aicund a 
Level 1 or 2 on the Policy Integration Scale, with either one-way information shaitg or 
relatively independent decision-making by individual 'sectors' 	Coordination occurs only 
at the higher level policy setting. This commitment to resource sharing will enhace 
fisheries managers' capacity to integrate fisheries through ecosystem-based management in 
order to meet the objective of ecologically sustainable development. 
Compliance is a major issue facing contemporary fisheries management. This is especially 
so in high seas fisheries and with regard to IUU fishing activities in the AFZ. It is, however, 
important that domestic fisheries are also monitored for theft level of compliance nsuring, 
amongst other things, the validity of the data to be used in stock assessments. A less 
orthodox approach to domestic compliance and enforcement would,be for Government to 
work with industry to enhance the acceptance of and, indirectly through associatel 
networking, the integration of management measures within the industry and the community. 
Government policy and management plans are not always readily understood by he 
layperson and that the best way to educate people is through extensive consultation and 
outreach programs, ensuring that operational standards that are adopted are not so Ilexible 
that they cannot then be enforced. This also works in reverse; government can we these 
forums to find out how practical management plans are and what is working effectively or 
what could be done for plans to work better on the ground. 
Recent funding commitments for SeaNet,405 an extension program designed to bulge the gap 
between government, researchers and industry, illustrates the Government's coinotitment 
towards better education, however, this has only been guaranteed for another one year. An 
appropriate Education Policy would complement this commitment by giving ediantion 
programs some long-term vision. This is also illustrated through the AFMA's enrging 
commitment towards enhancing education with respect to regulations as a complktnce 
mechanism through the National Compliance Strategy. 409 
406 Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. (2003). "A Framework forResourct Sharing 
and Management in Commonwealth-managed Fisheijes." DRAFT Discussion Paper ptpared for 
the 24 November 2003 meeting of the RSMWG in Canberra. 
407 In this instance, 'sectors' refers to commercial, recreational, indigenous and aquacultin interests. 
408 SeaNet was granted $400,000 funding from the NHT for 12 months guaranteed with thoussions of 
a further 3 years. 
409 AFFA (2003) "Looking to the Future . ....: Outcome 18: 49; and 
Craik, W. (2003). "Australian Fisheries Management Authority Annual Public Meetirg. " Hobart: 
Quarantine Centre, Macquarie Wharf No 1, Hunter Street, 17 October 2003. 
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122 Indirect fisheries management arrangements 
Until 1998, the AFMA dealt with the management of fisheries and the Fisheries Policy 
Branch of the Department of Primary Industries and Energy (DPIE) dealt with the policy 
decisions and implementation. In 1998, however, the DPIE underwent restructuring and 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry - Australia (AFFA) was established (now the DAFF). 
As part of the Industry Development Group of AFFA, the Fisheries Policy and Aquaculture 
Branch (FAB) was formed to take over the role of the Fisheries Policy Branch of DPIE. In 
comparison to the fisheries management responsibilities of the AFMA, FAB is charged with 
the responsibility for broader fisheries policy, international fisheries negotiations and 
strategic fisheries issues. 410 FAB works closely in conjunction with all those with interests in 
fisheries, to progress legislative amendments, to provide policy and infrastructure support for 
the AFMA and to provide advice to the Minister. The FAB work program is centred on 
three main focus areas: 
• International Fisheries - which provides policy advice on bilateral, multilateral and 
regional fisheries agreements and related issues; 
• Aquaculture, Food and Trade— which provides advice on national aquaculture 
industry development, including through the Aquaculture Action Agenda, and 
coordination of the seafood supply chain, including seafood safety and market and 
trade strategies; and 
• Strategic Fisheries Policy - which provides policy advice on national fisheries 
policy issues, Offshore Constitutional Settlement, legislative processes, resource 
access and use including native title and recreational fishing. 41 ' 
In light of increasing environmental regulatory demands, the Fisheries and Forestry 
Environment Branch was established in 2002 to provide advice to the Minister on 
sustainable fishing practices and environmental issues affecting or affected by fisheries 
practices. This Branch also consists of three sections including: 	 - 
• Marine Industries Environment - which provides policy advice for sustainable 
fishing including the effects of fishing on non-target species and the marine 
environment, including bycatch policy involving bMh international and national 
plans of action for seabirds and sharks (and actions for other listed species), use of 
marine protected areas and ecosystem-based regional marine planning under AOP 
and the development of a National Coastal Policy; 
410 AFMA. (2003). "What is AFMA?" http://www.afina.gov.au  
Adapted from: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Phone List —29 January 2004. 
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• Fisheries Action Program - which incorporates the management and finalisation of 
the Fisheries Action Program and the co-ordination and facilitation of all fish related 
matters concerning the Natural Heritage Trust; and 
• Invasive Marine Pests - which coordinates the development of national policies at 
the Commonwealth and state/territory level to help prevent incursions and 
translocations of exotic marine pests, particularly by commercial shipping 
operations. 412 
3.2.2.1 	EPBC Act —fisheries management requirements 
The demand for effective environmental monitoring of Australia's fisheries has increased in 
response to international developments such as: the LOSC in 1982, which established a right 
to exploit the marine resources and an obligation to protect the marine environment; the 
UNCED in 1992, which defined the concept of sustainable development and introduced the 
precautionary approach to management; and the Convention on Biodiversity in 1992 ,413 
which introduced the concept of integrated ecosystem management, recognising MPAs as a 
key conservation measure. In Australia, this shift in focus resulted in the consolidation of 
environmental controls and for a third party environmental auditing process to occur at the 
Commonwealth level. 
Thus, in September 2000, after Environment Australia (now DISH) revised Schedule 4 of the 
Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports & Imports) Act 1982, the Minister for 
Environment and Heritage amended the Act to remove the export-control exemption for 
most marine fisheries .414  Previously exempt state and Commonwealth export-fisheries are 
now subject to assessment by December 2004 under the EPBC Act.415 Under this Act, 
marine species will be exempt from export controls if they are harvested in accordance with 
management arrangements assessed as ecologically sustainable. Those species found to be 
subject to export controls under the EPBC Act will require an export permit or authority to 
be issued before export of the species is approved. 
The EPBC Act has also introduced the requirement that all Commonwealth fisheries, 
including those without export components, would commence a strategic environmental 
assessment by July 2005. Two-thirds of the assessments were to commence within the first 
412 Adapted from: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Phone List —29 January 2004. 
413 Sainsbury, K. and Sumaila, U.R. (2001). "Incorporating ecosystem objectives into management of 
sustainable marine fisheries." Paper presented at the Reykjavik Conference on Responsible 
Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem. Iceland: Reykjavik- 1-4 October 2001. 
414 AFFA. (2003). http://www.affa.gov.au 
EPBC Act. (1999). Part 13A. 
100 
CHAPTER 3: AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
three years of the Act coming into effect (that is, by July 2003).416  For those fisheries 
without a related management plan in place, it is a requirement that they undergo a strategic- 
assessment before the AFMA can determine the appropriate plan of management. Due to 
these requirements, the focus of strategic assessments to date has been on export-fisheries 
and those Commonwealth fisheries in the development stages of plans of management. 
One other type of assessment that can occur under the auspices of the EPBC Act relates to 
the incidental capture of protected species. This assessment can be carried out to accredit a 
fishery on the basis of the management plan including reasonable measures to avoid the 
incidental capture of or interference with protected species and/or requirements to record 
interactions with protected species. Without this accreditation, operators may be prosecuted 
for any capture of protected species, even if it is only incidental. 
3.2.2.1.1 	Strategic assessments 
Strategic environmental assessments are carried out in accordance with a set of guidelines, 
the Guidelines for Ecologically Sustainable Management ofFisheries, which are based 
largely on the Marine Stewardship Council principles looking at the condition of the fish 
stock, the impact on the marine environment and the fishery's management system. 417 
In meeting national ESD requirements for fisheries management, the Commonwealth 
Government requires that fisheries are managed in accordance with the following two 
principles: 
"Principle One: A fishery must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to over-
fishing, or for those stocks that are over-fished, the fishery must be conducted such 
that there is a higher degree of probability the stock(s) will recover; and 
Principle Two: Fishing operations should be managed to minimise their impact on 
the structure, productivity, function and biological diversity of the ecosystem."418 
486 AFMA. (2003). http://www.afina.gov.au  
417 Marine Stewardship Council. (2002). http://www.msc.org  [Access date: 20 June 20031. 
418 Environment Australia. (2001). "Guidelines for the Ecologically Sustainable Management of 
Fisheries." http://www.deh.gov.au/coasts/fisheries/assessmentlguidelines.html [Access date: 20 
June 2003]. 
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Each strategic assessment must include: 
a comprehensive description of the fishery, including information about the: 
- management agency; 
- species caught; 
- fishing methods used; 
- area fished; 
- number of operators; and 
- historic and current fishing effort; 
• a detailed description of the environment likely to be affected; 
the management arrangements applicable to the fishery; 
• an environmental assessment (as incorporated in the ESD framework) including the 
fisheries impact on the: 
- target species; 
- non-target species or bycatch; and 
- general ecosystem; 
• a performance report identifying the measures intended to prevent, minimise or 
compensate for the potential environmental impacts on the fishery, including any 
proposed independent environmental auditing or feasible alternatives and 
justifications as to the final choice; and 
. the source and reliability of any information used in the assessment. 419 
Strategic assessments are carried out to determine if the principles and associated objectives 
and guidelines for management are being adhered to, to ensure the ecological sustainability 
of the fishery. 
3.2.2.1.2 	Do strategic assessments adequately address the issue of 
integration as raised in the RMP process? 
Strategic assessments determine if the management plan incorporates the capacity to address 
ESD as raised in the National Strategy for ESD and the EPBC Act. However, there is no 
requirement for the re-assessment of management plans once approved, to determine if ESD 
objectives are being met in practice. Therefore, while the original assessment provides 
opportunity for cross-sectoral integration with environmental conservation interests in a two- 
419 Department of Environment and Heritage. (2003). "Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 Benchmarks for the Environmental Assessment of Fisheries." 
http://www.deh.gov.aulcoasts/fisheries/assessmentlbenchinarks.html  [Access date: 17 March 
2004]. 
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way information exchange, assessment and response process, there is no ongoing 
commitment to maintain this integrative relationship. 
Another flaw in the strategic assessment process relates to intra-sectoral integration issues. 
The strategic assessment process neglects to formally address the social and economic 
aspects of the fishery. These aspects will have a significant impact on the performance of 
any management system and should be recognised in the management plan. One way to 
accomplish this and avoiding duplicated effort, would be to adopt the ESD reporting 
framework (see Section 3.2.2.2) in its entirety. This framework addresses the intra-sectoral 
integration capacity of fisheries assessment to address social and economic aspects of 
fisheries management, but fails to provide a broader cross-seetoral integration capacity that 
would look at the impacts of and on other resource users (see Section 3.2.2.2 for discussion 
of this point). 
3.2.2.2 	ESD reporting - The 'How To' Guide for Wild Capture Fisheries 
In early 2000, in response to increasing pressure on fisheries to conform to ever increasing 
environmental monitoring practices, the Fisheries Research and Development Corporation 
(FRDC), through its ESD Reporting and Assessment subprogram, funded a project to 
develop a new ESD reporting framework for Australian fisheries .420  The 'How To' Guide 
for Wild Capture Fisheries (the Guide) is a guide for ESD reporting that is designed to meet 
the increasing demands of government policy and legislation by reducing duplication of 
effort. The proposed ESD report provides the foundations for strategic assessments under 
the EPBC Act, internal auditing processes and for environmental accreditation, similar to 
that provided internationally by the MSC. Environmental accreditation is a powerful 
management tool for fisheries. It enables accredited fisheries to readily access markets and 
provides leverage in doing so. The ESD reporting framework would provide the foundations 
for this accreditation to occur. The proposed reporting also provides a clear direction for 
wild capture fisheries with respect to integrated management as proposed in AOP by 
including the wider economic, social and environmental implications of each fishery. In 
doing so, the reporting framework builds on the EPBC Act's strategic assessments, which do 
not address the social and economic implications of wild capture fisheries. 
420 Fletcher, W.J., Chesson, J., Fisher, M., Sainsbury, K.J., Hundloe, T., Smith, A.D.M. and 
Whitworth, B. (2002). "National ESD Reporting Framework for Australian Fisheries: The 'How 
To' Guide for Wild Capture Fisheries." FRDC Project 2000/145. Australia: Canberra. 
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3.2.2.2.1 	Steps in ESD reporting 
For the purpose of this framework, ESD is broken up into eight components relevant to 
fisheries. These are categorised in three groups and are as follows 
Contribution of the fishery to ecological well-being 
Retained species; 
Non-retained species; 
General ecosystems; 
Contributions of the fishery to human well-being 
Indigenous well-being; 
Community and regional well-being; 
National social and economic well-being; 
Factors affecting the ability of the fishery to contribute to ESD 
Impact of the environment on the fishery; and 
Governance arrangements .421 
The first step to ESD reporting is the identification of issues, or hazards as they apply to the 
fishery. The Guide outlines a set of generic component trees, one tree applicable to each of 
the ESD components listed above. These generic component trees provide a starting point 
for issue consideration and provide some consistency to the previously haphazard 
brainstorming process that was issue identification. 
The next step in the process is the prioritisation of issues by using risk analysis tools. Each 
issue is assigned a level of consequence (from negligible to catastrophic) and the likelihood 
of this consequence occurring (from remote to likely). The combination of consequence and 
likelihood levels is assigned an overall level of risk and then management actions are 
assigned accordingly. The assignment of risk is highly dependent on interpretation and may 
vary considerably from analyst to analyst. It is therefore important that clear justifications 
accompany each level of risk assigned to each issue. 
The third step is a response to the risk analysis whereby performance reports are completed 
on the issues raised in step one. There are two main types of reports; those that entail a 
justification only of the conclusion - primarily because the risk ratings assigned in step two 
were sufficiently low to warrant not having any management actions; and those that require a 
full performance report detailing all elements of the proposed management system. 
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Performance reports are written for each issue with a risk rating high enough to trigger a 
management response. Reports must include the operational objective related to the 
management of the issue, an indicator and associated performance measure to assess the 
performance against the operational objective and a management response that is designed to 
achieve acceptable performance. 
The final step is the compilation of background material on the fishery and the environment 
in which it operates. Understandably, this step may need to be completed first or 
information may be gathered throughout the process ready for ordered compilation at the 
end. The material covered in this section refers to the: history of the fishery; where the 
fishery operates; the fishing methods used; the major species targeted, habitats and 
ecosystems that could be affected; and the biological characteristics of the main species and 
habitats involved. 
3.2.2.2.2 	Limitations of ESD reporting 
Full ESD reporting is voluntary and for it to be of actual benefit to fisheries, this reporting 
should be incorporated into fisheries legislation to ensure that proposed management actions 
are actuated. Without legislative backing it is possible for fisheries managers to choose to 
implement the easier management responses, generally low risk options that support the ESD 
framework but do not necessarily incorporate a fill suite of ESD actions. There may be 
situations where implementation of the more difficult, higher risk management actions may 
have greater benefit to the fishery. 
Another thaw back of the ESD reporting structure is that it relies on qualitative risk analysis, 
thus thawing on the analyst's interpretation of risk to the fishery. For this reason, there 
needs to be stringent mechanisms to ensure their objectivity is not hampered by, for instance, 
political or industry pressure. One way around this would be to obtain an assessment from at 
least two independent scientists, using a thircFshould arguable discrepancies arise, although 
this option is recognised as being resource intensive. There also needs to be clear definitions 
for each fishery with regard to each issue about what wan-ants a catastrophic consequence 
and what each level of likelihood means. Another alternative is to apply a form of 
quantitative risk based analysis, such as the Management Strategy Evaluation methodology 
(see Section 7.3.4) .422 
421 Fletcher et al (2002): 8-9 
422 Smith, A.D.M., Sainsbury, K.J. and Stevens, R.A. (1999). "Implementing effective fisheries-
management systems - management strategy evaluation and the Australian partnership approach." 
ICES Journal of Marine Science. 56: 967-979. 
105 
CHAPTER 3: AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
3.2.2.2.3 	Does the ESD framework adequately address the issue of 
integration as raised in the RMP process? 
There is a need for some form of coordination of reporting and reporting requirements at the 
Commonwealth level. This is evident through analysisof the number and scope of 
legislation and policies applicable to Australian fisheries that require some form of fisheries 
reporting. These include the reporting requirements of the strategic assessments under the 
EPBC Act, environmental accreditation requirements for MSC or Australian approval, 
requirements under the SERMP, initiatives under the Commonwealth Fisheries Policy 
Review and the AFMA's management plans. With more efficient management these could 
be streamlined to minimise duplication and industry scrutiny and to strengthen current 
management arrangements. 
ESD reporting for wild capture fisheries makes up one component of the National Strategy 
for ESD. Caution must be given to the application of new and emerging terminology, such 
as 'ecosystem-based' management proposed in the SERMP, to ensure that duplication of 
effort through new reporting requirements is minimised. For example under the auspices of 
the EPBC Act, fisheries are subject to strategic assessment in accordance with components 
1-3 of ESD listed above. It would also be of benefit for the AFMA to adopt ESD reporting 
as proposed here in its entirety (including components 4-8) as part of its fisheries 
management plans. This would minimise duplicated effort of reporting and set fisheries up 
in a strong position to enter into integrated management, perhaps adding value and 
credibility to current management practices. 
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3.3 What are the conflicts specific to Australian fisheries resulting 
from integration issues? 
There are five basic types of fishery conflicts. These are as follows: 
Jurisdictional conflicts 
	
	- who controls the fishery? What is the optimal form of 
management? What is the role of government? 
Management mechanisms - how is the fishery controlled? (for example, 
enforcement issues, quota allocation issues, co-
management issues). 
Internal allocation issues - relations between fishery users (for example, 
religious, ethnic, recreational, commercial, 
indigenous) 
External allocation issues - relations between fishers and other users of the 
aquatic environment (for.example, tourism, 
conservation, oil and gas). 
Philosophical issues 	- relations between fishers and non-fishery issues (for 
example, environment, politics, economic change). 423 
In dealing with fisheries specific conflicts the social status of the actors must be taken into 
consideration, as should the historical frictions between and the political weight of actors. 
When government is involved, careful consideration must be given to the political gains and 
general politics that may be influencing decision-making. 424  The economic impacts of 
management decisions must not be ignored and these must be weighed against the social and 
environmental impacts in making conflict management decisions. It is important that any 
scientific information must be unbiased and independent due to the supple nature of data 
interpretation that can easily be influenced by those in power. 
3.11 Type I— Jurisdictional conflicts 
Type I conflicts in Australia are dealt with under Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS) 
arrangements, whereby the relevant states and the Commonwealth reach agreement on 
management arrangements for cross-jurisdictional fisheries. These OCS arrangements have 
423 Bennett, E., Neiland, A., Anang, E., Bannerman, P., Atiq Rahman, A., Huq, S., Bhuiya, S., Day, 
M., Fulford-Gardiner, M. and Clerveaux, W. (2001). "Towards a better understanding of conflict 
management in tropical fisheries: evidence from Ghana, Bangladesh and the Caribbean." Marine 
Policy, 25: 365-376; and 
Charles, A.T. (1992). "Fishery conflicts: a unified framework." Marine Policy, 16(5): 379-393. 
424 Orbach, M.K. (1989). "Of Mackeral and Menhaden: A public policy perspective on fishery 
conflict." Ocean & Shoreline Management, 12 (3): 199-216. 
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been the subject of much criticism from outsiders, but generally seem to provide good 
management solutions to those involved directly in negotiations .425  The OCS arrangement 
for fisheries is based on principles for delivering species-based management rather than 
jurisdictional management. This is usually carried out by entrusting the management of the 
species or population over its entire range to one or the other jurisdiction. However, it still 
remains that while OCS arrangements deal with cross-jurisdictional conflicts, they neglect to 
adequately deal with intra-sectoral conflicts.426 The OCS arrangements work well when 
there are no on-water interactions (such as, for tuna and Rock Lobster), but further work is 
required on how the Commonwealth and states can have joint authority in practice. 421 Other 
problems that have arisen with the OCS relate to multi-species, multi-gear fisheries and 
complementary management arrangements across jurisdictional lines .428  It is believed, 
however, that despite these problems any negatives associated with OCS can be resolved 
through a renegotiation of MoU terms and conditions. 
Conflict also occurs with neighbouring nations over fisheries resources. This is particularly 
evident in the north with IUU fishing by Indonesians, and in the south with IUU fishing in 
Australia's sub-Antarctic waters. This conflict weighs heavily on Government with few 
mechanisms outside the judicial system to prevent this from occurring. 
3.3.2 Type 11—Management mechanisms 
Type II conflicts regarding how fisheries are controlled can occur between governments - 
where there is a distinct lack of continuity in management across jurisdictional boundaries. 
This can be either between states or between the states and Commonwealth. Many of these 
inconsistencies are dealt with in the current fisheries management plans and OCS 
arrangements. Many would refine, however, that these plans do not encompass the nature of 
the issues in their entirety. Their success in achieving sustainable management is also 
questionable considering the number of fisheries still being overfished. Certain states see the 
management of Commonwealth fisheries as driven by economic efficiency, which is 
included in the Commonwealth's FMA as a separate objective, and that states do not 
emphasise this objective as it detracts from the ESD principles on which natural resources 
are managed .429  This point is arguable in that economic efficiency is an obvious driver for 
425 From interviews with subject NT49 and LX67. 
426 From interview with subject NT49; and 
National Oceans Office. (2002). "Developing a national approach to integrated oceans 
management: principles and outcomes." DRAFT Paper for consideration by the IOM Working 
Group. 13 December 2002. 
427 From interview with subject NT49. 
428 From interview with subject LX67. 
429 From interview with subject NT49. 
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any commercial fishery, whether it be state or Commonwealth, and it is a moot point 
whether 0th is made explicit in legislation, which some would consider being upfront and 
transparent, or whether it is just implied. The RMP process has the potential to provide a 
new forum for discussing these conflicts within the broader context of marine resource users. 
This in itself has provided much conflict with some arguing that the MACs currently hold 
this power, believing these issues do not impact other resource users significantly enough to 
warrant a new negotiating forum. 
The operations of MACs raises many conflicts, including much long-lived and lively debate. 
Some believe the MACs do not work as well as they should and are incapable of addressing 
broader resource use issues and impacts across boarders due to their industry-based focus. 
The issue of representative membership versus expertise-based membership continually re-
emerges with no clear answer. There is also a belief by some in the fishing industry that, 
despite the theoretical impartiality of MAC members, MAC members often push their own 
agendas to the detriment of others unrepresented on these MACs.43° Another issue relevant 
to the effective and efficient functionality of MACs is the often-high turnover of the AFMA 
staff. This in itself poses a problem in some instances whereby management changes hands 
quite regularly, losing the 'expertise' and memory required for such an advisory committee 
to work efficiently. 
The timely development of management plans is in itself a source of conflict between 
industry and the Government. For example, 431  in the SENTF (Trevalla) fishery quotas were 
issued based on catch history over a defined period. This occurred, however, when catches 
in Tasmania were comparatively low to other state's catches, therefore resulting in quota 
allocations equivalent to around 37% of the then current Tasmanian catch. Some fishers 
have accelerated their catches or rejoined the fishery since then, but this has not been 
reflected in historic management decisions. The catch history period and the periodicity of 
management plan reviews were so far apart that it did not reflect current fishing 
arrangements. 
Another concern raised by stakeholders and constituents is the lack of regard the AFMA has 
for external expertise with respect to giving priority to issues raised by stakeholders and 
acting on them in a timely manner .432  The AFMA needs to be careful of industry capture '433 
For example '434  in Tasmania in the late 1980s approximately 42,000t of orange toughy was 
430 From interviews with subject EY7I and MD21. 
'' From interview with subject MD2 1. 
432 From interview with subject LX67. 
433 From interviews with subject LX67 and F033. 
434 From interview with subject LX67. 
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taken in one year. This raised concerns with the industry and with others as they saw the 
imminent collapse of the fishery, but the AFMA either chose to do nothing or was not 
equipped to react in a timely fashion to save the resource for the maximum benefit of all 
Australians. 
3.3.3 Type 111—Internal allocation issues 
Internal allocation issues, or Type ifi, between recreational, commercial and indigenous 
fishers are currently confronting Australian Commonwealth fisheries and policy managers. 
Even within the commercial sector for instance, there are often conflicts between fishers that 
use different gear types. This is evident in the waters around Tasmania where trawlers in the 
SETF are often involved in destructive gear interactions with other fisheries, such as The crab 
fishery. Fundamentally, many non-trawl fishers believe that trawling should be banned by 
the AFMA as a means of meeting the objectives of ESD, as it is effectively a "clear felling of 
the oceans', 435  and as such significantly impacts the environment and the livelihoods of other 
resource users who depend on the health of these ecosystems. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1.6.1 (the Commonwealth Fisheries Policy Review), resource 
sharing arrangements are currently being addressed by the Commonwealth. In addition, 
recreational fishers are also pushing for equal representation on MACs for fisheries in which 
resources are shared and allocated among sectors .436  Recreational fishers have been granted 
observer status on some of these MACs, but they see this as "second rate citizen status" .437 
This in itself presents conflict as MACs are a tool primarily for the management of 
commercial fishing operations, yet including appropriate capacity for recreational 
management is alluded to in the FMA where it refers to the fact that management plans may 
"prohibit or regulate recreational fishing in the fishery". 438 Mother contentious point is that 
MACs are meant to be expertise-based rather than representative. Despite this direction, it is 
evident that these expert members are not adequately representing certain interests that lie 
outside their field of expertise, but which make up a significant component of the fishery. 
Traditionally fishing for subsistence, indigenous fishers are under-represented in 
management processes, yet are increasingly seeking opportunities to join in commercial 
fishing operations. This is in part due to the lack of commitment by indigenous people to the 
435 Comment made by M. O'May at the AFMA Annual Public Meeting for the Fishing Industry. 
Hobart: 17 October 2003. 
436 From interview with subject F033. 
From interview with subject F033. 
438 Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) (as amended), s.17(6(h)). 
110 
CHAPTER 3: AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES MANA GEMENT 
Government's management methods, rather than a lack of opportunity. 439  It is clear, too, that 
the 'culturally challenged' method of engagement by Government creates this lack of 
commitment. This illustrates a fundamental conflict of cultures that is not easily addressed 
by western conflict management tools and approaches. Perhaps a combined effort 
incorporating experience and knowledge from both cultures will be needed for these parties 
to work together for the long-term sustainable management of Australia's fisheries 
resources. 
3.3.4 Type IV— External allocation issues 
Conflicts in Australian fisheries have risen as a result of a heightened awareness with regard 
to ecosystem-based management and a need for better management. Type IV conflicts 
between fishers and conservation users of the environment have been addressed by the 
requirements of the EPBC Act. These requirements indicate that all Australian export 
fisheries must undergo a strategic assessment by 2003 and all remaining fisheries must 
undergo a strategic assessment by 2005. These assessments will determine if management 
practices in place meet with the stringent conservation and environmental protection 
standards of the EPBC Act. One conflict involved in this case is between departments 
whereby one department, the DEH (formerly known as Environment Australia), is 
effectively auditing another, the AFMA, against environmental criteria that should already 
be met under the AFMA's management plans. There is debate as to whether the DEH is the 
most appropriate body to undertake this review given its lack of knowledge of fisheries 
management processes and in most cases, the actual fisheries. In general, however, the 
assessment process has been accepted as highlighting some of the inadequacies of current 
fisheries management practices in addressing ESD. Another element that has the potential to 
cause great debate is whether another layer of assessment will be imposed under the RMP 
process. Any multi-layered bureaucratic checking system has the potential to demean both 
the AFMA's management ability and the trust in the industry, which could further lead to 
non-compliance. 
Fundamental conflicts arising from both the non-consumptive and consumptive use of the 
marine environment have been raised through AOP's commitment towards a National 
Representative System of Marine Protected Areas (NRSMPAs). This commitment has led to 
great debate over structural adjustment issues primarily to do with displaced fishers. This is 
a revolutionary debate that will set the precedence for future structural adjustment claims, so 
must be managed with great care. Some fishers believe that there is a burning need for a 
rigid 'Structural Adjustment' Policy that clearly outlines the circumstances under which 
From interview with subject ZA9I. 
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compensation will be assigned and how this will be decided." ° What has emerged through 
the Government's policy statement on MPAS and displaced fishing, however, is some broad 
guidelines to structural adjustment, indicating a preference for market-based adjustments, 
and a commitment to assess cases on a case-by-case basis."' There is a certain level of 
distrust by the fishing industry of the Government's motives. Some believe that if the 
Government had a choice between paying compensation for displaced effort and/or 
reductions in TACs for quota managed fisheries and reducing the 'no-take' component of an 
MPA, they would opt for a reduction in the 'no-take' area to avoid paying out 
compensation .442  From a Government perspective, they were unlikely to ever develop a 
detailed Structural Adjustment Policy because there are so many variables governing the 
impact that any displacement of effort will actually have. 
In some cases it is most likely that impacts will be short-lived, but will involve some 
additional costs or reductions in income, hence the development of the MIPA and displaced 
fishing policy statement.43 Decisions with respect to any assistance given will still be on a 
case-by-case basis depending on a range of things such as if it will impact: the profitability 
of the individual; the sustainability of the fish stock; or if it will require some effort 
reduction. The DEH are pushing for the amalgamation of MPAs with spatial closures for 
overfished fisheries under the guise of the strategic assessments, as adjustment does not need 
to be paid out for spatial closures under the FMA.W  Fisheries are pushing for the two 
processes to be separated out, especially since they are running to very different timeframes, 
with MPAs in the SERMP region to be in place by the end of 2005 and spatial closures 
within three years. It is interesting to note that while this debate has been going on with 
commercial fishers, recreational fishers are still struggling to prove their value as a sector 
and 'structural adjustment' is unlikely to extend to this valuable sector, as has proven the 
case in the states .441 
Regional marine planning is inadvertently causing conflicts between fisheries and other 
users, such as the petroleum industry and conservation groups. For example, 446  the 
petroleum industry is undertaking a lot of exploration and seismic surveying in the Otways 
area. Regional marine planning has highlighted the concerns over the interaction of these 
"° From interview with subject EY7 I. 
"'Australian Government. (2004). "Marine Protected Areas and Displaced Fishing: A Policy 
Statement." Canberra: DEH. http://www.deh.gov.au/coasts/mpa/disptaced-fishing.html  [Access 
date: 4 February 2004]. 
442 From interview with subject EY7 1. 
413 From interview with subject HKO1. 
" From interviews with subject 1-IKO I and FM66. 
'4' From interview with subject F033. 
" From interview with subject BS82. 
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surveys with whale migration patterns through the area and conservationists' demands that 
the seismic operations cease in those months that whales are found to be moving through. 
This has effectively limited seismic activity to operate in the months of October and 
November to minimise this interaction. This period is, however, one of the most sensitive 
times for Rock Lobster with respect to production and hence gear interactions. So what has 
eventuated is a three-fold conflict that would have been easily resolved if all parties had been 
identified and engaged from the onset. Regional marine planning is value adding to the 
petroleum industry in terms of facilitating long standing conflicts and misunderstandings of 
the industry's operations. This has led to improved relations with traditional arch enemies, 
such as conservation groups. 
3.3.5 Type V- Philosophical issues 
Philosophical conflicts arise from inherent differences in the belief systems of stakeholders. 
The most obvious philosophical conflict relating to the fishing industry is that with extreme 
conservationists who believe that all life should be conserved and that we have no right to 
take the life of any living thing, especially for economic benefit. The balance to this 
argument is that the fishing industry theoretically only takes from the environment what is 
sustainable for ecosystem processes to survive. The polarisation of this fundamental debate 
is illustrative of the difficulties presented to resource use managers, which need to carefully 
balance stakeholder interests for the benefit of all Australians and the well-being of the 
environment. 
The RMP process is still in early development and some concerns have been raised over the 
potential of RMP to dictate future research and management efforts and requirements in 
sectors such as fisheries. As a result of these concerns and the relative inexperience of the 
NOO with respect to managing sectoral interests, the NOO has met with resistance from 
current sectoral management agencies, such as fisheries. These agencies have the additional 
advantage of hindsight and historical knowledge of both the governance arrangements and 
the industry. However, there is also argument for a non-biased assessment through the RMP 
process of where efforts need to be and should be made. 
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3.4 Summary 
This chapter concludes Part II of the thesis, which describes the current oceans and fisheries 
management arrangements in Australia and theft capacity to incorporate integration and 
conflict management as reflected in the Commonwealth's AOP. This chapter specifically 
builds on the integrated oceans management analysis of the previous chapter and explores 
the integration capacity of Australia's Commonwealth fisheries to meet the objectives of 
regional marine planning. From this analysis, it is evident that the independent nature of the 
statutory authority for Commonwealth fisheries management currently lends itself to a low 
capacity for integrated management with other sectors and within fisheries. Initiatives such 
as regional marine planning and those under the Commonwealth Fisheries Policy Review 
have brought these inadequacies to light and the current Government is moving to address 
issues such as intra-sectoral resource sharing and cross-sectoral coordination. Likewise, the 
many inherent conflicts in fisheries are being addressed by the Government, generally 
through broader stakeholder participation in line with the broader context of fisheries 
impacts in the regional marine planning process. 
Part III of the thesis will address international and other natural resource management 
developments for counterfactual analysis with the integration of fisheries management under 
the Australian regional marine planning process. The following chapter will address oceans 
policy and fisheries management developments in Canada, the USA, New Zealand, the 
European Union and Iceland. It is anticipated that these international experiences will offer 
some insights into the practical application of integration and conflict management in 
government policy. 
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PART III: 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Effective policy development and implementation requires thorough research of the issues, 
effective consultation with stakeholders and management agencies, an analysis of the work 
already underway on the topic, a sound understanding of legislation and government policy 
and ongoing working relations with those involved in the process. In order to reduce the 
learning time involved with policy transfer, policy makers often turn to international 
counterparts for set precedents and effective management strategies. This chapter explores 
international experience in the development and implementation of fisheries and oceans 
management in order to extrapolate some lessons to inform the Australian processes. While 
this chapter broadly addresses issues as raised in the framework of analysis, it does not 
explicitly analyse each country's capacity for incorporating integration and conflict 
management. Comparisons can be difficult given the variance of underlying factors, such as 
political systems, government priorities and economic pressures, that affect oceans 
management. This data will therefore be used to better inform Australian initiatives rather 
than concentrating on direct comparisons. 
Integrated oceans management, as it relates to the coordination of traditionally sectoral 
interests, is a relatively new concept, but several nations are endeavouring to deal with the 
challenges arising from implementation of this approach. Australia, although somewhat a 
world leader with respect to implementing integrated fisheries and oceans management, can 
benefit from the practical experience of these other nations. Canada has been included in 
this study as it has a similar political system to Australia, but also for its legislative approach 
to integrated oceans management that contrasts Australia's policy development approach. 
The USA has the same maritime delineation between state and federal jurisdictions as 
Australia and, although having a different political system, has approached integrated 
management regionally, in much the same way as Australia is proposing though regional 
marine planning. The USA has managed fisheries on a regional and inclusive basis for 
several years, and thus can provide valuable insights into the co-management approach for 
fisheries. 
New Zealand, also with a different political system, is developing an Oceans Policy. 
Although progress is slow, their consultation process appears quite advanced. New Zealand 
has also faced many challenges with indigenous fishers and has implemented innovative 
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approaches to fisheries allocation and management. The European Union, although having a 
questionable reputation with respect to the sustainable management of its fisheries resources, 
provides insights into the development of sustainable and integrated oceans management 
within a supra national political entity, which theoretically reflects similar issues as the 
Australian jurisdictional divisions between states and the Commonwealth. Iceland was 
chosen for its advanced market-based fisheries management system and is used as a 
comparator with Australia's co-management approach as the latter moves towards adopting a 
more market-based system. The Iceland experience provides opportunity to explore 
adequacy of both market-based systems and co-management approaches in rising to the 
challenges of integrated oceans management. 
4.1 Canada 
4.1.1 Canada's oceans management 
In 1987 the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) published the Oceans Policy 
for Canada document .447  This document highlighted the need for Canada to develop an 
integrated manageffient strategy regarding marine resource exploitation, since the declaration 
of the 200nm EEZ. This initiative, however, failed for a number of reasons. There was a 
lack of a dedicated ocean planning department. Although DFO was dedicated the lead 
agency, it left several prominent departments making their own, often overlapping 
policies.448  This was particularly evident in the summary of the 1987 policy initiative, 
indicating that 14 federal departments had been involved in 75 ocean-related programs. 9 
The focus of the DFO at the time was also on the rapid decline in fish stocks that was 
becoming apparent, coupled with a dramatic increase in unemployment rates, hence higher 
pressure on the Government, especially in the east-coast communities. The rise in illegal 
fishing and illegal imports and exports was matched by a relatively inadequate monitoring 
and enforcement regime, as evident in the turbot 'war' in 1995.450  The document also failed 
to address the issue of maritime security. The demise of the Soviet Union, however, reduced 
the threat from the Arctic. Coupled with the change in personnel of the DFO and 
departmental cuts, the oceans policy soon failed due to a lack of consistency and support. 45 ' 
Day, D. (1995). "Public policy and ocean management in Canada." Marine Policy, 19(4): 251-
256. 
448 Mitchell, C.L. (1998). "Sustainable oceans development: the Canadian approach." Marine Policy, 
22(4-5): 393-412. 
Crickard, F. (1995). "Canada's ocean and maritime security. A strategic forecast." Marine Policy, 
19(4): 335-342. 
450 McCay, B.J. and Finlayson, A.C. (1995). "The political ecology of crisis and institutional change: 
The case of the Northern cod." Annual Meetings of the American Anthropological Association. 
http://arcticcircle.uconn.edu/NatResources/cod/mckay.html  
451 Day (1995). 
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In November 1994 a Vision Paper for a National Oceans Management Strategy was released, 
bringing the idea of an integrated management system once again to the forefront of the 
federal policy regime .452  There were five elements to this proposed strategy: 
the conservation and protection of the ocean's environment; 
a management framework for the Sustainable Development (SD) of renewable and 
non-renewable resources; 
information sharing between science, environmental groups and management; 
sovereign rights; and 
a legal framework to support the strategy. 453 
In an attempt to overcome some of the fragmentation that led to the demise of the 1987 
Oceans Policy for Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard was merged into the DFO to 
strengthen DFO as the lead agency for oceans policy development .454 
On 31 January 1997 Canada's Oceans Act (COA) became law .455  The Oceans Act is based 
on the implementation of a national Oceans Management Strategy (OMS), as first introduced 
in 1994, to support the integrated legislative approach to cross-sectoral oceans management 
outlined in COA.456 Under the OMS, three primary legislative frameworks are written into 
the Act. These are for the establishment of 
i a National System of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in accordance with the Global 
Network of MPAs proposed at the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992; 
an Integrated Management Plan (IMP) for any activities in, or affecting Canada's 
oceans; and 
the development and enforcement of Marine Environmental Quality (MEQ) 
guidelines, criteria and standards. 457 
In early 2000 the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans (the Minister) announced the appointment 
of two Ministerial Oceans Ambassadors for Canada - Dr. Art Hanson and Mr. Geoff 
Holland - to advance the principles and approaches of oceans management called for in 
COA.458 On 8 June 2000 the Honourable Herb Dhaliwal (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) 
announced the formation of the Minister's Advisory Council on Oceans (MACO) to assist 
452 Swan, J. (1996). "Canadian Oceans Policy and UNCED." Chapter 3. In: Kriwoken, L., Haward, 
M., VanderZwaag, D. and Davis, B. (eds.), Oceans Law and Policy in the post-UNCED era: 
Australian and Canadian Perspectives. London: Kluwer Law International: 41-58. 
453 Ibid. 
414 Mitchell (1998). 
Environment Canada. (1999). "Canada's Oceans." http://www.ec.gc.ca/agenda2ll99/oceans.html  
456 Canadian Government. (1997). "Oceans Act." http://www.Iaws.justice.gc.ca/eniO-2.4/text.html  
"" Environment Canada (1999) "Canada's Oceans." 
458 Oceans Canada. (2001). "Oceans Canada." http://www.oceanscanada.com  
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the Minister in providing leadership in the sustainable development and integrated 
governance of Canada's oceans .459 MACO consists of seven members, chosen by the 
Minister for theft expertise, merit, interests and standing in the community, to stand for a 
period of up to three years. 460 MACO meets at least quarterly with the Ministers and/or 
senior officials of DFO, which also uirovides secretariat support to the MACO. 
For an integrated approach to ecologically sustainable development of the oceans, the 
Canadian Government also recognised the need for multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
research. Therefore in February 2001, the results of the Ocean Management National 
Research Network Initiative were announced. This Initiative awarded CANS 1.14 million 
over three years to new research devoted to developing sustainability within oceans 
management .461 
Canada's Oceans Strategy (COS) was released on 12 July 2002, five years after the initial 
commitment for an OMS was made .462  COS is a national strategy designed for the 
management of estuarine, coastal and marine ecosystems in Canadian waters. 463 COS is 
based on the guiding principles 464 of sustainable development, integrated management and 
the precautionary approach with an overarching goal: 
to ensure healthy, safe and prosperous oceans for the benefit of current and future 
generations of Canadians .465 
COS establishes three policy objectives and sets the strategic direction for federal initiatives, 
either to be developed or already in place, to support the implementation of each of these 
objectives over the next four years .466  
" Oceans Canada. (2001). 
460 Foster, E., lIaward, M. and Coffen-Smout, S. "Implementing integrated oceans management: 
Australia's South East Regional Marine Plan (SERMP) Process and Canada's Eastern Scotian 
Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) Initiative." Marine Policy, in press. (see Appendix One for 
signed permission forms). 
Critchley, J. (2001). "Ocean Management National Research Network Initiative." Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). 
http:/fwww.sshrc.ca/englishlprograminfo/grantsguide/ocean_management.html  
462 Chircop, A. and Hildebrand, L. (in press). "Beyond the Buzzwords: A Perspective on Integrated 
Coastal and Ocean Management in Canada." In: Rothwell, DR. and VanderZwaag, D.L. (eds.). 
Towards Principled Oceans Governance: Australian and Canadian Approaches and Challenges. 
Routledge Ocean Management and Policy Series; and 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada. (2002). http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.caloceanscanada/ 
463 Foster, Haward and Coffen-Smout: in press. 
'" Oceans Act. (1996): s30. 
465 Fisheries and Oceans Canada. (2002). http:J/www.dfo-mpo.gc.cä/oceanscanada/ 
466 Ibid. 
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The three policy objectives identified in COS are: 
understanding and protecting the marine environment— it is recognised that science 
plays a big part in our understanding of the marine environment and is essential in 
underpinning integrated management practices. Emphasis in this objective is placed 
on the development of MEQ guidelines and designation of MPAs through the 
development of IMPs; 
supporting sustainable economic opportunities - one of the key goals, for example, 
is for the conservation and sustainable use of fisheries resources and the 
development of the aquaculture industry. Goals for other industries and stakeholders 
are also highlighted as part of this policy objective; and 
• international leadership - evident through leadership in the United Nations Fish 
Stocks Agreement. 467 
"COS is advancing oceans governance in three main areas. First is the development of new 
and enhanced institutional governance mechanisms by the Federal Government to promote 
coordinated and collaborative oceans management across levels of Federal Government and 
between other levels of government. This will be done through the establishment of 
committees, management boards and information sharing. COS is also advancing integrated 
oceans governance through the development of Integrated Management planning that 
engages all stakeholders in the planning and management of all ocean activities. Finally, 
through the COS, it is recognised that by promoting a sense of stewardship through public 
awareness, the community will develop a sense of pride and ownership that will aid 
compliance and enforcement in oceans governance."468 
The COS companion document, Policy and Operational Frameworkfor Integrated 
Management ofEstuarine, Coastal and Marine Environments in Canada (the National IM 
Framework), provides the national structure and guidance for the development of regional 
ocean management and planning processes .469 The development of IMPs reinforces the need 
for nested geographic scales. The two scales dëfmed in the National IM Framework are: 
Large Ocean Management Areas (LOMAs) - these extend from the coastline to the 
limits of the 200nm EEZ, with boundaries based on ecological considerations and 
management units; and 
467 Foster, ilaward and Coffen-Smout: in press. 
468 Ibid. 
469 Ibid. 
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• Coastal Management Areas (CMAs estuarine/inshore) - these are subdivisions of 
LOMAs where smaller scale management and plaiming requirements are 
identified .410 
"Overlaying this framework of geographic scales is the network of existing planning and 
management zones relating to ocean management and use in the management area. These 
zones are generally sectoral in nature and can be categorised into one of four areas: (1) 
intensive use areas; (2) general use areas; (3) special management areas; and (4) protected 
areas. It is important that any IMP ensures these zoning arrangements are adequately 
coordinated across the LOMA to ensure cumulative effects and contradictory management 
arrangements are monitored and managed accordingly."47 ' 
The first integrated management pilot project based on a LOMA, established under the 
auspices of the Oceans Act, was the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) 
Project. This project was announced on 3 December 1998 and therefore preceded the release 
of the National TM Framework, highlighting Canada's 'learning-by-doing' approach to 
integrated oceans management .472  Prior to this, however, there were a few Coastal IMPs 
already in place or in the making (for example, the Caseapedia Bay IMP and the St 
Lawrence Upper North Shore IMP). 473 The development of the British Columbia Central 
Coast IMP means that there are now two projects based on LOMAs as specified in COA. 
Unlike the IMPs, however, there were no MPA Projects in force prior to the implementation 
of COA.474 There is now one designated MPA - the Endeavour Hydrothermal Vents - and 
10 Areas of Interest based mainly around Newfoundland, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organisation (NAFO) area and the southern Pacific area of the east coast .471 
4.1.2 Canada 'sflsheries management 
In Canada the fishing industry is divided into the Atlantic and Pacific fisheries, each 
managed in accordance with the specific division of the industry relative to the region. The 
early 1980s saw these fisheries in crisis. A series of reports were commissioned by the DFO 
to determine possible management strategies to combat the demise of the fishing industry. 
In response to concerns raised in these reports, the Federal Government devised a series of 
470 Fisheries and Oceans Canada. (2002). "Policy and Operational Framework for Integrated 
Management of Estuarine, Coastal and Marine Environments in Canada." Ottawa: Oceans 
Directorate. 
41' Foster, Haward and Coffen-Smout: in press 
472 Oceans Canada (200 1) "Oceans Canada." 
'" Department of Fisheries and Oceans. (2001). "OPAT." http://canoceans.dfo -
mpo.gc.ca/opat_public.asp 
414 Ibid. 
411 Ibid. 
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legislative changes. The most prominent change was the 1985 revision of the Fisheries Act 
of 1970. The revised Act allows for cabinet control over licenses and leases, 'fish habitat' 
protection, pollution management and liability clauses. 476 Foreign fishing is controlled under 
the auspices of the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act of 1985. Simultaneously, the provincial 
states and regional management organisations (such as NATO) have been implementing theft 
own policies in the relevant areas. 
The Canadian Federal Government, through Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) 477 , is 
responsible for the preparation and implementation of legislation and regulations relating to 
national fisheries management plans and allocation processes. 478 The provinces and 
territories are responsible for legislation and regulations related to fish habitat, programs and 
initiatives relating to the processing sector, provincial-territorial licensing and fisheries 
development initiatives .479 
DFO is responsible for, amongst other things, the thy-to-day management of Canada's 
fisheries resources. DFO's vision is for: 
safe, healthy, productive waters and aquatic ecosystems, for the benefit of present 
and future generations, by maintaining the highest possible standards of: 
• service to Canadians; 
• marine safety and environmental protection; 
• scientific excellence; and 
• conservation and sustainable resource use .480 
On 30 June 1 999the Federal, provincial and territorial governments formed the Canadian 
Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers (CCFAM) as a means of fostering 
cooperation and coordination across jurisdictional boundaries on fisheries issues of national 
interest . 481  The CCFAM consists of the Minister responsible for fisheries and aquaculture 
issues from each government. The CCFAM is governed by nine principles of cooperation 
and six primary objectives relating to the coordination of public policy objectives, 
aquaculture issues, information sharing, policy streamlining and the development of a 
476 Canadian Government. (1997). "Oceans Act." http://www.laws.justice.gc.calen/0-2.4/text.html;  
and 
Meaney, J. (1992). "Federal fisheries law and policy: Controls over the harvesting sector." Chapter 
2. In: VanderZwaag, D. Canadian Ocean Law and Policy. Toronto: Buttersworth: 2748. 
" Formerly the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. 
478 Governments of Canada. (1999). "Agreement on Inteijurisdictional Cooperation with respect to 
Fisheries and Aquaculture." 30 June 1999. 
479 Ibid. 
480 Fisheries and Oceans Canada. (2004). "A Policy Framework for the Management of Fisheries on 
Canada's Atlantic Coast." Ottawa: Communications Branch: 2. 
481 Governments of Canada (1999) "Agreement on Inteijurisdictional..." 
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national approach to international issues. 482 One of the objectives of the CCFAM also relates 
to the development of close links with other Ministers' Councils on matters of related 
responsibility, thus offering opportunity for this national body to also address cross-sectoral 
issues as they may relate to national fisheries management. 
The Framework and Guidelines for Implementing the Co-Management Approach outlines 
DFO ' s commitment towards decentralised management in appropriate fisheries through the 
establishment of Integrated Fisheries Management Plans (IFMPs) and Joint Project 
Agreements (JPAs).483 The primary goal of IFMPs is to establish the planning framework 
for the conservation and sustainable use of fisheries resources and the process by which a 
given fishery will be managed for the duration of the plan.4M As a management instrument, 
IFMPs offer extensive information on the fishery pertaining to long- (multi-year) and short-
(annual) term management objectives and criteria for evaluating performance at the end of 
the fishing season. IFMPs offer enhanced transparency, building on existing advisory 
approaches to management in a five-step process. They also enhance opportunities for 
internal integration within DFO between all potentially impacted sectors. IFMPs are, 
however, non-binding and should only describe the fishery, leaving binding licence 
conditions to reflect the activities in the plan. The content of the IFMP should include, 
amongst other things: 
• an overview of the fishery, including environmental and ecosystem relationships; 
• management, consultation and enforcement arrangements; 
• links with other planning initiatives and COA; 
• the specific and long-term objectives for the fishery with measurable indicators or 
criteria for performance review; and 
• financial responsibilities .411 
The amount of detail required in IFMPs is in excess of conventional management plans and 
incorporates cross-jurisdictional, cross-sectoral and intra-seetoral issues as points of 
consideration for the management of the fishery. This illustrates Canada's commitment to 
integration through the ecosystem-based management of its fisheries. The limited resources 
in time and money available for bureaucrats to compile this information, however, coupled 
with the non-binding nature of the plans compromise the effectiveness of IFMPs. WAs are 
482 Governments of Canada (1999) "Agreement on Inteijurisdictional..." 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada. (1999). "Framework and Guidelines for Implementing the Co-
Management Approach." Volumes I-Ill. http://www.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/ops/fm/IFMP/ [Access 
date: 17 October 2001]. 
484 Fisheries and Oceans Canada. (1999). "Framework and Guidelines for Implementing the Co-
Management Approach." Volume II: Integrated Fisheries Management Plans. http://www.pac.dfo- 
mpo.gc.ca/ops/fln/IFMP/Guidelines_2.PDF - January 1999. [Access date: 17 October 2001]. 
485 Ibid. 
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used to formalise cooperative activities between DFO and resource users. These 
arrangements can enhance the effectiveness of IFMPs through voluntary and often short- 
term legally binding agreements. 486 
4.1.2.1 	Canada's Atlantic coastflsheries 
The Atlantic east-coast fishery is governed by the Atlantic Fishery Regulations of 1985. 487 
These regulations place input restrictions on mesh size, gear sizes, gear types, etc and 
implement the DFO policy initiatives of the time. The Atlantic fishery, being the dominant 
fishery of the two Canadian fisheries, is primarily subdivided by inshore - offshore 
disputes . 488  The inshore, or community fishery, is governed by a large fleet of <35ft vessels. 
This fishery is often referred to as the 'social welfare fishery', because of the large number 
of less economical fishers that it supports. The corporate offshore fishery is very capital 
intensive and consists of relatively few larger vessels (>1 OOfl) generally owned by the 
processors. More recently another contingency to the ongoing disputes is the emergent 
nearshore fleet (35-65ft) that technically has inshore vessels that rival offshore vessels in 
mobility.489 The groundfish harvest of the Atlantic fishery dominates, with about 45% of 
annual harvest, and is further subdivided with disputes between 'fixed' gear and 'mobile' 
gear fishers .490 
Much of the Atlantic fisheries management has been influenced by the collapse of the 
northern cod fishery in July 1992. The closure of this fishery has been seen as a classic case 
of the "tragedy of the commons" .491  In response to concerns by inshore fishers and academic 
biologists over stock abundances, the DFO assigned a Task Force to investigate the Atlantic 
Fisheries and consequently, the Kirby Report was produced in 1982. This Report claimed 
that the fish stocks were well on the way to being rebuilt and predicted quota in the order of 
two times historical catches by the year 1987.492  Based on this information, the numbers of 
fishers, the power and number of vessels and the capacity of the processing plants grew in 
anticipation. It soon became apparent, in the inshore fishery especially, that catches were not 
correlating with predictions. In fact, after an internal DFO review of the stock assessment, it 
486 Fisheries and Oceans Canada. (1999). "Framework and Guidelines for Implementing the Co-
Management Approach." Volume III: Joint Project Agreements. http://www.pac.dfo- 
mpo.gc.calops/fmLIFMP/Guidelinesj.PDF - January 1999. [Access date: 17 October 2001]. 
487 Meaney (1992): 27-48. 
488 Charles, A.T. (1992). "Canadian Fisheries: Paradigms and Policy." Chapter 1. In: VanderZwaag, 
D. Canadian Ocean Law and Policy. Toronto: Buttersworth: 1-26. 
489 Ibid. 
490 Ibid. 
49' Hardin, G. (1968). "Tragedy of the commons." Science, 162: 1243-1248;and 
McCay and Finlayson (1995). 
492 McCay and Finlayson (1995). 
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was shown that stock sizes in the Kirby Report were overestimated by up to 100% and 
natural mortality was underestimated by up to 50%4 
On 2 July 1992 the then Minister for Fisheries and Oceans, John Crosbie, declared a two-
year moratorium on northern cod catches. This was soon turned into a closure of the fishery 
when, in 1994, the stock assessment reports indicated that the stocks were in fact declining 
further. The impact of this closure was especially felt by the inshore fleets and will be felt 
for years to come as the Federal Government spends billions of dollars on a series of crisis 
response programs to relocate the 35,000 fishers and plant-workers that have been displaced 
from the industry. 494 The failure of the 1987 Canadian Oceans Policy can be attributed in 
part to this 'cod crisis', which demanded high resources from the Federal Government to 
essentially realign the Atlantic fisheries .495 
The primary focus of the DFO in fisheries is to rebuild stocks and maintain a sustainable 
fishing industry.496 As part of achieving this objective the DFO released a discussion paper 
in February 2001, titled The Management of Fisheries on Canada's Atlantic Coast, as part of 
its Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review (AFPR) that was launched in 1999. The AFPR was 
initiated in response to the collapse of the Atlantic groundfish, the recognition of Aboriginal 
rights in the Marshall ruling498 and the development of IMPs under the auspices of COA. 499 
The AFPR is being completed in two phases. Phase I ended with the release of the Policy 
Frameworkfor the Management of Fisheries on Canada's Atlantic Coast (the Framework) 
in March 2004. 00 This Framework establishes the vision for the long-term management of 
Atlantic fisheries: 
the Atlantic fisheries will become a biologically sustainable resource supporting 
fisheries that: 
• are robust, diverse and self-reliant; 
effectively involve all interests inappropriate fisheries management 
processes; 
are sustainable and economically viable, contributing to the economic base 
of coastal communities; and 
411 McCay and Finlayson (1995). 
414 Ibid. 
491 Mitchell (1998). 
491 Ibid. 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans. (2001). "The Management of Fisheries on Canada's Atlantic 
Coast." http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/afpr-rppalDiscodoc_pages_e/discodoc(fiull)_e.htm  
R. v. Marshall 1999, 3SCRR456. 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans. (2001). 
°° Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2004) "A Policy Framework.. 
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• provide for the constitutional protection afforded Aboriginal and treaty 
rights and where Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal resource users work 
collaboratively. 50 ' 
To make this vision a reality, the Framework identifies two core objectives —for the 
conservation and sustainable use of resources and habitat and for biologically sustainable 
fisheries that support self-reliant and viable fisheries. The Framework also identifies two 
supporting objectives demanding shared stewardship that requires a stable, transparent 
access and allocation process. 502 The AFPR emphasises the need for decentralised 
management with the delegation of certain authorities or shared responsibility in a co- 
management arrangement with government and all marine users. The policy framework also 
implies that, with a shift in focus from top-down management to shared stewardship, the role 
of DFO will change from the day-to-day management of fisheries to one primarily concerned 
with developing policy, setting strategic direction and evaluating performance. 503 
The need for legislative change to the outdated Fisheries Act of 1985, which in its current 
form leaves little room for co-management, is reflected in the Framework that alludes to a 
delegation of certain decision-making powers to resource users . 504 Due recognition is also 
given to concurrent processes that will impact and be impacted by actions implemented 
under the Framework, namely the IMP commitments under COS and those relating to 
aquaculture and Aboriginal and treaty policies. Phase II of the AFPR will involve the 
implementation of the Framework into the practical management of the Atlantic fisheries to 
ensure long-term sustainability of the resource and its environment. 505 
The intra-sectoral capacity for integration in the Atlantic fisheries has been enhanced by the 
establishment of the Scotia Fundy Fishing Industry Roundtable (the Roundtable). 506 The 
increased competition for use of ocean space, greater public awareness of marine issues and 
the cumulative impact of multiple-use activities on the ocean resources have been cited as 
the impetus for development of the Roundtable. 507  The Roundtable serves to consolidate the 
views of the fishing industry on inter-fleet and oceans management issues and to facilitate a 
common strategic direction on ecosystem-based management. 508  It comprises a base of 20- 
°' Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2004) "A Policy Framework..": 7. 
502 Ibid. 
503 Ibid. 
504 Burke, L. (2003). DFO: Personal communication —21 August 2003. 
505 Department of Fisheries and Oceans (200 1) "The Management of Fisheries..."; and 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2004) "A Policy Framework..." 
506 Department of Fisheries and Oceans. (2002). "Terms of Reference - Scotia Fundy Fishing Sector 
Roundtable." 23 January 2002. 
507 Ibid. 
508 Ibid. 
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25 members representative of the fishing industry (harvesters and processors), with meetings 
open to others, but stability encouraged through attendance by base members. 509 As such, it 
is well positioned to address intra-sectoral issues and to deliver a united view on cross-
sectoral oceans management issues as an effective preventative conflict management 
mechanism. 
4.1.2.2 	Canada's Pacific coastfisheries 
The Pacific coast covers a relatively small area in comparison to the Atlantic coast and relies 
primarily on the salmon fishery for sustenance. 5 10 Due to the biological nature of the 
salmon, environmental conservation is of great importance in this fishery. Like the Gorges 
Bank moratorium on oil and gas exploration on the Atlantic coast, there is a moratorium on 
oil and gas exploration on the Pacific coast that has been in place since 1972. However, 
without the expanding oil and gas sector that the rest of the Atlantic coast has, there are few 
options for displaced Pacific coast fishers, besides land-based employment alternatives, 
should any reductions be imposed on the fishery. This is of consequence to the outcomes of 
the 1982 Pearse Commission Report, which recommended a need to reduce the number of 
fishers in the industry. 51 ' In March 1996, the government entered into a US$80 million buy-
back scheme in an attempt to reduce the salmon fleet, hence save the fishery from potential 
collapse as seen in the Atlantic cod fishery. 512 
The Pacific fishery is primarily subdivided according to gear selection between the gillnet 
fishers, the seiners and the trollers. 513 The internal conflict in this fishery is somewhat 
philosophical. The small-scale gill-netters argue that they are able to enhance conservation 
practices in comparison to the séiners, as they only target specific schools and therefore 
minimise by-catch. The large-scale seiners rebut by arguing that they have a higher net 
value. And the trollers argue that they capture the fish in their prime, before they enter the 
fresh water and the flesh deteriorates. Another division in the Pacific fishery lies in the 
conflict over quota allocation between native fishers, recreational or sport fishers and 
commercial fishers. This is a conflict seen in many fisheries throughout the world and has 
yet to be satisfactorily resolved. 
509 Department of Fisheries and Oceans. (2002). 
510 Mitchell (1998). " Ibid. 
512 Ibid. 
513 Charles (1992). 
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In October 1998 DFO released a Discussion Paper titled A New Direction for Canada's 
Pacific Salmon Fisheries. 514 This paper essentially equates to the Atlantic Fisheries Policy 
Review in its intent. Upon its release it was noted by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans 
that it was necessary to move away from crisis management of the Pacific fisheries to a more 
risk-averse, conservation-based form of management. 515 As a consequence of this discussion 
paper, an independent review team was established to review the decision-making processes 
in the Pacific salmon fisheries. 516  The final report from this review team was released in 
May 2001. The recommendations included a framework for future management covering 
three areas including: salmon harvest management planning; the establishment of an 
allocation and licensing advisory board; and policy forums. 
4.1.3 Lessons for Australia 
In terms of oceans management Australia has a larger budget and scope to implement policy 
initiatives than Canada. 517  This is most evident when looking at the economic impacts of the 
'cod crisis' and the lack of authority to manage multi-departmental oceans management 
without legislative reform, factors that led to Canada's previously failed attempts to 
implement oceans policy. There are, however, a number of lessons that can be learnt from 
the Canadian experience, some of which are already reflected in Australian policy and 
management, such as the 'areas of interest' concept adopted for evaluating MPA 
designations. Canada is facing similar difficulties in getting support outside DFO for IMPs 
as Australia is facing with state support for RMPs. The common ground here is the lack of 
financial commitment for non-lead agencies/departments/governments to implement any 
actions arising from the development of centrally administered oceans management. 
Canada's oceans management, albeit lagging behind Australia, has a much clearer process 
due to their 'learning-by-doing' approach. The IM Framework establishes the ground rules 
for IMPs while maintaining flexibility to adapt to any of Canada's vast and distinctive 
oceanic regions. Australia's regions are arguably less distinct, yet there is no overall guiding 
framework for the development of RMPs. This has caused, and will likely continue to cause, 
anxiety and concern amongst stakeholders, unsure of the purpose and impact of this process 
in each region. 
514 Department of Fisheries and Oceans. (1998). "A new direction for Canada's Pacific salmon 
fisheries." http://www-comrn.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/english/publications/allocfst98O8e.htm  
Ibid. 
526 Dragseth, C. and Maloney, M. (2001). "Minister releases report on improved decision-making in 
the Pacific salmon fishery." Department of Fisheries and Oceans. http://www-comm.pac.dfO-
mgo.gc.calenglishlrelease/p-releas/200  l/nrOSOe.htm 
517 Coffen-Smout, S. (2003). DFO: Personal communication - 25 August 2003. 
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Although Canada only has a few IMPs in process at the time of writing, Canada's objectives-
based fisheries management incorporates ecosystem-based management principles, including 
social and economic objectives, based on sound risk management processes. It is arguable 
how effective these plans are considering the continued demise of fish stocks in Canada, but 
there is a clear recognition and effort towards intra-sectoral and cross-sectoral integration of 
the fishery in the IFMP. Australia is moving towards this goal but has yet to incorporate 
these integration aspects of sustainability. 
Another significant lesson from the Canadian experience is the proposed legislative 
commitment towards co-management of their fisheries, with the devolution of certain 
decision-making powers to the resource users themselves. The Australian form of 'co-
management' is weaker, giving only certain resource users some advisory powers but no real 
authority to make hard decisions about their ongoing welfare. To obtain a true sense of 
stewardship for the oceans and its resources it is important to give users a sense of ownership 
over the decision-making process. This should be coupled with strong accountability 
mechanisms and overall auditing by government, which manages resources on behalf of the 
public, but there is capacity for the delegation of certain authorities beyond that of Australian 
MACs. 
Canada sets an interesting precedent for preventative conflict management by encouraging 
industry compliance with policy and management measures through a commitment to 
positive incentives in the first instance, rather than negative enforcement measures. This is 
most evident in the AFPR policy framework that explicitly states that "positive incentives 
must be sought for compliance; with strict enforcement measures only for those who do not 
chose to voluntarily comply with the established regulations".518 Australia's emphasis, as is 
the case with many other nations', has been on the establishment of mitigation measures as a 
negative incentive for compliance. It would be advantageous to adopt the trust-building 
measures of the Canadians in setting explicit positive incentives for the industry to self-
govern and monitor their own actions, with harsh penalties if they fail to account for their 
actions. 
Canada has taken a proactive approach to intra-sectoral integration and conflict management 
through the work of the Scotia Fundy Fishing Sector Roundtable. The Roundtable enhances 
the industry's capacity for inter-sectoral integration and has also developed a preventative 
conflict management approach to inter-gear conflicts through the collective identification of 
potential (anticipatory) conflicts, acute (actual) conflicts and systematic (those caused by 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2004) "A Policy Framework...": 15. 
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management processes) conflicts and relevant management strategies to address these 
conflicts.519 Australia has the opportunity to implement similar regional arrangements for its 
fishing industry, to consolidate regional industry views and work with industry to proactively 
address some of the issues raised in regional marine planning and integrated oceans 
management. 
4.2 United States of America 
4.2.1 USA's oceans management 
Under the auspices of the Marine Resources and Engineering Act of 1966, the Marine 
Sciences Council and the Commission on Marine Sciences, Engineering and Resources 
(COMSER, later known as the Stratton Commission) were established to make 
recommendations for a national marine science program to assist in coordinating marine 
science activities in the US. 52° COMSER, under the guidance of Julius Stratton, produced a 
report on ocean governance in the US, which stipulated that current governance was 
fragmented and there was a need for reform. The Stratton report is essentially the blueprint 
for the US oceans policy and many unsuccessful attempts were made at creating a second 
such commission to deal with exactly this issue. 521 The Stratton report, Our Nation and the 
Sea, was at the international forefront of oceans policy and established the National Oceanic 
& Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) - a federal oceans agency assigned the task of 
coordinating US research efforts .522 
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the Stratton Commission was the drafting of the 
Coastal Zone Management Act in 1972 and the subsequent landmark laws that soon 
followed. Under the auspices of the Coastal Zone Management Act, the Coastal Zone 
Management (CZM) Program was established as part of NOAA, dealing with such things as 
non-point source pollution control and coastal energy impacts.523 As of the beginning of 
1999, 97% of the US coastline was under the CZM Program with only illinois remaining to 
Information collected at the DFO/lndustry Roundtable meeting - Class of '47. 26 August 2003. 
Dartmouth: Marine Ports. 
520 US Commission on Ocean Policy. (2002). "Developing a National Ocean Policy." Mid-term 
Report of the US Commission on Ocean Policy. September 2002. 
52!  Bondareff, J.M. (1994). "Congress, reform and oceans policy." Coastal Management, 22: 147-161; 
and 
Cicin-Sain, B. and Knecht, R.W. (2000). "The future of U.S. Ocean Policy." Washington: Island 
Press. 
522 Kiessling, I. (1998). "Integrated Marine Management of the E.E.Z." PhD Thesis. Hobart: 
University of Tasmania; and 
US Commission on Ocean Policy (2002). "Developing a National Ocean Policy." 
523 Kiessling (1998). 
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sign on.524 The federal funding initiative for this program was approximately US$50 million 
per year in 1999.525  In conjunction with the CZM Program, a series of other programs were 
established under this Act, including the National Estuarine Research Reserve System, the 
National Marine Sanctuary Program and the Ocean Minerals and Thermal Energy 
Program. 526  These all contribute to a more holistic management arrangement of the coastal 
zone. 
The 1980s saw in the 'New Federalism' under the Reagan administration, in which there was 
an administrative policy shift of responsibility from Federal to state government, often 
without the accompanying funding. 527 The Reagan administration had an antigovernment 
philosophy, believing the Federal Government was too big with too much regulation, 
especially environmental regulation of energy development activities. 528 The 1980s hence 
saw little legislative development and an increased focus on deregulation and 
implementation issues. Following federal funding cutbacks in the 1980s, US ocean use and 
policy initiatives were developed sporadically and by some of the more proactive states .529 
The main areas of growth for management of state jurisdiction out to 3 miles included: 
coastal zone management; oil pollution control; outer continental oil and gas development; 
national marine sanctuaries; and fisheries management. 530  Many of these state initiatives 
were developed in response to public demand or, as in the ease of the Exxon Valdez incident 
in 1989, state concern that influenced federal decision-making. In response to the shift of 
responsibility, states began to produce theft own policy reports starting with North Carolina, 
then Oregon and Washington. 
To date, states have taken different approaches to the application of oceans policy in theft 
territorial waters. Oregon has by far developed the most sophisticated multi-tiered 
integration policy. This is supported by legislation in a top-down form of governance, 
crossing jurisdictions to incorporate federal waters in an ocean stewardship zone, 30-80 
miles offshore. 53 ' States such as North Carolina and Maine have enhanced their existing 
frameworks, which led to the development of an oceans policy document .532  Carolina and 
324 Cicin-Sain and Knecht (2000). 
525 Ibid. 
526 Cicin-Sain and Knecht (2000); and 
Kiessling (1998). 
527 Cicin-Sain and Knecht (2000); and 
Hershman, M.J. (1996). "Ocean management policy deVelopment in subnational units of 
government: examples from the United States." Ocean & Coastal Management, 31 (1): 25-40. 
528 Cicin-Sain and Knecht (2000). 
529 Kiessling (1998). 
530 Hershman (1996). 
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Hawaii attempted to streamline their existing programs and harmonise policies rather than 
writing new ones. 533  A major driving force for state oceans policy making was the federal 
lease sales of OCS oil and gas, which in the early 1990s was delayed for a decade, hence 
alleviating pressure from the states .534  Interestingly, fisheries have remained protected 
within the state oceans policies 
In 1983 the same year as the US claimed an EEZ, the Reagan Administration announced the 
development of a national oceans policy. 535  It soon became apparent, however, that without 
a central focused body dedicated to oceans policy, the convoluted politics of Congress would 
see the demise of this initiative .536  Despite this observation, Congress was reluctant to 
establish a centralised oceans policy body for fear of opening the 'Pandora's box' of the US' 
failure to sign the LOSC agreement and due to the lack of support for creating yet another 
'half-baked' advisory committee. 537  Positive outcomes for oceans policy issues arose in the 
1000' Congress, although the integrated management of these outcomes in an all-
encompassing oceans policy remained a contentious issue. 
On 24 September 1997, US Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Oceans Act to Congress, a 
radically different approach to the failed introduction of an oceans policy. The Act proposed 
that federal activities be directed towards a common goal. To assist in this primary focus, 
the Act directs the establishment of a 16 member Commission on Oceans Policy to make 
recommendations for a coordinated and comprehensive national ocean policy and for a 
Federal National Ocean Council (NOC) to advise the President. 538  On 14 November 1997, 
the Oceans Act passed the Senate, but the House of Representatives would not pass it due to 
reservations about the divisions of power under the new policy and the proposed 
administrative arrangements. 
In addition, towards this move for an Oceans Act, in late 1997 to early 1998, 12 teams were 
each assigned an ocean or coastal issue to write a report on the US developments. 539  The 
findings of these reports, the YOTO (Year of the Oceans) papers, are evident in some of the 
programs now inexistence. Another major initiative in the YOTO (1998) was a National 
Ocean Conference held in Monterey. At this conference, President Clinton offered nine new 
initiatives for oceans governance with a US$224 million budget for implementation. 540 
Hershman (1996). 
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536 Bond&eff (1994). 
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These initiatives included issues such as, extending the moratoria on offshore drilling, 
building sustainable fisheries, protecting coral reefs and ratifying the 1982 LOSC, to name a 
few .541  What were not included in any of these reports were the ecological values of the 
oceans as fish habitats, carbon sinks, etc. 
The Oceans Act was passed by Senate on 26 June 2000 after several years debate and some 
additional amendments, including the exclusion of integration in its strictest sense and the 
limitation of the administrative powers of the NOC to that of implementation. 542 The US 
Congress passed this legislation on 25 July 2000, 543 with provisions to establish a 
Commission on Ocean Policy charged with "studying and re-evaluating the nation's laws 
and policies regarding oceans and coasts". 544  
The final Act, effective as of 20 January 2001, incorporates the particulars of the US 
Commission on Ocean Policy (the Commission) and the guiding principles for establishing a 
National Ocean Policy. 545  This legislation is slightly different from that passed in Canada. 
They are both forms of enabling legislation, but the USA Oceans Act provides minimal 
guidance for practical integrated oceans management and planning, rather it defines the role 
of the Commission and what it should include in its National Oceans Report to the President 
and Congress. The legislation outlines the particulars of the Commission's membership and 
functions and authorises US$8.5 million for the Commission to carry out its work. 546 It is 
anticipated that upon receipt Of the final National Oceans Report (the Report), the President, 
in consultation with the states, will respond to these recommendations within 120 days and 
make a statement regarding the future development of a National Ocean Policy. 547 
Since the Commission began its work in September 2001 it has held 15 public meetings, 
with an additional 17 site visits around the country, hearing from around 440 presenters 
concerned about the future of the ocean and coastal environment .548  Four Working Groups 
of the Commission were established to deal with the key issues raised in these meetings 
within specific areas of focus pertaining to: Governance; Stewardship; Research, Education 
' Cicin-Sain and Knecht (2000). 
542 106" us Congress. (2000). "Oceans Act of 2000." 5.2327. 
° The Oceans Act of 2000 was signed into law by the President on 7 August 2000. 
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and Marine Operations; and Investment and Implementation. Based on this fact-finding 
mission and options analysis presented by the Working Groups, the Preliminary Report was 
developed and released on 20 April 2004. After a one-month public review period the 
Commission will prepare a revised Final Report for submission to the President. 
In accordance with the Oceans Act, the Final Report is to include the following reviews, 
assessments and recommendations: 
• an assessment of facilities (people, vessels, computers, satellites); 
• a review of federal activities and the cumulative effect of federal laws; 
• a review of the supply and demand for ocean and coastal resources; 
• a review of the relationships between federal, state and local governments and the 
private sector; 
• a review of the opportunities for investment in new products and technologies; 
• recommendations for federal legislative and institutional modification; and 
• a review of the effectiveness of existing federal interagency policy coordination. 149 
The Commission's recommendations, as outlined in the Preliminary Report, for the 
institutional arrangements of a National Ocean Policy Framework are: 
• a designated Assistant to the President; 
• an Office of Ocean Policy in the Executive Office of the President - directed by the 
designated Assistant to the President to support the Office and the NOC; 
• a National Ocean Council (NOC) - the central decision-making body chaired by the 
Assistant to the President and composed of cabinet secretaries of departments and 
directors of independent ocean and coastal agencies; and 
• a Presidential Council of Advisors on Ocean Policy - situated within the Office and 
composed of coastal governors, other appropriate non-federal state, local and tribal 
government representatives, the private sector, research community,. NGOs and 
watershed organisations, to provide enhanced federal leadership and coordination for 
the coasts and oceans. 550 
149 US Commission on Ocean Policy (2002) "Developing a National Ocean Policy"; and 
US Commission on Ocean Policy (2003) "Information on the Oceans Act of 2000" 
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The functions of the NOC will include, but not be limited to, policy development, program 
implementation and reporting including: 
implementing and improving the recommendations of the Commission; 
making recommendations for federal agency reorganisation or consolidation 
reflecting the Commission's recommendations; 
addressing legislative redundancies and duplication and develop policies to resolve 
conflicts and fill in gaps; 
reviewing and assessing the progress of individual agency programs in achieving 
national ocean goals; 
• identifying areas for interagency/cross-jurisdictional conflict resolution; 
• improving interagency ocean and coastal coordination; 
• guiding the development and implementation of a national ocean policy research 
plan, a national ocean data and information management system and a national 
program for the assessment of the state of ecosystems; 
• creating and overseeing task groups to address specific problems; 
• providing, in cooperation with the State, leadership in international affairs; 
• determining appropriate ecosystem planning and management units and relevant 
scientific criteria; and 
periodically report on the progress of the national ocean policy through a State of the 
Nation's Oceans and Coasts Report .151 
The NOC would also be responsible for coordinating with relevant agencies and officials in 
the development of a national coastal management policy containing national coastal goals 
and objectives to ensure that the economic and environmental needs of the coastal areas are 
balanced in a sustainable manner. 552 This would involve relevant amendments to the dated 
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. 
The proposed framework also provides for the establishment of regional ocean councils that, 
in conjunction with the NOC and regional ocean information programs, would develop 
guidance for regional ecosystem management plans addressing state/regional coordination, 
pollution reduction, economic development and research priorities. 553  These regional ocean 
councils would not replace existing regional bodies such as the regional fisheries 
management councils but rather, would complement them by streamlining policies, 
' US Commission on Ocean Policy (2004) "Preliminary Report..." 
552 US Commission on Ocean Policy. (2003). "Introduction of Draft Policy Options." Washington, 
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processes and programs to ensure the maintenance of economic and environmental harmony 
in a sustainable manner. Regional management plans would reflect regional goals that are 
consistent with the national goals established in the national ocean policy with associated 
performance objectives and measures. Regional ocean council responsibilities could 
involve: 
• dispute resolution where interagency coordination is lacking; 
• accurate delineation and feature mapping of the region; 
• building public awareness to enhance a stewardship ethic of the ocean; 
• facilitation of coastal and ocean science and information sharing and support; and 
• applying ecosystem-based principles of the ocean policy to integrative regional plans 
for coastal management. 554 
A number of focus area panels could be established to assist the regional ocean councils. 
resolve particular problems on the understanding that ultimate decision-making power 
remains with the relevant federal, state, tribal or local agency. 
4.2.2 USA 'sflsheries management 
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) established eight regional fisheries 
management councils to govern federal fisheries out to 200 miles, recognising the need for 
state and regional knowledge in effective fisheries management. 555 Individual states manage 
marine fisheries in inshore and coastal waters out to 3 miles, with interstate coordination 
occurring through three regional interstate fishery commissions (the Atlantic, Gulf and 
Pacific fishery commissions) .556 Initial opposition to the FCMA by commercial fishers 
quickly turned to support as these fishers gained dominance in the fisheries councils in the 
1980S.557 Since its conception in 1976 the FCMA has undergone 12 amendments in an 
attempt to overcome some of the problems associated with the Act, the most recent 
prominent amendment being in 1996. 
114 US Commission on Ocean Policy (2003) "Introduction of Draft Policy Options" 
" Buck, E.H. (1996). "95036: Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
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The 1996 Amendment received bipartisan support and the amended FCMA became known 
as the Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA), or the Magnuson-Stevens FCMA. 559 The Sustainable 
Fisheries Act became law on 11 October 1996 .560   This Act incorporates changes to the 
previously amended FCMA to include provisions for science, management and conservation 
action by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) under the auspices of NOAA. 56 ' 
Through the amendments, the optimal yield for fishing became the maximum sustainable 
yield minus an amount determined by socio-economic and ecological considerations .562 
Other amendments besides the prevention of overfishing, included: 
• the reduction of incidental mortality and by-catch; 
• the conservation of fish habitats; 
• the introduction of access fees; 
• the reformulation of the Fisheries Management Plan approval process; and 
• the prohibition of allocating individual fishing quotas until 1 October 2000, at which 
time the process was to be thoroughly reviewed .563 
The NMFS also produced a set of National Standard Guidelines (NSG) to help the eight 
regional fisheries management councils interpret the SFA. 5" The primary aim of the NSG 
was to prevent overfishing while achieving optimal yield by setting standards for fishing 
communities, by-catch and safety at sea .511 
4.2.2.1 	Regional Fisheries Management Councils 
Eight Regional Fisheries Management Councils (RFMCs) are charged with the management 
of federal US fisheries. These are the New England, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, 
Caribbean, Gulf, Pacific, North Pacific and Western Pacific Councils. 566  These Councils 
constitute both voting and non-voting members, reflecting the expertise and interest of the 
constituent states. 
Cicin-Sain and Knecht (2000). 
560 NOAA Fisheries. (2001). "Sustainable Fisheries Act." http://www.nrnfs.noaa.gov/sfa/  
511 Ibid. 
562 Restrepo, V.R. and Powers, J.E. (1999). "Precautionary control rules in US fisheries management: 
specification and performance." ICES Journal ofMarine Science, 56: 846-852. 
563 Cicin-Sain and Knecht (2000). 
564 Restrepo and Powers (1999). 
565 Cicin-Sain and Knecht (2000); and 
Restrepo and Powers (1999). 
'66 NOAA. (1996). "Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act." Public Law 94-
265. Section 302. http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/magact/  [Access date; 8 April 2004]. 
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The voting members are usually appointed for a three-year term and include: 
• the principal marine fishery management official from each constituent state; 
• the applicable regional director of the NMFS; and 
• members selected by the Secretary of Commerce for their experience, scientific 
expertise, or training knowledge regarding the conservation and management, or 
harvesting of the fishery resources in the given area. 567 
In the selection of members, the Secretary must ensure a fair and balanced apportionment 
between definitive stakeholders, namely recreational and commercial representatives, but 
there is no mention of any necessity to include 'other' expectant stakeholders in this "fair 
and balanced" apportionment . 568  According to Okey (2003), this has led to an overwhelming 
dominance of extractive interests on the Councils who have vested interest in the fishery and 
are, generally speaking, more interested in short-term profit rather than intergenerational 
equity. Such 'industry-capture' has led to the evidential failure of US fisheries management 
to meet public good and long-term sustainability objectives. 569 The members selected by the 
Secretary are taken from a list of three individuals for each available vacancy submitted by 
the Governor of each constituent state.570 While the sentiment of expertise-based 
representation is maintained, it is more often the case that fishing industry lobby groups 
mount self-serving campaigns on the Governor to nominate them, therefore the Secretary has 
only a choice of extractive users, which leads to 'industry-capture'. Although 'industry-
capture' is highlighted as a significant issue in the effectiveness of these Councils, it is 
noteworthy that commercial and recreational interests made up 82% of the voting members 
of the combined Councils for the period 1990-2001, and 17% of voting members over the 
same period constituted 'other' interests, which is quite significant in comparison to some 
other international arrangements. 571 The problem posed by the inclusive and transparent 
nature of these Councils is that it can substantially slow the decision-making process, 
making it inefficient and unwieldy.572 
Councils are charged with: 
the development and amendments of fishery management plans for each fishery 
under their jurisdiction to be submitted to the Secretary; 
567 NOAA. (1996) "Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation..." 
568 Okey, T.A. (2003). "Membership of the eight Regional Fishery Management Councils in the 
United States: are special interests over-represented?" Marine Policy, 27: 193-206. 
569 Ibid. 
570 NOAA (1996) "Magnuson-Stevens Fishery qonservation..... 
"' Okey (2003). 
572 Miklsen, K.H. and Jentoft, S. (2001). "From user-groups to stakeholders? The public interest in 
fisheries management." Marine Policy, 25: 281-292. 
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to prepare comments on any application for foreign fishing or management plans 
and amendments; 
conducting public hearings as and when necessary to allow all interested parties an 
opportunity to be heard; 
submitting periodic reports to the Secretary; 
• reviewing and revising optimum yield and total allowable foreign fishing levels; and 
• any other activities required to meet the functions of the Council. 573 
In carrying out its functions Councils are required to establish and maintain the following 
advisory bodies: 
• a Scientific and Statistical Committee - to assist in the development of management 
plans; 
Advisory Panels - to assist in carrying out its functions; and 
• a Fishing Industry Advisory Committee - to provide information and 
recommendations on the development of fishery management plans. 574 
The Secretary also may establish advisory panels of at least seven members, with a balanced 
representation between commercial, recreational and other interests, to assist in the 
collection and evaluation of information relevant to fishery management plans that apply to 
highly migratory species .575 
A number of recommendations related to fisheries management were also made in the US 
Commission on Ocean Policy Preliminary Report. These recommendations include: setting 
harvest limits below the allowable biological catch determined by the Council's Scientific 
and Statistical Committee; setting deadlines for allowable catch recommendations; timely 
development of fisheries management plans; annual management priority needs to be 
submitted to the NMFS; and the development of regional bycatch reduction plans. 576 
4.2.3 Lessons for Australia 
The Commission on Ocean Policy is proposing the establishment of regional ocean councils 
to develop, in conjunction with the NOC, regional ecosystem management plans addressing 
state/regional coordination, pollution reduction, economic development and research 
NOAA (1996) "Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation..." 
Ibid. 
575 Ibid. 
576 US Commission on Ocean Policy (2004) "Preliminary Report..." 
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priorities.577 In retrospect, perhaps this institutional arrangement is what Australia needed to 
assist in the effective development of its instrumental RMPs. It is at least a potential 
consideration for the implementation and ongoing management of these plans. Integrated 
Oceans Management Advisory Councils (IOMACs) are proposed in Section 7.4.5 for the 
effective regional implementation of RMPs, and with other nations also considering this 
path, it seems quite feasible and potentially beneficial for their successful implementation. It 
will be of interest to watch the USA in its implementation and development of these regional 
councils and plans to see what challenges they face and how they overcome or pre-em, pt 
them. 
The USA has developed a National CZM Program in recognition of the land-sea 
interconnectivity. This is an integral part of integrated oceans management and one that is 
yet to be adequately addressed in Australia. Many failed attempts at developing a National 
Coastal Policy have strewn Australia's past and are relatively insignificant when considering 
that Australia has not yet even integrated across maritime jurisdictions by getting the states 
signed on to Oceans Policy commitments. - 
Although a "coordinated and comprehensive framework" is one of the elements of an ocean 
policy agreed to by the Commission, the topical development of the process used to 
categorise issues remains particularly sectoral in nature. Integration is being proposed for 
the implementation stage, after the issues and possible policy options to address these issues 
have been determined for each topical area. It will be useful to examine the US approach 
with respect to the Australian semi-sectoral approach to determine whether any proposed 
legislative or institutional modifications can adequately deal with the issue of integrated 
oceans management, or whether it will result in simple cohesion of management practices 
across jurisdictional and sectoral boundaries. 
RFMCs are an example of the practical application of a regional approach to management 
and as such provide a working example for Australia. These bodies incorporate the intra-
sectoral interests of definitive and expectant stakeholders. There appears to be some 
'industry-capture' of these Councils in the USA, but Australia has risen to this challenge 
before in the functioning of the AFMA Board. To this end Regional Fisheries Advisory 
Councils (RFACs), balancing recreational, indigenous, aquaeulture and commercial interests 
is considered in Section 7.4.6. In order to address cross-sectoral interests of latent 
stakeholders, the development of Integrated Oceans Management Advisory Councils 
(IOMACs) is proposed (see Section 7.4.5), rather than the primary advisory body being all- 
577 US Commission on Ocean Policy (2003) "Introduction of Draft Policy Options" 
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inclusive and somewhat inefficient and unwieldy as experienced by the USA in theft 
RFMCs. 
4.3 New Zealand 
4.3.1 New Zealand's oceans management 
New Zealand ratified the LOSC in 1996 and consequently, in the United Nations Year of the 
Oceans in 1998, NZ like many other nations began focusing their attentions on the 
sustainable use of theft oceanic juridietions. 578 In December 1999, the Commissioner for 
the Environment presented a paper, Setting Cturse for a Sustainable Future, to Parliament 
recommending the development of a sustainable management strategy for the oceans .579 
Following this recommendation, in June 2000, Cabinet announced its intention to develop an 
Oceans Policy. 
The Hon Pete Hodgson (Minister Responsible for Oceans Policy) launched the Oceans 
Policy on 12 October 2000. The Oceans Policy aimed to incorporate 18 pieces of domestic 
legislation and 14 departments of State regarding New Zealand's oceans use and resources, 
into an overall policy framework with common goals. 580 The development of this initiative 
was delegated to a Committee of six Cabinet Ministers, chaired by the Hon Pete Hodgson .581 
The Oceans Policy for NZ is divided into three stages. In March 2001, the Ministerial 
Advisory Committee on Oceans Policy (MACOP) led by Dame Catherine Tizard, was 
established as part of Stage One of the process. 582  The first stage involved defining the 
vision and values of the region, by means of a public consultation process. Dame Cath 
Tizard led the MACOP of eight government-selected New Zealanders in a six-month public 
consultation process on the Oceans Policy development. 583 
The MACOP's report to the Minister was released on 30 September 2001. This report 
highlighted the increasing public awareness of the need for more integrated management 
regarding the us&of the oceans.SM  It was also recognised that a few strongly held views will 
578 Ministerial Advisory Committee on Oceans Policy. (2001). "Healthy Sea: Healthy Society. 
Towards an Oceans Policy for New Zealand." http://www.oceans.govt.nzlhappeninglhappfra.html  
579 Thid. 
580 Speden, G. (2009). "Oceans Policy process launched." Media Statement for Hon Pete Hodgson. 
http://www.oceans.govt.nz  
588 Ministerial Advisory Committee on Oceans Policy (2001) "Healthy Sea...... 
582 Ministerial Advisory Committee on Oceans Policy (2001) "Healthy Sea:.."; and 
Speden, G. (2001). "Dame Cath Tizard to lead Oceans Policy group." Media Statement for Hon 
Pete Hodgson. http://www.oceans.govt.nz  
583 Speden (2001) "Dame Cath Tizard..." 
584 Ministerial Advisory Committee on Oceans Policy (2001) "Healthy Sea...... ; and 
Speden (2001) "Dame Cath Tizard..." 
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be hard to reconcile in this process as some people are feeling over consulted with little 
follow up action, hence leading to a high degree of scepticism over this latest policy 
initiative and its pending implementation. Based on this report, Cabinet identified a vision 
statement for New Zealand's oceans: 
Healthy Oceans: New Zealanders understand marine life and marine processes and, 
accordingly take responsibility for wisely managing the health of the ocean and its 
contribution to the present and future social, cultural, environmental and economic 
well-being of New Zealand .585 
Also identified at this stage were a series of goals, values (identified from the public 
consultation phase) and principles to guide the development of an Oceans Policy. 
The second stage involves designing the policies to achieve the vision of the first stage. 
Work to date on this stage has incorporated reports on economic opportunities and local 
level management issues, stakeholder workshops and meetings, - a series of working issues 
papers and a stock take of current arrangements. The final step in this stage will be public 
consultation on the draft policy options and will be completed in 2004. And finally, the 
third stage involves the delivery of the vision through the creation of appropriate policies, 
legislation, institutional frameworks and the identification of areas for further work. 
At present, the marine-based legislation is designed for direct and indirect protection of the 
environment without a clear common goal or established integration. The Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA) was the first legislative regime to attempt to integrate New 
Zealand's land, water, air and other resources. 587 However, the RJvIA's scope for integrated 
oceans management is limited to the management of the coastal waters, extending only as far 
as the territorial sea and does not include activities such as fisheries. 588 
More specific ocean-use protection issues are covered by: 
. the Marine Mammals Protection Act 1978, which provides for the establishment of 
marine mammal sanctuaries within the New Zealand EEZ where deemed necessary 
for conservation; 
Ministry for the Environment. (2004). "Policy Development." 
http://www.oceans.govt.nzlpolicy/index.html  [Access date: 28 April 2004]. 
586 Ministry for the Environment. (2004). "Stage Two." http://www.oceans.govt.nzipolicy/stage2.html  
[Access date: 28 April 20041. 
587 Ministry for the Environment. (1991). "Managing our future." Wellington: Ministry for the 
Environment. 
588 Rosier, J. and Hastie, W. (1996). "New-Zealand coastal planning: an issue-based approach." Ocean 
& Coastal Management, 33(1-3): 147-165; and 
See Section 6.5 for more details on the RMA. 
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. the Fisheries Act 1996, which establishes a legislative framework for the sustainable 
development of the fishing industry, including protection of biodiversity and habitat; 
. the Biosecurity Act 1993, which covers management of introduced pests and ballast 
exchange; 
. the Marine Reserves Act 1971, which is administered by the Department of 
Conservation and comprises a legislative basis for site specific protection of the 
marine environment589; and 
. other legislative regimes covering Transport, Cables and Pipeline, and Customs. 590 
There are several other Acts and policies that contribute to sustainable resource management 
of the New Zealand EEZ, such as those that deal with Maori claims and aquaculture. These 
are all to be incorporated into New Zealand's integrated Oceans Policy framework. 
New Zealand is currently exploring legislative options for oceans management in recognition 
of the need to integrate ocean activities and clarify rights and responsibilities for sustainable 
management of its ocean resources. 591  This work is progressing slowly due to the priority 
currently assigned to the development of the NZ Foreshore and Seabed Policy. 592 
4.12 New Zealand 'sflsheries management 
In response to the exponential growth of the NZ fishing industry, due to the importation of 
large freezer trawlers, and the imminent danger of inshore fisheries becoming overfished, the 
NZ Amendment Act 1986 was developed .593 This Act, more commonly referred to as the 
Quota Management System (QMS), incorporated 27 commercial species at the time. 594 
Under the QMS, each of the 179 fish stock Total Allowable Catches (TACs), encompassed 
by the 27 species identified, were set to achieve maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and were 
subdivided into ITQs. 595 ITQs were in effect a property right given to the owner in terms of 
set tonnage of fish permitted to harvest. 596  The QMS was an initial success due in part to the 
New Zealand currently has 16 Marine Reserves in place covering around 5% of the territorial sea. 
"0 New Zealand Government. (2001). "Oceans Policy." 
http://www.oceans.govt.nz/libraiy/libraryfra.html  
591 Ayre, M. (unpublished). "New Zealand." Report for the National Oceans Office on international 
developments in oceans governance, 2004. 
Ayre (unpublished); and 
See Section 6.5.6 for further explanation of Foreshore and Seabed Bill tabled in Parliament. 
" Sharp, B.M.H. (1997). "From regulated access to transferable harvesting rights: policy insights 
from New Zealand." Marine Policy, 21 (6): 501-517. 
Batstone, C.J. and Sharp, B.M.H. (1999). "New Zealand's quota management system." Marine 
Policy, 23(2): 177-190; and 
Sharp (1997). 
... Annala, J.H. (1996). "New Zealand's ITQ system: have the first eight years been a success or a 
failure?" Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries, 6: 43-62. 
596 Batstone and Sharp (1999). 
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widespread support it received from the fishing industry. It was perceived to improve the 
biological status of the stock, to provide secure access for industry, to provide flexible 
management and to produce a more efficient market-driven industry. 597 Resource rents were 
also introduced with the QMS. A Fisheries Fund was meant to be established to contain 
these rents, however, funds supposed to be used for the compensation of quota reductions, 
ended up in the Government Consolidated Fund creating a lot of mistrust. 598 In 1994 the 
Ministry of Fisheries was established, resource rents were abolished and the Fisheries Act 
1983 was amended to recover fisheries management costs from the industry. 599  
Initial allocation of quota was distributed in accordance with catch history over a given 
period and, for fisheries exceeding their maximum biologically sustainable yield, 
government entered into a voluntary buy back scheme investing some NZ$45 million to buy 
back 15,800t of fish. 600 Under this tonnage system, government involvement in the market 
was seen as an incentive to harvest the full TAC, as the government would essentially 
compensate for any reductions in ITQs.60 ' In 1990, the predicted reductions required in the 
TAC of orange roughy would have cost the government some NZ$100 million. The 
government was therefore persuaded to change ITQs to a percentage of the TAC and hence 
alleviate the financial buy-back pressure experienced by the government. 602  This resulted 
from a series of negotiations between industry and government, leading to an agreement 
commonly referred to as the "Accord". In the Accord: 
• ITQs were changed from a fixed to proportional basis as of 1 October 1990; 
• resource rents were frozen for a five-year period as of 1 October 1989, while 
compensation for TAC reductions was being arranged; and 
the TAC Advisory Council consisting of half industry and half government was 
established .603 
There are few limitations placed on quota owners, the theory being that the more limitations, 
the higher the costs of enforcement and the lower the probability of successful management. 
The law does, however, require that the quota holder must be a New Zealander, and given 
that many quota owners have joined under cooperative arrangements, if they are from a 
Annala (1996). 
'98 Batstone and Sharp (1999). 
Annala (1996); and 
Batstone and Sharp (1999). 
600 Annala (1996). 
60! Batstone and Sharp (1999); and 
Kerr, S., Newell, R.G. and Sanchirico, J.N. (2003). "Evaluating the New Zealand Individual 
Transferable Quota Market for Fisheries Management." Moth Economic and Public Policy 
Research Trust. Moth Working Paper #2003-02. 
602 Annala (1996). 
603 Ibid. 
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company then at least 75.1% of that company should be New Zealand owned and 
controlledP°" There are no foreign licensed fishing activities in the New Zealand EEZ. 
Quota owners may not possess more than 35% of the total quota of deep-water fish stocks or 
more than 20% of the total quota of the inshore fish stocks .605  Theoretically though, the 
more efficient firms will acquire a majority of the quota as they become better established 
with relatively low running costs and minimal effort. 606 
Compliance and enforcement are managed primarily through a detailed reporting procedure 
consisting of four documents. 607 The Catch Effort and Landing Return requires the details of 
the fishing expedition relevant to each fishing method used, for the scientific records and 
contribution to future stock assessments. 608 The Catch Landing Return is retained by the 
skipper on board the vessel and is filled out as soon as the catch is landed.09 The Licensed 
Fish Receiver's Return must be authorised by a licensed receiver of commercial goods and 
essentially puts the receiver in a position of responsibility to accurately monitor the use of 
the resource. 6 ' ° Finally, the Quota Management Report is retained and filled in by the quota 
holder. 61 ' The design of these forms is such that they must correlate with one another and 
each is devised as an additional checkpoint for the sustainable use of the resource. 
In September 1992, negotiations began between the Government and representatives of the 
Maori fishing population. 612  These negotiations led to a MoU under which the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Fishery Claims) Settlement Act 1992 was finally settled upon. Under the auspices 
of this Act, the Government provided some NZ$150 million for the purchase of 50% of 
Sealord Products, the transfer of 20% of quota from all new fisheries entering the QMS and 
the recognition of customary fishing rights. 613  It is of interest to note that the Maori now 
own or control between 30-50% of the QMS quota .614 
The Fisheries Act 1996 was written to include guiding environmental principles such as the 
precautionary approach to management. It also encompasses clear guidelines for conflict 
resolution mechanisms, consultation procedures and the establishment of a National Fishery 
604 Clark, 1. (1993). "Individual transferable quotas: the New Zealand experience." Marine Policy, 17 
(5): 340-342. 
605 Ibid. 
606 Batstone and Sharp (1999). 
607 Kerr, Newell and Sanchirico (2003). 
608 Clark (1993). 
609 Ibid. 
610 Ibid. 
611 Ibid. 
612 Annala (1996). 
613 Ibid. 
614 Kerr, Newell and Sanchirico (2003); and 
New Zealand Government (2001) "Oceans Policy" 
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Advisory Council and for the inclusion of all commercially harvested stocks into the QMS 
within a three-year period.615 The Fisheries Act 1996 clearly makes the Minister of Fisheries 
responsible for setting the TAC and the commercial TAC (TACC) for each fishery. In 
setting the TACC, the Minister must take into account the influence of the non-commercial 
sector (TACN) even though the recreational users are not explicitly allocated quota. 616 
Mother notable change to the QMS has been the separation of fishing rights as a form of 
property right from fishing allocations or catching rights. Where it was once the ITQ that 
was the only requirement to go fishing, as of 1 October 2001, an Annual Catch Entitlement 
(ACE) is required before a fisher can go fishing. 617 The ITQ is till the quasi property right 
and the ACE is the specific allocation of the TAC. 618 
4.3.3 Lessons for Australia 
New Zealand has approached the development of its Oceans Policy with much more caution 
and deliberate consultation than Australia. This could be primarily attributed to Australia's 
product-driven approach to management and planning, which demands products according to 
budgetary commitments regardless of whether development indicates more time is required 
to adequately address unforeseen issues and public concerns. Although Australia consulted 
widely and arguably effectively in the pre-planning stages of development, there has been a 
breakdown in this wide-ranging public consultation since the onset of the regional marine 
planning process and perhaps Australia would be wise in learning from its New Zealand 
counterpart in slowing the process to adequately consult with and obtain approval from the 
wider community. 
New Zealand has an advanced 1TQ system that embraces the concept of setting TACs that 
take into account recreational and other non-commercial interests before setting a TACC 
within this limit. Given Australia's recent commitment towards evaluating and developing 
resource sharing arrangements with recreational and indigenous fishers, it would be 
beneficial to look further at the New Zealand system. The beneficial features of the QMS 
are that there are standardised rules for quota definition and trading across species and areas, 
there are few trading restrictions, there is relative stability in the rules over time and there are 
low levels of government involvement in the trading process. 619  Also an important feature of 
615 Annala (1996); and 
Batstone and Sharp (1999). 
616 Batstone and Sharp (1999). 
617 Ken, Newell and Sanchirico (2003). 
oil Annala (1996); and 
Batstone and Sharp (1999). 
619 Ken, Newell and Sanchirico (2003). 
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the New Zealand system is that while quota for the environment has not yet been assigned, 
there is an explicit recognition of environmental requirements in the setting of TACs. This is 
something Australia is yet to achieve, where commercial catch takes precedence and now 
other allocations are to be arranged around this catch. An alternative proposal, to set an 
overall TAC and subdivide this between resource users, is proposed in Section 7.3.2.1. 
4.4 European Union 
4.4.1 The European Union's oceans management 
Environment Action Programmes (EAPs) were brought in by the European Union in the 
1970s to ensure progress in environmental issues across the member states. 620 EAPs initiate 
much of the environmental legislation and policy development for the European Community. 
There have been six EAPs to date, with the most recent one, the 6th  EAP, being accepted by 
the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union on 22 July 2002.621  The 6'  
EAP represents the environmental component of the Community's Strategy for Sustainable 
Development, making the distinct link between the environment and the European objectives 
for social growth and internationally competitive industries. 612  The 6th  EAP is focused on a 
strategic approach to meeting the Community's environmental objectives, primarily through 
effective implementation and enforcement of current arrangements, the integration of 
environmental objectives into other policies and programs and the development of 
innovative and cooperative arrangements. 623 
There are four areas identified in the 6th  EAP where new efforts are needed to tackle ongoing 
and increasing environmental problems. These are: climate change; nature and biodiversity; 
environment and health affecting the quality of life; and natural resources and waste. 624  One 
of the actions foreseen in the 6th EAP is the development of seven thematic strategies to 
address key environmental issues that require holistic and integrated management. These 
thematic areas include the: Clean Air For Europe Strategy; Soil Protection Strategy; 
620 Irish Wildlife Trust. (2002). "The Sixth Environmental Action Programme." 
http:f/www.iwt.ie/6eap...pgl.html [Access date: 22 March 2004]. 
621 Cox, P. and Moller, P. S. (2002). "Decision No. 1600/2002/EC of the European Council and the 
Council of 22 July 2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme." 
Official Journal of the European Communities, L 242: 1-15. 
622 EUROPA. (2003). "Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice." 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environmentlnewprg/ [Access date: 22 March 20041. 
623 Commission of the European Communities. (2001). 'Proposal for a decision of the European 
Parliament and of the Council laying down the Community Environment Action Programme 2001-
2010." Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the sixth environment 
action programme of the European Community. 2001/0029 (COD). 
624 European Communities. (2001). "Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice." Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
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Sustainable Use of Pesticides Strategy; Protection and Conservation of the Marine 
Environment Strategy; Waste Prevention and Recycling Strategy; Sustainable Use of Natural 
Resources Strategy; and Urban Environment Strategy. 625 
The Commission of the European Communities presented the preliminary paper for the 
Protection and Conservation of the Marine Environment Strategy to the Council and the 
European Parliament on 2 October 2002.626  The strategy paper identifies the issues faced by 
the EU in the protection of the marine environment, the current situation with respect to 
existing policy, legislation and data and proposes a way forward for the EU to meet the 
increasing challenges in the protection and conservation of the marine environment. 627  The 
document also outlines the potential objectives for the Marine Strategy according to the 
issues raised in the initial part of the document. 
Overall, the Marine Strategy should promote the sustainability of the seas and conservation 
of the marine ecosystem, including sea beds, estuarine and coastal areas, paying special 
attention to sites holding high biodiversity value. 628  It is proposed to make this overall 
objective operational through the establishment of semi-sectoral, or issue specific objectives 
with accompanying time frames. Fourteen sub-objectives are also proposed in this document 
and fit under the areas of: loss of biodiversity and destruction of habitats; hazardous 
substances; eutrophication; radionuclides; chronic oil pollution; lifter; marine 'transport; 
health and environment; climate change; enhancing coordination and cooperation; and 
improving the knowledge base.629 Finally, a list of 23 actions are proposed to stimulate 
discussion with regard to meeting these objectives. Unlike Australia's SERIvIP, the Marine 
Strategy presents clearly defined actions that are proposed to specifically meet the objectives 
of the Strategy with associated time frames. This document does not, however, specify 
exactly how integration across sectors or member states will occur in the long run, rather it 
addresses specific environmental issues that will contribute to holistic integrated oceans 
management, once addressed. 
625 EUROPA (2003) "Environment 2010 ..... 
626 Commission of the European Communities. (2002). "Towards a strategy to protect and conserve 
the marine environment." Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament. Brussels: 2 October 2002. COM (2002) 539 final. 
627 Ibid. 
628 Ibid: 17. 
629 Ibid: 18-20.. 
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4.4.2 The European Union 'sflsheries management 
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was introduced in January 1983, after several years of 
negotiations. 630  The CFP covered four areas of fisheries policy affecting the EU. These 
were: the conservation of fish stocks; the structuring of the EU fleet and support facilities; 
the globalisation of the market for fish; and the external fisheries policies that affect the 
EU.631 The conservation of fish stocks was established via the setting of TACs, which were 
divided and distributed amongst member states as national quotas. These national quotas 
could be divided into individual quotas at the member state's discretion. 611  Other technical 
measures, such as area closures and minimum mesh sizes, were set in conjunction with these 
quotas to achieve maximum protection for the fish stock populations. 
Member states were given sole fishing rights from the low water mark to 12nm, with the 
12nm to 200nm area being open to fishing by all EU member states. 633  The structuring of 
the fleets and the support facilities was coordinated via finding mechanisms for expansion or 
reductions in accordance with the multi-annual guidance programs (MAGPs) for each 
state. 634  The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) provides funding for both 
the decommissioning of vessels and the increase of fishing efficiency, a system that should 
be balanced according to the prevailing needs of the sustainable industry. 635  A single market 
for the EU was established covering the pricing system, marketing arrangements and world 
trade policy. 636  To ensure that all national enforcement standards were the same, a 
Community Inspectorate of 25 staff was established .637  The Inspectorate ensures fair and 
equitable standards of all member state enforcement authorities. EU representatives also 
deal with international negotiations on behalf of all the member states. 638 
The first CFP review took place in 1992 and it was not until then that a fill list of fishing 
vessels operating in the EU wafers was produced .639  The findings of this review indicated 
that there were too many vessels for the available resources and that, in conjunction with the 
630 Gwiazada, A. (1993). "The Common Fisheries Policy. Economic Aspects." Marine Policy, 17 
(4):251-255. 
631 The European Commission. (1998). "2.2 The Common Fisheries Policy." 
http:/feuropa.eu.int/commlfisheries/doc_et_publlfactsheets/facts/en/pcp2_2 hun 
632 Gwiazada (1993). 
633 Ibid. 
634 Ibid. 
635 Todd, E. and Ritchie, E. (2000). " VIEWPOINT: Environmental Non-Government Organisations 
and the Common Fisheries Policy." Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems, 
10: 141-149. 
636 Gwiazada (1993). 
637 The European Commission (1998) "2.2 The Common Fisheries Policy" 
638 Gwiazada (1993). 
639 Ibid. 
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regulation of fishing activities, it was necessary to reduce the fleet capacity. 640  Asa result of 
this review, new fishing regulations were introduced in December 1992, including the 
introduction of multi-annual TACs and total allowable fishing effort (TAFE) rather than 
tonnage, multi-species TACs and precise management definitions relating to specific stock 
objectives and strategies. 641 Uncertainty remained over ecosystem-interactions, which were 
largely unknown. To be effectual, new multi-annual TACs and multi-species TACs should 
be accompanied by a strong commitment to improved data collection, as previous TACs 
based on scientific evidence still resulted in stocks plummeting, indicating the inadequacies 
of scientific knowledge or understanding. 642  These new regulations also included the 
establishment of a Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee to advise the Commission 
on technical aspects and research .643  A monitoring system was introduced in 1996 to 
monitor the fishing activities of the EU's 50,000 vessels." 
The selling of TACs can ignore black market fishing activities, which can be as much as 
30% of the TAC, therefore contributing to the evident overfishing problem faced by the 
EU."5 The EU has been advised by countries such as New Zealand, Iceland, the USA, and 
Australia that the only means to resolve the problem of overfishing would be to adopt a form 
of secure private tenure of the resource. 646  The suggestion of ITQ market-based 
management has met strong scepticism, due to the strong cultural and jurisdictional 
differences of the EU compared with other countries currently using this market-based 
system. 647  However, the international support for an ITQ management system is strongly 
supported by economists who say that the only way to stop overcapacity is to ensure a 
marked return for the right to fish."' 
A Green Paper on the Future of the CFP was released on 20 March 2001 to initiate public 
debate with the view of the second CFP review in mind. 649 The action plan associated with 
"° Mackenzie, L.D.M. (1993); "Sea Fisheries Management: the EC position." Marine Policy, 17(5): 
343-346; and 
The European Commission (1998) "2.2 The Common Fisheries Policy" 
641 Mackenzie (1993). 
642 Karagiamiakos, A. (1996). "Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and quota management system in the 
European Union." Marine Policy, 20 (3): 235-248. 
64' Mackenzie (1993). 
644 Gwiazada (1993). 
64' Bate, R. (2000). "The Common Fisheries Policy: A sinking ship." The Wall Street Journal, June 
2000. 
646 Ibid. 
647 Bate (2000); and 
Mackenzie (1993). 
648 Gwiazada (1993). 
6'9 European Commission's Directorate-General for Fisheries. (2001). "Green Paper on the Future of 
the Common Fisheries Policy." Press Release: 20 March 2001; and 
European Commission's Directorate-General for Fisheries. (2001). "Re-thinking the Common 
Fisheries Policy." Press Release: 20 March 2001. 
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this report primarily focuses on the protection of sharks and minimising the incidental by-
catch of cetaceans. 650  In an effort to address the environmental implications for and by 
fisheries, Biodiversity Action Plans were also being developed at this time to halt the loss of 
biodiversity in wildlife, ecosystems, crop varieties, animals and fish: 651 Biodiversity Action 
Plans meet the EU's international obligations under the Convention on Biological Diversity 
1992, the requirements of the EU Biodiversity Strategy adopted in 1998 and more recently, 
the 6th  Environment Action Programme commitment to halt the loss of biodiversity by 
201 0.652  The Biodiversity Action Plan for fisheries was one of four adopted on 28 March 
2001 and has identified three areas posing a threat to the environment or to the industry. 653 
These are: the conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks; the protection of non-target 
species and habitats; and the prevention of damage or pollution from aquaculture. 654 The 
issues raised were intended to feed into and be addressed by the second UP review. 
A Communication from the Commission on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy - 
Roádmap was released in 2002 bringing together the components of the second UP review. 
This document presents the Commission's action program for the reform of the CFP and 
gives a roadmap for its implementation. In achieving this, the inadequacies of the current 
CFP are highlighted, including those supported by environmental NGOs and academic 
observers relating to the negative impacts created by the economic driving force of the CFP. 
These negative impacts include overfishing, discards that can be as high as 60% of a vessel's 
catch, drift-nets and industrial fishing, all of which are not given high priority by bureaucrats 
in setting the politically-based TACs.655 The document then proposes new objectives for a 
reformed CFP and details nine different action areas for reform designed to address the 
inherent inadequacies of the CFP in meeting the sustainability objectives relating to the 
economic, environmental and social dimensions of a reformed CFP. 65' 
650 European Commission. (2003). "The way forward." CFP Reform Fact Sheet No. 6. KL-04-03-006-
EN-fl. 
651 European Community Biodiversity Clearing-House Mechanism (2004) "EU Biodiversity Action 
Plans adopted by the European Parliament." http://biodiversity-
chm.eea.eu.int/stories/ST0RY1016812291  [Access date: 23 March 20041. 
652 Ibid. 
653 European Commissions Directorate-General for Fisheries. (2001). "Commission takes steps to halt 
loss of Biodiversity." Press Release: 28 March 2001. 
654 Ibid. 
655 Todd and Ritchie (2000). 
656 European Communities. (2002). "Communication from the Commission on the Reform of the 
Common Fisheries Policy - Roadmap." Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities. 
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Action areas include: 
• the conservation of resources and management of fisheries; 
• the repercussion of the conservation policy on the fishing fleet; 
• access to waters and resources; 
• control and enforcement; 
• international fisheries; 
• aquaculture; 
• the social dimension of the CFP; 
• economic management of fisheries in the Union; and 
• effective and participatory decision-making. 657 
The Council of Fisheries Ministers accepted the first package of reforms as the new CFP, on 
1 January 2003.658  More reforms were tabled in 2003 and are currently at different stages of 
implementation. The reformed CFP specifies that the new CFP shall be guided by the 
principles of good governance to ensure exploitation of living aquatic resources that 
provides sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions. 659 It includes the 
following major changes, designed to address the inadequacies of the original CFP: 
• a long-term view to attain/maintain the adult biomass of fish stocks through multi-
annual Recovery and Management Plan objectives, 660  complementing the traditional 
annual TAC setting based on scientific advice and other associated measures and 
technical measures depending on the stock . 661  This will increase long-term security 
for the industry and enable fishers to plan for the future, while ensuring the 
conservation of fish stocks; 
• a simplification of fleet policy replacing the existing MAGPs, giving member states 
more responsibility in ensuring a balance of theft fleet capacity and fishing 
opportunity and an end to blanket subsidies for fleet renewal, renewal now only 
occurring when compensated by the exit of equivalent or higher capacity. 662 This 
will be accompanied by a restructuring of public aid priorities through the FIFG and 
657 European Communities (2002) "Communication from the Commission...": 8. 
658 European Commission. (2003). "Why did we need a new fishery?" CFP Reform Fact Sheet No. 1. 
KL-04-03-001-EN-D. 
659 European Communities. (2002). "Council Regulation (EC) No. 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 
on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries 
Policy." Official Journal of the European Communities, L 358: 59-80. 
° Ibid: 62-63 (Articles 5 & 6). 
European Commission. (2003). "A long-term approach to fisheries management." CFP Reform 
Fact Sheet No. 2. KL-04-03-002-EN-D. 
662 1 G must be withdrawn for HIT introduced for vessels under IOOGT; and 1.35(11' must be 
withdrawn for I GT introduced for vessels between I OOGT and 400GT (1 (iT: 1 GT after December 
2004) - European Commission. (2003). "A new policy for the fleet." CFP Reform Fact Sheet No. 3. 
KL-04-03-003-EN-fl. 
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complemented by a special fund under the CFP reform to meet the objectives of the 
multi-annual plan objectives and to address the overcapacity of the EU fleet as a 
priority, through the decommissioning and permanent removal of vessels 663 ; 
. standardisation of national control measures, through an EU Joint Inspection 
structure and a catalogue of sanctions, to ensure uniformity of control and 
enforcement measures across the EU, including mandatory VMS for >1 Sm vessels 
by 1 January 2005664; 
building on consultation at the EU level that currently occurs, Regional Advisory 
Councils (RACs) comprising fishermen, scientists and other relevant stakeholders, 
covering the sea area of at least two member states' responsibilities, will be 
established to facilitate regional and localised stakeholder involvement and equity 
across the ELT 65 ; 
a compliance scoreboard displaying the enforcement record of member states in 
relation to the CFP to raise public awareness, pressuring more effective 
enforcement666 : and 
• the transparent decentralisation of certain management powers, at least to the 
national level, so that emergency measures, in response to environmental crises 
identified by RACs, the Commission or member states, may be implemented .667 
The CFP, however, still denies individual member states the right to establish their own 
fisheries policies, hence negates any monetary revenues for the individual states that might 
otherwise be accrued .668  In contrast, the EU energy policy is such that individual states can 
make their own policies regarding prospecting for oil and can keep any taxes and revenues 
accrued from fixing the corporation tax and royalties. 669 Individual states have to therefore 
share a valuable resource, fish stocks, with all other EU states yet receive no monetary 
revenues, perhaps lessening the incentive to abide by the CFP. 
European Communities (2002) "Council Regulation (EC) No. 2371/2002.....L 358: 64-6 
(Chapter III: Adjustment of Fleet Capacity). 
651 European Commission. (2003). "Better and more uniform enforcement of fisheries rules." CFP 
Reform Fact Sheet No. 4. KL-04-03-004-EN-D. 
European Commission. (2003). "Improving the management of the Common Fisheries Policy." 
CFP Reform Fact Sheet No. 5. KL-04-03-005-EN-D. 
666 European Commission (2003) "Better and more uniform..." 
European Commission (2003) "Why did we need a..."; 
European Commissions Directorate-General for Fisheries (2001) "Re-thinking the..... ; and 
European Commissions Directorate-General for Fisheries. (2001). "Results of the Fisheries 
Council of 25 April 2001." Press Release: 26 April 2001. 
668 Gwiazada (1993). 
669 Ibid. 
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4.4.2.1 	Regional Advisory Councils 
In October 2003 the European Commission developed a proposal paper for a Council 
Decision on the establishment of RACs under the CFP.67° RACs will be established to offer 
advice to the Commission and the member states when called upon and of theft own 
initiative and to enhance dialogue between different interests concerned with the CFP. This 
decision provides the framework from which RACs should be established, recognising that 
the details and functioning will be specific to the RAC developed for each region and as such 
cannot be dictated at this level. Six RACs are proposed covering each of the following 
areas: the Baltic Sea; the Mediterranean Sea; the North Sea; the North Western waters; the 
South Western waters; and Pelagic stocks. 671 These areas are large enough to cover 
management units based on biological criteria and to fit within organisational and financial 
constraints, while recognising that subdivisions of the RACs may be required to deal with 
specific fisheries or regions. 
Each RAC will comprise a general assembly (GA) that meets at least annually, comprising 
enough stakeholders to achieve an effective balance between inclusiveness and efficiency of 
discussion. The GA is to appoint an executive committee (EC) of 12-18 members to manage 
the work of the RAC and by unanimous vote, an impartial chair. Two-thirds of both the GA 
and EC membership shall be allotted to representatives of the fishing sector, with the 
remaining one-third comprising other interest groups, such as environment or recreational 
fishers. At least one catch sector representative from each member state shall be represented 
on the EC. The proposal also outlines the appropriateness for observers, the public and for 
linkages between these forums and other management and administrative bodies, such as the 
Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture, to avoid duplicated effort. The ultimate 
economic goal for the RACs is to be self-financing in the long-term, but proposals are made 
for start-up funding for the first three years. 
RACs are an indication of the EU's commitment towards more bottom-up intra-sectoral and 
cross-sectoral integrative management. It is recognised that those who are affected by any 
policy or management decision need to be involved in the decision-making process to foster 
a sense of ownership that will encourage compliance with the final outcomes. The inclusion 
of cross-sectoral interests is a reflection of the current international move towards 
ecosystem-based management, which implies that the oceans are interconnected and 
670 Commission of the European Communities. (2003). "Proposal for a Council decision establishing 
Regional Advisory Councils under the Common Fisheries Policy." Brussels: COM(2003) 697 final. 
2003/0238 (CNS). 
67!  Ibid. 
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therefore any action taken by any one user will have an impact on the rest of the system, 
hence the other users of these resources 
The Commission arguably deals effectively with cross-jurisdictional integration at the inter-
state level, but is limited in its scope to deal with intra-state integration or between 
neighbouring member states. The establishment of RACs, however, recognises that all 
levels of government and all relevant stakeholders need to be part of the decision-making 
process to ensure effective compliance. RACs also comprise multi-fishery representatives, 
therefore, have the potential to address any intra-sectoral issues or conflicts that may arise. 
However, being limited to a consultative capacity, it is arguable whether the RACs will 
actually hold any influence over decision-making by the Commission .672  The rights of 
access and withdrawal of Community fishermen will remain invariable under the reformed 
CFP and their power to influence fisheries management will be dependent on the relevant 
management body's uptake of recommendations and advice provided by the RAC. 673 It may 
be that the RACs will provide little more than a sounding board for Commission decisions or 
a forum for localised conflict management. 
4.4.3 Lessons for Australia 
Until recently the EU, with its ambiguous and ineffective policies, was arguably trailing 
internationally with respect to integrated oceans management. The passing of the 6th  EAP in 
2002 emphasised the environmental problems being faced by the EU in the management of, 
amongst other things, its marine environment. The Marine Strategy is in its initial stages and 
is somewhat akin to Australia's Oceans Policy in its ambitious commitment towards 
integrated oceans management, yet it approaches this through the holistic management of 
environmental issues recognising sectoral and jurisdictional boundaries that will be long-
lived. The Marine Strategy focuses on an overall management objective, rather than a focus 
on institutional arrangements that perhaps Australia could learn from. The development of 
regional marine planning in Australia appears to emphasise how things would be done rather 
than addressing what was to be achieved. Arguably, with a clearer focus on the overall 
objectives of what was to be achieved from the SERMP and how this was to be measured, 
the process would have been inherently more apparent. 
The EU's commitment to establish RACs is a reflection of Australia's fisheries MACs, the 
primary difference being the jurisdictional challenges faced by the EU in incorporating 
multi-cultural interests. RACs, like Australia's MACs, will hold influence over decision- 
672 Iglesias-Malvido, C., Garza-Gil, D. and Varela-Lafuente, M. (2002). "Management systems in the 
EU fisheries." Marine Policy, 26: 403413. 
673 Ibid. 
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making only in so much as the oven!l governing body decides to adopt recommendations 
and advice offered by these consultative forums. However, it would be of benefit for 
Australia to keep a watchful eye on the effectiveness of development and implementation of 
these RACs, with the view of adapting cross-jurisdictional, cross-sectoral and intra-sectoral 
integration to the challenges of regional marine planning. Benefit could be gained from 
determining the effectiveness of such a large body in providing meaningful advice and 
conflict management on regional issues and the potential impact of this advice. 
4.5 Iceland 
4.5.1 Iceland's oceans management 
The National Strategy on Sustainable Development, also known as the National 
Environment Strategy (NES) of Iceland, entitled Towards Sustainable Development, was 
adopted by Government in March 1993 674  The NES focused on the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine living resources, integrated coastal zone management and marine 
environmental protection. 61' As a follow up to its adoption, the Minister for Environment 
assigned seven working groups the task of developing strategic action plans towards 
sustainable development in the various sectors .676  In 1996, these working plans were 
compiled into one document, A Plan of Action for Sustainable Development in Iceland, 
which was adopted by Government in 1997 and revised in August 2002, as the extensive 
implementation plan for the NES. 677 The various Ministries charged with responsibility of 
the sectors covered by the report are today continuing the inaugural task of adopting this 
Plan of Action, however, this is occurring in a rather haphazard manner with sectoral 
economic objectives taking precedence .678 
4.12 Iceland's fisheries management 
The Fisheries Management Act was introduced in Iceland in December 1983 •679  Under the 
auspices of this Act, the Ministry of Fisheries was given the power to determine the details 
674 Felixson, T. (1997). "Iceland Country Profile Implementation of Agenda 21: Review of Progress 
made since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 1992." United 
Nations: http://www.un.orglesa/earthsummit/icela-cp.htm;  and 
United Nations. (1999). "Natural Resource Aspects of Sustainable Development in Iceland - Ocean 
and Coastal Areas." http://www.un.org/esa1agenda2  1/natlinfo/countr/icelandlnatur.htm. 
675 United Nations (1999) "Natural Resource Aspects..." 
676 Felixson (1997). 
677 Felixson (1997); and 
-United Nations (1999) "Natural Resource Aspects..." 
678 OECD. "Environmental Performance Review of Iceland." The OECD Environment Program. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/34/2378124.pdf  [Access date: 28 April 2004]. 
679 Eythorsson, F. (2000). "A decade of ITQ-management in Icelandic fisheries: consolidation without 
consensus." Marine Policy, 24: 483-492. 
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of a proposed quota system. Initial allocation of quota was therefore based on the previous 
three years of catch history for each vessel and a portion of the TAC was allocated 
accordingly. 680 An effort-based option was introduced for smaller vessels in 1985. It 
followed that vessels of 100RT had free access to the fishery until 1988 and vessels under 
6GRT had free access until 1990.681  However, as smaller vessels became more numerous, 
their combined catches became more influential on the health of the fish stocks. 
In 1988-1989 there were signs of economic crisis indicating that the management system in 
place was ineffectual. A new Fisheries Management Act was established in 1990, 
implementing TTQs forjust about all the Icelandic fisheries. 682  This Act also abolished the 
effort option for trawlers that had caused increasing concern in the most recent years. 
Quotas assigned under the Act are permanent, divisible and fairly freely transferable. 683 
These characteristics have brought about concerns surrounding the question of privatisation 
and have been met with much discord . 6 Under the legislation, however, fish resources 
remain the property of the state and quota transfers are limited to Icelandic flagged vessels 
only.685 
Over the past decade, since the introduction of the ITQ system, Iceland has been dealing 
with many unforeseen problems related to the market-based system, which has resulted in a 
general lack of public support. The primary issues that have come to light involve allocation 
of quota issues and the concentration of quota. 686  In an attempt to combat the concentration 
issue, an upper limit to TAC shares was set in Parliament in March 1998.687  This was set at 
no more than 10% TAC for cod and haddock and no more than 20% TAC for other demersal 
species .688  The issue of contract leasing has been dealt with by the establishment of the 
Quota Exchange Market (QEM) that essentially deals with any excess quota distribution in a 
fair way that does not compromise the salaries and livelihood of the dependant crew 
members . 689 A more social aspect of the ITQ system is the dependence of communities on 
quota holders. If a quota holder decides to leave a community or sell their quota, then this 
affects the community members that have perhaps put themselves on the line by moving to a 
certain area and investing in establishment costs, reliant on this quota for work. 
680 Eythorsson (2000). 
681 The Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries. (2001). "Responsible Fisheries." 
http://www.fisheries.is/managem/indek.htm  
682 Eythorsson (2000). 
683 The Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries (2001) "Responsible Fisheries" 
684 Eythorsson (2000). 
5 Ibid. 
686 Ibid. 
687 Ibid. 
688 Ibid. 
689 thid 
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Iceland has moved from a regulated industry with production units embedded in the 
communities to a market-based industry with highly mobile production units showing no 
affiliation with any specific communities. The question of the validity and future of the ITQ 
system, in light of international environmental commitments, is now being addressed by the 
Resource Committee and the Consensus Committee. 690 Iceland's rich marine life remains its 
most important natural resource and fisheries still drive Iceland's economic development, 
hence the sustainable development of the fishing sector is paramount to Iceland's future. 69 ' 
Iceland has traditionally attempted to run a transparent management system involving all 
stakeholders and those with an interest, however, the review committees (see above) have no 
stakeholder representation. This is perhaps because the situation has become so tense 
between principal stakeholder groups that communication is very difficult and consensus 
would be near impossible. 692 
4.5.3 Lessons for Australia 
Iceland is not embarking upon integrated oceans management as such, but rather is 
addressing sustainable development of its sectors under the NES. While this is a very 
different approach from Australia, it will be of benefit to note whether sectoral management 
towards a common goal of sustainability will work as effectively as attempts to integrate 
sectoral management under the umbrella of integrated oceans management. Iceland's 
approach to integrated oceans management has been relatively haphazard and it is therefore 
difficult to draw any noteworthy conclusions from Iceland's experience to date. 
Icelandic fisheries on the other hand have been sustainably governed by ITQs since their 
inception. The years of experience and well-established nature of the market-based system 
have highlighted numerous areas of contention and/or potential problems from which 
Australia may benefit from learning. The most evident problem that can arise in the 
development of any ITQ system is inappropriate initial allocation of quota, which can lead to 
high-grading of catch and unreported discards .693  It is important to accurately estimate 
proportions of catch in the first instance to avoid these problems emerging. This relies on 
accurate catch data, which is often missing, hence a precautionary approach needs to be 
taken in setting quota. Mother problem that may arise is the concentration of quota 
allocated to particular fishers or companies. Iceland and New Zealand have overcome this 
by setting limits on quota concentrations. Local community impacts of market-based 
690 Eythorsson (2000). 
691 Felixson (1997). 
692 Eythorsson (2000). 
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systems are felt through the social disparity of arrangements, whereby quota owners have no 
strong affiliations with local communities and readily sell quota for use in other 
communities, taking with it the localised financial expenditure. The other issues relevant to 
ITQs are the increasing international environmental pressures on domestic fisheries and the 
capacity to incorporate ecosystem-based management measures, which can be lacking in 
market-based structures if not issued with restrictions or instructions. As Australia 
increasingly moves towards Statutory Fishing Rights and market-based quota systems, it is 
important to plan for the resolution of these problems, if not pre-empt them to avoid their 
occurrence in the first place. 	. 
Market-based systems, such as Iceland's ITQs, are generally more suited to address short-
term economic objectives that have the potential to reduce excess competition and enhance 
industry efficiency, rather than the social and environmental objectives incorporated in ESD 
(as it is referred to in Australia) .694 Co-management approaches, such as those used in 
Australian fisheries, however, are better suited to incorporate social objectives in achieving 
economic viability in terms of enforcement and compliance. Market systems are also based 
on the premise that government has ultimate control in imposing regulations, whereas co-
management recognises the importance of stakeholder support for implementation of 
government policies at the operational level .695  For this reason, while it is important to 
recognise the benefits associated with the allocation of fishing rights and ITQs, as in 
Icelandic and New Zealand fisheries, Australia should also recognise the benefits of the 
current co-management approach in ensuring that the triple-bottom line objectives - 
including social, environmental and economic values - of ESD are adequately met. 
693 Squires, D., Campbell, H., Cunningham, S., Dewees, C., Grafton, R.Q., Herrick, S.F., Kirkley, J., 
Pascoe, S., Salvanes, K., Shallard, B., Tunis, B. and Vestergaard, N. (1998). "Individual 
transferable quotas in multispecies fisheries." Marine Policy, 22(2): 135-159. 
694 Dubbink, W. and van Vliet, M. (1996). "Market regulation versus co-management? Two 
perspectives on regulating fisheries compared." Marine Policy, 20 (6): 499-516; and 
Squires et at (1998). 
695 Ibid. 
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4.6 Summary 
This chapter highlights the efforts of Australia in advancing Oceans Policy, despite the 
complexities of multi-departmental mandates and sectoral interests, which have hindered 
some other international developments. Initial attempts to implement such policies in 
Canada and the USA failed due to a lack of commitment to effectively integrate decision-
making processes. Regional fisheries bodies, not dissimilar to Australian MACs, have been 
adopted in the USA and EU to manage for intra-sectoral integration within the fisheries 
sector. While Australia reflects the participative aspects of these arrangements, MACs are 
limited in their scope to primarily address commercial fishing issues. It would be of benefit 
to broaden the scope of these arrangements so that fisheries can meet the integrative 
objectives of regional marine planning. 
Market-based fisheries management is increasingly being used globally for the sustainable 
development of the industry. Australia is developing market-based approaches to fisheries 
management that will greatly benefit from the co-management arrangements already in place 
in Australia to meet the objectives of ESD. Australia needs to give due recognition to the 
issues encountered by international counterparts in implementing market-based regimes, 
such as quota concentration and the demise of local economies, to ensure they are 
appropriately managed for in Australia's domestic fisheries. 
This chapter illustrates Australia's leadership in the international community with respect to 
integrated oceans and fisheries management practices. While these evaluations are effective 
in establishing the beneficial aspects of national governance systems, more detailed scrutiny 
into the working relationships of natural resource management models will provide informed 
insights into the capacity for best practice integrated fisheries management that can meet the 
broader objectives of regional marine planning. Some Australian natural resource 
management models are analysed in the following chapter for their capacity to incorporate 
intra-sectoral, cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional integration and effective conflict 
management. Australian natural resource management models are used as they are 
established with similar governance structures to meet the same overarching national 
objectives as fisheries, hence can potentially better inform the integration of Australian 
fisheries in regional marine planning. 
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Policy development is enhanced by the use of policy learning based on past experience that 
can be transferred into current management practices. There are many parallels between 
integrated oceans and fisheries management and other natural resource management (NIRM) 
experiences. It is important therefore, that the Commonwealth, in developing Regional 
Marine Plans, learn from approaches that have worked well and those which have proven to 
be unsuccessful initiatives in other NRM areas. 
This chapter examines how selected Australian NRM models progress towards ecosystem-
based management. It does so by: assessing their overall capacity for integration in terms of 
the Policy Integration Scale (see Section 12.1); identi'ing the more specific components 
that effectively address cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional integration; and assessing their 
capacity to address conflict management issues. This assessment is used to consider 
approaches that could address integration of fisheries issues in the broader context of 
regional marine planning. 
Some NIRM models described in this chapter have demonstrated capacity for cross-
jurisdictional integration or coordination, such as in the Great Barrier Reef and the Murray 
Darling Basin. Others have had to contend with cross-sectoral planning issues, such as 
Queensland's Integrated Planning process and Tasmania's Regional Forest Agreement. 
South Australia has embarked upon a widely accepted marine planning process from which 
many of these issues, and issues of conflict, are being effectively dealt with through 
constructive participative and consultative stakeholder processes. 
5.1 Queensland Integrated Planning Act 1997697 
Queensland's Integrated Planning Act 1997 (the IPA) is a legislative instrument designed to 
streamline government approval processes across two tiers of government and all relevant 
sector-based agencies to achieve ecological sustainability in land-use and development. 
Planning instruments developed under the WA are required to be comprehensive, holistic 
and include adequate consultation between government and the public. As such, planning 
696 This chapter has been adapted from the following report, with the consent of the National Oceans 
Office (see Appendix One for signed permission forms): 
Foster, E. (unpublished). "Evaluation of Alternative Models." Consultancy report for the National 
Oceans Office, 2003. 
697 The following description is dra.'n heavily from: 
England, P. (2001). "Integrated Planning in Queensland." Firs: edition. NSW: The Federation 
Press. 
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instruments include provisions for integration and are also are consistent with the objective 
of ecological sustainability. 
5. Li Planning Instruments 
	
5.1.1.1 	Planning Schemes 
Planning Schemes are the highest local level planning instrument in the WA hierarchy 
(second only to State Planning Policies, which may override these schemes on a matter of 
State interest). At the heart of Planning Schemes is the identification of Desired 
Environmental Outcomes (DEOs). Planning Schemes also include measures to facilitate the 
achievement of DEOs (that is, codes). Performance indicators are included to assess the 
achievement of DEOs, however, this is no longer a compulsory requirement of Planning 
Schemes. The Planning Scheme development process focuses on public consultation and 
consultation across government between ministers on matters of State interest. 698 
5.1.1.2 	Other instruments of the IPA 
Instruments of the WA that support or advise Planning Scheme development are: 
• Temporary Local Planning Instruments 699 - In the event of an immediate 
environmental risk, Temporary Local Planning Instruments can modify a Planning 
Scheme for a period up to a year. There is no public consultation provided for in this 
procedure and the Minister may repeal these temporary instruments at any time; 
• Local Planning Scheme Policies700 - Local Planning Scheme Policies support 
Planning Schemes at a local government level but are not regulatory in nature. In 
formulating these policies the WA provides opportunity for public consultation, but 
there are no provisions for ministerial consultation or approval; 
• State Planning Policies70 ' (SPPs) - SPPs may only be made by the Minister and only 
on matters of State interest affecting the economic or environmental interests of the 
State/region, or ensuring efficient, effective and accountable planning/development. 
The process of formulating SPPs is the same as for Planning Schemes. Reasoned 
responses must be issued for each submission. Local governments are issued a copy 
of the final policy to advise theft Planning Scheme development process. 
698 See WA Schedule 1 
699 See WA Schedule 2 
700 See WA Schedule 3 
70!  See IPA Schedule 4 
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5.1.2 Review of Planning Instruments 
Local governments are required to review theft planning instruments every eight years. 702 In 
addition to this periodic review, the Minister may order a review of planning instruments to 
protect or give effect to a State interest. Regional Planning Advisory Committees (RPACs) 
may also be established by the Minister to report on matters identified by the Minister in the 
terms of reference for the RPAC. RPACs provide a framework for coordinating planning 
activities within a region, but are limited in scope to those issues raised by the Minister. 
5.1.3 Integrated Development Assessment System 
The WA provides scope for cross-jurisdictional and cross-sectoral integration through the 
Integrated Development Assessment System (IDAS). The WAS is designed to integrate 
state and local government approval processes and its referral process ensures effective 
coordination across all relevant sector-based agencies. 703 
There are four stages to the WAS process 
Application Stage 
Information and Referral Stage (the assessment manager directs the applicant to 
supply the application to each applicable referral agency (if any) for their assessment 
of the application). Referral agencies must base their assessment on the agency's 
own laws and policies. They must also have regard to the relevant Planning 
Scheme; SPPs; and any relevant designation of land for Community Infrastructure. 
The types of referral agencies are: 
Concurrence agencies (power to impose conditions/refuse an 
application/request further information); or 
. Advice agencies (recommend conditions/refusal of application/provide other 
advice). 
Notification Stage (public submissions are sought. Referral agencies are not required 
to take into account public submissions in their assessments) 
Decision Stage (different rules apply for different types of development, but the 
relevant local government is the usual decision-maker). For: 
. Code-Assessable (The local govermnent/assessment manager's decision 
must be based on the application; applicable codes; any relevant SPPs, and 
sometimes, the Priority Infrastructure Plan. An application can only be 
refused if it does not comply with applicable codes and cannot be made 
compliant by imposing conditions); or 
702 IPA s2.2.1 
703 IPA s 3.1.1 
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• Impact-Assessable (The local government/assessment manager's decision 
must be based on the application; the Planning Scheme and other applicable 
planning instruments; applicable codes other than concurrence agency 
codes; relevant SPPs; existing approvals over the land/adjacent land; and 
matters prescribed under a regulation. An application can be refused or 
conditions applied if a concurrence agency requires such action or if the 
assessment manager so decides.) 
Ministerial IDAS powers: The Minister may give directions to an assessment manager prior 
to the assessment manager's decision if the development involves a State interest and the 
matter lies outside the jurisdiction of a concurrence agency. In these circumstances, the 
Minister may direct an assessment manager to refuse an application, impose conditions upon 
an application, approve an application in part only or make a preliminary approval. These 
directions are appealable. The Minister or Premier also has the power to call-in and decide 
or re-examine development applications involving State interests. If an application is called-
in, the assessment process continues from the point it was called-in and concurrence agencies 
take on an advisory role. There is no provision for appeal in this case. Ministerial call-in 
powers maybe exercised after an assessment manager's decision has been made and, as 
such, holds greater power than the direction of the Minister. 
5.1.4 Appeals processes 
	
5.1.4.1 	Planning and Environment Court 
The Planning and Environment Court (PEC) functions in a similar manner to a District 
Court, with the judge of the PEC having the same powers as a District Court judge in 
summoning, examining and prosecuting witnesses/persons brought before the PEC. 704 The 
rights of appeal to development decisions are available to those parties involved in the 
process and under certain circumstances this appeal will this delay the development process 
until a decision on the appeal is made. Alternative Dispute Resolution705 provisions apply to 
proceedings of the PEC in accordance with the District Courts Act 1967 (part 7) and the 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Chapter 9; part 4). 
5.1.4.2 	Building and Development Tribunals 
In the event that a development application is refused or the applicant feels some aspect of 
the approval warrants appeal, then the Chief Executive may establish a Building and 
70 IPAs4.1.4(3) 
705 IPA Ch4 Part lDiv. 11 s4.1.48 
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Development Tribunal to decide on the appeal. A Tribunal comprises of up to five general 
referees selected by the Minister for a $riod up to three years, or in the case of an appeal 
against the local government's decision about the amenity and aesthetics assessment of a 
building; then a Tribunal of just three aesthetic referees selected by the Chief Executive is 
required for the hearing of just one or more decisions on the amenity and aesthetics of a 
building.706 This type of Tribunal appeal is a merits review appeal. Further appeal would lie 
in judicial review for legal error by the Tribunal. 
5.1.5 How are integration and conflict dealt within this NRM model? 
The WA attempts to take into account the full range of values affecting land-use and 
development. The IPA defines ecological sustainability in a multi-faceted manner to ensure 
consideration of environmental, economic development and community factors in decision-
making. Decision-makers are thus obliged to exercise their powers in ways that advance or 
have regard to the purpose of the WA, which is: 
to seek to achieve ecological sustainability by - (a) coordinating and integrating 
planning at local, regional and State levels; and (b) managing the process by which 
development occurs; and (c) managing the effects of development on the 
environment (including managing the use of premises) . 707 
This ensures that Government has one voice and that cross-sectoral issues are considered. In 
this respect, the WA has a capacity for 'negative' integration, or Level 4 on the Policy 
Integration Scale, with each plan and arrangement in the process not inconsistent with 
relevant higher level codes and policies in place 
The WA allows the Minister to establish Regional Planning Advisory Committees to report 
on matters identified by the Minister in their terms of reference .70 ' The scope of these 
Committees is, however, limited to the issues dictated by the Minister and their jurisdiction 
limited to those local councils also identified by the Minister, hence limiting their capacity 
for proactive integrated planning and management. 
Cross-jurisdictional integration in the WA operates at the planning level. All Planning 
Schemes must deal with the 'core matters' of land-use and development, infrastructure and 
valuable features. They must coordinate and integrate these matters including any State and 
regional dimensions. Currently some, and in future all, local governments will have to 
706 11'A Ch  Part 2 Div 1s4.2.l (2)&(4) 
707 IPA  1.2.1 
IPA s 2.5.2(3). 
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include a Priority Infrastructure Plan (PIP) in their Planning Schemes to show planned, 
coordinated infrastructure development for future years. Draft Planning Schemes are 
circulated among State departments to ensure a whole of government approach. 
Cross-sectoral integration at the uses and user level is limited to the ability of users to make 
their concerns known through the public submission process in the formulation of planning 
instruments and during the notification phase during the assessment of impact-assessable 
development. The scope of this as a means to implement cross-sectoral integration is 
questionable as there is no obligation for the decision-makers to act on these submissions or 
to achieve any particular outcome in relation to multiple-use unless this is specified in one of 
the planning instruments. However, given that the higher-level decision-makers are elected 
ministers, it is in their political interest to address concerns raised in the public submission 
phase. 
Conflict is primarily dealt with through the appeals process defined in the WA. Appeals are, 
however, limited to those involved in the process with external appeals or concerns reserved 
for the public consultation period. Although there are extensive consultation periods allowed 
for, whereby concerns of external parties may be raised, there are no requirements for these 
to be addressed or resolved in the final development plan, hence the capacity to effectively 
deal with some of the potential conflicts with external parties is limited. 
5.2 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
The Great Barrier ReefMarine Park Act 1975 was the first of its kind to incorporate cross-
jurisdictional issues in conservation and multiple-use marine management. Under the 
auspices of this Act, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP) is managed for 
conservation and sustainable- or reasonable-use as a whole through spatial zoning of uses.709 
In the GBRMP area, multiple-use management in the broadest sense means the spatially 
defined zoning of uses, rather than the integrated management of uses within specified 
zones. There are provisions, however, for integrated multiple-use management through 
concepts such as site and area management plans, although these must be consistent with the 
zoning plans. There are also provisions for overall management decisions to be made 
applicable to the entire GBRMP. These provisions should be reflected in the zoning plans 
except for the cases of approved research. An example of this was the creation of a 
regulation banning spearfishing using SCUBA anywhere in the Great Barrier Reef Region, 
'O' Day, J.C. (2002). "Zoning-lessons from the Great Ranier Reef Marine Park." Ocean & Coastal 
Management 45: 139-156. 
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except for purposes of research approved by the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
(GBRMPA).71° 
5.2.1 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 
The Great Barrier ReefMarine Park Act 1975 (GBRMP Act) establishes the boundaries of 
the Great Barrier Reef Region in accordance with the provisions of the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act 1973. Under the auspices of the GBRMP Act, Queensland retains responsibility 
for regions landward of the low-water mark and almost all islands in the GBR region at the 
time of Federation. The Commonwealth retains responsibility for all waters below low-
water mark and for all islands assigned to the Commonwealth at Federation or subsequently. 
The retention of this arrangement for the Great Barrier Reef was a condition in negotiations 
leading to the OCS arrangements. 
As well as establishing the boundaries of the marine park, the GBRMP Act establishes: 
. the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) and describes its 
functions; 
• the Great Barrier Reef Consultative Committee (GBRCC); 
• the object for preparation of zoning plans (s 32(7)); 
• a moratorium on mineral extrapolation, except for approved research purposes; and 
• power to make regulations addressing pollution outside the Marine Park (s 66(2)(e)). 
5.2.].] 	Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
Under the auspices of the Act, a Commonwealth statutory authority, the GBRMP Authority 
(GBRMPA), was established with responsibility for multiple-use management of all waters 
in the GBR marine environment, ihcluding the Commonwealth waters and the waters 
surrounding the State's islands. 71 1  The goal of the GBRMPA is: 
To provide for the protection, wise use, understanding and enjoyment of the Great 
Bather Reef in perpetuity through the care and development of the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park .712 
The GBRPMA comprises one Commonwealth chair (chief executive), a member appointed 
to represent the interests of the indigenous communities adjacent to the Marine Park, and two 
part-time representatives nominated by each of the Queensland and Commonwealth 
710 Day (2002); and 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Regulations 1983 (as amended), s.38. 
71 ' GBRMPA. (2002). http://www.gbrmpa.gov.aul 
712 Ibid. 
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Governments respectively.713  The functions of the GBRMPA include making 
recommendations to the Minister and carrying out activities in the following areas: 
• the development and care of the marine park; 
• carrying out and arranging research, monitoring and data interpretation; 
• environmental impact assessments and permitting of use; 
• providing and arranging for the provision of educational, advisory and informational 
services; 
• preparing and implementing zoning plans; 
• preparing and implementing plans of management; and 
advising on and facilitating financial arrangements with Queensland for the 
administration of the marine park?" 
In 1998, GBRMPA was restructured to form 4 critical issues groups (fisheries; tourism and 
recreation; water quality and coastal development; and conservation, biodiversity and world 
heritage) and 4 support groups (program delivery; corporate services; legal services; and 
information support) with two staff situated in Environment Australia. 715 
5.2.1.2 	Great Barrier Reef Consultative Committee 
The Great Barrier Reef Consultative Committee (GBRCC) is an independent advisory body 
established to encourage interaction between users and user groups. The Commonwealth 
Minister for Environment and Heritage appoints the GBRCC members for a three-year 
period .716  Membership consists of a GBRMPA-appointed member as the chair and no less 
than 12 other members, of which the Queensland Government may nominate one-third .717  In 
practice the Commonwealth closely consults with Queensland in selecting members so that 
effectively at least half the members are Queensland nominees. The GBRCC provides 
advice to the Minister, either as asked by the Minister or of its own accord, on the operation 
of the GBRMP Act. It is also charged with providing advice to the GBRMPA upon request 
on issues relating to marine parks. The GBRCC meets up to three times a year and may 
appoint working groups as required. 
713 Kenchington, R.A. (1990). "Managing Marine Environments." New York: Taylor & Francis; and 
Kriwoken, L.K. (1991). "Great Barrier Reef Marine Park - Intergovernmental relations." Marine 
Policy. September 1991: 349-362. 
714 Great Barrier ReefMarine Park Act 1975 (as amended), s.7; 
Kenchington (1990); and 
Kriwoken (1991). 
715 GBRMPA. (2000). "Annual Report 1999-2000." Townsville: GBRMPA. 
716 Kriwoken (1991). 
717 GBRMPA (2002). 
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5.2.1.3 	Zoning plans 
The primary method of regulating incompatible uses in the GBR is spatial separation by 
zoning. The uses of the GBR region are divided into one of three categories: 
fishing/collecting; recreation/tourism; and conservation/science. In determining zoning 
plans, the GBRMPA must regard the conservation value of the GBR, provide for the 
reasonable use and protection of the region, minimise the impacts of exploitation, reserve 
areas for aesthetic purposes, reserve areas in theft natural state and determine the extent and 
sequence of buffer zones. 718  The recovery of minerals is strictly forbidden, except for 
scientific research purposes. The development of zoning plans takes around two years from 
initial preparation to approval by Parliament. There are seven stages to the development of a 
zoning plan: 
information gathering on the nature and uses of the proposed area; 
public participation period whereby comments from the general public are sought on 
the information gathered in stage one (30 days); 
preparation of a draft plan, incorporating minimal regulations consistent with 
management arrangements and plans already in place; 
public participation period whereby comments from the general public are sought on 
the draft plan (30 days); 
consideration of public comment and plan finalisation; 
adoption of the revised plan; and 
submission of the plan by GBRMPA to the Minister for the Environment and 
Heritage for approval. If no move for disallowance is made within 15 Parliamentary 
sitting days, the plan is brought into force and the Minister announces the date the 
plan will come into effect. 719 	 - 
The intended inflexibility of the statutory zoning plans makes them more robust, to short-
term political manipulation yet impractical for rapid response to environmental 
emergencies . 720  Due to the debilitating nature of this inflexibility, a permitting system was 
established to deal with issues that cannot be anticipated in the zoning process, such as 
initiation of tourist operations, development of facilities such as tourist pontoons or resorts, 
aquaculture proposals and marinas. Area statements guide the issuance of permits by 
establishing the desired usage and management priorities for individual reefs in the context 
of the zoning plans. Reef use plans are site-specific, problem-oriented plans designed to deal 
with urgent changes required within the zoning plan system. It was an early policy notion 
that the GBRMPA should review zoning plans every five years, however, this has yet to 
718 Kenchington (1990). 
OBRMPA (2002). 
720 Kenchington (1990). 
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occur due to the lack of sufficient resources and the relatively short time interval between 
establishing the zone and proposed review. 
Previous zoning plans were developed for the four sections of the GBRMP - the Far 
Northern, Cairns, Central and Mackay/Capricorn Sections - and resulted in less than 4.5% of 
the GBRMP being declared in Green Zones (or 'no-take ).121  In the late 1990s with 
advances in the scientific knowledge base and recognition of the importance of biodiversity, 
this zoning system was found to be inadequate in protecting the range of biodiversity in the 
Region. Therefore, the Representative Areas Program (RAP) commenced in 1998 to 
identify the major habitats and develop a new Zoning Plan based on the protection of a 
'representative' sample of each habitat type (70 bioregions - including 30 reef and 40 non-
reef bioregions) in a network of 'no-take' areas (33.3% of the GBRMP). 722 Coincidentally, 
also in 1998, the Gumoo Woojabuddee Section and 28 new coastal areas were incorporated 
into the GBRMP and thus required the timely development of an appropriate Zoning Plan. 723 
Figure 4 	Map illustrating the amalgamated GI3R area as included in the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Zoning Plan 2003. 
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Source: 	GBRMPA. (2004). "Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Zoning Plan 2003." 
Queensland: GBRMPA: 3. 
GBRMPA. (2003). "The Great Barrier Reef Representative Areas Program - The Planning Process 
in Detail." http:f/www.gbrmpa.gov.au [Access date: 28 April 20041. 
722 Day, .1., Fernandes, L., Lewis, A., De'ath, G., Slegers, S., Barnett, B., Kerrigan, B., Breen, D., 
Innes, J., Oliver, J., Ward, T. and Lowe, D. (2000). "The Representative Areas Program for 
protecting biodiversity, in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area." Proceedings of the Ninth 
International Coral Reef Symposium. Bali, Indonesia; and 
GBRMPA (2003) "The Great Barrier Reef Representative Areas Program..." 
723 GBRMPA (2003) "The Great Barrier Reef Representative Areas Program..." 
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A Draft Zoning Plan for the amalgamated GBR Section (consisting of the original four 
sections and the new areas incorporated in 1998) was released in June 2003.724  The final 
Zoning Plan, taking into account public submissions, was tabled in Parliament by the 
Minister for Environment and Heritage on 3 December 2003 and came into effect on 1 July 
2004 . 725 
Figure 5 	Final Zoning Plan for the amalgamated GBR under the RAP in accordance 
with the conservation zones and associated allowable activities (identified in the 
table to the left). 
Source: 	GBRMPA. (2003). The Great Barrier Reef Representative Areas Program - The 
Planning Process in Detail." http:I/www.gbrmpa.gov.au  [Access date: 28 April 2004]. 
5.2.2 Emerald Agreement 1979 
The Emerald Agreement came about in the context of negotiations of the OCS and 
Commonwealth insistence on retaining the boundaries established by the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act 1973. It heralded the beginning of formal relations between the 
Commonwealth and Queensland Governments in an agreement on offshore jurisdictional 
issues in the GBR marine area. It was the first time support was shown for a cross-
jurisdictional ministerial council to guide policy decisions. 
The Emerald Agreement established: 
. that the GBRMP Act was to be implemented without amendment; 
. that Queensland was to produce complementary legislation; 
. the role of the GBR Ministerial Council in coordinating policy; 
724 GBRMPA (2003) "The Great Barrier Reef Representative Areas Program..." 
725 GBRMPA (2003) "The Great Barrier Reef Representative Areas Program..."; and 
Kemp, D. (2004). "Historic Protection for the Great Barrier Reef." Media Release for the Minister 
for the Environment and Heritage. 25 March 2004. 
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that Queensland had thy-to-day management responsibilities of the Capricornia 
Section (through an agreement known as the Basis of Agreement); and 
. that the Ministerial Council has responsibility for endorsing and monitoring 
scientific research in the region .726 
Despite the provisions of the Emerald Agreement, it took Queensland seven years before it 
implemented any complementary legislation. Contrary to the provisions of the Emerald 
Agreement, however, Queenslahd's legislation was not entirely complementary. Rather, the 
Queensland Government did not discount the possibility of oil drilling in the reef area under 
Queensland jurisdiction, despite being aware that the Commonwealth would never allow this 
activity to happen. Queensland's Marine Parks Act 1982 contained provisions for 
implementing complementary zoning plans to reflect adjacent Commonwealth areas but its 
implementation placed little emphasis on conservation. This was arguably due to the fact 
that the Premier of Queensland was a member of the Great Barrier Reef Ministerial Council, 
which had the effect of placing strategic powers in the Premier's Department rather than the 
Queensland National Parks and Wildlife Services (NPWS) and reflected the pro-
development attitude of the Queensland Government at the time .727 
On 10 May 1988, the Main Agreement was signed to replace the Emerald Agreement. 728 
The Main Agreement was an extension of the Basis of Agreement, covering the entire 
marine park rather than just the Capricornia section, which formalised the intentions of both 
Governments. The Main Agreement, although not legally enforceable, also clarified the 
financial arrangements between Governments and the GBRMPA's responsibility for 
establishing policies relevant to the GBRMP.729 As a result of the Main Agreement, marine, 
parks officers of the Queensland NPWS of the Queensland Department of Environment and 
Heritage, have primary responsibility for the day-to-day management of the GBRMP. Fifty 
per cent of funding for day-to-day management comes from the Commonwealth Government 
and the remaining fifty per cent comes from the Queensland Government. This funding is 
administered via a trust. 
5.2.2.1 	Great Barrier ReefMinisterial Council 
The Great Barrier Reef Ministerial Council (GBRMC) meets annually with the goal of 
seeking complementary management regimes for Queensland and the Commonwealth at the 
ministerial level. It consists of four Ministers —two Queensland and two Commonwealth 
726 Pitts, D. (1997). "Best Practice Mechanisms for Marine Use Planning. Australia's Oceans Policy." 
Hobart: National Oceans Office. Issues Paper 3. 
727 Kriwoken (1991). 
728 Pitts (1997). 
729 Ibid. 
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Ministers. There is no reference in the Act to the Council, its objects, purpose and 
operations. It is essentially a high level administrative and political forum with a major 
function of achieving intergovernmental agreement on the program and budget of 
management of the GBRMP. The GBRMC has no legal recourse to ensure relevant 
jurisdictional issues are brought to the meetings, however, there is no inhibition if Ministers 
agree to place an item on the agenda of a meeting. The core function of the GBRMC is 
oversight of policy and budgetary arrangements for the day-to-day management the 
GBRMP. The Commonwealth has ultimate power, and when the State is not represented at 
the whole of government level, a logical tendency is for unilateral Commonwealth decision-
making in the GBRMP area, highlighting the potential to undermine intergovernmental 
relations. 
5.2.3 How are integration and conflict dealt within this NRM model? 
The GBRMP management is difficult to assess for its overall capacity for integration. While 
it incorporates a sophisticated capacity for cross-jurisdictional integration (Level 7 on the 
Policy Integration Scale - see Section 1.2.1), in the sense that the inter-governmental 
GBRMPA controls parameter setting through spatial zoning of uses, sectoral uses continue 
to be managed independently with interaction generally managed through the GBRMPA 
(Level I on the Policy Integration Scale). For some sectoral interactions, however, two-way 
information exchange processes are incorporated through MoUs or other informal 
agreements to overcome apparent and potential conflicts, indicating a more advanced 
capacity for integration at the operational level. Overall, the GBRMP is managed in terms of 
being not inconsistent rather than proactively integrated, a pattern reflected in other 
Australian NRM models. Specific aspects of the GBRMP model, however, do work 
particularly well in addressing cross-jurisdictional and cross-sectoral integration and conflict 
management, some of which are discussed below. 
The GBRMPA and GBRMC offer opportunity for cross-jurisdictional coordination between 
Queensland and the Commonwealth through joint management of the GBRMP area. 
Through management capacity, trust, shared objectives and mutual confidence, cross-
jurisdictional issues may be addressed within these forums. The GBRMC works well when 
both Governments use it to its full potential, but fails when either one sees it as opportunity 
to play political power games over jurisdictional responsibilities. Cross-jurisdictional 
integration can occur for issues brought to the GBRMC table, but there is no mechanism 
other than decisions of the Chair or of the Council itself for actually bringing issues to the 
Council. 
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This coordination is weakly reflected by the eventual implementation of complementary 
Queensland legislation to the GBRMP Act, however, it is unlikely that further legislative 
provisions would effect cross-jurisdictional integration. Despite these mechanisms for cross-
jurisdictional coordination, there are no legal mechanisms, other than the power to make 
regulations under S 66 (2) (e) of the GBRMP Act, for integration with terrestrial or adjacent 
area management .730  The Great Barrier Reef Consultative Committee and the range of 
regional and subject specialist advisory Committees operated by GBRMPA provide 
consultation channels, which can be very effective in achieving solutions, across the 
ecologically imaginary lines that form jurisdictional boundaries. 
The GBRMPA manages the GBRMP as a whole and as such must coordinate cross-sectoral 
interests through the development of zoning plans. The GBRMPA essentially acts as a 
coordinating body ensuring guidelines of individual sectors do not compromise the integrity 
of the GBRMP in achieving its objectives under the GBRMP Act. Jntra-sectoral integration 
generally remains outside the scope of the GBRMPA, with a few exceptions whereby MoUs 
between individual sectors/sub-sectors and the (IBRMPA can be developed. The zoning 
plans themselves, howevet, are not mechanisms for cross-sectoral integration as they involve 
a separation of uses according to their perceived impact rather than an integrated 
management approach. In this respect, zoning plans act as conflict management tools that 
also harmonise human activity with conservation requirements. 
The GBRCC also offers opportunity for cross-sectoral integration through the endorsement 
and involvement of various interests, albeit government-selected and advisory in nature. 
Community involvement is encouraged through the establishment of Marine Resource 
Advisory Committees and public education outreach programs run by GBRMPA. Public 
participation also features as a significant component in the development of zoning plans 
and, through the RAP, has resulted in the most submissions received yet by the GBRMPA 
through any public consultation process to date. 
5.3 Murray-Darling Basin Agreement 
The Murray-Darling Basin Initiative (the Initiative) represents a coordinated, cross-
jurisdictional partnership across six governments, in cooperation with the Basin community, 
which has been established to give effect to the 1992 Murray Darling Basin Agreement (the 
Agreement)."' 
730 Kenchington, R. and Crawford, D. (1993). "On the meaning of integration in coastal zone 
management." Ocean & Coastal Management, 21: 109-127. 
73' Commonwealth of Australia. (1992). "Murray-Darling Basin Agreement 1992." Canberra. 
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The purpose of the Agreement is: 
to promote and coordinate effective planning and management for the equitable, 
efficient and sustainable use of water, land and other environmental resources of the 
Murray Darling Basin. 732 
Figure 6 	Map illustrating the interdependence of states based on the complex and far 
reaching River Murray system. 
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Source: 	Murray-Darling Basin Commission. (2004). "The River Murray System." 
http://www. mdbc.gov.au/river — murray/river—murray_system/river—Mm-ray_system. 
him [Access date: 7 July 20041. 
The Agreement was signed by the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia in 1992 and was adopted with the passing of the Murray-Darling Basin Act 1993 in 
each jurisdiction .733  Queensland joined in 1996 upon signing the Agreement, and the 
Australian Capital Territory became a member through a MoU in 1998. The Agreement 
focuses on water entitlements for South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland 
and the ACT. It also covers the procedures to be followed for natural resource management, 
water distribution, asset management and financial disbursements relating to the natural 
resource of the Basin. 
732 Murray-Darling Basin Commission. (2001). "Annual Report 2000-01." Canberra: MDBC: 6. 
733 Commonwealth of Australia. (1993). "Murray-Darling Basin Act 1993" (as amended); and 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission. (2001). "The Murray-Darling Basin Initiative 2001." 
Canberra: MDBC; see also 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission website. http://www.mdbc.gov.au. 
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The Act establishes new institutions for natural resource management in the Murray-Darling 
Basin at the political, bureaucratic and community levels and describes theft objectives, 
functions and composition. Governance of the Initiative is through: 
. the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council (MDBMC or the Council) - the 
political decision-making forum; 
• the Murray-Darling Basin Commission (MDBC or the Commission) and its Office - 
the executive arm which advises the Council and implements its decisions; and 
• the Community Advisory Committee (CAC) - which advises the Council and 
facilitates communication between the community and the Council/Commission. 734 
£3.1 Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council 
The Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council (the Council) is responsible for providing the 
policy and direction needed to implement the Initiative. 735 Its main functions are to consider 
and determine major policy issues concerning the use of the Basin's land, water and other 
environmental resources, and to develop and authorise measures to achieve the purpose of 
the Agreement (see Box I). 
The Council meets at least twice per year and comprises the Ministers holding land, water 
and environmental portfolios within the Governments of New South Wales, Victoria, South 
Australia, Queensland and the Commonwealth. Up to three Ministers from each 
Government may sit on the Council. One ACT Government Minister also participates on a 
non-voting basis, allowing the ACT to take part in planning and management of the Basin 
environmental resources, but not the management of the waters of the River Murray system. 
Many of these Ministers also sit on other related Ministerial Councils such as the Natural 
Resources Management Ministerial Council. Further, the work of the Council complements 
the water reform policy agenda of COAG. In addition, Council representation is broader 
than natural resources management with many Ministers responsible for portfolios such as 
agriculture, fisheries, forestry and in some cases, oceans policy and urban as well as rural 
water resources issues. There is, therefore, the potential for a much more integrated 
approach to sustainability through the Initiative. 
114 Commonwealth of Australia (1992) "Murray-Darling Basin Agreement 1992"; and 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission (2001) "Annual Report 2000-01" 
735 Ibid. 
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Box 1 	Role of the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council 
The Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council determines policies and authorises planning 
and management of natural resources for the benefit of the Basin. Council also manages 
the River Murray flow, water regulating structures, water allocation and accounting. The 
Commonwealth, State and Territory governments covering the Basin through the Council, 
work together in a unique partnership with the community to respond to issues requiring: 
• joint government action; or 
• action by an individual State or Territory but which could have implications across 
the Basin. 
This relationship is based on: 
maintaining sufficient trust to share the natural wealth equitably; 
exercising core responsibilities for water resource sharing, water quality protection 
and river operations with efficiency; and 
adding value to the pursuit of sustainable resource use, by the agreement of 
governments, under principles of integrated catchment management. 
Source: 	Murray Darling-Basin Commission. (unpublished). "Role of the Murray-Darling 
Basin Ministerial Council." Internal MDBC document being finalised for 
publication, 2003: 1. 
5.3.2 Murray-Darling Basin Commission 
The Murray-Darling Basin Commission (the Commission) is responsible for managing the 
River Murray and the Menindee Lakes System of the lower Darling River, advising the 
Council on matters relating to the Initiative and developing and implementing policies and 
measures for the equitable, sustainable use of the Basin's natural resources. 736 It is an 
autonomous organisation equally responsible to all participating Governments and to the 
Council itself. 
The Commission comprises an independent president selected by the Council after receiving 
advice from the Commissioners. The Governor-General (in the case of the Commonwealth 
representatives) and the Governor (of each of the respective states) select two 
Commissioners and two Deputy-Commissioners from each of the participating Governments 
for a five-year appointment period. The Council then selects one of these Commissioners to 
be the Deputy President. The ACT has one non-voting representative and the chair of the 
Community Advisory Committee attends meetings. The Commission is also advised by 
high-level project boards and committees and is supported by the Office of the Commission. 
736 Murray-Darling Basin Commission (2001) "Annual Report 2000-01" 
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5.3.3 Community Advisory Committee 
The Community Advisory Committee (CAC) represents the wider Basin community and 
provides the medium for two-way communication between the community and the 
Council/Commission.737 Its role is to advise the Council and Commission on natural 
resource management issues referred to them by the Council or Commission and to present 
views of the Basin's community on these issues. The CAC comprises an independent chair 
and 28 members including: one representative from each of five special-interest 
organisations (the National Farmers Federation, the Australian Conservation Foundation, the 
Australian Local Government Organisation, the Australian Landcare Council, and the 
Indigenous Land Corporation); and 23 regional representatives (9 NSW, 5 Vie, 4 SA, 4 Qld, 
1 ACT) .138  The Council sets nomination guidelines and requirements of the Committee. 
The chair attends the Council and the Commission meetings. 
5.3.4 How are integration and conflict dealt within this NRM model? 
The very machinery of the Initiative and the complexity of the issues in the Basin foster an 
inter-governmental and inter-agency approach. The pursuit of sustainable resource use and 
management requires a holistic and cross-sectoral approach to management. In addition, the 
central decision-making body comprising all primary impacted governments to establish 
joint agreement on water use and management, gives this model a high capacity for overall 
integration, nearing a Level 8 on the Policy Integration Scale (see Section 1.2.1). Some 
specific aspects of this model, which are detailed below, address integration issues 
particularly well and others show potential to undermine its overall function. 
The Agreement is primarily a cross-jurisdictional Agreement with legislative backing by 
each of the contracting Governments. While the Council and the Commission are the 
primary decision-making bodies for the Basin-wide policies and approaches, day-to-day 
management of the Basin's resources remains the responsibility of various jurisdictions 
within each of the contracting Governments. In addition, each State has its own policies and 
approaches to natural resources management, which could undermine the Basin-wide intent 
of the Commission and Council, although this would defeat the purpose of establishing 
cooperative arrangements in the first place. 
The Council and Commission offer opportunity for vertical cross-jurisdictional integration, 
through representation of different levels of government (that is, federal and state). They 
also offer opportunity for horizontal cross-jurisdictional integration, through representation 
"' Murray-Darling Basin Commission (2001) "Annual Report 2000-01" 
738 Ibid. 
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of different jurisdictions on boards and committees (that is, Commonwealth, NSW, SA and 
Vie). Local level government has the opportunity to enter into negotiations through 
representation on the CAC. 
A government-community approach is actively supported through the Initiative's programs 
and is the basis for the sharing of concerns and effort, joint development of more integrated 
policies and programs, and coordinated planning and management. The CAC plays an 
importarit role in fostering cross-sectoral integration, consultation and planning. Its powers 
are, however, limited by only having chair representation at the decision-making forums and 
by only having government-appointed members, which could lead to bias and mistrust if 
driven by short-term political considerations. 
5.4 Tasmanian Regional Forests Agreement 
£4.1 National Forests Policy Statement 1992 
The National Forests Policy Statement 1992 (NFPS) was a response to conflicting forest 
management objectives involving the environmental value of forests that was fought for by 
the Commonwealth versus the growing forest industry fought for by state governments. 739  It 
defines eleven broad national goals for forest management, including a commitment to 
conservation, wood production, plantation development and international obligations. 740 
Regional Forest Agreements (RFAs) are the implementing instruments of the NFPS and are 
negotiated following a process set out in the NFPS: 
• Scoping Agreement - identifies government and regional obligations, interests in and 
uses of the forest resources; 
Comprehensive Regional Assessments - full audit of the uses of the forest resources 
(environment and heritage assessment & social and economic assessment) - 
designed to develop a Comprehensive, Adequate and Representative (CAR) reserve 
system, formulate Ecologically Sustainable Forest Management (ESFM) practices 
and set logging levels; 
• Forest Resource Use Options - impact assessments carried out on each forest 
resource use option allowing the most appropriate management option to be 
selected; and 
RFA negotiation - includes duration, implementation mechanisms and options for 
review .141 
Slee, B. (2001). "Resolving production-environment conflicts: the case of the Regional Forest 
Agreement Process in Australia." Forest Policy and Economics, 3: 17-30. 
740 Commonwealth of Australia. (1992). "National Forest Policy Statement - A New Focus for 
Australia's Forests." 
74' Ibid. 
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5.4.2 Regional Forests Agreements 
RFAs are 20-year inter-governmental agreements, which are made between federal and state 
authorities to govern forest use and conservation in designated forest areas. A RFA defines 
the tasks of forest management, establishes guidelines for sustainable use in accordance with 
the NFPS and assigns future forest management responsibilities to the relevant authorities. 
The process of making RFAs is subject to assessment under the Environment Protection 
(Impact Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth), which has been subsumed within the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversisy Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act). Under the EPBC 
Act, forestry operations in a region covered by a negotiated RFA do not require 
environmental approval .742 
£4.3 CAR reserve system 
In accordance with the NFPS, a CAR reserve system is established as part of a RFA. This 
system is based on a set of national criteria and indicators for the conservation of 
biodiversity, old-growth and wilderness forest areas. These criteria were established by the 
Joint ANZECC/MCFFA National Forest Policy Statement Implementation Sub-Committee 
(JAN15), hence are referred to as the JAN15 criteria. The JAN15 criteria are: 
• 15% of the pre-1750 distribution of each forest ecosystem should be protected; 
• 60% of vulnerable or old-growth forest ecosystems, should be protected; 
• all rare or endangered forest ecosystems should be protected; 
• dedicated reserves need to be replicated as insurance against natural disaster; 
• 90% or more high quality wilderness should be protected in reserves; 
• protection of Indigenous and European heritage value is essential; 
• industry access security outside reserves is important; and 
• overall RFAs aim to develop sustainable management of the whole forest area, 
inside and outside reserves.743 
5.4.4 The Tasmanian RFA 
The Tasmanian RFA (TRFA) is an inter-governmental agreement signed by both the State of 
Tasmania and the Commonwealth in 1997. To this end the State and the Commonwealth 
have agreed to establish a framework for the management and use of Tasmanian forests, 
which seeks to implement effective conservation, forest management and forest industry 
practices. 
742 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), s.39. 	- 
143 Commonwealth of Australia. (1997). "Nationally Agreed Criteria for the Establishment of a 
Comprehensive, Adequate and Representative Reserve System for Forests in Australia." A report 
by the Joint ANZECC/MCFFA NFPS Implementation Sub-committee. 
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Tasmania, like other states and territories entering into RFAs, has implemented legislation 
that allocates forestland tenures and specifies the administrative framework and policies 
within which public and private forests are managed. The Tasmanian Regional Forests 
Agreement (Land Classification) Act was passed in 1998 to classify land pursuant to the 
TRFA, which amends the Forest Act 1920, the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1970 and the 
Crown Lands Act 1976. The Forest Practices Act 1985 (Tasmania) and Forest Practices 
Code, the use of environmental management systems, and the State-wide NRM framework 
are the primary tools for ESFM. 
The TRFA established guiding principles and management practices for Tasmania's private 
and public forests. The TRFA is based on the vision, goals and objectives of the NFPS and: 
establishes a CAR Reserve System (meeting the JANIS criteria) on private land 
(through the RFA Private Forest Reserve Program) and public land - providing the 
bridge to ESFM; 
develops and implements ESFM and use, encompassing integrated NRM, a policy 
on maintaining a Permanent Forest Estate and management based on sustainable 
yields - providing the bridge to industry development; and 
. facilitates the development of an internationally competitive native and plantation 
wood production and wood products industry, comprising social and economic 
development at a regional level .741  
Forestry Tasmania (industry-based) manages approximately 40% of Tasmanian forests; the 
State Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment (DPIWE) manages 
approximately 30% as conservation reserves; and the remaining 30% of Tasmanian forests is 
either not managed, kept for conservation or private forests, which is managed for grazing or 
water. 745  While the TRFA establishes the guiding principles for forest management, each of 
these departments or organisations manage their area of forest in accordance with different 
objectives. Effectively these organisations act as different intra-sectoral forest interests. 
Forestry Tasmania has achieved ISO 14001 certification of its environmental management 
system. 746  In doing so, its objectives are geared towards wealth generation, developing a 
competitive industry, but also includes public services such as nature conservation and 
744 Commonwealth of Australia & The State of Tasmania. (1997). "Tasmanian Regional Forest 
Agreement"; and 	 - 
Resource Planning and Development Commission. (2002). "Inquiry on the Progress with 
Implementation of the Tasmanian Regional Forest Agreement (1997)." Hobart: Artemis Publishing 
Consultants. December 2002. 
Or, S. and Gerrand, A.M. (1998). "Management Decision Classification: A System for zoning 
land managed by Forestry Tasmania." Tasforests, 10: 1-14. 
746 Resource Planning and Development Commission (2002) "Inquiry on the Progress..." 
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recreation. 747  The management objectives for the DPIWE in public reserve management, on 
the other hand, are predominantly based on the non-consumptive conservation value of the 
resources. 748 
The Private Forest Reserve Program is a DPIWE program established with a $30 million 
commitment from the Commonwealth Government to establish the private forest reserve 
system in Tasmania in accordance with the CAR reserve commitment under the TRFA.' 49 
Landowner participants are offered a number of incentives, including financial incentives, 
should their land be proven suitable for management under the Program. Lump-sum, up-
front payments and regular management payments are available if a covenant is placed on 
the Land Title and the forest managed in accordance with a Management Agreement .750 
Regular management payments, but no up-front payment is available if the landowner will 
not place a covenant on the land title, but will manage the forest in accordance with a 
Management Agreement .75 ' And if the landowner is not interested in either option, in the 
case of forests of the.highest conservation value, there is the possibility of purchasing the 
land. 
Private Forests Tasmania is a Tasmanian Government authority established under the Private 
Forests Act 1994 to promote the development of private forestry in Tasmania. Its objectives 
are to assist and educate landowners and investors on the appropriate management of forests 
on private land, including advising on plantation developments, farm forestry, sustainable 
forest practices and promoting forestry research .752 
In striving to meet their individual objectives these organisations and programs have 
collectively contributed to the (arguably) successful implementation of the TEFA. To this 
end the Resource Planning and Development Commission (the Commission) produced a 
Final Recommendations Report on the Inquiry on the Progress with Implementation of the 
Tasmanian Regional Forest Agreement (1997) in December 2002 . 753 The purpose of the 
review was not a renegotiation of the TRFA, but rather an opportunity for stakeholders and 
the general public to comment on management arrangements. The findings of this Report 
indicated that 78 of the 90 specified commitments or milestones of the TRFA identified in 
147 On and Gerrand (1998). 
141 Parks & Wildlife Services Tasmania. (2004). 
http://www.parks.tas.gov.au/manage/parksres/reserves.html  [Access date: 10 June 2004]. 
149 Private Forest Reserves Program. 'Private Forest Reserves Program - A Voluntary Program to 
Protect Native Forests on Private Land in Tasmania." Brochure. Hobart: PFRP. 
http://www.pfrp.tas.gov.auldownloads/brochure.pdf [Access date: 10 May 2004]. 
750 Ibid. ' Ibid. 
752 Private Forests Tasmania. (2003). http://www.privateforests.tas.gov.au/ [Access date: 1 July 2004]. " Resource Planning and Development Commission (2002) "Inquiry on the Progress..." 
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the Commission's Terms of Reference have been completed or substantial progress has been 
made. Another eight showed some progress and four had no progress, with three of those 
four being with the knowledge and consent of the signatory Parties. 754  It was noted that 
much of the criticism of the TRFA stemmed not from the implementation of the Agreement, 
but rather with the specifies of the Agreement itself and as such lay outside the Terms of 
Reference of the Commission's inquiry. Despite the favourable review of the 
implementation of the TRFA, the Commission provided an extensive list of 
recommendations to fine tune some of the processes and address the concerns and criticisms 
of the public. 
5.4.5 How are integration and conflict dealt within this NRM model? 
Despite an overall framework for the integration of forest practices, operational management 
remains the responsibility of individual sectors, which must operate not inconsistently with 
the overarching TRFA. Therefore, this model illustrates a capacity for Level 4 'negative' 
integration on the Policy Integration Scale (see Section 1.2.1), but has been compromised by 
some of the detailed political and participative processes as describe below. 
Although the State is responsible for management of a majority of forests in Tasmania, the 
Commonwealth is bound to consistency with the State in its approach to forest management 
on Commonwealth land in Tasmania. This includes several RFA reserves as well as forests 
used for logging. In this sense, cross-jurisdictional coordination is achieved through 
Commonwealth action. 
The RFA process requires that the full range of uses, users and values be taken into account 
in the planning and decision-making encapsulated in the final agreement. The TRFA failed 
in achieving true cross-sectoral consultation as only a few stakeholders were involved in the 
actual decision-making process and ultimately the decisions were made by politically 
influenced high-level bureaucrats, that often overlooked the values of large stakeholder 
groups in order to retain political support. 
Cross-sectoral integration is alluded to in the TRFA in terms of a holistic approach to 
management that incorporates conservation, forest management and forest industry practices. 
However, the actual management and cross-sectoral arrangements are left for the specific 
management agencies to negotiate, with minimal public reporting and public consultation 
required .755  There are few mechanisms stipulated in the objectives of the individual 
management bodies - Forestry Tasmania, DPIWE or Private Forests Tasmania - to engage 
114 Resource Planning and Development Commission (2002) "Inquiry on the Progress..." 
See: TRFA. (1997). "Attachment 11: Public Reporting and Consultative Mechanisms." 
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in cross-sectoral management, but each organisation has to follow the guiding principles of 
the TRFA in managing its allocated forest resources 
5.5 Spencer Gulf Marine Plan 
5.5.1 Marine planning in South Australia . 
Marine planning in South Austialia is a key initiative of the South Australian Government's 
Our Seas and Coasts: A Marine and Estuarine Strategy (the Strategy), which was released in 
1998.756 This initiative comes under one of five commitments made in the Strategy - the 
'sustainable use' commitment for an ecosystem-based management approach for the marine 
environment. 757  Marine planning originally aimed to resolve conflicts between stakeholders 
and users of the marine environment by zoning for the range of stakeholders. It soon became 
apparent, however, that the conflicts between commercial and recreational users were 
unresolvable and that excluding the general public using lines on maps was not practical .758 
Therefore, the new aim of marine planning became zoning for the conservation and 
protection of the marine environment without excluding industry growth and development .759 
Building on the Our Seas and Coasts: A Marine and Estuarine Strategy, the South 
Australian Government has developed a Living Coast Strategy (the LC Strategy) to assist in 
the achievement of ecologically sustainable development, ensuring the long term 
productivity and conservation of the marine, coastal and estuarine areas, by providing for 
integration of the use and management of coastal and marine environments. 760 The the LC 
Strategy is a whole-of-government environmental initiative that will identify gaps in current 
management arrangements and propose strategies to address these gaps . 761  The LC Strategy 
will reinforce the Government's commitments for the establishment of a Marine Planning 
Framework and a Representative System of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). 
A new Coastal and Marine Management Act is also currently under development as a 
coordinating mechanism, under which Marine Plans may sit in the future. 762 In the interim, 
756 Department for Environment and Heritage. (2002). "Marine Planning." 
http://www.environrnent.sa.gov.gov.aulcoasts/planning.html  [Access date: 15 February 2002]. 
"' Department for Environment and Heritage. (2001). "Spencer Gulf Marine Plan - Newsletter." 
Update Issue No. 1: October 2001. 
758 Interview with subject XUI 1. 
759 Ibid. 
760 Department for Environment and Heritage. (2003). "Marine Conservation Programs." 
http://www.environment.sa.gov.au/coasts/conservation.html [Access date: 10 May 20041. 
761 Government of South Australia. (2004). "Findings from the 2003 State of the Environment 
Report." http://www.environment.sa.gov.aulreporting/coast/health.html [Access date: 12 May 
2004]. 
762 Caton, B. (2002). "States Symposium, 'The Good, The Bad and The Ugly': Contribution from 
South Australia." Coast to Coast Conference Proceedings. Tweed Heads, NSW: 4-8 November 
2002; and 
Interview with subject XU1 1. 
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the ministerial Plan Amendment Report (PAR) will be used to get the Spencer Gulf Marine 
Plan recognised under the Development Act 1993, within a Development Plan for "Land not 
within a Council area (Coastal waters)" . 76' However, this Act only guides development and 
not the actions of everyday people that may be affected by, or affect, the Marine Plan 
implementation process outside any development processes, hence in the interim the Marine 
Plan holds no real statutory authority. 764 
Eight bioregions have been identified in South Australian waters at a scale of 1,000 km 2 that 
reflect similar patterns of diversity within. 765  These bioregions contain many smaller marine 
biounits at a scale of 100 kin  that similarly reflect patterns of biodiversity at a smaller scale. 
The Spencer Gulf Marine Plan encompasses two of these bioregions.' 66  It was approved in 
February 2001 as the pilot Marine Plan, the first of six Marine Plans planned for South 
Australian waters. 
5.5.2 Spencer Gulf Marine Plan 
Figure 7 	Spencer Gulf Marine Planning Area (left) and Spencer Gulf Biounits (right). 
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Source (Spencer Gulf Map): 	Department of Environment and Heritage. (2001). "Spencer Gulf 
Marine Plan." Update Issue No. I. October 2001. 
http://www.environment.sa.gov.au  [Access date: 20 April 2003] 
Source (Biounits Map): 	Boxall, V., Paxinos, R., Emmett, J., Wright, A., Smolinski, J., von 
Baumgarten, P. and Best, L. (2004). "The South Australian 
Marine Planning Framework." Coast to Coast Conference 
Proceedings. Hobart: 19-23 April 2004. 
763 Interview with subject XU II. 
"4 Ibid. 
765 Boxall, V., Paxinos, R., Emmett, J., Wright, A., Smolinski, J., von Baumgarten, P. and Best, L. 
(2004). "The South Australian Marine Planning Framework." Coast to Coast Conference 
Proceedings. Hobart: 19-23 April 2004. 
'66 Ibid. 
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Stage one of the Spencer Gulf marine planning process involved extensive regional briefings 
with relevant local and State Government agencies and regional development boards .767 
Once local governments were engaged, informal meetings with peak stakeholder groups and 
the wider public were held to identify theft values and uses in the gulf area . 768  The resultant 
Focus document provides a regional perspective of the Spencer Gulf drawing on definitive 
recorded and verifiable data incorporating 71 Geographical Information Systems (GIS) 
spatial layers of information collated into 931 planning units (51cm x 5km grids) .769 The 
spatial layers include information on the economic, cultural, social and environmental values 
found in the Spencer Gulf. 770 
Each of the 931 planning units were then analysed according to a set of ecological criteria 
relating to the contribution of species, habitats and ecological processes to the functioning of 
the whole marine ecosystem. 771  The planning units were then grouped into one of four 
ecologically rated (ER) zones: 
• ER1 zones are critical zones incorporating nursery areas and seagrass habitats; 
• ER2 zones are essential habitats; 
• ER3 zones are contributing habitats that are generally more robust to impacts; and 
• ER4 zones need a precautionary approach to management due to the lack of 
information known about the area. 772 
It is anticipated that as knowledge and research in the area increases, all ER4 zones will be 
classified into one of the ER1-ER3 zones. Based on these classifications and closely related 
to this process, but run by a separate departmental section, is the Representative System of 
MPAs program which comes in after the marine planning process and analyses areas of 
representative protected area importance at a finer scale of 11cm x 1km grid squares. 773 
Once ER zones have been identified and classified, the next step in the process is to develop 
a Marine Plan. The Marine Plan contains: 
• a series of maps summarising ecological, economic and social values; 
• a map summarising current impacts on those values; 
• an ER zoning map; 
• the definitions, goals, objectives and strategies for ER zones 14; 
767 Fuller, S. (2002). DEH: Personal Communication - 19 February 2002. 
768 Department for Environment and Heritage (2002) "Marine Planning" 
769 Boxall et a! (2004); and 
Interview with subject XU1 1. 
770 Boxall et at (2004). 
771 Ibid. 
772 Interview with subject XU 11. 
... Ibid. 
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a description of ER zone locations for each biounit, containing information on 
habitat, uniqueness and reason for zoning; and 
. information on the current impacts and conservation areas within each ER zone. 774 
The Marine Plan does not seek to control the thy-to-day management of the marine and 
estuarine activities, but rather it seeks to integrate the regulation of different activities, with 
the day-to-day management remaining the responsibility of the relevant authority. 775 As 
such, the success of the Marine Plan depends on the 'whole-of-government' and community 
approach towards implementation and compliance. 
5.5.2.1 	Institutional arrangements 
A Marine Planning Team, housed in the Coast and Marine Branch of the Department for 
Environment and Heritage, is the lead agency established to act on behalf of the 'whole-of-
government' to zone State waters for multiple-uses compatible with the ER zoning 
process. 776  The Government Agency Steering Committee oversees the Marine Planning 
Team in an advisory capacity and also contributes to a 'whole-of-government' approach .777 
The Steering Committee is made up of the heads of involved Government departments, 
including the Chief Executive of the Department for Environment and Heritage, Primary 
Industries and Resources SA (PIRSA), the Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity 
(DWLBC) and the Local Government Association. 778  The Steering Committee is charged 
with oversight of, not only the marine planning process, but also the MPA program .771 It is 
designed to guide the process, but in practice it merely signs off on the Marine Planning 
Team's work, which is also important given their role in coordinating implementation on an 
integrated front down track .780 
The State Government Marine Managers Forum was established as an inter-departmental 
committee in 1999. It includes representatives from all State Government departments with 
an interest in marine issues and marine management . 781 The primary aim of this body is to 
reduce the potential for conflict and difficulties associated with cross-agency responsibilities 
Boxall et a! (2004). 
Ibid. 
776 Caton (2002). 
777 Interview with subject XUI 1. 
778 Boxall, V. (2004). DEH: Personal Communication 12 May 2004. 
779 Department for Environment and Heritage. (2002). "Spencer Gulf Marine Plan - Newsletter." 
Update Issue No. 3: October 2002. 
780 Boxall, V. (2004). DEH: Personal Communication - 12 May 2004. 
781 Government of South Australia (2004) "Findings from the 2003..." 
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a well as providing an informant's role in the development of State Government marine-
related policies and research priorities. 782 
The Spencer Gulf Regional Consultative Committee (the Committee) was formed in 2002 to 
aid community consultation and participation efforts by appointing locals with knowledge to 
impart, in an advisory capacity. 783  One member of the Committee was appointed from the 
Marine Advisory Committee and one person appointed from the Technical Advisory 
Committee .784  The remaining ten of the twelve individuals were publicly nominated, but 
appointed by the Minister for Environment and Conservation on the advice of the Steering 
Committee, to contribute technical expertise, advice and local knowledge to the development 
and implementation of the Spencer Gulf Marine Planning process and to advise on the values 
and desires of the general public.785 Members of the Committee come from a diverse range 
of community interests including commercial fishing, recreational fishing, boating, marine 
ecology, local government, aquaculture, indigenous issues, economic development and 
conservation. The Committee meets regularly with the Marine Planning Team to discuss 
each step of the development of the marine plan. 
5.5.3 How are integration and conflict dealt within this NAM model? 
The South Australian marine planning process is working towards conservation zoning and 
multiple-management of uses within these zones. At present, however, it is in the 
developmental stages and the process lacks the legislative support required to effectively 
manage for the integration of uses. This model is approaching a Level 6 on the Policy 
Integration Scale, whereby the 'whole-of-government' approach is being adjudicated by the 
Marine Planning Team until such time a legislative authority gives it the power to plan with 
other departments and agencies for the integration of uses through ER zones. Consultation 
and stakeholder participation are the primary tools used to enhance this model's capacity for 
integration, some processes which have been described in more detail below. 
Cross-jurisdictional integration was dealt with early on through a briefing tour, whereby 
relevant local and State Government agencies and regional development boards were 
consulted and given the opportunity to raise concerns and issues before taking the 'whole-of-
government' planning framework to the public for further consultation. By getting this 
initial sign on from other levels of government and other agencies before presenting it to the 
public, South Australia effectively by-passed the jurisdictional and sectoral suspicions 
782 Government of South Australia (2004) "Findings from the 2003..." 
u Boxall, V. (2004). DEll: Personal Communication— 12 May 2004. 
Department for Environment and Heritage. (2004). "Terms of Reference - Marine Planning 
Regional Consultative Committees." Personal Communication - V. Boxall. 12 May 2004. 
Department for Environment and Heritage (2002).. .Update Issue No. 3: October 2002. 
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occurring with the Commonwealth RMP process. There is a risk in presenting a proposed 
policy or process to the public before having all affected levels of government and agencies 
within government buy into the process; as any breakdown in a 'whole-of-government' 
approach that is in public view can cause a breakdown in trust and confidence in the 
government itself, effectively rendering the proposal obsolete before it begins. 
The original analysis upon which ER zones is based includes economic, social, cultural and 
environmental values and uses. The resultant Spencer Gulf Marine Plan should therefore 
achieve a high level of cross-sectoral integration. However, this analysis is based on 
definitive recorded and verifiable data only. This means that qualitative and cultural values 
may be compromised if they were not recorded or easily and readily defined, hence 
compromising the cross-sectoral nature of the marine planning process. 
While there appears to be advanced institutional arrangements with respect to cross-sectoral 
integrative approaches incorporated in the Steering Committee and Marine Managers Forum 
for instance, coordination appears to be compromised at the operational level between this 
marine planning process and other policies and programs, such as the MPA program and 
with policies and programs of jurisdictions outside State boundaries, such as the 
Commonwealth's RMP process. 786 Although coordination maybe happening at different 
levels of government, in South Australia at least, there is a distinct breakdown in interagency 
and intra-jurisdictional communication that is counterintuitive to the overall Government 
objective of integrated management. 787 
There is a community-based forum for consultation, the Spencer Gulf Regional Consultative 
Committee, in the marine planning process that was developed through a public nomination 
process. Actual appointment of nominees was by the Minister and the body itself is limited 
to an advisory role. In the initial stages the Committee approached the task with caution, 
arguably because it was unclear of its role and what marine planning meant for South 
Australia. However, with time it appears that the group has gained the confidence of both 
Government and the public and are now a very powerful entity in themselves. It is perhaps a 
good lesson to make sure the Terms of Reference in establishing any regional body are very 
clear and that all involved are well informed of the process and the issues with which they 
are faced. 
786 Observation from interview process and personal experience. 
787 Interview with subject XUI 1. 
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5.6 Lessons for Australia 
Australian NRM models offer a number of lessons for how to advance sectoral arrangements 
(such as fisheries) in integrative processes (such as the RMP process). One of the recurring 
issues is whether to legislate for cross-jurisdictional and cross-sectoral coordination when 
implementing an integrated management process. While legislative arrangements appear to 
have worked well in delineating Commonwealth and state responsibilities in the GBRMP 
and the MDB, the 'policy' option was chosen over legislation in the development of 
Australia's Oceans Policy to avoid opening up potentially debilitating disputes with the 
states over jurisdiction and to avoid overturning effective OCS arrangements. 788  Without 
legislation, however, it has been a long road to getting the states on board. Perhaps one 
lesson learnt from other Australian NRM models such as the South Australian Marine 
Planning Framework, is to ensure there is confidence and agreement within an organisation 
or collective body before presenting the collective proposal for external examination. 
There are distinct advantages associated with zoning, including security, confidence and 
clarity in the process and, with effective consultation, zoning can also offer an effective form 
of conflict management. It is recognised, however, that zoning is only one of many potential 
management tools. Two different approaches to zoning have been adopted in the Great 
Barrier Reef and South Australia. South Australia started out with the approach of zoning by 
stakeholder groups to avoid conflicts, but soon discovered that conflicts were inevitable and 
that drawing 'lines on maps' to zone according to stakeholder desires, including the option of 
alienating the public from some of the more industry-intensive regions, was not an option. 
Therefore, South Australia changed the objective of their zoning arrangements to manage for 
conservation using multiple-use management principles. The GBRMPA also originally used 
spatial zoning to manage conflicts between users. And similar to South Australia, it has 
recently re-zoned the area to meet more stringent conservation objectives, while maintaining 
some of the traditional spatial separation of uses. 
The Commonwealth chose against zoning in the SERMP because too little is known about 
the marine environment under Commonwealth jurisdiction and compliance and enforcement 
are too arduous offshore. While this may be true, it is also important to recognise that 
managing an area on a precautionary basis may buy time to address some of these data 
problems. For example, ER4 zoning in South Australia uses management on a precautionary 
basis with adaptive management principles to review zoning arrangements as more 
788 Foster, E., Haward, M. and Coffen-Smout, S. "Australia's South East Regional Marine Plan 
(SERMP) Process and Canada's Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) Initiative 
- Implementing integrated oceans management." Marine Policy, in press. (see Appendix One for 
signed permission forms). 
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information is discovered. Eventually, with the provision of more information, all the ER4 
zones will be zoned as ERI-3 zones. Perhaps it is worthy to note the powerful influence of 
industries, such as the petroleum industry, that refuse to be locked out of areas due to 
unknown prospecting opportunities, coupled with the Howard Government's energy 
policy789  that has reformed thel excises to offer incentives for frontier exploration and to 
seek self sufficiency in oil production, and how this could influence Australia's capacity to 
adopt an offshore zoning plan for conservation purposes. 
The Queensland WA offers some insights into a form of auditing process whereby 
development approvals must be checked off at different levels and by different agencies 
according to those impacted. This is a possibility for future development and uses under the 
RMP process, whereby an integrated oceans auditor could check proposals for conformity 
with the relevant RMP and then could disseminate the proposal for approval by other 
relevant departments and agencies. 
The TRFA and the WA process are examples of potentially effective consultation processes 
that have broken down in that the public do not get adequate opportunity to voice their 
concerns or that they have a chance to feed into the process, but there are no requirements for 
the management body to act on the issues raised. In areas of management where little is 
officially known about the resource, members of the public may offer the best insights from 
the perspective of unofficial first-hand experience to inform management practices. It is 
important therefore, that in progressing towards an integrated oceans management regime, 
where little is known about best practice, that the public are effectively engaged and that 
transparent feedback processes are incorporated such that management bodies are held 
clearly accountable to the public for their management decisions. 
The TRFA is an example of nested subsidiarity, whereby individual organisations can 
manage their 'share' as they like as long as the overall objectives and criteria of the 
Commonwealth-State agreement are met. This type of arrangement could be the solution to 
getting states to actively participate in national integrated oceans management, where states 
have the freedom to manage state waters but they must be in accordance with some 
overarching national oceans objectives or strategies and there must not be conflicting 
management across the jurisdictional maritime boundary. 
789 Prime Minister John Howard. (2004). "Securing Australia's Energy Future." White Paper on 
Australia's energy policy. 
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5.7 Summary 
This chapter highlights some constructive approaches to integrated management that have 
been used in other Australian NRM models. It also emphasises the often 'negative' 
integration approach to natural resource management that has been adopted by Australian 
governments in the past. Approaches such as zoning for conservation are increasingly being 
highlighted as effective for the coordination of multiple-uses towards meeting common 
conservation objectives. This type of coordination generally involves overall coordination 
through a third party or third party instrument, or increasingly by a cross-jurisdictional 
decision-making body, that may prove most effective for at least coordinating sectoral 
management under the current Australian governance regime. Effective participatory 
processes are highlighted as an effective means for integration and preventative conflict 
management. 
While this chapter deals with natural resource management in the Australian context, it is 
also of benefit to look to international counterparts for similar experiences in resource 
management from which Australia can learn and better inform its own processes. It is 
recognised that governance structures, budgetary allocations and general policy approaches 
will be vastly different, hence minimising the capacity for direct comparisons. However, 
specific aspects of the working relationships of international natural resource management 
models may be drawn from in implementing domestic policies and approaches. The 
following chapter looks at some international NRM models, thawing heavily from Canada, a 
similar federal state, and New Zealand, a unitary state with well developed resource 
management arrangements. 
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Integration in natural resource management (NRM) is a concept currently being defined and 
implemented worldwide. The previous chapter examined selected approaches from within 
Australia to meet the requirements for integrated management. This chapter examines 
international examples of integrated management, examples reflecting global initiatives from 
the 1980s and early 1990s. While it is recognised that individual States have different 
governance systems and policy objectives that will guide specific approaches to natural 
resource management, examining detail of the operational arrangements that address cross-
sectoral and cross-jurisdictional issues is clearly valuable. The analysis of these experiences 
can inform Australian processes, such as fisheries integration with the context of regional - 
marine planning. 
International NRM models are examined in this chapter for their capacity to address 
integration overall with respect to the Policy Integration Scale (PIS - see Section 1.2.1), for 
the more specific components of the model that effectively address cross-sectoral and cross-
jurisdictional integration and for their capacity to address conflict management issues. 
Canada is an obvious starting point for comparative analysis due to its similar governance 
structure and the development of its national oceans management regime. Canada rivals 
Australia for leadership with respect to implementing integrated oceans management. 
Canada has, however, adopted a different approach of bottom-up implementation through 
'learning-by-doing' approaches, with the result that national policy setting somewhat lagged 
behind operational 'experiments'. This chapter also analyses New Zealand's experience, 
which has a relatively long-history with integrated management in terms of its natural 
resources, providing a useful comparison with a different political system to that of 
Australia. 
790 This chapter has been adapted from the following report, with the consent of the National Oceans 
Office (see Appendix One for signed permission forms): 
Foster, E. (unpublished). "Evaluation of Alternative Models." Consultancy report for the National 
Oceans Office, 2003. 
192 
CHAPTER 6: INTERNATIONAL NRM MODELS 
6.1 Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable 
Development. (Canada) 
The Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable Development (CESD), part of the 
Auditor General's Office in Canada, is responsible for making the Government accountable 
for 'greening' its policies, operations and programs . 791 The CESD assists the Auditor 
General in auditing environmental and sustainable development issues. 
6.1.1 Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable Development 
The Federal Commissioner, for the Environment and Sustainable Development (CESD) was 
established under an amendment to the Auditor General Act in 1995, within the Office of the 
Auditor General (OAG) . 792 The CESD has two roles: 
to review how well Federal Government policies, programs and spending support 
Canada's move towards sustainable development; and 
to provide liaison, monitoring and encouragement to the Government and the public 
on sustainable development. 793 
The 1995 amendments also imposed a requirement on 25 federal departments to prepare and 
deliver sustainable development strategies (SDS) and action plans to the House of Commons 
by December 1997, which are to be reviewed at least every three years. 714  The 1995 
amendments to the Act also introduced an environmental petitions process. The petitions 
process is a formal way for the public to ask Federal departments questions regarding 
environmental and sustainable development issues. Petitions are sent to the OAG and then 
the CESD, On behalf of the Auditor General, forwards them to the relevant Minister(s) who 
in turn must respond directly to the writer within 120 days. 795 
Following the 1995 amendments and in working with expert staff, the CESD is required to 
provide an annual 'green' report to the House of Commons on the extent to which Federal 
79' Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development. (2001). http:J/www.oag- 
bvg.gc.ca/domino/cesd_cedd.nsflhtml/menuUe.html  [Access date: 20 May 2004]. 
792 Office of the Auditor General. (2002). "What we do." http:Ilwww.oag- 
bvg.gc.ca/domino/other.nsUhtmllbodye.html . [Access date: 15 December 2002]. 
113 Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development (2001). 
Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development. (2001). "Department and 
Agency Strategies." http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/cesd_cedd.nsflhtml/deptsd_e.html [Access 
date: 15 October 20031. 
Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development. (2001). "Environmental 
Petitions." http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/cesd_cedd.nsUhtml/menu7..e.html  [Access date: 20 
October 2003]. 
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departments have met the objectives and implemented the plans set out in the SDS •796 
'Green' reports are additional annual reports to the OAG Annual Reports presented to the 
House of Commons, specifically addressing the issue of the environment and sustainable 
development. The CESD also comments on the number, nature and status of environmental 
petitions in these 'green' reports. 
6.1.2 How are integration and conflict dealt within this NRM model? 
The CESD is a government-independent auditor who is charged with the responsibility of 
maintaining Federal Government accountability with respect to environmental and 
sustainable development issues. This is a 'negative' approach to integration, whereby 
departments are assessed for their cohesion with sustainable development (SD) principles 
and as such the CESD itself operates at around a Level 6 on the PIS (see Section 1.2.1). It is 
a form of reactive management whereby policies and programs are assessed for their 
capacities to address overall SD Government policy. Although the CESD does not 
encourage operational integration between departments, it does ensure that high-level 
consistency with overarching Government policy is maintained and that potential for 
conflicts between departments is minimised. Some of the operational aspects of this model 
are examined. 
The CESD's mandate does not extend to examining or auditing provincial performance 
towards sustainable development. This poses a significant limitation for progress towards 
national sustainable development as most problems fall in the broad area of shared 
jurisdiction and as such, require provinces, municipalities, industry and all Canadians to act. 
The only mention of integration as part of sustainable development, which does not indicate 
any prescribed measures for cross-jurisdictional integration with provinces, is: 
the integration of environmental and economic considerations, along with the 
consideration of equity, is a fundamental underpinning of the concept of sustainable 
development. 797 
The 1995 amendments to the Auditor General Act support the conclusion that the CESD 
provides scope for cross-sectoral integration. Specifically, section 21.1(a) states the need to 
integrate the environment with the economy. This point is emphasised in section 21.1(f) 
calling for an integrated approach to planning and making decisions that takes into account 
the environmental and natural resource costs of different economic options and the 
796 Auditor General Act 1995 - Appendix A. http://www.oag -
bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsflhtmll97aae.html [Access date: 20 May 20041. 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada. (2004). "What is Sustainable Development?" 
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/cesd_cedd.nsf/htmllmenu6_e.httnl [Access date: 20 May 2004]. 
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economic costs ofdjfferent environmental and natural resource options. 798 Additionally, in 
his 1999 report on the first round of SDS, the CESD highlighted the need for effective 
coordination across departmental mandates and warned departments that he expected to see 
them working together in areas of shared responsibility.' 
The use of an environmental petitions process allows for a degree of conflict management 
whereby the government is made accountable to the public for its actions with respect to 
environmental and sustainability issues. Australia has a similar, yet less formal process 
whereby the public may question the actions or policy direction of any Minister and/or 
seek/provide information of relevance via written correspondance. The relevant Minister is 
politically-driven to reply in a timely and accurate manner. It would, however, be beneficial 
for Australia to adopt a formal environmental accountability process, such as having an 
ecologically sustainable development auditor as a matter of process. In doing this, it would 
ensure that ESD requirements are being met consistently across the land-coast-sea interface. 
In this system oceans governance and fisheries management would make up just part of the 
whole, and relevant departments would be accountable for their ESD actions in line with the 
overall Government objectives for ESD as outlined in Australia's National Strategy for ESD. 
6.2 West Coast of Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board 
(Canada) 
The West Coast of Vancouver Island Aquatic Management (WCVIAM) Project established a 
community-based, cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional Board (herein referred to as 'the 
Board' or WCVIAMB). The Board was established for a pilot period of three years, from 
the Board's inauguration in February 2002. It was established with eight government and 
eight non-government representatives, with vested interests in aquatic management 
processes. The Terms of Reference for the Board were agreed by consensus in October 2000 
and ratified by participating governments in February 2001 •800 
798 Auditor General Act 1995- Appendix A. 
719 Commissioner on the Environment and Sustainable Development. (1999). Moving up the Learning 
Curve: The Second Generation of Sustainable Development Strategies. Report of the 
Commissioner on the Environment and Sustainable Development. - point number 5. 
800 West Coast of Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board. (2002). http://www.pac.dfo-
thpo.gc.ca/oceans/iin/amb.htm [Access date: 20 August 2002]. 
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6.2.1 The Board composition 801 
The Board comprises 16 members. This includes the eight government representatives, two 
from each of the following levels and departments: 
• two senior Federal Government representatives from Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
with decision-making responsibility in the management area; 
• two senior provincial government representatives from the BC Ministry of 
Sustainable Resource Management with decision-making responsibility in the 
management area; 
• two elected First Nations representatives from the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council 
(emphasising the 'government-to-government' relationship that exists with First 
Nations); and 
• two elected regional government representatives, one from each of the Alberni-
Clayoquot and the Comox-Strathcona Regional Districts. 
The remaining eight members comprise non-government members that characterise the 
diverse use and geography of the area, including commercial harvesting, aboriginal 
harvesting, recreational harvesting, processing, environment/stewardship, aquaculture, 
tourism and labour. These members are nominated by coastal communities, or those with an 
interest in integrated aquatic resource management, and are jointly appointed by an inter-
government selection committee comprising representatives from all participating 
governments. Non-government members of the Board are not selected on the basis of 
representing any particular group or interest, rather they are selected on the basis of their 
commitment towards the Board's vision, purpose, principles and objectives, for their 
knowledge and experience in the area and their base of support. 
6.2.2 WC VIA MB Terms of Reference802 
The Board aims to focus governments, communities and stakeholders on principle-based, 
integrated ecosystem management. The Board's priority is that of conservation of aquatic 
resources and their habitats in the management area. It will achieve this by leading and 
facilitating the development and implementation of a strategy for the integrated management 
The following section drawn from: 
West Coast of Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board. (2003). 
http://www.westcoastaquatic.ca/Resources.htm [Access date: 15 October 20031. 
802 The following section drawn from: 
West Coast of Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board. (2001). "Terms of Reference." 
http://www.westcoastaquatic.caIPDF/WCVI%2OAMB%2OTerms%2Oof%2oReference.pdf  [Access 
date: 20 June 2004]. 
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of aquatic ecosystems in the management area, based on a set of overarching principles and 
in a manner consistent with statutory authorities, policies, standards and processes (toR:4). 
The Board is predominantly an advisory body that makes consensus driven 
recommendations to the appropriate statutory authority, which is charged with the 
implementation of legislation and policies, in a shared decision-making process. Shared 
decision-making means that those with the authority to make a decision and those who will 
be affected by the decision will work together to seek an outcome acceptable to all involved. 
As a consensus-based body, members must agree on decisions that they can "live with" 
(ToR:l7). In this model there is an inherent risk of compromising to the lowest common 
denominator on hard line decisions, which may result in broad outcomes that do not 
satisfactorily address the specificity of the issue at hand. For example, in trying to protect 
biodiversity, mediating between extreme views of complete area closures versus ongoing 
industry activity, it could be decided to close a small area where industry does not actually 
operate. This leads to the question of whether industries, such as fisheries, do not operate 
there because the area is actually not productive, in which case, would the closure really 
protect biodiversity? Despite this risk, it must be noted that the advice of the Board is only 
one method of input into the many processes that feed into decision-making affecting aquatic 
resource management in the area. 
The Board has no mechanisms to override existing legislation, however, in certain 
circumstances the Board may be assigned responsibility to make decisions and implement 
changes. Despite the absence of any requirements for the statutory authority to act on the 
recommendations made by the Board, the all-inclusive sectoral and government framework 
of the Board is politically alluring for pro-active decision-making based on recommendations 
made. 
6.2.3 How the Board functions 
Issues are raised one of two ways and the Board's time is divided roughly 50:50 between the 
two. The first way entails the issue response procedure. This involves a response to issues 
coming from the Board members, the public or interest groups, which require more 
immediate attention. 803  The issue is addressed alongside a series of analytical questions 
agreed by the Board, including to what extent the issue is within the parameters of the 
Board's decision-making capabilities. 
803 West Coast of Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board. (2002). "Operating Procedures." 
http://www.westcoastaquatic.ca/PDF/AMB%200perational%2OProcedures.pdf  [Access date: 20 
June 2004]. 
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The second stream of issues involves proactive strategic planning development. The focus 
of strategic planning is on the principles, objectives and evaluation framework outlined in 
the Terms of Reference. The Board has a strategic plan framework in place, which includes 
a shared vision of how aquatic management should look if the Board's principles and 
objectives were being implemented successfully. An assessment of work already being done 
in relation to WCVI aquatic management is then carried out and gaps and focus priorities are 
deciphered. Based on analysis of focus priorities, three- to five-year strategic goals are 
outlined for moving towards the principles or objectives of the Board's Terms of Reference. 
As part of these longer-term strategic goals, annual milestones are set and responsibilities 
assigned for achieving these goals. The Board must consult with other groups in achieving 
its strategic plan. Specific operational plans bring these strategic plans to fruition and the 
Board is generally less involved with these specific plans, but plays a strong role in 
monitoring whether goals have been met and milestones achieved. 804 
The Board may convene special shared decision-making forums called Management 
Committees (MC) to address particular issues, or perform particular tasks concerning the 
integrated management of aquatic resources in the management area (ToR:9). The MCs 
comprise experts and other people directly involved in, or affected by, management 
decisions. To the extent possible, members should be selected by prospective participants, 
be representative of the diversity of interests relevant to the committee's task, have a broad 
support base and share a commitment to work together. Like Board members, they should 
be committed to the Board's vision, principles and objectives in performing their tasks. 
6.2.4 How are integration and conflict dealt within this NRM model? 
In theory, the overall integration capacity of this Board is very high. If implemented as 
intended, the Board would be around a Level 8 on the Policy Integration Scale (see Section 
1.2.1), where a central intra-governmental body is establishing priorities and developing 
strategic plans for regional and cross-sectoral integrated management. In practice, however, 
the integration capacity of the Board is compromised by the practicalities of its 
implementation and advisory nature. This section explores some of the practical issues that 
have deviated the Board away from its potential for high level integration. 
The government Board members carry equal weight and each is supposed to provide equal 
financial support. In conjunction with the consensus-based decision-making process 
inherent in the functioning of the Board, these features provide a theoretically well-
established framework for cross-jurisdictional negotiations. In practice, however, there is 
E04 West Coast of Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board (2002). "Operating Procedures..." 
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currently little cross-jurisdictional integration occurring. DFO supports the Board in 
addressing coastal zone management issues, but DFO does not see the Board as the 
appropriate arena to address anything 'too controversial'. 805 This is reflected by DFO's 
decision to make the Board advisory, rather than granting it any decision-making authority, 
despite this being the Board's original aspiration. The Provincial Government has opted for 
observer status, meaning that it is not obliged to contribute financially and cannot be held 
accountable for the implementation of recommendations coming from the Board .806  In 
addition, the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council has retracted funding, resulting from having 
their own treaty funding being cut as they fight out a legal battle with DFO. 807 
Government representatives comprise senior level officials from all levels of government. 
The departmental representatives of each level of government, however, are not required to 
consult with other departments. Despite this, the political nature of the Board indicates that 
there is scope for cross-sectoral integration at the government level. Power to implement 
recommendations made by the Board remains with the vested statutory authority that 
assesses recommendations prior to consideration for implementation. Some statutory 
authorities will need to be convinced of the value of the Board's recommendations since they 
do not have the benefit of participating in its deliberations. This issue has been tabled by the 
Board and was included in the Minutes of the first meeting in February 2002 where it was 
suggested that a means be developed to get the 18 or so agencies involved in marine 
use.. .together and see how they want to be involved. 808  Also at the core of the Board's 
functioning is the basic principle of ecosystem-based management, which inherently implies 
integration of management practices across sectoral and jurisdictional boundaries. 
Another mechanism for cross-sectoral integration available to the Board is the ability to 
convene special shared decision-making MCs to address particular issues or perform 
particular tasks concerning the integrated management of aquatic resources in the 
management area (ToR: 9). By being representative and issue-specific, the Board is able to 
include a more diverse range of interests and a much wider knowledge base of the 
management area than if decisions were made independent of such Committees. 
The Board may choose to participate in dispute resolution between resource users. When the 
conflicts between core government bodies of the Board itself cannot be resolved, however, it 
is questionable if the Board is ready for such a responsibility. Where the Board may offer 
Pinkerton, F. (2003). WCVLAMB: Personal Communication - 11 September 2003. 
806 Ibid. 
807 Ibid. 
808 West Coast of Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board. (2002). "Board Meeting Draft 
Minutes: February 22/23, 2002." http:/Iwww.westcoastaquatic.ca/PDF/minutes_%20feb_02.pdf  
Access date: 13 August 2003]. 
IRM 
CHAPTER 6: INTERNATIONAL NRM MODELS 
greater benefit is at the 'grass roots' level, whereby projects initiated under the Board's work 
program may bring historically disputant parties together to work towards a common goal. 
This has been illustrated in the development of the 2003-2005 Experimental Fishery Plan for 
Goose Barnacles, whereby the WCVI Aquatic Management Society worked in conjunction 
with local First Nations groups to determine the issues facing the fishery and the methods 
First Nations groups have used for thousands of years to sustainably harvest this species. 809 
These data sets were combined to develop an Ekperimental Fishery Plan designed to pave 
the way for the re-opening of commercial harvesting in a sustainable barnacle fishery on the 
wCvI.SI0 
6.3 Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management Initiative 
(Canada) 
The Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) Initiative was announced on 3 
December 1998 as the first pilot integrated oceans management plan under the auspices of 
Canada's Oceans Act 1997. It emanated from a recommendation in the 1997 Sable Gully 
Conservation Strategy, which stated that integrated management approaches should be 
applied to the offshore area around the Sable Gully Area of Interest under DFO's Marine 
Protected Areas Program. 811 The objectives of this inter-governmental, multi-stakeholder 
initiative are to integrate the management of all activities in the ESSIM area, to encourage 
conservation and responsible use of marine resources, to maintain natural biological 
diversity and to foster economic diversification and wealth generation. 812 
The Federal-Provincial ESSIM Working Group was formed in January 2001 in recognition 
of the need to formalise and integrate federal and provincial government policies and 
regulations in the ESSIM area. 813  The Working Group incorporates over 20 ocean-related 
federal and provincial departments, agencies and boards .814 Due to a history of mistrust and 
809 WCVIAMB. (2003). "WCVI Aquatic Management Board Meeting." Port Alberni, BC: 10-11 
September 2003. 
880 Ibid. 
Ill Foster, E., Haward, M. and Coffen-Smout, S. "Implementing integrated oceans management: 
Australia's South East Regional Marine Plan (SERMP) Process and Canada's Eastern Scotian 
Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) Initiative." Marine Policy, in press. (see Appendix One for 
signed permission forms); and 
Rutherford, R.J., Herbert, G.J. and Coffen-Smout, S. "Integrated ocean management and the 
collaborative planning process: the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) 
Initiative." Marine Policy, in press. 
812 Oceans and Coastal Management Division, Oceans and Environment Branch and Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada Maritimes Region. (2001). "Development of a Collaborative Management and 
Planning Process." A Discussion Paper prepared for the Federal-Provincial ESSTM Working 
Group. http://www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.caloceansle/essiin/essim-reports-planningprocess-e.html  
[Access date: 13 August 2003]. 
Foster, Haward and Coffen-Smout: in press. 
814 Rutherford Herbert and Coffen-Smout: in press. 
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sectoral protectionism, most sectors maintain the desire for bilateral negotiations with DFO 
until such time as the government can prove they have developed adequate capacity to 
effectively meet multi-sectoral demands. 815 
In February 2002, 150 participants attended the first ESSIM Forum Workshop held to 
initiate multi-stakeholder dialogue on integrated oceans managementY 6 Emphasis was 
placed on the need for sectors to organise themselves so that their participation in the ESSIM 
process is effective and representative. The first ES SilvI Forum Workshop discussions 
provided valuable input into the structure and function of the ESSIM Forum and the ESS[M 
Secretariat continues to use these considerations in refining the proposed Forum structure. 
As yet, the proposed model has not been fully implemented at the operational level. 
6.11 Institutional arrangem ents for the implementation of the ESSIM Plan 817 
The proposed ESSIM Forum consists of the following institutional arrangements to aid the 
development and effective implementation of the final ESSIM Plan: 
• the Oceans Management and Planning Group (0MPG) - the core of the ESSIM 
Forum comprises non-government multi-stakeholder representation in an 
informative and advisory role on the development,, implementation and operation of 
the ESSIM Plan, reporting to a proposed ESSIM Advisory Board. Decisions would 
be consensus-driven and meetings would occur quarterly 818 ; - 
• the Federal-Provincial ESSIM Working Group - mandated to implement 
government policy, program and regulatory harmonisation and coordination at the 
operational level whilst providing advice to the Regional Committee on Ocean 
Management (see below) on linkages, complementarities and conflicts between 
ESSIM initiatives and government policies, programs and regulations; 
815 Foster, Haward and Coffen-Smout: in press; and 
Rutherford, Herbert and Coffen-Smout: in press 
816 Coffen-Smout, S., Herbert, G., Rutherford, R.J. and Smith, B.L. (eds). (2002). "Proceedings of the 
1l Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) Forum Workshop." Halifax, NS: 20-21 
February 2002. Canadian Manuscript Report of Fisheries and Aquatic Science 2604 (Halifax, DFO, 
2002). 
817 This section is adapted from the following paper by the author, with the co-authors' permission 
(see Appendix One for signed permission forms): 
Foster, 1-laward and Coffen-Smout: in press. 
818 OCMD. (2001). "Development of a Collaborative Management and Planning Process: A 
Discussion Paper prepared for the Federal-Provincial ESSIM Working Group." November 2001. 
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• the Regional Committee on Ocean Management (RCOM) - comprises the senior 
executive forum for federal and provincial departments and agencies, including 
senior federal (Regional Director-General level) and provincial (Deputy Minister 
level) representatives and senior representatives of First Nations, to coordinate 
decision making at the intergovernmental and interdepartmental level on planning, 
management and regulatory matters in the ESSIM area in response to 
recommendations from the 0MPG; and 
• the ESSIM Forum Secretariat— currently the OCMD, facilitates and coordinates the 
planning and management process. It is charged with facilitating comprehensive 
communications and information exchange, compiling background reports and 
logistical support and coordination. 
Figure 8 	Proposed ESSIM Forum to aid the development and effective implementation 
of the ESSIM Plan. 
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6.3.2 The Eastern Scotian Shelf Ocean Management Plan 
In preparation for the second ESSIM Forum workshop in February 2003, the ESSIM 
Secretariat released a discussion paper as a strategic planning framework for the 
development and implementation of the future Eastern Scotian Shelf Ocean Management 
Plan (ESSOMP or the Plan).819 Since the first Workshop, the Initiative has evolved to 
include coastal areas through the establishment of the Large Ocean Management Area 
(LOMA) concept in DFO's national Policy and Operational Framework for Integrated 
Management (IM) of Estuarine, Coastal and Marine Environments in Canada, which was 
released with Canada's Oceans Strategy (COS) in July 2002.820 
The ESSOMP will be a five-year strategic plan for the integrated management of all policies, 
programs, plans, measures and activities in or affecting the Eastern Scotian Shelf LOMA. 
819 ESSIM Forum Secretariat. (2003). "A Discussion Paper prepared for the ESSIM Forum.": 3. 
820 Oceans Canada. (2002). http://www.cos-soc.gc.caldoc/publicationse.asp 
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The ESSOMP management vision is for: 
An effective, collaborative process that provides integrated and adaptive 
management plans, strategies and actions for environmental, social, cultural, 
economic and institutional sustainability in the Eastern Scotian Shelf Large Ocean 
Management Area. 821 
As currently envisioned, the ESSOMP will include the following key elements: 
a clear definition of the Large Ocean Management Area in geographical, physical 
and political/jurisdictional terms; 
• a clear statement of purpose, scope and legislative basis for the Oceans Management 
Plan; 
• a defined area of application with respect to the LOMA and sub-areas or ocean ceo-
zones; 
• management vision and goals; 
• management principles and approaches enshrined in the Plan; 
• high-level management objectives in terms of the four elements of sustainability - 
(1) environmental - including ecosystem (implemented through the use of Marine 
Environmental Quality objectives) and sustainable-use objectives; (2) social and 
cultural; (3) economic; and (4) institutional; 
operational objectives that provide the basis for implementation of the Plan through 
annual action plans, which identify and prioritise planning requirements and 
implementation actions through the use of indicators, reference points, and 
accompanying management strategies and actions to maintain indicators within 
acceptable limits; 
area-based management framework of ecosystem-based sub-units; 
• ocean use planning measures, such as zoning, to address spatial and temporal 
management requirements for multiple oceans use; 
institutional planning framework of collaborative processes for the development and 
implementation of the plan, including mechanisms for stakeholder engagement, 
planning and decision making, and addressing conflicts; and 
ongoing monitoring, performance measurement and feedback mechanisms to enable 
plan revisions and adaptive management .822 
821 ESSIM Forum Secretariat (2003) "A Discussion Paper...": 17. 
822 Rutherford, Herbert and Coffen-Smout: in press. 
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6.13 How are integration and conflict dealt within this NBM model? 
It is difficult to assess how this model will address integration overall, in terms of the Policy 
Integration Scale, since the major driving instrument, the ESSOMP, has not yet been 
developed. However, there are significant developments with respect to the individual 
components of this model to address cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional integration, some 
of which are described below. 
The development of the Eastern Scotian Shelf LOMA to incorporate coastal waters 
highlights the importance of municipal and provincial government participation in the 
ESSIM Forum if it is to be inclusive of all levels of government with decision-making 
authority in the management area. At the international level, the ES SOMP specifically 
addresses the issue of consistency with Canada's international commitments, responsibilities 
and rights and the need to collaborate with First Nations, including those bodies established 
under land claims agreements 
A concern with the development of the ES SOMP is that Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) 
is the lead agency. DFO comprises the fisheries sector but has minimal influence over other 
sectors. Traditionally, management objectives and indicators have been based on the fishing 
industry. With DFO as the lead agency, the potential remains for the ESSOMP and ESSIM 
Forum to maintain their emphasis on the fishing industry. However, with the consensus-
based structure of the executive decision-making level of government involved in the ESSIM 
Forum, the lead agency may prove having no more influence than as a coordinating body for 
the overall ecosystem-based development of the ESSOMP. 
The Federal-Provincial ESSIM Working Group and RCOM offer scope for cross-sectoral 
integration through representation across the broad range of government departments with a 
management interest in the ESS area. The RCOM, as it is proposed, comprises Members 
and Associate Members, which constitute observers that may become full Members should 
the issue at hand directly impact their department. This provides an all-inclusive means for 
integration across departments at the senior level that also incorporates departments with 
only a few management responsibilities in the area. 
At the core of the proposed ESSIM Forum is the 0MPG, a multi-stakeholder body with an 
advisory role to the executive level of government. This body is open to all stakeholders 
with an interest in the management area and therefore has the potential to address the issue 
of cross-sectoral integration. Traditionally the fishing industry has dominated such forums, 
so the Secretariat has been charged with assisting stakeholder groups in making 
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representative and meaningful contributions to the ESSIM Forum by trying to build 
capacities to engage the diverse range of interest groups. 
At this early stage of development, however, bilateral negotiations between DFO and the 
relevant stakeholder groups are maintained. This is due in part to scepticism over the degree 
of influence of this new multilateral process over existing management structures, while in 
other cases there is simply limited capacity in terms of people, resources or time to commit 
to the ESSIM Forum process. Stakeholders are reluctant to engage resources and time to a 
process that is still fundamentally in the early experimental stages of development. It is 
anticipated that with increased support and commitment from the governments, stakeholders 
will actively participate in the ESSIIM planning and management process. 
Conflict management through the Initiative has been discussed in terms of conflict 
resolution, crisis management and conflict avoidance mechanisms through planning and 
consensus-building. It has been acknowledged that in the first instance, the ESSOMP should 
be about providing a planning base with an associated vision and direction for the handling 
of identified issue areas to prevent conflict from occurring. 823  If this is not successful or is 
too timely, then crisis management mechanisms such as ADR and other conflict resolution 
techniques may be required either in the interim, or to solve otherwise unresolvable issues. 824 
However, the emphasis is on proactive conflict prevention. 
6.4 Quatsino Sound Coastal Management Plan (Canada) 
The Vancouver Island Strategic Land Use Plan (2000) recommended that Quatsino Sound 
be given a high priority for coastal planning. 825 In response to this recommendation, which 
was similarly identified as a priority by the Mount Waddington Regional District, and as a 
pilot Coastal Management Area (CMA) as part of DFO ' s greater Central Coast Integrated 
Management Initiative, the Quatsino Sound Coastal Management Plan was developed. 926 
The Plan area covers some 780km of shoreline and 1300km2 of marine waters . 12 ' Given that 
the Province has jurisdiction over the foreshore (intertidal areas of the coastline along the 
823 Rutherford, B. (2003). "Discussion Item: Conflict Resolution." ESSIM Online Discussion Forum - 
11 March 2003. http://www.thinkwell.ca [Access date: 23 September 2003]; and 
Massicotte, A. (2003). "Discussion Item: Conflict Resolution." ESSIM Online Discussion Forum - 
12 March 2003. http://www.thinkwell.ca [Access date: 23 September 2003]. 
824 Herbert, G. (2003). "Discussion Item: Conflict Resolution." ESSIM Online Discussion Forum - 30 
March 2003. http://www.thinkwell.ca  [Access date: 23 September 20031. 
825 Ocean Management Research Network. (2003). "Integrated Coastal Planning in British Columbia: 
Lessons Learned." Workshop Backgrounders for the 2003 OMRN National Conference. 5 
November 2003. http://www.maritimeawards.ca/OMRN/pacific-print.html [Access date: 22 May 
2004]. 
826 Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management (BC). (2004). "Quatsino Sound Coastal Plan." BC: 
Coast and Marine Planning Branch. 30 March 2004. 
827 Ibid. 
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coastal 'inland waters' and many agreed upon sub-tidal areas) and the Federal Government 
has jurisdiction over the seabed from the low water mark (from the boundaries of the inland 
waters, seaward to the territorial limit) it is imperative that all levels of government 
cooperate to develop and implement this integrated Plan. 828 The Plan is designed to assist 
prospective land tenure applicants, First Nations, local government, Land and Water British 
Columbia Incorporated (LWBC) and other agencies in dealing with applications for the use 
of provincial Crown foreshore and nearshore tenures. 829  While the Plan identifies uses for 
which applications of tenure may be submitted for a given area, the Plan does not guarantee 
that once accepted, the tenure applications will, or should be approved. 
6.4.1 Planning Units 
The Plan area is divided into 15 smaller planning units so that a more precise examination of 
uses and interactions in the area may be assessed. In the Plan, each planning unit includes: 
a description (including a biophysical Ecounit Profile830, areas of ecological 
significance, special features, unit attributes based on government GIS databases and 
assigned Relative Importance values); 
• a map of the specific area; 
• values that are specific to the Quatsino First Nation; 
• current uses and activities in the planning unit area; 
• issues and concerns raised in consultation with the public and stakeholders; 
• coastal management goals addressing the requirements of the federal Integrated 
Coastal Management program; 
• a table of acceptable tenured uses in the planning unit area 831; 
• the management emphasis of the planning unit (Conservation, Recreation, 
Community or General Management Emphasis - see Section 6.4.3)832; 
• the conditions for acceptance of tenure application; 
• tenure approval and management guidelines; and 
• required action for follow-up and implementation .833 
828 Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management (BC) (2004) "Quatsino Sound Coastal Plan" 
829 Ibid. 
830 Derived from the BC Marine Ecounit Classification. 
831 See section 6.4.2 below for determining acceptability. 
832 See section 6.4.3 below for an explanation of management emphasis categories. 
833 Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management (BC) (2004) "Quatsino Sound Coastal Plan" 
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6.4.2 Determining acceptable uses 
The Plan only provides recommendations with respect to uses that are subject to provisions 
of the provincial Land Act requiring that they be tenured .834  The Plan identifies 18 such uses 
in the Quatsino area including, but not limited to: aquaculture operations; docks, wharves 
and associated facilities; log handling; boat launches; marine telecommunications and 
utilities; and conservation. 835  Other activities are acknowledged in the Plan to ensure that the 
full range of undertakings is considered in the making of decisions, but recommendations 
relating to their ongoing nature are not made. The determination of acceptable uses is based 
on a series of decision rules that consider existing use commitments, compatibility, agency 
siting and best management practices. 836  Each use is assigned a code of acceptability. These 
are one of the following: 
. acceptable - the use is considered acceptable and appropriate - applications should 
be accepted for processing and evaluation, bearing in mind that this does not 
guarantee that a tenure will be approved; 
• conditionally acceptable the use is considered conditiofially acceptable - new 
applications should be accepted for processing and evaluation only if they meet the 
terms of relevant Management Provisions in the Plan; or 
not acceptable - the use is considered inappropriate applications should not be 
accepted for processing and evaluation. 
There is a formal variation process for any applicant wishing to challenge a conditionally 
acceptable or not acceptable determination based on it being a new technology or method, a 
new economic activity or venture, or reflecting a change in local community support. 837 
These challenges are dealt with on a case-by-case basis and do not guarantee a permanent 
change if granted acceptability in this instance, but may pave the way for future reform in the 
annual review of the overall Plan. 
6.4.3 Categorising planning units in terms of management emphasis 
Planning units are classified in one of four management emphasis categories. These are: 
Conservation Emphasis - accounting for approximately 15% of the Plan area, 
consists of units predominated by or adjacent to significant marine ecological or 
cultural features and values, including terrestrial and marine protected areas and 
other reserves; 
834 Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management (BC) (2004) "Quatsino Sound Coastal Plan" 
835 Ibid. 
836 Ibid. 
837 Ibid. 
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. Recreation Emphasis - accounting for nearly 15% of the Plan area, consists of units 
predominated by public and commercial recreational activities, significant features 
and opportunities; 
Community Emphasis - accounting for less than 3% of the Plan area, consists of 
units predominated by a concentration of multiple uses and activities that are 
associated with adjacent floating or upland settlement, typically including any 
combination of commercial, industrial, community and public institutional uses, 
private moorage and/or rural development; and 
General Marine Emphasis - accounting for around 67% of the Plan area, consists of 
units characterised by relatively remote locations with limited uses and/or 
development potential and generally lower biological diversity, with ongoing marine 
transportation and navigation activities and commercial and recreational fishing 
activities. 838 
Although planning units are classified in these management emphasis categories, it is not 
intended that these categories represent zoning, but rather these categories are intended to 
represent the general flavour of the current range of uses and activities and a general sense of 
the preferred future opportunities for any given area. Any use could feasibly occur in any 
planning unit regardless of the management emphasis. 
6.4.4 How are integration and conflict dealt within this NRM model? 
The Quatsino Sound Central Management Plan provides for the coordination of uses in the 
Plan area through provincial planning tenure applications as required under the Provincial 
Land Act. The Plan provides for coordination rather than integrdtion towards sustainable 
development and conservation in the area, as individual uses are not required to be managed 
in accordance with other uses, rather they are collectively managed for their overall impact 
on a given area. The Plan therefore has a low level capacity (Level 1) for integration on the 
Policy Integration Scale. Non-tenure activities are also identified and taken into account 
with respect to management decisions, but recommendations are not made on these and as 
such they are limited only by regulations outside the jurisdiction of this Plan. As identified 
below, the Plan does, however, provide for specific integration capacities with respect to 
cross-jurisdictional issues and some limited capacity for cross-sectoral integration. 
Cross-jurisdictional integration is incorporated in the Plan through coastal management goal-
setting in each planning unit, reflecting the relevant elements of the federal Integrated 
Coastal Management program. The Plan is provincially-led but also satisfies the 
118 Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management (BC) (2004) "Quatsino Sound Coastal Plan" 
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requirements to be the first pilot CMA under the federal Central Coast Integrated 
Management Initiative. Alongside the extensive consultation between departments and 
governments, using a provincially-led plan to meet the requirements of a federal-based 
initiative is a clear indication of advanced cross-jurisdictional integration and trust between 
governments. 
The extensive range of uses tested for acceptability illustrates the cross-sectoral capacity of 
this Plan. Through incorporation and recognition of industry, community, First Nations and 
conservation as valid uses in the area, the Plan inherently aims to balance economic, 
conservation, social and cultural objectives for the Quatsino Sound. This cross-sectoral 
capacity, however, is limited by the fact that the Plan only assesses tenure uses for 
acceptability and not for actual approvals. Non-tenure uses, whilst recognised in the Plan, 
lay outside the auspices of this Plan, hence compromises the cross-sectoral capacity to 
control overall impact in the area. The Plan is also limited in that it provides a template for 
uses that could be allowed in the area but offers no guidance or indication on approvals of 
tenures, hence it may lead to a concentration of effort by particular users in the future if not 
adequately monitored. 
The formal variation process offers one opportunity for conflict management whereby new 
opportunities, technologies and shifts in community perceptions can be incorporated into the 
Plan's provisions. However, being assessed on a case-by-case basis, this has the potential to 
create more conflicts if one such variation is accepted but a similar application is rejected. It 
is thus important that in the Plan's annual reviews, these variations are noted and 
incorporated accordingly and assessed with consistency. 
6.5 Resource Management Act 1991 (New Zealand) 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) came into force on 1 October 1991 after four 
years of negotiations. 839  The RMA replaced over 20 major statutes and more than 50 other 
ad hoc environment-related lawsY ° The purpose of the RIvIA is: 
to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources. 841 
As such, it is the first piece of legislation to integrate the management of New Zealand's 
land, water, air and other resources to meet specific environmental outcomes and depends 
839 Ministry for the Environment. (1999). "Your Guide to the Resource Management Act: An essential 
reference for people affected by or interested in the Act." Wellington, NZ: Ministry for the 
Environment. 
840 Ibid. 
84 'Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.5(1). 
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largely on the goodwill of local government to do the 'right thing' at the 'right time'. The 
RMA is characterised as enabling, rather than prescriptive, legislation. As such, despite the 
devolution of resource management to the local authorities, it says little about what 
mechanisms must be used in the course of that management. 
In its strictest sense, the RMA does not cater for social, economic or cultural issues except in 
the context of their effects on the environment. However, there is continuing debate over the 
interpretation of the purpose. 842 Some argue for the 'environmental bottom-line' approach 
whereby the biophysical environment cannot be traded or compromised in decision-making. 
Others argue for the 'overall judgement' approach whereby consideration of the social, 
economic and cultural issues must be made. 843 
6.5.1 Central Government - roles and responsibilities 
Under the RMA, the Governor-General is able to prepare national environmental standards 
that have the force of legislation and which local authorities must have regard to in the 
development of all policy statements and plans. 844 National environmental standards are also 
given effect through the granting of resource consents. No national standards have actually 
been set to date, although some are currently being developed. 
Although the RMA is based on the principle of subsidiarity - meaning that decisions are 
taken as close to the community of interest as possible - the Minister for the Environment 
retains the ability to exercise specific decision-making powers. The Minister has the power 
to develop national policy statements to guide local authorities on matters of national 
significance. As part of this process, the Minister must release the proposed statement for 
public comment and appoint a Board of Inquiry to investigate and report on the proposal . 5 
Once approved, local authorities must ensure their plans give effect to any national policy 
statement or any New Zealand coastal policy statement. 846 
842 Government of New Zealand. (2002). "Oceans Policy Stocktake Report - Appendix 1: Analysis of 
Legislation." http:f/www.oceans.govt.nz [Access date: 19 December 2002]. 
843 Upton, S., Atkins, H. and Willis, G. (2002). "Section 5 re-visited: a critique of Skelton & Memon's 
analysis." Simon Upton-on-line website. http://www.arcadia.co.nz/rm/section5.htm [Access date: 
12 June 2004]. 
' 44 	Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.43(l). 
845 Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.46 & 47. 
846 Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended), s. 67(2a). 
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6.12 Regional Councils - roles and responsibilities 
There are 12 regional councils in New Zealand, which govern spatial areas defined by major 
terrestrial water catchment boundaries.' They are responsible for managing the use of land, 
air and water resources and for coordinating the management of these resources at the 
regional scale. They are vested with the authority to control pollution (that is, discharges of 
contaminants to land/air/water, water quality/quantity) and are responsible for controlling 
water abstraction (including geothermal energy), soil conservation, coastal management and 
natural hazard mitigation. 848 
Regional councils must prepare regional policy statements that establish the resource 
management issues in the region, state the environmental goals and means to achieve them 
and outline policies for integrated resource management . 849  Regional policy statements must 
not be inconsistent with any water conservation order and must give effect to any national 
policy statement or New Zealand coastal policy statement. 850  These policy statements 
provide the directional framework from which regional and district plans are prepared. 
Regional councils may also prepare regional plans to provide the detail necessary to fulfil the 
policy requirements. These regional plans are not (with the exception of coastal plans) 
compulsory, but must be prepared if a council wishes to exercise regulatory control. 
Regional plans are: binding on all resource users; identify significant management issues; 
and set out appropriate objectives, policies and methods to address these issues. They also 
specify the information required for resource consent applications and outline the possible 
environmental results that may occur with implementation of the plans. 85 ' All plans must 
give effect to any national policy statement or New Zealand coastal policy statement and 
must not be inconsistent with water conservation orders or regional policy statements. 852 
6.5.3 District/City Councils - roles and responsibilities 
There are 69 district, or city councils, referred to as territorial/local authorities in New 
Zealand, that are responsible for land use and surface river/lake planning, subdivision and 
noise pollution. 853  Territorial authorities must prepare district plans that identify significant 
resource management issues in the district and set out the objectives, policies and methods to 
... Ministry for the Environment (1999) "Your Guide to the Resource Management Act...": 18. 
848 Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.30. 
849 Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZJ, s.62. "° Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZJ, s.62(3). 
Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.67(1). 
852 Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.67(2). 
853 Ministry for the Environment (1999) "Your Guide to the Resource Management Act...": 18. 
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address these issues .954  However, before adopting any provision, the local authority must 
demonstrate that it is necessary and the most effective and efficient means relative to other 
means. Thus, although local authorities must have plans, the content of those plans is not 
prescribed. 
Similar to regional plans, district plans must specify the information required for resource 
consent applications and outline the environmental results that may occur with 
implementation of the plan. District plans must give effect to national policy statements and 
New Zealand coastal policy statements and must not be inconsistent with water conservation 
orders, regional policy statements and regional plans. 855 Provisions of district plans may 
include rules controlling land use (including rules requiring activities to obtain resource 
consent), designations, or a notice to the community of an intention to use land for a 	- 
particular purpose, and heritage orders to protect heritage characteristics of particular places. 
6.5.4 Public participation - rights of appeal & the Environment Court 
The Act gives local authorities much discretion about whether to and how to do things. It 
also emphasises consultation and provides significant opportunities for public participation, 
through public submission processes, and rights of appeal. All persons have had at least two 
(and often many more) opportunities to make submissions on plans before they are adopted. 
However, an amendment was made in 2003 to include provisions to cut back on public 
notification for the specific case of resource consent applications with only minor 
environmental effects .856  For those applicants that have been unable to obtain approval from 
all affected parties, but where environmental effects are only minor, then the new 
amendments allow the council to notify only those deemed to be affected, rather than the 
prolonged delays and financial costs associated with fill public notification .857  This may be 
seen to compromise the transparency of such processes on the one hand, but on the other 
hand will minimise delays and costs of relatively 'safe' consents so that focus can remain on 
the more complex approvals processes. 
All persons who make submissions have a right to appeal to the specialist Environment 
Court should they be dissatisfied with the local authority's decision. 858 In addition, any 
person who has an interest greater than the public generally, whether or not they were a 
submitter, has the right to appear at a Court hearing. Depending on the significance of the 
854 Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.75(1). 
855 Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.75(2). 
856 Ministry for the Environment. (2004). "Amendments to the Resource Management Act." 
http://www.mfe.govt.nzllaws/rma/amendments.html  [Access date: 12 July 2004]. 
857 Ibid. 
Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.120. 
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potential effects, similar rights of participation can be available with respect to resource 
consents. The broad rights of participation extend to allowing any person to seek 
enforcement action against any resource user acting contrary to the Act, or even against a 
local authority for not adequately fulfilling its functions. 
The Environment Court is a critical part of the regime. The Court, consisting of a Judge and 
two specialist/technical commissioners, issues enforcement notices and hears appeals on 
both resource consents and plans. 859 Lodging an appeal is a relatively straightforward and 
inexpensive procedure. In considering appeals, the Environment Court hears the matter 
afresh and may overrule, amend or uphold the local authority's decision as it sees fit. 
6.5.5 Resource consents 
Resource consents are effectively permission to use or develop a natural or physical 
resource and/or carry out an activity that affects the environment. 860 The RMA includes five 
types of applications for consent of activity. These are for: 
land use consent; 
subdivision consent; 
water permits; 
permits for discharges to water, land or air; and 
coastal permits for any use of a coastal resource. 861 
The vast majority of resource consents are obtained from regional or district and city 
councils. However, there are two exceptions: 
• resource consents may be called in and determined by the Minister for the 
Environment (although, to date, this has only occurred once) 862 ; and 
particular activities identified in the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement as 
Restricted Coastal Activities are ultimately determined by the Minister of 
Conservation (see below)863 
Each application for resource consent must be accompanied by a comprehensive 
environmental impact assessment as part of the application to determine the effects of the 
activity on the environment.SM  The emphasis is on management of the environmental effects 
859 Ministry for the Environment (1999) "Your Guide to the Resource Management Act....: 20. 
860 Ibid: 26. 
86! Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.87. 
862 Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.140. 
863 Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.117(1). 
864 Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s.88(2b). 
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rather than on the activity itself. Land use, subdivision and coastal consents for reclamation 
have an infinite lifespan, unless stated otherwise. 86' All other consents may be obtained for a 
maximum 35-year period and if no time is specified, consent applies for a five-year 
period .866  Review times may be specified in the consent terms but review outside these 
agreed periods is restricted to particular circumstances(principally the adoption of a new 
regional plan). 
6.5.6 Coastal areas 
Coastal areas are dealt with as something of a special case under the RMA. The Minister of 
Conservation (the Minister) is assigned the task of preparing a New Zealand Coastal Policy 
Statement (NZCPS) taking into account the physical, biological, social and economic 
considerations of coastal management (the first was adopted on 5 May 1994) .867  Under the 
umbrella of the NZCPS, regional councils prepare their policy statements specific to the 
needs of the region. At a more issues-based level, regional councils must prepare regional 
coastal plans that cover their regions from the mean high water spring tide to the limit of the 
territorial sea .868  These plans must be approved by the Minister. The allocations, water and 
discharge aspects of activities in the coastal marine area, including aquaculture activities, are 
managed through coastal plans and the coastal permit process. Local district authorities are 
then assigned the task of developing district plans to manage land-use activities of the 
coastal area. 869 Regional councils approve coastal permits except in the case of restricted 
coastal activities (RCAs), which are activities identified as having potentially significant 
environmental effects. Although regional councils are involved in considering RCA 
applications, the Minister for Conservation makes the final decision. 
There are two contentious issues confronting New Zealand coastal management under the 
provisions of the RMA. These are the aquaculture moratorium, leading up to the aquaculture 
reform package, and the foreshore and seabed debate. Aquaculture has had a complex and 
somewhat confusing history with management coming under one of two Acts - the Marine 
Fanning Act 1971 or the RMA - and permits and licensing issued under two different Acts - 
the RMA (coastal permit) and the Fisheries Act 1983.870  In March 2002, the Resource 
Management (Aquaculture Moratorium) Amendment Act 1002 was passed imposing a two- 
865 Resource Management Act 1991 (as amended) [NZ], s. 123(a & b). 
866 	1991 (as amended) [NZ], s. 123(c). 
867 Ministry for the Environment. (2002). http://www.mfe.govt.nz/managementlact.htm  ; and 
Rosier, J. and Hastie, W. (1996). "New-Zealand coastal planning: an issue-based approach." Ocean 
& Coastal Management, 33(1-3): 147-165. 
868 Rosier and Hastie (1996). 
869 Ibid. 
870 Gibbs, N. (2002). "The Aquaculture Moratorium - blunt instruments vs. targeted tools." Resource 
Management Journal, March 2002, X (fl: 12-14. 
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year moratorium on the granting of RMA coastal permits for aquaculture activities . 871  The 
moratorium allows councils to plan for aquaculture development in line with the Resource 
Management (Aquaculture Reform) Bill, expected to be introduced into Parliament in late 
2004. The imposed moratorium, however, has been the cause of conflicts between 
government and the marine farming industry. Industry believing that the moratorium 
severely limits theft development capacity to meet the rising demands of the international 
market, and government wanting to take the time to ensure adequate legislation is in place to 
minimise conflicts between resource users and to ensure a sustainable and viable industry. 873 
The joint aquaculture reform, between the Ministry of Fisheries and the Department of 
Conservation, is intended to provide the framework for sustainable marine farming in New 
Zealand by rolling the regulation of environmental impacts of aquaculture into the RMA, 
rather than being split between the two different Acts as is currently the case. 874 
The foreshore and seabed debate has stemmed from a decision of the Court of Appeal in 
June 2003, which indicated that the Maori Land Court had jurisdiction to consider claims of 
customary rights of the foreshore and seabed. 871  If the Maori Land Court found evidence for 
customary title, it was alluded to that a new freehold title could be created for that land. This 
decision attracted adverse media coverage focusing on the public outcry of those who were 
concerned for theft freedom of access rights to these foreshore and seabed areas. In response 
to these concerns, the New Zealand Government has tabled a Foreshore and Seabed Bill in 
Parliament, which reinforces the public right of access to the foreshore and seabed through 
vesting full ownership of the area with the Crown in perpetuity. 876  The Bill also proposes 
clear recognition of customary rights through increased opportunity for participation in 
decision-making processes and protection of recognised customary activities under the 
provisions of the RMA. Despite this recognition, however, it is clear that the Government 
will not consider any proposal for private tenure of the foreshore and seabed area. 
6.5.7 How are integration and conflict dealt within this NRM model? 
The 'nested' arrangement of the RMA defined by the principle of subsidiarity, establishes 
cross-jurisdictional policy coordination that, as necessary, carries through from the central 
government down to the district or city councils. It is explicitly stated that regional policy 
statements must give effect to national policy statements, regional plans must give effect to 
878 Ministry for the Environment. (2004). "Aquaculture reform." 
http://www.mfe.govt.nzlissues/resource/aquaculture/ [Access date: 12 June 20041. 
872 Ibid. 
873 Gibbs (2002). 
874 Ministry for the Environment (2004) "Aquaculture reform" 
875 Ministry for the Environment. (2003). "The Foreshore and Seabed of New Zealand: Protecting 
Public Access and Customary Rights." Summary of Government's Proposals. August 2003. 
876 NZ Government. (2004). "Foreshore and Seabed Bill." Government Bill. 22 April 2004. 
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national policy statements and not be inconsistent with regional policy statements and 
district plans must give effect to national policy statements and must not be inconsistent with 
any of the regional instruments. This mechanism seeks a relatively loose form of policy 
coordination, around a Level 4 on the Policy Integration Scale (see Section 1.2.1), with the 
RMA ostensibly enabling considerable variation in policy approaches through the use of the 
flexible but 'negative' approach of the not inconsistent test. 
Furthermore, policy integration is arguably limited in that the RMA promotes a largely one-
way coordination framework with each level of government obliged to coordinate with the 
next level up the hierarchical chain of governance. The extent to which the RMA promotes 
policy and management integration between governments is difficult to assess. Local 
authorities must consult with relevant Minister(s) and other local authorities affected by 
plans and policies. Although local authorities have a high degree of discretion over the 
extent to which views of others are accommodated, any of these aggrieved parties is able to 
refer any dispute to the Environment Court to be settled if necessary. 
Cross-jurisdictional integration is promoted through the RMA that provides for: local 
authorities to prepare combined plans with other local authorities; regional councils to 
prepare plans that address a number of resources in an integrated way; the ability to transfer 
functions; and to hear development proposals jointly where more than one management 
agency is involved. The seamless jurisdiction from land extending over coastal water is 
limited only by the fact that it ends at the territorial sea boundary (1 2nm), outside which ad 
hoc regimes exist. Due to the dynamic nature of the oceans, this can be problematic when 
trying to effectively manage environmental outcomes. While a number of mechanisms 
enable integration, none ensure it. There is seemingly a tension within the RMA between a 
desire to promote integration and a desire for a devolved system to allow for local 'special 
case' solutions to local issues. Much depends on the individual management decisions of 
local authorities, as is consistent with the RMA' s promotion of an essentially devolved 
management system. 
The purpose of the RMA establishes the Act as a non-sectoral management regime that 
focuses on environmental effects rather than activities, uses, or sectors. It provides for a full 
range of uses by not distinguishing between them, relying instead on the assessment of 
effects to determine what is accommodated and what is not. The pursuit of social, economic 
or cultural outcomes is not within the scope of the purpose. However, balance is achieved 
by ensuring these conditions are a relevant consideration. Limitations on social and 
economic welfare must be justified on robust environmental grounds. 
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Cross-sectoral integration, although effectively redundant in the values-based approach of 
the RMA, is compromised due to the incomprehensive nature of the document with 
reference to the resources that it covers. 
For instance: 
. fisheries management is not addressed in the RMA, even though the impacts on 
aquatic biodiversity are; 
• there is an untidy interface with indigenous forestry, whereby two separate and un-
integrated regimes apply to the management of indigenous forests. One of these 
regimes is the RMA that is intended to address the impacts on indigenous 
biodiversity and the other is for the "protection of areas of significant indigenous 
vegetation" as a national priority; and 
• aquaculture also has an untidy regime whereby pre-1991 farms are currently 
managed under a separate Marine Farming Act, and post-1991 farms are managed 
under the RMA. however, in both circumstances licenses issued under the 
Fisheries Act and RMA coastal permits are required. This complex regime is 
currently being addressed in the Aquaculture Review and is expected to be resolved 
with the passing of the Resource Management (Aquaculture Reform) Bill in late 
2004 .877 
The RMA, however, does not set out to ensure a particular balance of uses is achieved. That 
is left to the individual decisions of sectors and users. Conflict between competing users on 
plan and resource consents is resolved in public decision-making forums. Critical to the 
feasibility of the approach is the open and participatory decision-making processes. Recent 
amendments to limit opportunity for participation should not impact the transparency of the 
process too greatly, as these amendments only apply to very specific scenarios and all 
directly impacted should effectively be consulted. Generally, planning processes provide 
multiple opportunities for public participation and there is open access to appeal to the 
specialist Environment Court. 
6.6 Lessons for Australia 
Regional marine planning in Australia is only one of many terrestrial and marine initiatives 
working towards ecologically sustainable development as envisioned in the National 
Strategy for ESD. In Canada, the wide ranging array of SD initiatives has been recognised 
and rather than attempting to manage them as one integrative unit, they are assessing each 
program's capability to meet the overall national objectives for SD. This 'bottom-up' 
877 Ministry for the Environment (2004) "Aquaculture reform". 
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approach ensures that individual components of the management system have adequate 
capacity to meet the overall objectives of sustainable developmement through integrated 
management. To this end, it is important that RMPs incorporate a performance assessment 
system that ascertains whether the RrvfP is meeting the overall national objectives of AOP 
and ESD, as well as the specific objectives of the RMP itself. This will also require a more 
systemic approach whereby capacity within each contributing sector to address integration, 
as encapsulated by regional marine planning, will need to be built and effectively 
implemented. 
Effective government and stakeholder engagement and consultation is a recurring issue in 
NRM models internationally, as well nationally. Token gestures of support by provincial 
govermnent is evident in the WCVJAMB and thus compromises the Board's capacity to deal 
with issues in an integrative way. Likewise the state consultative groups involved in the 
development of the SERIvIP might also be accused of tokenism. The development process 
for Australia's Oceans Policy was praised for its effective engagement and consultation with 
relevant stakeholders and the general public. The development process for the SERMP, 
however, has likewise been criticised for selective consultation with specific representatives 
of the community and peak stakeholder groups. While these representatives have been 
selected or choose to participate on the basis of their expertise and representativeness, some 
feel that a more open and transparent process should have carried through to the regional 
marine planning stage. Canada's ESSIM Initiative provides for this continuing engagement 
through annual ESSIM Forum Workshops. In this way, stakeholders and the wider 
community not involved in the thy-to-day developments of the Plan are assured of a regular 
opportunity to contribute to the planning process, get updates and provide feedback. 
Most NRM models involve some form of planning. Australia's SERMP lacked any formal 
planning process in the beginning and this arguably contributed to the tardiness of its 
development and limited capacity to address planning issues per se. The Quatsino Sound 
Plan is based on a tenure system under the auspices of the provincial Land Use legislation. 
Currently, Australia has no legislation for the integrated planning and management of its 
offshore jurisdiction. The tenure system incorporated in the Quatsino Sound Plan offers 
some potential insights into possible tenure arrangements for Australian activities offshore, 
which would embrace the current sectoral governance arrangements but also plan for the 
cumulative impacts of activities in the region. 
New Zealand's RMA is a working example of how the nesting of planning arrangements can 
work to ensure that the will of central government is followed for the national benefit, 
without the need for central government to apply strict controls. Australia has the capacity 
218 
CHAPTER 6: INTERNATIONAL ARM MODELS 
to adopt such an approach to integrated oceans management and is attempting to do so 
through the MACC's IOM Working Group. However, the constitutional division of power 
between states and the Commonwealth potentially limits Australia's capacity to adopt a 
nested approach. Australia has no binding overarching direction or objectives for integrated 
oceans management, therefore there are no guarantees that the Commonwealth's oir states' 
efforts towards effective integrated oceans management will be reflected or complemented 
across all marine jurisdictions. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter illustrates some of the similarities in natural resource management between 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, which all maintain a relatively sectoral approach to 
management whilst attempting to incorporate effective principles of integrated management. 
The principle of 'subsidiarity' is used by all these countries and is illustrative of the 
'negative' approach to integration that has worked well in the sectoral-based, hierarchical 
governance systems. Canada is slowly moving towards a more 'positive' approach to 
integration, which encourages practical participative management and effective 
communication. It will be important for Australia to adopt some of these more proactive 
approaches to integration in the regional marine planning process, including incentives to 
build capacity for integration from within sectoral arrangements. 
The following chapter draws from the information in this chapter, and all previous chapters, 
to propose some tools and approaches for oceans and fisheries management that will enhance 
the capacity of Australian fisheries to meet the integration objectives of integrated oceans 
management. These tools and approaches build on current management practices in 
Australia, some reflected in other natural resource management areas, and on international 
experience to provide a well informed inventory of tools that effectively address the 
implementation issues of integration and conflict management, as identified in the Chapter 
One. 
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PART IV: 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis aimed to address critical issues in the implementation of fisheries management in 
regional marine planning under Australia's Oceans Policy. Preceding chapters have 
identified implementation issues and examined a number of initiatives, both Australian and 
international, in natural resource management. This enables the identification of tools and 
approaches that can address the primary concerns of integration and conflict management in 
the implementation of fisheries management under the framework of regional marine 
planning in Australia. 
This chapter examines a number of alternative tools and approaches - in effect a 'toolbox' - 
to address integration and conflict management in fisheries and oceans management. The 
'toolbox' draws from the information gathered in this study and is separated into 
instrumental 978  and institutional879 tools for implementation in recognition of the fact that 
these are two separate, but highly dependent processes required for the successful 
implementation of an integrated approach to resource management. This dichotomy, while 
to a degree an artificial construct, reinforces the key point that instrumental tools, such as 
national policies, will not necessarily bring about change without the appropriate 
institutional, or structural, arrangements in place to operationalise them. Likewise, 
institutional tools, such as participative forums, will not promote integration or change if 
there is no guiding instrument or clear will for change to coordinate activities. 
7.1 Approaches for integration and conflict management 
While more specific solutions have been proposed in this chapter to address specific fisheries 
and oceans issues, there are some overarching tools that can be used in Australia to aid 
policy integration and support improved conflict management. 
878 Instrumental tools refer to policies, principles, legislation, etc that are used to guide actions 
towards integrated fisheries and oceans management. 
879 Institutional tools are the governance structures set in place to support integrated management and 
implementation of instrumental tools. 
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7.1.1 A Marine Policy and Legislative Clearing House 
A coordination tool used internationally and mentioned in the development of AOP and 
regional marine planning has been the establishment of a marine policy and legislative 
"clearing house". The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C) would be 
ideally suited to this role, as it has an oversight of all government activity and a policy 
coordination objective. This incudes policy coordination with the states/territories, which 
would ideally suit the cross-jurisdictional and cross-sectoral integration objectives of oceans 
management. A clearing house would not give rise to integration as such, but it does offer 
opportunity for the effective coordination of activities in the marine environment across 
departmental mandates. Feedback and reporting mechanisms could be used to identify areas 
of overlap or inconsistencies in government policy or objectives in the marine sector and 
actioned responses could reflect these accordingly. 
Departments and agencies would be required to register any marine-based policy or 
legislative initiatives, including regulations, with the Clearing House stating objectives and 
management mechanisms. The Clearing House would have the capacity to advise the 
relevant department or agency whether there was any overlap with other management 
arrangements and which other agencies were involved, to reduce the potential for conflict 
upon implementation. It would also ensure that PM&C are well positioned for negotiations 
and coordination with the states/territories on issues to do with integrated oceans 
management. Coordination, rather than integration, through registration with the Clearing 
House is perhaps a more practical first step for integrating activities that, to date, have been 
managed within distinct sectoral arrangements. 
The Clearing House's role centres on 'preventative conflict management' through the early 
identification of potential conflicting objectives. Departments or agencies may be made 
aware of these conflicts by PM&C and be given the prerogative to decide on appropriate 
actions, whether they trigger conflict management mechanisms, or if the department or 
agency feels the probability of the conflict escalating to these triggers is unlikely, to simply 
note the potential and deal with it when and if it arises. The Clearing House could also offer 
an avenue for 'reactive conflict management', such as mediation or conciliation, should 
departments or agencies not be able to satisfactorily manage a conflict. The Clearing House, 
positioned in PM&C, would have access to the broad view of national objectives, hence 
would be well suited to balance objectives and resolve conflicts for national benefit. This 
avenue for conflict management should, however, only be used as a last resort due to the 
personnel demands it would engender if used as the first option. 
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7.1.2 An Ecologically Sustainable Development Auditor 
An ESD Auditor could be established in Australia to assess various sectors for meeting the 
objectives of the National Strategy for ESD. This institutional arrangement could be 
modelled on the Canadian Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development 
and established under the auspices of Australia's National Strategy for ESD, the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 or the Auditor-General Act 
1997 An ESD Auditor would be responsible for increasing government accountability 
over its actions with respect to ESD. This role is arguably already embraced by annual 
reporting mechanisms and performance assessments under the EPBC Act. These provisions 
are, however, tentative and weak and do not adequately address differences in reporting 
structures or establih a standard means to assess ESD. 88 ' A specific ESD Auditor, situated 
in the Australian National Audit Office, would provide for independent scrutiny to ensure 
that ESD was being pursued consistently across the Government. At present the Auditor-
General has the mandate to undertake performance audits, inclusive of environmental audits, 
at his discretion .882  However, as illustrated by experience in Canada, the establishment of a 
well resourced audit institution with a mandate to specifically address ESD issues would be 
significantly more successful At infusing all components of ESD into future policy direction. 
While this would not explicitly help Australia meet integration objectives, it would ensure 
that marine industries are being managed for ESD, and therefore intuitively managing for 
ecosystem health that would contribute to integrated management. The obvious limitation to 
the effectiveness of an ESD Auditor is the absence of power to audit state/territory sectors, 
or to assess whether they were meeting the same ESD objectives, hence cross-jurisdictional 
cohesion would be limited. 
7.1.3 Mediation training 
One of the re-emerging issues in any area of management is the ability of the convenor, or 
chair of meetings, to effectively manage conflicts between parties in order to keep them 
engaged and to reach agreeable solutions to issues. Keeping all parties 'at the table' and 
working together to reach an agreeable outcome is often half the battle in natural resource 
management. 883  It often falls to the convenor, or chair, to play this role while stepping back 
from the actual debate. This is a difficult role for chairs who are also departmental or agency 
880 Rose,G. (2001). "Environmental Performance Auditing of Government - the role for and 
Australian Commissioner for the Environment." Environmental Planning and Law Journal, 18 (3): 
293-318. 
Ibid. 
882 Auditor-General Act 1997 (Cwth), s. 8. 
883 From interview with subject GJ62. 
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representatives as, quite often, these constitute some of the key players in the debate.'"  
While conflict management and more specifically, mediation, comes naturally to some 
managers or convenors, it is important that others are trained in the meeting processes that 
will help achieve effective and lasting results. This is especially important in government 
where officials are acting in the interests of the public good and as such should be able to 
separate 'needs' from 'desires' to achieve effective and balanced outcomes without reaching 
ineffective lowest common denominator decisions. Standard mediation and meeting process 
training for any management position or in the least, access to training, should be provided 
for all public service employees. 885 
The other option is to rely on independent trained mediators recommended by organisations 
such as the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC). The 
NADRAC was established in 1995 and funded by the Australian Government Attorney-
General's Department to advise the Government and Federal courts and tribunals on ADR 
issues .886  The cost of hiring a trained mediator or training internal mediators, at first glance, 
seems quite excessive. However, when looking at the number of issues that could have 
reached a timely and satisfactory resolution if coordinated by a trained mediator from the 
start, the cost becomes somewhat obsolete. Training would also prepare meeting 
participants so that they themselves would recognise distinctive behaviours and the 
importance of distinguishing 'needs' and 'desires' to reach agreeable resolutions. Mediation 
training, however, does not guarantee a good convenor or chair. Much of their success falls 
to an intuitive response to personal characters and an ability to control people, a gift not 
everyone can readily access. 
7.2 Integrated oceans management tools 
The integrated oceans management initiative is technically outside the scope of this study, 
due to the jurisdictional limitations of the SERMP. It has been included because, without 
complementary state arrangements or at least agreement to cooperate, the SERMP will be 
ineffectual. The influence of urban run-off, intense coastal activity and other land-based 
pollution cannot be ignored in such a dynamic and interconnected environment as the 
oceans, where impacts will be felt through time and space, knowing no jurisdictional 
884 Middle, G. (2004). "Institutional arrangements, incentives and governance - unlocking the barriers 
to successful coastal policy making." Queensland: Cooperative Research Centre for Coastal Zone 
Estuary & Waterway Management (Coastal CRC). A report from the Coast to Coast 2002 
Conference, Tweed Heads. Published April 2004: 8. 
885 A recommendation also reflected in coastal management - see Middle (2004): 10. 
886 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC). (2004). "ABOUT 
NADRAC: What is NADRAC?" Canberra: Attorney-General's Department. 
http://www.law.gov.aulwww/disputeresolutionHome.nsflHeadingPagesDisplay/About+NADRAC?  
OpenDocument [Access date: 31 May 20041. 
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boundaries. For this reason, and in recognition of the evolution of integrated oceans 
management, this section provides some tools for the effective implementation of integrated 
oceans management. 
Are current integrated oceans managemend oceans policy arrangements addressing the 
issue of integration (cross-jurisdictional / cross-sectoral)? 
At present, the IOMWG of the NRMMC is working on a nationally agreed set of principles 
of good governance to assist cooperation and consistency in oceans management across 
jurisdictional boundaries. 887 This national approach will advance Australia towards greater 
cross-jurisdictional cohesion with respect to the objectives of the ESD of our oceans. Is 
agreement of "principles of good governance" enough? Will this be another half-hearted 
attempt at addressing key issues? Should we be working towards a stronger commitment 
towards integrated oceans management from all jurisdictions? Some alternative proposals 
that address these issues are outlined in this section. 
Cross-sectoral integration is addressed clearly in AOP and consequently in the SERMP. The 
development of MPAs, fisheries spatial management, a national system to address the 
problem of introduced marine pests, cumulative impact multiple-use risk assessment, 
estuarine and coastal water quality monitoring and a system of indicators to measure marine 
ecosystem health, all contribute to the cross-sectoral management of the oceans to ensure the 
conservation and protection of marine ecosystems. 888  Despite these significant steps towards 
ecosystem-based management, individual sectoral management is maintained and may prove 
an impediment to cross-sectoral integration beyond basic coordination. A number of 
alternative cross-sectoral approaches are identified in this section. 
Do current integrated oceans management/A OP arrangements include effective conflict 
management provisions? 
Integrated oceans management has to incorporate conflicts associated with past but relevant 
policy developments, such as that associated with the Commonwealth passing of AOP. 
Participative processes are recognised as tools to heed such conflict and induce momentum 
towards satisfactory resolution. These are some of the approaches being used by the 
IOMWG. Preventative conflict management mechanisms include comprehensive policy 
development, planning and coordination, networking, information dissemination and public 
887 National Oceans Office. (2004). "South-east Regional Marine Plan - Implementing Australia's 
Oceans Policy in the South-east Marine Region." Hobart: National Oceans Office: 18. 
888 Ibid: 32. 
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consultation. 889 These have all been incorporated into the development of the SERMP under 
AOP to varying degrees. The development of the SERMP has included comprehensive 
planning and coordination mechanisms as well as extensive information dissemination 
avenues and several commendable opportunities for public consultation in the process. 
However, as pressure increased for the timely release of the Plan, public consultation was 
reduced and tensions mounted as stakeholders felt locked out of the process once again. 
This had the potential to reignite old conflicts and work against the NOO in gaining public 
trust and acceptance of the final Plan. It is important that once opened, consultation channels 
are maintained and stakeholders remain engaged. This section identifies some avenues for 
effective stakeholder consultation processes in an effort to minimise the potential for future 
conflicts. 
7.2.1 A National Integrated Oceans Management Policy 
The IOMWG of the NRMMC's MACC, has the potential to readdress cross-jurisdictional 
conflicts that arose in the development of AOP. Originally intended as a national oceans 
policy, AOP had the potential to create a nationally agreed approach to the management and 
use of Australia's oceans. That chance was overrode for political reasons, but has since been 
re-captured through the work plan of the IOMWG. The IOMWG is working towards 
integrated approaches to sustainable ocean use that crosses jurisdictional boundaries. 
Although 'principles of good governance' are being developed for the management of the 
oceans, these guiding principles may not take a strong stance towards supporting the ongoing 
integrated ESD of the oceans. It is therefore possible that a national approach, such as a 
National Integrated Oceans Management Policy, could be developed with associated 
indicators and performance measures to determine if the objectives of the policy are being 
met over time. This policy could not comprise blanket regulations, but rather would need to 
be broad enough to encapsulate jurisdictional differences in ocean management approaches 
whilst maintaining an integrated approach towards the conservation of the oceans. This 
approach would be endorsed by the COAG before implementation, and therefore would have 
a strong cross-jurisdictional foundation. One of the primary breakdowns in the national 
approach to AOP was the lack of clarity with respect to financial incentives for states to sign 
on to such a policy. Any new policy would need to adopt federal funding incentives for state 
sign on and ongoing joint funding arrangements for monitoring national performance. This 
would give the states security in that they could retain their associated management 
889 Commission of Inquiry into the Conservation, Management and Use of Fraser Island and the Great 
Sandy Region and The Cabinet Office of New South Wales. (1990). "Public Issue Dispute 
Resolution —A Joint Discussion Paper."; and 
From interview with subject XU1 1. 
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arrangements, but also be eligible for federal funding assistance under the federal-led 
integrated oceans management program. Funding would be provided for states to 
accordingly adjust theft arrangements in line with a national policy and its associated 
objectives. 
7.2.2 Conservation Zoning 
Although zoning has not been promoted in the development of AOP and in regional marine 
planning to date due to a lack of stakeholder support, it should not be discounted as a viable 
option for future RMPs. Stakeholders are implicitly supporting some form of zoning in the 
development of RMPs to ensure security of access for the future. This perhaps reflects the 
lack of understanding of multiple-use management by stakeholders in the early stages of 
regional marine planning, where the NOO was itself showing signs of uncertainty over the 
best way forward for integrated oceans management. Effective marketing and confident 
delivery of options, with an indication of potential and probable impacts to industries from 
the onset would have arguably curtailed this blanket rejection of zoning. The other major 
impediments to explicit zoning involve accommodating interests of key industries, such as 
petroleum, minerals and biotechnology, over concerns that zoning would lock these 
industrial uses from areas when neither the resource potential nor the impacts of exploration 
in given areas is sufficiently known. 
Conservation Zoning890 .is an approach not dissimilar to the South Australian ecologically 
rated (ER) zones, incorporated in their marine planning process. In effect this falls in line 
with multiple-use planning and management being pilot tested in the Otways region of the 
south-cast. Conservation Zoning would require that the region, in this case the South-east 
Region, be divided into subunits potentially based on bioregions. Each bioregion would then 
be assessed in terms of importance in the overall function of the regional ecosystem and 
assigned a conservation category with an associated maximum number of allowable impact 
units. The current and potential uses of the bioregion would then be ascertained and through 
multiple-use risk assessment processes, each activity/use and combination of activities/uses 
would be assigned an impact unit according to the impact or cumulative impact the 
activity(s)/use(s) has on the ecosystem health. 'Subjectivity would be unavoidable in 
assigning impact units, but the adoption of a rigorous, replicable and transparent risk 
assessment process would prevent this from becoming an issue. The bioregion would then 
be managed according to the allowable impact for the area, with no one sector allowed to 
dominate more than 30% of the collective regional area, unless specifically authorised due to 
890 An approach developed by the author in early work at DAFF in February 2002 S a possible way 
forward for the SERMP to incorporate effective integration and conflict management principles. 
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a lack of competition from other uses. Once the maximum number of allowable impact units 
is reached, no more activities or uses would be allowed in the bioregion until impact units 
are reduced to, or are below, the maximum allowable impact units. By disallowing any use 
or activity from occurring once the total allowable impact units are reached, all industries or 
sectors in the zone should feel the ramifications equally and will potentially work together to 
find a timely solution to a reduction in impact units. 
Guidelines for conflict management in determining the reduction of impact units would need 
to be pre-determined and a timeframe for the trigger of an alternative conflict management 
mechanism should the stakeholders fail to reach an agreeable solution in a timely fashion, 
should also be pre-determined. Similar to multiple-use management, this would require 
conservation, economic and social and cultural objectives to be set for each zone. A pre-
determined process to balance the allowed uses to meet these objectives, would also be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. These processes should be pre-determined to ensure 
security for industry and confidence in the process. Mother advantage of this approach 
would be that in some conservation zones, uses or activities exceeding a pre-determined 
number of impact units may be disallowed as too impact intensive for that given area. This 
would be based on the assumption that there are known overall impacts, and therefore effects 
associated with particular values of impact units. Obviously the maximum number of 
allowable impact units would need to be regularly reviewed and monitored in terms of 
regional ecosystem health requiring ecosystem indicators, triggers and management 
mechanisms for quick response to be incorporated in the overall SERMP. As experienced in 
the MPA process, the issue of compensation or structural adjustment is bound to arise and 
need to be addressed prior to implementation. 
7.2.3 An Integrated Oceans Management Act 
One option to further strengthen the concept of conservation zoning, would be the 
development of an Integrated Oceans Management Act. Theie are a number of options for 
such legislation. As a support for the concept of Conservation Zoning, this legislation could 
be a planning act providing for the tenure of activities and uses in the offshore marine region 
delivered through regional marine planning. Refining this legislation to allow applications 
for resource use to be referred to an assessment board based on bioregions, would ensure that 
maximum allowable impact units are not exceeded and that the overall objectives of 
conservation of ecosystem health in the region are achieved. This type of framework to 
administer use is not dissimilar to the Clearing House concept. It would not explicitly 
encourage integration, but would involve the coordination of activities to meet set objectives. 
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This legislation could in theory be modelled on the complementary Commonwealth and state 
approach that underpinned the Offshore Constitutional Settlement. Since regional marine 
planning currently remains under the auspices of AOP, the process only relates to 
Commonwealth legislation, applicable to planning and management in Commonwealth 
waters only, therefore negating any cross-jurisdictional integration potential. The nature of 
ecosystem-based management and integrated oceans management infers that any legislation 
should be applicable across jurisdictional boundaries. Despite this seemingly obvious 
practicality, our federal system makes it extremely unlikely that all states and territories as 
well as the Commonwealth will agree to come under the same planning legislation, 
especially given the fiscal and management issues that would arise. 
A national approach to legislation for integrated oceans management would need to respect 
the independent management regimes of states, territories and the Commonwealth, yet lay 
the ground rules for effective integration based on the land-coast-ocean continuum. This 
could be accomplished through the setting of overall objectives for the region, crossing the 
land-coast-ocean interface and putting these in legislation as well as any national monitoring 
and reporting requirements to determine the success of integrated oceans management in 
meeting these objectives nationally. This could also simply be accomplished through 
establishing legislative state-Commonwealth coordinating bodies to ensure management 
across the jurisdictional boundary is complementary. It would require states to work with 
the Commonwealth in devising state coast and marine plans, and likewise the 
Commonwealth to work with the states in developing RMPs. This is arguably occurring in 
the Commonwealth's AOP process through the SE States Consultative Working Group, 
however, it is more a one-way informative consultation between the Commonwealth and 
states rather than a two-way participative consultation. There is no legislative requirement to 
complement or integrate with either regime nor work towards a common objective for the 
land-coast-ocean interface. 
7.2.4 The future for Marine Protected Areas 
The NRSMPA has the potential to address the issue of integration as raised in the RMP 
process through area or seasonal management with respect to user conflicts, the potential to 
counteract some of the detrimental effects of resource exploitation and as a reference point 
for future scientific assessments. Effective implementation, however, depends on 
stakeholder support while maintaining scientific credibility and achieving conservation 
objectives. An important lesson that has emerged from the current MPA process is the need 
to slow down and take the appropriate time to work through the issues of conflict between 
stakeholders. This may require a disassociation from the regional marine planning process 
and associated deadlines. In doing so all parties may reach consensus, hence ending up with 
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80% of what they want, rather than the lowest common denominator that may result from a 
rushed effort. Consensus-based decisions would also promote a greater sense of ownership 
of the process that can assist with enforcement down the track. 891 However, political 
pressure to deliver tangible outcomes in the SERMP dictates that this time will not be 
taken .892  This is relevant for the MPA process, but also for any such planning process that 
involves multiple stakeholders. The MPA process depends on credible science but, given the 
gaps in knowledge and time required to adequately address these gaps, cannot be based on 
credible science if rushed through. 
There is also a need for clarity with respect to the MPA process; how it involves 
stakeholders and what is required of them. 893  The use of BAOJ has created unnecessary 
uncertainty for stakeholders with interests in the BAOI and should not be used in future 
plans, but rather the Region should be a blank map from which work with stakeholders and 
scientists identifies appropriate MPA areas. The fact that the fishing industry are satisfied 
with MPA processes as running in Tasmania for example, indicates that industry will come 
on board to MPAs if given clear guidelines with respect to the process of identification and 
selection and the opportunity to have their say and be actively heard. 894 The Commonwealth 
needs to perhaps learn from their counterparts and slow down to ensure that the objectives 
for establishing MPAs are met and that everyone is on board. If not, enforcement issues are 
certain to become problematic in the future. 
There are options that could ease the anxieties of the fishing industry over the designation of 
MPAs. One option would be to assign MPA selection to an independent body (such as the 
Resource Planning and Development Commission in Tasmania) answerable to the NOMB 
with some form of an appeals tribunal in place so that fishers and other stakeholders may 
present their case. 
Another possible avenue for the effective implementation of MIPAs, free of political 
influence, would be a combined private/public sector designation process. The private sector 
would be responsible for the identification of candidate sites and would be answerable to the 
public and relevant stakeholders, taking into account all the biological, social, economic and 
cultural issues. Government could provide the legislative and policy backing for the 
effective implementation and ongoing management of the designated areas. The carefully 
appointed private sector has no particular vested interest in the identification of candidate 
MPAs and is proposed as a good alternative to public sector MPAs that are understandably 
89! From interview with subject GJ62. 
892 From interview with subject FM66. 
893 Ibid. 
894 From interview with subject MD21. 
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influenced by the 'politics of the day'. 895 The problem with solely private sector MPAs is 
that they often lack the capacity to address the issues of effective monitoring and compliance 
and adequate funding resources that go along with these responsibilities. The question is 
also raised of whether MPAs, which dictate the management of public resources, can be 
governed by the private sector in as much as fishers do not 'own' the fish, rather the 'right' 
to fish. Hence a combined effort could potentially free MPA designation from political 
whims and industry influence. A business management approach by the private sector to 
MPA designation based on credible science and conservation objectives, not inconsistent 
with government policy and legislation, could be effectively implemented and monitored by 
the government. 
7.3 Fisheries management tools 
Are current fisheries management/policy arrangements meeting the objectives of integration 
(cross-jurisdictional /cross-sectoral /intra-sectoral)? 
Cross-jurisdictional integration of fisheries management is inadvertently achieved through 
bilateral negotiations under OCS agreed arrangements. This is only inadvertent integration 
because the OCS is based on principles for delivering species-based management rather than 
jurisdictional management, usually by entrusting the management of the species or 
population over its entire range to one or the other jurisdiction. The OCS arrangements work 
well when there are no on-water intra-sectoral interactions, but there needs to be work done 
on how the Commonwealth and States can have joint authority in practice. 896 Other 
problems that have arisen with the OCS relate to multi-species, multi-gear fisheries and 
complementary management arrangements across jurisdictional lines. 897  Some approaches 
to combat these issues are proposed in this section. 
Cross-seetoral integration issues are dealt with under the guise of multiple-use management 
projects directed by the NOO. Whilst this approach has met with some opposition as 
industries want to continue to address these issues themselves, it does present a new 
opportunity for effective conflict management mechanisms to be established. The 	- 
advantages of some of these approaches have been highlighted in this section. 
Intra-sectoral integration is an issue pushed to the forefront of fisheries policy making since 
the inception of the SERMP and the IOM initiative. In recognition of the increasing 
295 Hinkley, L. and Reckseik, H. (2003). "MPA Perspective: Managing conflict with and among user 
groups: winning strategies for MPA managers." MPA News, 4 (10): 6; and 
Middle (2004): 6. 
896 From interview with subject NT49. 
897 From interview with subject LX67. 
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influence of the relatively uncontrolled recreational fishing sector and demand for 
recognition of the indigenous fishing sector, the Commonwealth Government has developed 
a resource sharing framework, which is in the process of being tested. Whilst this provides 
positive opportunity for intra-sectoral management, the complexities involved impede 
expedient implementation. Some current arrangements and alternative proposals are 	- 
presented in this section for their capacity to address intra-sectoral integration. 
Do current fisheries management/policy arrangements include effective conflict management 
provisions? 
Current fisheries management arrangements do not explicitly address the management of 
conflicts, with most significant conflicts being addressed in arbitration. Stakeholder 
participation and inclusion in decision-making processes is recognised as an effective means 
to prevent significant conflicts from occurring. The following sections present alternative 
proposals that address the issue of conflict management within the context of current 
fisheries management processes. 
7.3.1 Regional OCS arrangements 
At present, fisheries OCS arrangements are deliberated on a case-by-case basis between 
relevant jurisdictions as issues arise. It would be beneficial to have a proactive regionally-
based OCS arrangement to complement traditional reactive bilateral arrangements, whereby 
a strategic approach towards issues, such as recreational fishing and multiple-species 
management, can be dealt with cohesively across jurisdictional boundaries within a given 
region. Such a proactive OCS arrangement could be actioned through the Southern Fisheries 
Management Forum (SFMF: see Section 7.4.7) to complement TOM initiatives also actioned 
through the NRMMC. Regional OCS arrangements could also include conflict management 
mechanisms and triggers for known interactions to expedite resolution time for anticipated 
conflicts. 
7.3.2 Fisheries management plans 
Many potential areas of conflict in fisheries were recognised in the 1980s and 1990s. One 
source of conflict centred on the key question of who actually had the right to manage or 
control the fishery? Centralised government control was questioned due to its lack of 
success in the past and pressure rose for a move towards co-management practices and 
industry involvement. 898  In light of an ever-limiting resource, internal fishery conflicts 
898 Charles, A.T. (1992). "Fishery conflicts. A unified framework." Marine Policy, 16 (5): 379-393. 
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between different gear users and different user groups were arising over resource use. 899 
Management plans were being challenged and input-based management practices, such as 
limited gear or limited entry, were being replaced by output-based management, such as total 
allowable catches (TACs). 900 The move away from input-based management approaches 
was designed to reduce effort that was otherwise uncontrollable. 
Output-based management is not suited to all fisheries. It is best used in single species 
fisheries with few fishers, hence few landing points to monitor. It is also a good 
management tool for fisheries producing minimal or no by-catch and targeting species in 
which abundance does not fluctuate unpredictably. 90 ' Output-based management in fisheries 
that involve by-catch species can often lead to discarding and high grading, which is the 
discarding of the low-value part of the catch. Fisheries such as prawn trawl fisheries are 
unsuitable for output-based management, as the prawn abundance is unpredictable and 
highly variable from year to year. 902 Fishers have a great capacity to outmanoeuvre 
bureaucratic control and overfish their given quotas or to escape the limitations of input 
controls, but are increasingly improving their understanding of, hence their capacity to meet, 
ecosystem-based fisheries management objectives. 
ITQs were used as a management tool as early as 1984 in the Southern Bluefin Tuna fishery 
in Australia, but did not feature in other fisheries until the early 1990S.903  ITQs essentially 
give quasi-property rights to fishers, hence they increase stability within the fishing industry 
and reduce overall effort of catch. However, there are apparent problems with ITQs, some 
of which are eminent in Australian fisheries today. Amongst these are the problems 
associated with initial allocation - who to allocate quota to and how much - and the 
problems of compliance and enforcement. 904 A suggested allocation mechanism within the 
commercial fishing sector, and potentially between commercial and recreational sectors, is to 
allocate quota preferentially to graded gear types, the higher grading being equivalent to 
higher environmental protection and more cost-effective production. 905 Quota would be 
Charles (1992). 
900 Haward, M. (1995). "The Commonwealth in Australian Fisheries Management: 1955-1995." The 
Australian Journal ofNatural Resources Law and Policy, 2 (2): 313-325; and 
Kearney, RE., Andrew, N.L. and West, R.J. (1996). "Some issues in the management of 
Australia's marine and coastal fisheries resources." Ocean & Coastal Management, 33(1-3): 133- 
146. 
°' Kearney, Andrew and West (1996). 
902 Ibid. 
903 Campbell, D., Brown, D. and Battaglene, T. (2000). "Individual transferable catch quotas: 
Australian experience in the southern bluefm tuna fishery." Marine Policy, 24: 109-117. 
°" Sutinen, J.G. (1999). "What works well and why: evidence from fishery-management experience in 
OECD countries." ICES Journal ofMczrine Science, 56: 1051-1058. 
905 Kearney, Andrew and West (1996). 
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transferable but only to higher or equivalent gear grading, therefore limiting the quota to the 
more environmentally desirable and cost-effective modes of fishing 
7.3.2.1 	An overarching management plan 
The SESSF (see Section 3.2.1.4) is significant in its approach to regional management 
crossing traditional intra-sectoral barriers in an attempt to meet the objectives of ecosystem-
based fisheries management. However, it is increasingly apparent that commercial fishers 
are not solely to blame for the demise of certain fisheries worldwide. Other contributing 
factors are habitat degradation (from human interference or natural phenomenon), pollution 
and other fishery users, such as recreational and indigenous fishers. 906  There are well 
established controls and checks on the commercial catch in Australia, but the recreational 
catch is managed ad hoc, with no overarching national policy or management guidelines for 
control between jurisdictions. It is speculated that recreational fishing actually exceeds some 
commercial catch statistics, yet has traditionally been unofficially managed .907  Thus what 
has eventuated is a haphazard form of governance of recreational catch, with some states 
imposing recreational licenses with strict bag and other gear limits or seasonal closures, 
whereas in other states, recreational fishers are relatively free from constraint. Likewise, the 
indigenous cultural take is not well recorded and to date is relatively unmanaged due to 
ongoing native title claims and the difficulty in monitoring and enforcing any such 
constraints on cultural take.905 
As fishery management issues emerge, or are publicised, it is evident that the lack of 
knowledge about the impact and size of the recreational and indigenous fishing sectors is 
impeding successful management practices. These issues have increasingly caused conflict 
with other users of the marine environment, especially commercial fishers who are under 
increasingly strict control and cost-recovery management, which they view as impacting 
their livelihood whilst other users of the resource are able to "freely" fish, sometimes even 
competing for the same resource. While the SESSF deals effectively with the regional 
integration of the commercial sector, there lies also the potential to incorporate other users in 
the management plan as well. 
In New Zealand, the TAC is set incorporating commercial and non-commercial take and 
then a commercial TAC (TACC) is allocated. 909 The TACC is set bearing in mind the non-
commercial take, even though the recreational sector is not explicitly allocated quota. The 
906 Kearney, Andrew and West (1996). 
907 Ibid. 
908 From interview with ZA9 1. 
909 Batstone, C.J. and Sharp, B.M.H. (1999). "New Zealand's quota management system." Marine 
Policy, 23(2): 177-190. 
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Maori people are then allocated 20% of the TACC in accordance with the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Fishery Claims) Settlement Act 1992.910  In Australia, resource sharing between fisheries 
user groups was a concept introduced in the Commonwealth Fisheries Policy Review. 
Despite the establishment of a RSMWG to deal with the complex issue of multi-sectoral 
fishing allocations and to provide advice to the Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and 
Conservation (the Minister), this group has focused on the practical implementation of the 
Framework in one fishery and only in relation to recreational and commercial sharing. Since 
meeting in November 2003, the group has still not come to any resolution on the 
implementation of the Framework. 
A different approach would be for the development of an overarching management plan for 
each fishery, setting a global TAC (inclusive of commercial, recreational, indigenous 911  and 
aquaculture catch912 where appropriate), the ecosystem-based management issues pertinent 
to the fishery and the process for intra-sectoral allocation and dispute resolution. The global 
TAC would be based on the best available scientific knowledge of the ecologically 
sustainable yield, taking into account the maximum yield that can be taken from a species 
population or stock without affecting ecosystem functioning. This work would require the 
use of integrated models and decision rules due to the lack of adequate data in most 
scenarios. Once the maximum ecologically sustainable yield, or global TAC, was set then it 
would be up to a central allocation body, perhaps even the AFMA in conjunction with the 
RSMWG (or for another alternative, see Section 7.4.6 on Regional Fisheries Advisory 
Councils) to allocate quota to the commercial sector and the remaining allocation to be 
distributed to the non-commercial uses, maybe even through ITQs, although some strict 
provisions on transfer between the recreational and commercial sectors would need to be 
established. Day-to-thy management could continue under the management of each 
individual sector orjurisdiction as long the ecological objectives of the overarching 
management plan are met and quota is not exceeded. Annual reporting to the central body 
would b! essential and this forum could provide an avenue for conflict management between 
resource users. 
At present, the Framework envisages that the Minister's final allocation decision, based on 
the advice of the RSMWG, will be applied to the TAC (commercial) managed by the 
AYMA.913 This is bound to reinforce the scepticism and suspicion held by industry and will 
undoubtedly meet with demands for compensation if the commercial quota is reallocated to 
910 Batstone and Sharp (1999). 
911 Indigenous catch could be allocated via group recreational fishing licences as in Victoria's 
Fisheries Act 1995 (as amended), s46. 
9t2 Aquaculture catch here refers to wild catch that is fanned for grow out. 
DAFF. (2004). "Explanation of Framework." Support documentation for 4 February 2004 meeting 
of RSMWG. 
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recreational fishers and other resource users. Under the guise of a global TAC, the 
commercial catch should not need to be reallocated if it is shown that the fishery is 
sustainable under the strategic assessments of the EPBC Act. Since recreational and 
indigenous fishing are already occurring outside the assumed sustainable commercial catch, 
these new management components should simply be estimated and allocated a value. The 
global TAC would then comprise the commercial catch plus the newly allocated recreational 
and indigenous catch so that the fishery, as a whole, could be managed for ecological 
sustainability. This would mean that if reductions were required, they would be felt by the 
whole of the fishery, including all resource users under the overarching management plan. 
equally and not primarily by the commercial users. Reductions for conservation purposes 
would also reduce the likelihood or need to pay out compensation. 
7.3.3 Full Ecologically Sustainable Development repo fling for Australian. 
fisheries 
The National Strategy for ESD refers explicitly to Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management 
with specific objectives to meet herewith. One way to ensure fisheries are meeting these 
objectives is to adopt ESD reporting requirements in their entirety, as proposed in the 
National ESD Reporting Framework for Australian Fisheries: The 'How To' Guide for Wild 
Capture Fisheries. At present ESD reporting has been used for only the ecological aspects 
of fisheries. Reporting needs to be adopted for the social and economic aspects of the 
fishery as part of the management plans to determine impacts and to be able to manage for 
the whole of the fishery and its components. 
The SESSF Plan and subsequent environmental accreditation under the EPBC Act illustrates 
the Commonwealth's commitment to ecologically sustainable management of Australian 
fisheries in terms of the economy and the environment. By omitting the social and cultural 
dimensions to fisheries management, ESD objectives are somewhat compromised. To 
overcome this omission, ESD Reporting in its entirety could be incorporated in the 
assessment of the SESSF Plan to highlight risks associated with social and indigenous 
interests in the regional fisheries. The ESD Reporting Framework includes eight 
components of ESD within three main categories. These are the: 
Contribution of the fishery to the ecological well-being (including retained and non- 
retained species and general ecosystems - all of which are covered in current 
fisheries management plans); 
Contributions of the fishery to human well-being (including indigenous, community 
and regional, national social and economic well-being - economic interests being the 
main one covered in current fisheries management plans in accordance with the 
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economic efficiency objective of the FMA, but remaining outside the scope of the 
EPBC Act, which neglects social and economic aspects); and 
. Factors affecting the ability of the fishery to contribute to ESD (including the impact 
of the environment on the fishery and governance arrangements - this part would 
give fisheries a greater capacity to determine external influences on the ability of the 
fishery to meet its objectives).'" 
Performance evaluation of issues raised from the component trees for ESD reporting requires 
an objective, an indicator and a performance measure to determine if the objectives are being 
adequately met and then suggestions as to the current and future fisheries management 
responses should they be triggered.915 Determining the appropriate management responses 
to ESD indicator triggers is imperative to any good management plan and is something that 
is being evaluated in the Southern Regional Fisheries. 
7.14 Management Strategy Evaluation 
Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) deals explicitly with the problems of uncertainty 
and can technically deal with the multiple objectives in striving for ESD and ecosystem-
based fisheries management.916 MSE is different from traditional fisheries management 
techniques in that it does not seek to provide an "optimal" solution for fisheries management, 
but rather it identifies the trade-offs between management objectives that occur when 
applying alternative management strategies. 917  The MSE approach relies on Monte Carlo 
simulation testing of the whole management process based on a set of pre-agreed 
performance measures that are derived from a set of pre-agreed operational management 
objectives. 918 It is at this stage of selecting operational objectives and specify ing 
performance measures that the importance of stakeholder involvement is emphasised. This 
participative process means that there is a high level of peer review, and non-technical 
stakeholders are able to valuably input into the process, hence ensuring ownership and 
914 Fletcher, W.J., Chesson, J., Fisher, M., Sainsbury, K.J., Hundloe, 1., Smith, A.D.M. and 
Whitworth, B. (2002). "National ESD Reporting Framework for Australian Fisheries: The 'How 
To' Guide for Wild Capture Fisheries." FRDC Project 2000/145. Australia: Canberra: 8-9. 
915 Fletcher eta! (2002): p8 . 
916 Smith, A.D.M., Sainsbury, K.J. and Stevens, R.A. (1999). "Implementing Effective Fisheries-
Management Systems - Management Strategy Evaluation and the Australian Partnership 
Approach." ICES Journal ofMarine Science, 56: 967-979. 
117 Punt, A.E., Smith, A.D.M. and Cui, G. (2001). "Review of Progress in the Introduction of 
Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) approaches in Australia's South East Fishery." Marine & 
Freshwater Research, 52: 719-726; and 
Smith, Sainsbury and Stevens (1999). 
918 Sainsbury, K.J., Punt, A.E. and Smith, A.D.M. (2000). "Design of Operational Management 
Strategies for Achieving Fishery Ecosystem Objectives." ICES Journal ofMarine Science, 57: 
731-741. 
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understanding of the evaluation results and potentially minimising future conflicts with the 
results.919 
The MSE approach has been limited to relatively simple models due to the relatively high 
levels of uncertainty and complexity involved with ecosystem-based objectives and 
interactions that have the potential to undermine the scientific defensibility of the process. 920  
There are no guarantees that the management strategies will work out in the real world as 
they do in the simulation. However, if a management strategy cannot meet management 
objectives in the relatively ideal situation of simulation, then there is no reason to believe in 
the real world with less ideal situations that they will achieve any more promising results. 21 
Adopting MSE approaches in fisheries management is thus somewhat of an insurance policy 
and conflict management tool for managers, in that industry and other interested parties are 
also involved in the evaluation process, hence increasing communication between often 
traditionally conflicting parties and giving all parties an increased sense of ownership of the 
outcomes. 922 
The MSE approach also means that there is a likely chance of discovering at least what will 
not work, at least theoretically, in achieving the desired objectives, hence it reduces the costs 
and effort in practical application of redundant management strategies. This advantage 
illustrates how fisheries are moving to a more corporate approach of business management 
and could also prove to be advantageous in integrated oceans management dealing with often 
conflicting objectives of resource users. The wider application of MSE is being applied to 
the multiple-use management of the North West Shelf in Australia through the North West 
Shelf Joint Environmental Management Study (NWSJEMS) with somewhat successful 
results. 913  Some limitations to the project are in the complexity and uncertainty involved in 
evaluating the impacts between users and the response of the ecosystem to the cumulative 
impacts of multiple user groups. However, eventually this analysis should link the 
ecosystem and human impacts to project the cumulative impact of multiple uses and the 
response of the ecosystem to a given management measure, thus offering a potential way 
forward for conflict management and marine planning in the implementation of RMPs. 
Despite significant advantages, the MSE approach has not yet been applied effectively to 
economic or social objectives. This issue is being embarked upon, at least with respect to 
919 Sainsbury, Punt and Smith (2000). 
920 Ibid. 
921 Punt, Smith and Cui (2001). 
922 Smith, Sainsbury and Stevens (1999). 
923 McDonald, A.D., Sainsbury, K.J., Little, V.D., Gray, R. and Fulton, E. (2004). "Multiple Use 
Management Strategy Evaluation for a Coastal Marine Ecosystem." Coast to Coast Conference 
Proceedings. Hobart: 19-23 April 2004. 
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economic objectives, in the Southern Region Fisheries. In the Southern Regional Fisheries, 
the proactive development of the SESSF goes beyond the theoretical implementation of the 
SESSF Plan. In order to put the SESSF at the forefront of the practical implementation of 
Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management, as committed under the National Strategy for ESD 
and building on ESD Reporting mechanisms, the Fisheries Research and Development 
Corporation, the AFMA and the NOO have jointly supported and funded a.3-year $2 million 
"Evaluation of Alternative Management Strategies for management of the SESSF" (AMS) 
project with CSWO. 924 The objectives of the AM  project are to identify key economic and 
environmental issues facing the SESSF and the regional and fishery specific management 
objectives and strategies encompassing the full range of management, measures available, 
then to evaluate integrated management strategies against regional and specific fishery 
management objectives and report them to the AFMA and the relevant MACs and 
stakeholders 925 
7.3.5 Fisheries Observer Policy 
Compliance is a reoccurring issue for fisheries management, which has most recently been 
addressed in the Looking to the Future document. 926  This is especially so in high seas 
fisheries and with regard to IUU fishing activities in the AFZ, however, it is important that 
domestic fisheries are also monitored accordingly for compliance and data collection to be 
used in stock assessments. One way forward would be to develop a Fisheries Observer 
Policy for placing observers on vessels. An independent consulting company could be 
assigned the task of hiring a suite of observers for a minimum five-year induction period, for 
consistency and cost-efficiency of training. The company, in accordance with government 
and industry-agreed training measures, would train each of the candidates in the beginning, 
with refresher courses every year or two depending on the demands on the fishery and 
changes in policy or legislation. Once trained, each observer would be held accountable for 
their work in that if any intentional misreporting were found, all data from that observer 
would be omitted from the official record. Accountability is important, especially if funded 
in partnership with industry. The observer program should be expanded to cover at least 
50% of the major producers within the commercial fisheries and should extend to also cover 
a percentage of the recreational, indigenous, charter and aquaculture industries in accordance 
with their contribution to the fishery as a whole. This would ensure compliance and benefit 
924 AFMA Management. (2004). "Agenda Item 10.2: Alternative Management Strategies and 
Ecological Risk Assessment Projects Update." SETMAC85. Fèbruaiy 2004. 
http://www.afma.gov.au [Access date: 6 June 2004]; and 
Sachse, M. (2003). Personal communication and announcement at the Marine Ecosystems 
Workshop, Cronulla, NSW. 8-10 December 2003. 
925 AFMA Management (2004) "Agenda Item l0.2 ..... 
926 AFFA. (2003). "Looking to the Future: A Review of Commonwealth Fisheries Policy." Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service. Outcomes 3942: 52. 
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integrated management through more accurate stock assessments and records of resource 
use. 
7.3.6 Conflict Management Toolbox 
Conflict management mechanisms have the potential to increase the capacity for integration 
when other instrumental and institutional arrangements are constrained by jurisdictional or 
sectoral conflicts, or when integration requires cooperation between parties with - 
philosophical differences. The accessibility of these approaches to fishers and fisheries 
managers is currently limited by a lack of knowledge and awareness of these conflict 
management tools. The development of a web-based Conflict Management Toolbox for 
fisheries would provide opportunity for stakeholders to access tools and approaches to deal 
with conflict. The Conflict Management Toolbox would be similar in context to the Citizen 
Science Toolbox developed by the Coastal CRC in 2003, which offers free advice on 
appropriate stakeholder engagement mechanisms. 927 
The Conflict Management Toolbox would be a free resource for fisheries stakeholders, 
including managers and scientists, conservation interests and the general public, in dealing 
with potential and actual conflicts involving fisheries in Australia. In this respect, it offers 
potential to voluntarily enhance coordination within the fishery, with other fisheries and gear 
types, or with others sectoral interests. The website would list the fill range of tools and 
approaches to conflict management as they apply to fisheries, giving clear examples of 
application and relationship to current management practices. It would also provide 
recommendations on the best tools to use for a given conflict, based on information provided 
by the website user. This information could include: the budget; the number of parties 
involved; the location of disputant parties; the complexity of the dispute; if confidentiality is 
to be maintained; if parties want direct negotiations; if parties want an ongoing relationship; 
and whether there is a need for binding resolution. 928 The website would provide the public 
opportunity to openly discuss concerns with the industry through internet chat rooms. It 
would also be a valuable resource for managers and fishers through weekly or monthly news 
postings with respect to the resolution of particular fisheries conflicts, thus providing 
learning through set precedent for future management decisions. 
Introduction of a Conflict Management Toolbox would demonstrate confidence in the 
industry to efficiently deal with their own disputes and is likely to -take the onus off 
Coastal CRC. (2003). "Citizen Science Toolbox." http://www.coastal.crc.org.au/toolboxlindex.asp  
[Access date: 20 June 2004]. 
928 Fels, A. (1999). "The Growing Importance of Conflict Management." Canberra Bulletin ofFublic 
Administration, 92: 21-23. 
239 
CHAPTER 7: THE TOOLBOX 
government to mediate conflicts between resource users, so that they can concentrate their 
efforts on the ESD management of the resource. It also offers significant benefit in the 
developmental stage, when all existent and potential conflicts would be identified. This 
would give fisheries managers some clear insights into the potential risks and conflicts they 
may encounter in the future. The risk in establishing a free voluntary resource is that it will 
not be utilised enough lobe economically viable. However, if it is successfully marketed 
such that just one conflict can be resolved outside the judicial system and relations between 
any stakeholders are improved, then it will arguably offer great benefit to the overall 
management system. 
7.4 Institutional tools 
To achieve the integration of management and the ecosystem-based management of our 
oceans, it is important that we establish the appropriate governance arrangements to deliver 
these outcomes, rather than modifying the outcomes to fit existing governance arrangements. 
Change of this magnitude is often difficult to achieve because of vested interests within 
Commonwealth, state and local governments and departments, private interests that benefit 
from the status quo and an often over-consulted community that are tired and cynical of 
change for the sake of change. 929  Often, opposition within government to change from the 
status quo stems from inadequate staff training or an unwillingness for key individuals or 
agencies as a whole to endorse such structural change . 930  However, just designing 
integrative institutional arrangements will not induce change within itself. The instrument of 
change is also required, whether that be new policy, legislation or a new approach to 
planning and management. 
Do current integrated oceans management/fisheries management institutional arrangements 
address the issues of integration (cross-jurisdictional / cross-sectoral / intra-sectoral) and 
conflict management? 
Cross-jurisdictional integration is currently being addressed through the MACC's IOMWG 
of the NIRMMC. However, this integration is limited cross-sectorally by the inclusion of 
only a few relevant ministers charged with oceans-related issues in each jurisdiction, an issue 
somewhat overcome by the inclusion of other Ministerial Council representatives. There is 
the capacity for current oceans management to address cross-seetoral issues through the 
NOMB at the senior decision-making level. This capacity, however, wanes towards the 
929 Graham, B. (2002). "Governance and Development in the Coastal Zone: The Resource Assessment 
Commission Coastal Zone Inquiry 10 years on." Proceedings of the Coast to Coast 2002 
Conference. 4-8 November 2002. Tweed Heads, NSW: Coastal CRC: 121-124. 
http://www.coastal.crc.org.aulcoast2coast2002/proceedings/Theme2/Governance-Development-
Coastal-Zone.pdf [Access date: 31 May 2004]. 
Middle (2004): 11. 
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more operational level and does not include cross-jurisdictional decision-makers in anything 
other than an advisory capacity. Some proposals for institutional arrangements to support 
efficient implementation of integrated oceans management inclusive of and highlighting 
some effective conflict management provisions are presented in this section. 
Cross-jurisdictional integration of Australian fisheries occurs through the AFMF. This 
forum includes all relevant Australian fisheries agency managers, and is therefore well suited 
to address cross-jurisdictional issues. Cross-sectoral integration of Commonwealth fisheries 
with other sectors is being addressed by the broadening membership of relevant MACs to 
include other interests, such as conservation interests. However, limitations pertain to the 
number-of members allowed and the relative influence new interests have as they are - 
generally included as observers only. And intra-sectoral integration of Australian fisheries is 
currently proceeding slowly through the RSMWG. As previously discussed, the successful 
implementation of many management or policy mechanisms depends on the efficient 
management of real and potential conflicts. Some alternative proposals for fisheries 
institutional arrangements that address the issue of integration and conflict management are 
proposed in this section. 
7.4.1 An Integrated Oceans Management Inquiry by the Resource Assessment 
Commission 
Conflict management in natural resource management is not a new concept for Australia. In 
the early 1990s the Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) 931 , established under the 
auspices of the Commonwealth's Resource Assessment Commission Act 1989, was hailed as 
a success in offering practical solutions to conflicts between resource users in contentious 
issue areas. The RAC, or a similar body, could be re-instated for the assessment of resource 
use in the oceans in an TOM Inquiry, in line with the RAC's Coastal Zone Inquiry. 
The RAC was 'sidelined' by Paul Keating when he came into power as Australian Prime 
Minister in 1991, as he believed that environmental policy was merely a 'sideshow' to 
economic policy.932 While the RAC completed its final report on Coastal Zone 
Management, it was wound up in 1993. Although it is technically possible to reinstate a 
RAC for an IOM Inquiry, it is a theoretical rather than practical option, given governments' 
preference for the creation of new styles of governance rather than revisiting old styles. 933 
The RAC is included, however, as it provides an example of an institutional tool that could 
address integration. It is capable of addressing environment and development issues, the 
931 The RAC was created to provide autonomous advice to the Prime Minister, on complex and often 
contentious resource use issues of national importance, as referred by the Government. 
932 Haward, M. (2004). UTAS: Personal Communication— 8 June 2004. 
Kaye, S. (2004). Personal Communication - 8 June 2004. 
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management of conflicting resource uses and it reflects an independence in peer review of 
government policy and management. The NOO, as an executive agency, could be seen to 
have adopted a similar assessment role as the RAC 
The RAC also examined impacts of various combinations of uses on resources and the 
environment and as such is not dissimilar to the MSE approach with respect to multiple-use 
management. However, it will still be some time before the MSE approach can be applied to 
the complexities of JOM: 
7.4.2 Ongoing role for the National Oceans Office 
As identified in Chapter 2, the main conflicts with the NOO have arisen from the uncertainty 
surrounding its ongoing role and the extent to which it adds value to management. 934 In this 
section, a number of alternatives are offered for the ongoing role of the NOO after the 
development of RMPs that may provide some security for industry and government agencies 
alike. 
	
7.4.2.1 	Clearing House for Oceans Policy and Legislation 
As discussed in Section 7.1.1, a marine-based policy and legislative "clearing house" would 
be ideally situated in the DPM&C given its role as government policy coordinator. 
However, it is recognised that the NOO has developed the expertise and has been in the 
process of building up a legislative and policy "assessment" of our oceans over the last four 
years. It would therefore make sense for the NOO to retain this role by making it a 
requirement that agencies and governments register any new oceans management related 
legislation or policy with the NOO before implementation. This would put the NOO in a 
better position to advise on integration issues and to pre-empt any potential areas of 
conflicting use. As Australia moves to embrace the states in oceans management and 
planning through the integrated oceans management initiative, it would also be beneficial for 
the NOO to maintain this register inclusive of the states' legislative and policy developments 
to ensure consistency across jurisdictions and to maintain a focus towards integrated oceans 
management. 
7.4.2.2 	Independent Assessment Board for Planning Approvals under a tenure 
allocation regime 
If an Integrated Oceans Management Act were introduced as planning legislation requiring 
application for tenure of ocean uses and activities as proposed in Section 7.2.3, then a role 
934 From interview with subject LX67. 
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for the NOO would be for planning approvals in accordance with the objectives of AOP and 
regional marine planning. The NOO would have the power to approve tenures in 
Commonwealth waters only and by doing so would have the potential to record the 
cumulative impacts on any given bioregion. This would involve the review and amendment 
of current legislative approvals, such as fisheries approvals under the Fisheries Management 
Act 1991, so that they fall under this new legislation. Entrusting this approval system to an 
executive agency such as the NOO would remove planning and management of the oceans 
resources from the direct political influence of any one minister that is apparent in normal 
government departments. The NOO is answerable to five Commonwealth ministers 
involved in oceans management and planning, therefore no one minister should have the 
power to unduly weight decisions on political whims, but rather approvals and planning 
should be made for the ESD objectives of integrated oceans management. 
7.4.2.3 	Monitoring ofRMP implementation - regional offices 
Another proposal for the future of the NOD is for the decentralised regionalisation of its 
office. This would mean that the NOD would comprise a series of regional offices to 
support the implementation and monitoring of each Regional Marine Plan, themselves 
answerable and supported by a central Canberra-based policy coordination office. 935 
Regional offices would help give AOP and RMPs access to a regional voice and local 
communities would be able to see that regional plans are being managed by regional officers. 
With a regular contact point, local communities would gain a sense of ownership of the 
RMPs, potentially leading to reductions in enforcement and compliance expenses. At 
present, in the eyes of many of the public, RMPs are offshore plans run by bureaucrats at 
sometimes great distances from the region concerned, therefore instilling little confidence 
that they actually know or can understand the issues involved: Offshore plans and processes 
are difficult to 'sell' to those directly impacted by decisions let alone the general public. 
Offshore regions are not usually accessed or used by the general public and are not highly 
visible, hence 'out of sight - out of mind'. It is therefore important to give the offshore area 
a visible anchor, such as regional offices where people can access information to remind 
them of the activities that may be affecting them which are out of sight. 
The role of the regional offices would be to monitor the implementation of the RMP for that 
given region using the performance assessment system and to report this information to the 
central Canberra-based office. Regional offices would have the scientific power to 
adequately monitor the region for meeting its operational objectives and would advise the 
central office on recommended management strategies to meet future objectives. To ensure 
From interview with subject LX67. 
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consistency in approach and to take advantage of the potential for policy learning that may 
occur between regions, it is important that regional offices convene on specific issues at least 
annually. This would potentially reduce the learning curve through networking and would 
ensure that a national approach would be taken, although flexibility in which specific 
approach to take is mandatory given the complexities and differences between regions. 
These regional offices could even replace the Regional Integrated Oceans Management 
Advisory Councils (see Section 7.4.5) proposed, to then feed into a Canberra-based national 
policy coordination NOO, which would be answerable at this stage to the NOMB, or 
potentially in the future to the Integrated Oceans Management Ministerial Council (see 
Section 7.4.3). The central Canberra-based policy coordination branch of the NOO is 
imperative to ensure RMPs are adhering to national policies and approaches and to guide 
future plans and directions through the principle of subsidiarity. 
	
7.4.2.4 	Secretariat to the relevant Ministerial Council 
Once RMPs are developed for all Australian waters under AOP and integrated oceans 
management supersedes AOP by embracing the states, the ongoing role of the NOO may be 
as secretariat to the Integrated Oceans Management Ministerial Council (IOMMC - see 
Section 7.4.3), or to the current IOMWG of the NRMMC. As secretariat, the NOO would be 
responsible for coordinating submissions to the relevant Ministerial Council. However, the 
NOO would conceivably be capable of extending its power beyond simply secretariat to also 
proactively coordinate policy and direct management and integration issues related to 
integrated oceans management. The role of secretariat could also be amalgamated with the 
role of policy coordinator as proposed in Section 7.4.2.3. 
7.4.2.5 	Mediator for regional multiple-use management 
Given that multiple-use planning of our offshore marine regions is not likely in the near 
future, one potential ongoing role for the NOO could be as a mediator for random localised 
multiple-use management, as in the Otways case study. Instead of planning for multiple use 
for the whole region, conflicts between users could be referred to the NOO for resolution as 
and when they arise. There are advantages and disadvantages to having an independent 
mediator. Many stakeholders will dismiss the "interference" of a third party such as the 
NOO because of a lack of knowledge and experience with sometimes deep seated and 
protracted issues of conflict. If there is along history between conflicting users, there is 
often a belief that any thitd party will not understand the full context of the argument and 
may inadvertently dismiss one part or the other. The other side of the argument for an 
independent mediator is that often deep seated conflicts need fresh minds to divert conflict 
244 
CHAPTER 7: THE TOOLBOX 
away from what parties want and refocus them on what they collectively need. Often in 
doing this, parties will find that they have commonalities and can resolve the issues 
themselves after all. The NOO would be a good independent mediator to these conflicts as 
they have developed a sound understanding of the range of issues through regional marine 
planning and would be able to focus conflicts to adhere to AOP and RMPs. To successfully 
achieve in this role, however, they would require mediation training, something which they 
are currently lacking and a fact that is well noted by reluctant stakeholders to this process. 
7.4.3 An Integrated Oceans Management Ministerial Council 
At present, IOM issues are addressed by the IOMWG of the MACC, which is a joint 
committee of the NRMMC and the Primary Industries Ministerial Council (PIMC). The 
NRMMC comprises ministers of the crown to promote the conservation and sustainable use 
ofAustralia 's natural resources 936, but only includes the Commonwealth Minister for 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the Minister for Environment and Heritage. The 
PIMC comprises ministers of the crown to develop and promote sustainable, innovative and 
profitable agriculture, fisheries/a quaculture, and food and forestry industries937 , but only 
includes the Commonwealth Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. Australia's 
Oceans Policy and regional marine planning are the responsibility of the NOMB comprising 
five Commonwealth Ministers responsible for the environment (chair), industry, resources, 
fisheries, science, tourism and shipping. 938 Evidently, integrated oceans management issues 
are becoming increasingly "cross-cutting" and do not fit the traditional ministerial boxes that 
currently contain oceans management issues. 939 In terms of Commonwealth decision-
making, cross-sectoral integration is not adequately met in the current TOM framework and 
cross-jurisdictional integration is not adequately met in the current AOP framework. 
Integration of AOP and IOM requires that TOM issues are also addressed by the Ministers of 
the NOMB. 
A major impediment to the states signing on to a national oceans policy in the first place was 
that there were no state ministers included in the decision-making body, the NOMB. This 
has been somewhat overcome for the states through the development of TOM through the 
936 Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council. (2004). "About the Natural Resource 
Management Ministerial Council (NRMMC)." http://www.mincos.gov.aulabouLnrmmc.htm  
(Access date: 15 June 20041. 
" Primary Industries Ministerial Council. (2003). "About the Primary Industries Ministerial Council 
(PIMC)." http://www.mincos.gov.aulabouLpimc.htin [Access date: 15 June 2004]. 
938 Bergin, A. and Haward, M. (1999). "Current Legal Developments: Australia." The International 
Journal ofMarine and Coastal Law, 14: 387-398; and 
Commonwealth of Australia. (2003). "Oceans Policy: Principles and Processes." Hobart: National 
Oceans Office: 9. 
139 Peters, B.G. (1998). "Managing Horizontal Government The Politics of Co-ordination." Public 
Administration, 76 (Summer): 295-311. 
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MACC, which involves relevant state ministers and departmental heads. However, 
membership is limited to those involved in natural resource management and primary 
industry issues. The example of the Commonwealth AOP process has clearly indicated that 
true cross-sectoral integration within jurisdictions will require that a broader membership be 
incorporated and should thus apply also to the states 
To overcome limitations of the current regime, it is proposed that an Integrated Oceans 
Management Ministerial Council (IOMMC) be established, reflecting the original proposal 
by the Ministerial Advisory Group on Oceans Policy in 1998.14'  The IOMMC would include 
Commonwealth ministers of the NOMB and all relevant state ministers. Relevant state 
ministers would, as in the development of AOP, include those responsible for environment, 
industry, resources, fisheries, science; tourism and shipping in each jurisdiction. It is 
recognised that the current COAG guidelines presumes against the creation of new 
Ministerial Councils. 94 ' However, it is questionable how effective IOM will be through a 
Working Group (the IOMWG) of ajoint Committee (the MACC) that is not even 
responsible to all the ministers involved in oceans planning and management at the 
Commonwealth level (the NOMB). If Australia is serious about the ecologically sustainable 
development and conservation of our oceans, perhaps there needs to be a greater 
commitment to facilitated consultation and cooperation between governments, to develop 
policy jointly and to take joint action in the resolution of issues with respect to national 
cross-seetoral and cross-jurisdictional integrated oceans management. 942 
940 Environment Australia. (1998). "Australia's Oceans Policy." Report of the Ministerial Advisory 
Group on Oceans Policy. March 1998; and 
See Figure 9 for a proposed IOM Institutional structure. 
94' Agreed to by COAG on 8 June 2001: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. (2002). 
"Commonwealth-State Ministerial Councils - A Compendium." Canberra: DPM&C. June 2002: 6. 
2 Ibid: 1. 
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7.4.4 Department of the Oceans 
To overcome traditional sectoral management boundaries and work towards the practical 
implementation of ecosystem-based management, a Department of the Oceans (DOO) could 
be established. Given the complexity and enormity of the role such a department would 
need to play, there are several options for implementation. 
The first option would be for the DOO to be answerable to the NOMB as the formal 
mechanism for integrating policy at the most senior level .943  Portfolios of departments 
currently associated with and involved in AOP development and implementation would be 
amalgamated under the umbrella of the DOO. This would enhance policy cohesion towards 
the ecosystem-based management objectives of AOP by streamlining processes by reducing 
the number of individual departmental checks and by reducing the capacity for competing 
interests at the departmental level. 944 Conflicts between sectors would need to be resolved at 
the departmental level to meet the overarching departmental objectives for integration, rather 
than at the senior ministerial level that may be swayed by the politics of the day.945 It would. 
potentially reduce the inefficiencies of attempting to integrate several, often conflicting, 
departmental objectives with respect to oceanic resource use. Amalgamation has the 
potential to produce better policies, but there is also the risk that policy options will be 
limited due to the lack of competition. The 1987 public service amalgamations showed the 
negative risks to be slight and that the amalgamation of 27 to 16 departments proved 
effective in increasing interdepartmental efficiencies and more cohesive policy coordination, 
even though these benefits were practically slower than expected to realise. 946 A DOO 
would have relatively slow realising benefits due to the seeming opposing nature of the 
objectives of some sectors involved (for example, the petroleum industry and conservation). 
However, by working towards the ecologically sustainable development of our oceans taking 
in ecosystem-based management principles, the DOO should prove to break down traditional 
sectoral barriers and coordinate resource use more effectively than across separate 
departments with often polarized mandates. In a sense, this would be a forced type of 
conflict resolution. 
113 Craswell, E. and Davis, G. (1993). "Does the Amalgamation of Government Agencies Produce 
Better Policy Coordination?" In: Weller, P. Forster, J. and Davis, G. (eds). Reforming the Public 
Service - Lessons from recent experience. Queensland: Centre for Australian Public Sector 
Management: 180-207; and 
See Figure 9 for a proposed IOM Institutional structure. 
Craswell and Davis (1993). 
141 Ibid. 
946 Ibid. 
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A second option is for the DOO to be answerable to an overarching Minister for Oceans, 
supported by a sweep of junior sectoral ministers. This framework would allow for the 
current sectoral arrangements to continue as separate branches of the overall department, 
each answerable to a junior sectoral minister, working towards the same overarching goal of 
ESI) to maintain marine ecosystem health and viable industries. This framework would rely 
on a combination of formal senior level approaches with more informal mechanisms such as 
the use of policy networks to aid interagency coordination under the oceans management 
umbrella. Branch separation would ensure that intra-sectoral integration is maintained and 
effectual, whilst working to a Minister for Oceans would give the Minister a broad view of 
the issues, free of politically sectoral ties (as with the junior ministers), so as to maintain 
cross-sectoral integration and to prevent inconsistencies between branch mandates. 
7.4.5 Integrated Oceans Management Advisory Councils 947 
Instrumental change and advancements with respect to the integrated management of our 
oceans are not uncommon in Australia. What is becoming more evident however, is the 
need for institutional change to overcome the present jurisdictional and sectoral constraints 
that are hindering the effective implementation of these reforming policies and approaches. 
Not dissimilar to the WCVIAMB, Integrated Oceans Management Advisory Councils 
(IOMACs) are one possible means for addressing the need for practical integrated oceans 
management. IOMACs would be responsible for advising on the ecologically sustainable 
development of bioregions in accordance with ecosystem-based management principles, 
within large marine ecosystems, similar to those identified in AOP but inclusive of state and 
coastal waters as well. IOMACs would be linked to national policies, such as an IOM 
National Policy and a National Coastal Policy, by the principle of subsidiarity. 948 
Each IOMAC would comprise a representative sample of the interests in the bioregion of 
concern. These interests would include cultural, economic, social, conservation, scientific 
and public good interests through representative government. The exact composition would 
vary according to the bioregion and some IOMACs would cover several bioregions 
depending on the similarity of the interests involved. The number of bioregions requiring 
IOMACs could prove quite cumbersome, therefore the number of IOMACs in each Region 
would need to be limited. A compromise must be reached between managing too many 
This section has been adapted from the following paper by the author, with permission from the co-
author (see Appendix One for signed permission forms): 
Foster, E.G. and Haward, M. (2003). "Integrated Management Councils. A Conceptual Model for 
Ocean Policy Conflict Management in Australia." Ocean & Coastal Management, 46: 547-563. 
948 See Figure 9 for a proposed IOM Institutional structure. 
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small areas independently, which can lead to "the tyranny of small decisions"949 , and the 
difficulties of effectively managing large areas at the operational level. - 
A typical council would comprise at least two representatives of each of the federal, state 
and, where applicable, local governments as well as at least one indigenous representative. 
At least two representatives of each level of government are required in recognition of the 
fact that there may in fact be several departments involved in the management of the 
bioregion. This could be simplified, at least at the Commonwealth level, through the 
establishment of a DOO (see Section 7.4.4) from which federal representation could be 
provided. Other non-government interest groups include, amongst others: fisheries; oil and 
gas; conservation; tourism; transport and shipping; and the general public. Although the size 
of IOMACs would reflect the complexity of the bioregion, for procedural management it is 
reasonable to expect that non-government membership should not exceed ten representatives 
and that no more than one-third of these should be representative of any one interest group. 
This would eliminate the possibility of domination by any one interest group that might lead 
to intimidation, hence would thwart the process. Members would select a non-government 
chair in annual rotation with at least biannual meetings. Funding would be primarily from 
the three levels of government according to their jurisdictional responsibilities with perhaps 
a minor contribution from non-government representative groups. To ensure a sense of 
equality, all non-government groups should have to raise a nominal fee for participation, 
which could obviously be waived on consensus by the IOMAC involved, or governments 
could provide some form of grant scheme to assist representative stakeholder groups be 
involved. 
The broad objective for IOMACs would be: 
To allocate ocean resources to a mix of uses and monitor these uses (including 
direct, indirect and cumulative impacts on the ecosystem) within a planning area that 
offers the greatest long-term community benefits (taking economic, environmental, 
social and cultural values into account) compatible with maintaining the ecosystem 
health and sustaining viable industries. 950 
With this overarching objective in mind, JOMACs would be responsible for providing advice 
on whether current Commonwealth, state/territory and national policies and regulations meet 
the conservation and sustainable development objectives for the bioregion and for providing 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts. (1991). 
"The injured coastline." Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service: 46. 
950 Adapted from: 
Commonwealth of Australia. (1998). "Australia's Oceans Policy." Canberra: Environment 
Australia: 37. 
250 
CHAPTER 7: THE TOOLBOX 
advice on the future needs of the bioregion to meet these objectives, in terms of management 
and research requirements. Given the often complex and financially demanding nature of 
monitoring and compliance, any advice given would be limited to anecdotal or qualitative 
advice with scientists and management agencies retaining responsibility for quantitative 
monitoring. IOMACs would also be responsible for providing advice on the functionality of 
various management strategies and potential future management responses. At regular 
intervals (biannually) the chairs of each IOMAC in each large marine ecosystem region (for 
example, the South-east Region) would meet to discuss cross-bioregional issues. This 
Regional IOMAC would also be responsible for determining any issues to be taken forward 
to the relevant national decision-making body, in this case envisioned as an IOM Committee 
of the IOMMC (see Section 7.4.3), and for acting as liaison between IOMACs and the 
national IOM Committee by providing reports to the IOM Committee pending decision and 
passing on decisions and guidance from the IOM Committee to the individual IOMACs. 95 ' 
The IOM Committee would be responsible for maintaining a national approach to integrated 
oceans management and for guiding Regional IOMACs towards this end. 
IOMACs would be advisory in nature, but much like the fisheries MACs, their 'power' 
would be held in the inclusive consensus voting approach to deliberations. A consensus-
based approach to decision-making would ensure a sense of ownership by all members as 
long as IOMACs work towards effective decisions rather than lowest common denominator 
approaches. The inclusion of local, state and federal government representatives, who can 
drive change in their constituencies to the decision-making forum and would be bound to act 
on decisions of the IOMACs to ensure they retain legitimacy  and reflect responsiveness to 
local needs, also adds considerable 'power' to these bodies. Also not dissimilar to fishery 
MAC's advice to the AFMA Board, should advice from an IOMAC be rejected by the IOM 
Committee, the reasons for such rejection must be clearly presented to the IOMAC in 
question. 
One of the greatest limitations of JOMACs would be reluctance of government and other 
management agencies to cede any responsibility to such bodies for fear of losing control or 
due to a lack of confidence in the ability of the IOMAC to adequately address pertinent 
issues .952  Governments are also reluctant to entertain the concept of devolving decision-
making power to any regional body as this involves handing over expenditure allowances 
and expenditure of public money cannot be made by any body other that the government 
entrusted with it on behalf of the Australian public, hence IOMACs would have to be 
95' See Figure 9 for a proposed IOM Institutional structure. 
952 Cassells, D.S. and Valentine, P.S. (1988). "From conflict to consensus - towards a framework for 
community control of the public forests and wildiands." Australian Forestry, 51 (1): 47-56; and 
From interview with subject ZA9 1. 
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advisory in nature. 953  These are legitimate concerns, but can be addressed by focusing the 
role of government agencies on national and state coordination and compliance rather than 
local level planning. IOMACs would focus on the strategic management and monitoring of 
bioregions, whilst strategic management would remain the responsibility of the applicable 
department or agency. Another drawback with the establishment of JOMACs is that there is 
a risk of effort shift towards legislation of these integrated bodies while integration is still 
being defined, but there is a distinct need for a harder line in the future as these issues are 
worked through, especially with respect to compliance and enforcement. 954 
7.4.6 Regional Fisheries Advisory Councils and the National Fisheries 
Allocation Board 
Overarching management plans for regional fisheries need to be developed outside the 
AFMA process, which is predominantly a commercial fisheries allocation and management 
process. Integration under the SERMP indicates that fisheries should be better preparing 
themselves with a unified voice in the emerging integrated oceans management process. The 
establishment of Regional Fisheries Advisory Councils, in line with the large marine 
ecosystem model of regionalisation, is one possible means for advancing intra-sectoral 
integration and aiding conflict management in Australian fisheries. For example, a Southern 
Regional Fisheries Advisory Council (SRFAC) could be established covering the area of the 
AFMA's Southern Region Fisheries, which coincides with the SERMP. 955 The SRFAC 
would comprise of representative of each of four committees. These committees would be: 
• the Southern Commercial Fisheries Advisory Committee (SoCFAC) - including 
MACs with jurisdiction in the South-east RMP area - such as the SESSFMAC - 
which includes the SETMAC, GABTMAC and GHATMAC - to advise the AFMA 
Board on the allocation of the commercial TAC between relevant commercial 
fisheries in the SESSF (that is, maintain its current role) - the SoCFAC would advise 
the SRFAC on commercial allocation issues/needs and management arrangements in 
the South-east; 
• the Southern Recreational Fisheries Advisory Committee (SReFAC) - including 
recreational fishers and/or representatives in the South-east - to advise the SRFAC 
on recreational allocation issues/needs and management arrangements in the South-
east with respect to each commercially fished species; 
• the Southern Indigenous Fisheries Advisory Committee (SIFAC) - including 
traditional indigenous consultation between affected indigenous communities - 
" From interviews with subject NT49 and ZA9 1. 
954 TFG International. (2002). "Review of the Implementation of Oceans Policy." Final Report. 25 
October 2002. 
See Figure 10 for a proposed integrated Fisheries Management Institutional structure. 
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would advise the SRFAC on indigenous allocation issues and cultural needs in the 
South-east with respect to each commercially fished species; and 
• the Southern Aquaculture Fisheries Advisory Committee (SAFAC) - including any 
aquaculture representatives in the South-east - to advise the SRFAC on aquaculture 
interests and allocation issues in the South East with respect to eacheommercially 
fished species. 
The SRFAC would comprise: a Government Chair (DAFF) to ensure Government policy 
and legislation with respect to resource sharing are adhered to; a nominated representative of 
SESSFMAC representing commercial interests; a nominated representative of SReFAC 
representing recreational interests; a nominated representative of SIFAC representing 
indigenous interests; and a nominated representative of SAFAC representing aquaculture 
interests. Amongst other objectives, the primary objective of the SRFAC would be to advise 
the National Fisheries Allocation Board (see below) on an overarching management plan, 
including the allocation of a global TAC and the relevant distribution to each sector. 956 
Other roles of the SRFAC would include: dispute resolution; producing annual performance 
reports to determine if the objectives of the overall management plans have been achieved; 
and advising the South-east Integrated Oceans Management Advisory Council (see Section 
7.4.5) on pertinent fisheries issues in the South-east. 
The National Fisheries Allocation Board (NFAB) would include nominated representatives 
of all the Regional Fisheries Advisory Councils (RFACs). The NFAB 's primary objective 
would be to ensure national consistency and to approve, based on recommendations from the 
RFACs, the set intra-sectoral allocations for each fishery and to approve the overarching 
management plans for submission to the Minister for Fisheries. The Minister for Fisheries 
would have the ultimate power of veto, but like the AFMA Board, the NFAB would operate 
as an independent decision-making authority. 
956 See Figure 10 for a proposed integrated Fisheries Management Institutional structure. 
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7.4.7 Regional Fisheries Management Forums 
The Australian Fisheries Management Forum (AFMF) comprises the CEO or Director of all 
Australia's fisheries management agencies. Other agencies, such as BRS, CSIRO, and EA, 
can progress issues through the sub-committees of the AFMF. The AFMF's purpose is to: 
provide a mechanism to support the development of new Ministerial Council and 
Standing Committee arrangements for fisheries, aquaculture and related matters; 
provide a regular forum for discussion of issues and policies relevant to the group - 
national fisheries issues - and to resolve any contentious issues possible; 
support and give accountability to fisheries related committees, such as the Research 
sub-committee, the Compliance sub-committee, the Aquaculture sub-committee and 
the Environment and Health sub-committee; and 
provide a process for key issues to be forwarded to the Standing 
Committee/Ministerial Council.957 
The AFMF is not a formal part of the MACC/Standing Committee/Ministerial Council 
structure, but it does informally feed into the MACC and the cross membership between the 
AFMF and the MACC facilitates the profile of fisheries issues through the Ministerial 
Council level .958  If a new JOMMC were formed, it would make sense that the AFMF would 
then feed into this body instead through the appropriate committee, such as an Industry 
Development Committee and also to the NFAB. 
To assist the implementation of regional fisheries management, it would be beneficial to 
have Regional Fisheries Mariagement Forums, which are subsets of the AFMF. For 
example, in the south, the Southern Fisheries Management Forum (SFMF) would comprise 
CEOs or Directors of Southern Australian fisheries agencies, including the Commonwealth, 
South Australia, Tasmania, NSW and Victoria. This provides an avenue for valuable cross-
jurisdictional integration of fisheries issues at the regional level, such as integration of the 
SESSF Plan with southern state fisheries and recreational fisheries plans and other OCS 
arrangements, and a significant avenue in to the Ministerial Council level though the 
AFMF. Being an informal process, it provides an opportunity for the resolution of 
contentious issues between jurisdictions without the need for formal adjudication processes. 
" AFMF Meeting 1. "Terms of Reference and Objectives." NSW: Sydney. 12 February 2002. 
Agenda Item 4. 
958 AFMF Meeting 1. "Operational Structure of AFMF." NSW: Sydney. 12 February 2002. Agenda 
Item 5. 
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7.4.8 Fisheries Interdepartmental Committee 
Integration, as raised in the RMP process, could be enhanced by the establishment of a 
coordinating body, such as a Fisheries Interdepartmental Committee (FIDC) that deals with 
fisheries under the EPBC Act, MPAs, RIVIP, Bycatch Policies and the National Coastal 
Policy. A FIDC would be beneficial in coordinating simple things like definitions, but also 
to ensure that fisheries are not excessively scrutinized by different departments under the 
changing legislative and policy frameworks of the Government. There is an opportunity to 
assess all the requirements of fisheries and to work towards a comprehensive reporting 
process that would provide consistency of approach for at least some elements of these 
frameworks to minimise duplication. For instance, it would be useful to coordinate the 
descriptive elements of the strategic assessments carried out under the EPBC Act with the 
descriptive elements of fisheries assessments required for international environmental 
accreditation (such as for Marine Stewardship Council certification) to avoid duplication of 
effort down track. These coordination measures happen on a bilateral, or even multi-lateral 
basis in some cases, but coordination across the full sweep of fisheries regulations and 
arrangements is unlikely without such a body in place. The establishment of an annual 
Australian Fisheries and Seafood Forum 959  is a positive step towards this end, however, the 
scope of this forum and its membership and the extensive time between meetings would 
indicate that it could not meet the immediate needs of dynamic integrated fisheries 
management. 
7.4.9 Fishing Industry Policy Council 
The Fisheries Administration Act 1991 clearly identifies the objectives, functions and 
establishment guidelines for a Fishing Industry Policy Council (FIPC). Whilst this body has 
not yet been formed, there is an increasing need to execute such a body. As outlined in the 
legislation, this body would comprise commercial, recreational, environmental, research, 
government and any other representatives connected to the industry as determined by the 
Minister. 960  It has the potential to facilitate an exchange of views between all those 
interested in the industry, hence to develop a unified approach to matters affecting the 
industry and thus forms the basis for effective proactive internal conflict management within 
the industry and external with environment and research interests. 961  It seems that as we 
move into the realm of resource allocation between sectors and increased environmental 
scrutiny, a body such as this would be beneficial pre-empting some of the angst caused by 
conflicting demands of different sectors on the industry and effectively forewarning the 
AFFA (2003) "Looking to the Future...": 40. 
960 Fisheries Administration Act 1991 (Cwlth), s102 (1). 
96!  Fisheries Administration Act 1991 (Cwlth), s97. 
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Minister to these potential conflicts, whilst giving industry the opportunity of having a direct 
link to the Minister other than through the AEMA or DAFF. As an inclusive body, it has the 
potential to act as an advisory body to the National Allocation Board proposed above to 
ensure the legitimacy of the RFAC, or even in place of this body, should the representation 
be appropriate (see Section 7.4.6). A direct link to the Minister would be sure to give the 
industry a better sense of ownership and confidence in the management process. However, 
the thaw back from using such a body is that it is ministerially appointed and this may in 
itself instil some suspicion in stakeholders as to the independence and unfettered advice that 
may culminate. It is recognised that the AFMA Board has become the major conduit 
between industry and government, but it is limited in its scope and the industry has lost some 
confidence in the AFMA over the years. 
7.4,10 Fisheries Management Advisory Committee Reform 
The SERMP alludes to the fact that the expertise of MAC members should cover all key 
stakeholders in the fishery. In part, this is addressed in the Fisheries Management Paper 
(FMP) No.1 through the inclusion of all relevant areas of expertise in membership of the 
MACs. However, the numbers are limited and membership is only semi-flexible through the 
allowance of Permanent Observers. Permanent Observers, however, must go through the 
cumbersome bureaucratic approvals process, as occurred with the approval of EA (now 
DEH) as  Permanent Observer. It is also a little naive to think that if the issues facing the 
fishery are predominantly to do with research at the time, that more research members would 
be appointed taking over any industry member's places. The fact is that industry 
membership is very unlikely to reduce in numbers to open up space for other interests. 
Therefore, if the MACs were to become more representative of expertise covering all 
stakeholders, perhaps a change in the legislative number of members needs to be addressed. 
To avoid members taking on an advocacy role, a change to the reference of individual 
members should mean that all members are referred to as SBTMAC members (for example), 
instead of specific reference to industry members, conservation members, etc. This would 
do away with the connotations of representativeness that exists at present. 
There is also possibility for a stakeholder reference group to convene external to each MAC, 
with the objective of providing advice to the MACs where appropriate. This should be a pre-
determined group of representatives that are 'on-call' to convene at the MAC's will, but no 
more often than MACs are convened. This group should be representative of the 
stakeholders involved in the fishery rather than expertise-based, therefore offering all 
stakeholder groups a voice in management decisions via the expertise-based MACs that 
would ultimately pass on advice to the AFMA Board. A nominated representative of these 
stakeholder reference groups should be a Permanent Observer on the MACs. 
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Where consensus cannot be reached by reasonable and mature debate, instead of passing the 
onus onto the AFMA Board to determine  the overall feeling of the MAC from Minutes and 
the Chair's Summary, perhaps a further formalised conflict management process should be 
implemented. This could be through the use of an independent facilitator, such as the 
Executive Officer or an AFMA employee unrelated to the fishery. To avoid prolonged 
discussion, parties would be required to reach a mutual agreement with the help of the 
facilitator in a set time frame to present to the AFMA Board along with the full record of 
discussions. Another alternative would be to record all discussions clearly but as a last 
alternative, indicate support for arguments by show of hands. This approach runs against 
AFMA's current policy and as such would require a change to the FMP No. 1. Yet another 
option would be to provide the AFMA Board with a set of decision rules that would satisfy 
all concerns of MAC members. This would not only offer the Board a substantial picture of 
discussions within the MAC, but would provide a constructive way forward for the Board 
should they chose to accept the recommendations. 
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7.5 Summary 
The thesis aimed to identify tools and approaches for the efficient implementation of 
fisheries management under the guise of regional marine planning. Building on the 
information gathered with respect to international and national advances in natural resource 
management towards integration, including conflict managenient techniques, this chapter 
provided some insights into alternative approaches that may be adopted in Australian 
fisheries and integrated oceans planning and management. It was found that while 
instrumental oceans management appears to embrace the concept of integration and conflict 
management through inclusive processes, institutional arrangements at the operational level 
have been slow to realise. A variation on the concept of multiple-use zoning has been 
revisited as well as some institutional changes, including the development of an Integrated 
Oceans Management Ministerial Council that reflects the current move towards cross-
jurisdictional integrated oceans management, and complementary proposals, including the 
development of Regional Integrated Oceans Management Advisory Councils, designed for 
the operatioriâl implementation of integrated RMPs. 
Fisheries have been relatively focused on internal commercial conflicts between gear users 
and between commercial fisheries. In light of the ecosystem-based management objectives 
under the National ESD Strategy, strategic assessments under the EPC Act and integrated 
management obligations under the SERMP, fisheries have moved to address broader issues 
of integration such as intra-sectoral integration with recreational and indigenous fishers and 
at least coordination with other sectors such as petroleum and conservation. Some regional 
approaches to management, such as the development of regional OCS arrangements and 
overarching fisheries management plans, have been proposed along with some institutional 
arrangements to better address cross-sectoral integration in the context of the SERMP, 
including the establishment of Regional Fisheries Advisory Councils. Participative 
processes are highlighted as the greatest tool for conflict management, however, alternative 
dispute resolution techniques and training are also prioritised as valuable to expedite conflict 
resolution processes. The identification of these processes and improved accessibility to 
industry are proposed through the development of a Conflict Management Toolbox website. 
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8.1 Introduction 
This thesis examined key issues affecting the implementation of fisheries management 
within Regional Marine Plans (RMP) under Australia's Oceans Policy (AOP), with a 
specific focus on the South-East Regional Marine Plan (SERMP). Two key issues were 
identified. The first was operationalising the concept of integration with respect to fisheries 
and oceans management. The concept of integration is potentially nebulous. This thesis 
distinguishes between, and separates, cross-jurisdictional, cross-sectoral and intra-sectoral 
integration. The second issue was the importance of advanced conflict management 
techniques in the implementation of integrated management. Conflict is viewed as an 
indicator of a healthy and 'democratic' system of decision-making that can bring positive 
change if well managed. This thesis explores alternative approaches used in conflict 
management and identifies means to transform inhererit conflicts in fisheries and oceans 
management from negative into positive action. 
8.2 Integration in Australia's oceans management 
This thesis argues that the delineation of Commonwealth and state jurisdiction in Australia, 
coupled with a traditionally sector-based management system, suggests that Australia is 
unlikely to achieve integration at the higher levels of the Policy Integration Scale (PIS). 
AOP and regional marine planning have arguably raised the cross-sectoral integration 
capacity of the Commonwealth, with respect to oceans management, as high as it will go 
(approximately Level 5 on the PIS). Enhanced integration beyond this will require a 
restructuring of the federal governance system away from traditional sectoral-based 
management towards a more ecosystem-based framework. The Integrated Oceans 
Management (TOM) initiative is also increasing the capacity for cross-jurisdictional 
integration, but will be unlikely to achieve any high levels of integration under the current 
federal system (currently around aLevel 3 on the P15). It is unlikely that states/territories 
would ever concede to change the Australian Constitution, therefore the cross-jurisdictional 
capacity of Australia's oceans will always be constrained to Offshore Constitutional 
Settlement (OCS) style arrangements and nationally agreed guidelines. Integration in oceans 
management occurs at high level policy planning and development. There has been minimal 
reference to the practical implementation issues in the SERMP to ensure that the objectives 
of AOP and broader TOM will be met through ongoing management measures. This thesis 
proposes some practical implementation approaches to ecosystem-based management (see 
Section 8.5 for a summary of these proposals). 
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8.3 Australia's fisheries management 
Australian fisheries are increasingly moving from input to output control systems. For 
instance, the granting of Statutory Fishing Rights and quota-based management are coining 
into force in the SESS Fishery in 2005. This will enable market-based control of the 
integrated fishery, with a greater onus on the fisher to maintain the integrity of the ecosystem 
and its functioning. This thesis argues that, based on international experience with this type 
of system, market-based approaches are only effective in the long-term if coupled with other 
societal-based approaches. It is therefore recommended that in implementing market-based 
approaches, Australia also maintains its fisheries co-management system, to meet the social 
and environmental aspirations of Australia's fisheries management. 
Intra-sectoral fisheries integration is needed to adequately meet the ecosystem-based 
management objectives of AOP. As such, resource sharing allocation between fisheries 
resource users, such as recreational, commercial and indigenous users, is coming to the 
forefront of fisheries policy making in Australia. The lack of practical application of this 
commitment in the SERMP, however, seriously affects the sector's capacity to meet the 
integration objectives of AOP. There is an increasing need for fisheries to build capacity 
from within to integrate management with other sectors, such as conservation and petroleum, 
to meet the demands of ecosystem-based management. There is no easy solution to resource 
sharing and conflicts are manifest in some fisheries. This thesis proposes some ways to 
advance ecosystem-based management with respect to Australia's fisheries and the 
integrative objectives of the SERMP (see Section 8.5 for a summary of these proposals). 
8.4 International experience and other natural resource 
management models 
The arguments of this thesis are based on an examination of international approaches and 
other natural resource management models, from both within Australia and abroad. 
Examination of international developments in fisheries and oceans policy reveals Australia's 
foresight in proactive oceans planning and management and leadership with respect to 
fisheries co-management. This foresight, however, brings with it many pressures and 
uncertainties. There are a number of examples from other countries that provide 
opportunities for analysis and 'lesson drawing'. The most relevant example may be that of 
Canada, which has a similar governance structure (despite fundamentally different 
constitutional division of powers over fisheries and oceans) and has also embarked on a 
national approach to oceans planning and management. The failure of USA Regional 
Fisheries Management Councils to meet their cross-sectoral objectives offers other (perhaps 
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even negative) insights into approaches to cross-sectoral fisheries management . 96' New 
Zealand has developed resource-sharing arrangements in fisheries, particularly addressing 
indigenous interests, and privatisation issues, from which Australia can learn. 963 The 
European Union is in the process of establishing Regional Advisory Councils for its fisheries 
resources, which will potentially offer insights into the efficiency of Australian fisheries 
Management Advisory Committees (MACs).9" Iceland offers insights into the long-term 
social issues arising from a predominantly market-based fisheries management system. 965 
Natural resource management models demonstrate the complexities of managing industry 
development whilst maintaining ecosystem integrity. This analysis introduces some of the 
challenges to be expected by fisheries in the implementation of the SERMP. Participative 
processes are highlighted as a key to successful natural resource management, yet most 
models highlight the importance of retaining central control. While the devolution of power 
has been extensively discussed in the literature, practical implementation of such 
arrangements is limited. This is due in part to the reluctance of central authorities to 
relinquish any power, or financial commitments, that they have been vested with on behalf 
of the general public. 
8.5 The Toolbox 
This thesis draws on the research and proposes some tools and approaches for integration 
and conflict management in the implementation of fisheries within regional marine planning. 
These tools are not presented as definitive answers, but rather, as academic contemplation on 
a pressing issue of national significance. These approaches have been separated into 
instrumental and institutional tools, recognising that neither one alone will bring about 
effective change and ajudicious combination is required to achieve the intended outcomes. 
962 Okey, T.A. (2003). "Membership of the eight Regional Fishery Management Councils in the United 
States: are special interests over-represented?" Marine Policy, 27: 193-206. 
963 Annala, J.H. (1996). "New Zealand's ITQ system: have the first eight years been a success or a 
failure?" Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries, 6: 43-62; and 
Batstone, C.J. and Sharp, B.M.H. (1999). "New Zealand's quota management system." Marine 
Policy, 23(2): 177-190. 
" Commission of the European Communities. (2003). 'Proposal for a Council decision establishing 
Regional Advisory Councils under the Common Fisheries Policy." Brussels: COM(2003) 697 final. 
2003/0238 (CNS). 
iubbink, W. and van Vliet, M. (1996). "Market regulation versus co-management? Two 
perspectives on regulating fisheries compared." Marine Policy, 20 (6): 499-516; and 
Eythorsson, E. (2000). "A decade of ITQ-management in Icelandic fisheries: consolidation without 
consensus." Marine Policy, 24: 483492. 
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Some approaches proposed for general policy integration and improved conflict management 
are: 
a Clearing House for Marine Policy and Legislation; 
an Ecologically Sustainable Development Auditor; or 
. mediation training as a matter of process in government to minimise conflict. 
Some instrumental Integrated Oceans Management tools proposed include: 
• a National Integrated Oceans Management Policy; 
• spatial management through Conservation Zoning; 
• an Integrated Oceans Management Act; or 
• semi-privatisation of the Marine Protected Areas process to minimise conflict. 
Some instrumental Fisheries Management tools proposed include: 
regional OCS arrangements; 
overarching intra-sectoral (recreational, commercial, indigenous and aquaculture) 
fisheries management plans; 
• full ESD reporting for Australian fisheries (including social, cultural and economic 
aspects); 
Management Strategy Evaluation as a conflict management tool; 
implementation of a Fisheries Observer Policy; 
development of a Conflict Management Toolbox interactive website. 
To facilitate the implementation of these proposed instrumental tools and for the effective 
implementation of current policies and programs, the following institutional tools are 
proposed: 
• an Integrated Oceans Management Inquiry carried out by a body modelled on the 
former Resource Assessment Commission; 
•. some alternative ongoing roles for the National Oceans Office to either replace their 
current role or enhance aspects of it (including: a clearing house for oceans 
policy/legislation; an independent assessment board under planning legislation; 
regional outreach; secretariat to ministerial councils; or a mediator for multiple-use 
management); 
an Integrated Oceans Management Ministerial Council (IOMMC) incorporating the 
NOMB and relevant state ministers as the decision-makers; 
a Department of the Oceans; 
• Integrated Oceans Management Advisory Councils (IOMAC5) incorporating cross- 
sectoral and cross-jurisdictional interests for regional oceans management; 
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Regional Fisheries Advisory Councils (RFACs) incorporating intra-sectoral interests 
and a National Fisheries Allocation Board (NFAB); 
Regional Fisheries Management Forums (RFMFs) building on the Australian 
Fisheries Management Forum concept; 
establishing a Fisheries Interdepartmental Committee (IDC) to ensure duplication is 
minimised within Government; 
implementing the legislated Fishing Industry Policy Council; or 
• some minor MAC reforms in line with the SERMP and the concept of representative 
versus expertise-based membership. 
8.5 Conclusion 
The material presented in this thesis emphasises that more 'positive' cooperative approaches 
to integrated oceans management and fisheries management are required to meet the 
increasing demands of ecosystem-based management. This means a shift away from the 
'negative' hierarchical models, to a proactive consensual approach to management. If 
managed well and implemented with a judicious combination of instruments and institutional 
arrangements, sectoral management has the potential to effectively meet the ecosystem-
based objectives of AOP and regional marine planning. This thesis also concludes that 
sectors, such as fisheries that are impacted by regional marine planning, need to build 
capacity from within to integrate cross-jurisdictionally, cross-sectorally and intra-sectorally 
to meet the ecosystem-based objectives of AOP. 
AOP and regional marine plahning also provide an opportunity to address traditional sectoral 
conflicts through participatory processes for the effective management of healthy oceans: 
cared for, understood and used wisely for the benefit of all, now and in the future. The 
participatory approach is inclusive of definitive and expectant stakeholders in the 
development of policy and planning processes, and of information exchange with latent 
stakeholders. At present, there are no proposals for ongoing stakeholder participation in 
management and review processes once RMPs are implemented, nor for any formal conflict 
management process between interest groups. Fisheries management mechanisms contain 
similar participatory processes, but are generally limited to an advisory role and/or 
incorporate 'meeting-friendly' stakeholders, who may not be representative. Conflict 
management processes provide an effective means of addressing integration when 
institutional and instrumental integration are constrained by sectoral or jurisdictional 
interests, or philosophical differences. This thesis concludes that conflict management 
approaches need to be made more accessible to all stakeholders through regional marine 
planning and fisheries management processes. 
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